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BARBARIANS AT THE GATES: A POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH PROPOSAL TO RATIONALIZE THE 
LAWS OF WAR
William Bradford1
“And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no rules of war, the former must also suspend their observance of them, 
where they no longer serve to any purpose, and must render every action or encounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first 
aggressors.”2
I. Introduction
A. Humanizing War with Law:  Aspiration
Since the dawn of man,3 war4 has been justified as an object of divine ordination,5 the natural state of 
humanity,6 and a tool in the progressive betterment of character,7 culture,8 and civilization.9  In this hyper-
ideological age tragically symbolized by September 11th, 2001, war, to the dismay of those who hoped 
material transformations might weaken its siren’s call,10 waxes ever more destructive,11 driving efforts to 
abolish force as a moral imperative12 and, less quixotically, to induce compliance with an accreting body 
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 DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPALS OF MORALS 20 (1777).
3
 War is as old as humanity.  See LAWRENCE H. KEELEY, WAR BEFORE CIVILIZATION (2000) (examining 
anthropological research tracing war to before the origin of the human species); Edoisiagbon Aikhionbare, War and Peace in 
Contemporary International Relations: An Empirical Study of the Concept of Intermediacy in International Law and Politics 2 
(1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University) (noting that, in every historical age, war has been admitted 
among the relations between peoples as a legitimate means of protecting rights and settling disputes).
4
 Although the issue of whether an armed conflict is a “war” in the Constitutional sense is relevant under U.S. law, the terms 
“war” and “armed conflict” have become essentially synonymous in international law.  EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 1 (1992).  
Both are employed in reference to the phenomenon of organized violence between contending political communities, whether 
such violence is directed across or within state borders. See L. FREEDMAN, ED., WAR 2 (1994) (defining war as a state of law 
involving a high degree of violence in the relations between organized human groups).
5 See, e.g., ST, AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 392 (G.G. Wash et al, transl. 1958) (contending that, despite its miseries, war is a 
state of affairs of which God approves) (citing Ecclesiastes 3:8)); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Secunda 
Secundae, Question 40 (same); HELMUT VON MOLTKE, STRATEGY (positing that war is an integral aspect of the divine 
ordering of the universe); Darrell Cole, Death Before Dishonor or Dishonor Before Death? Christian Just War, Terrorism, and 
Supreme Emergency, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 98 (2002) (contending that “we fail to be all that we 
are intended by God to be . . . when we refuse to fight just wars[,]” and “soldiers are elevated by God through [war.”). 
6 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 105 (1660) (describing natural condition of mankind as a state of perpetual war of all 
against all—“bellum omnium contra omnes”); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, IL PRINCIPE (1515) (W.K. Marriot transl.) 
(positing war as an evil necessary to the existence of the state); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 306-10 (suggesting
human violence has biological, environmental, and cultural determinants).  Liberation theorists suggested war was the vehicle 
through which “the embittered, the dispossesed, the naked of the earth, the hungry masses yearning to breathe free, express their 
anger, jealousies and pent-up urge to violence.”  JOHN KEEGAN, HISTORY OF WARFARE 56 (1994).  For communist and 
fascists, war was creator and purpose of the state.  See, e.g., BENITO MUSSOLINI, DIZIONARIO ITALIANO (1932) (“War 
alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have courage[.]”).
7 See JOHANN K. BLUNTSCHLI, DES MODERNE KRIEGSRECHT (1866) (stating that “war is an element of the world order 
established by God” which fosters the “noble virtues of man—courage, self-sacrifice, obedience”).
8 See KEEGAN, supra note 5, at 46 (positing that war may be the product of the forceful perpetuation, against resistance, of 
culture, defined as “that great cargo of shared beliefs, values, associations, myths, taboos, imperatives, customs, traditions, 
manners and ways of thought, speech and artistic expression which ballast every society”).
9 See DAVID WELLS, THE WAR MYTH 78 (1967) (noting that 19th century Continentals analogized war to the process of 
national or cultural selection whereby the most fit civilization(s) would survive a contest with lesser civilizations and that this 
relentless war of extermination was essential to human progress); HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL DARWINISM (1857) 
(describing war as the means through which “the ethical health of nations is maintained”).
10 See KEEGAN, supra note 5, at 58 (examining “(e)xpectations that . . . rising living standards, literacy, scientific medicine, the 
spread of social welfare” would trigger the arrival of effective anti-warmaking attitudes in the world.”).
11 See R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 13 (1994) (noting that in the last century alone, wars have claimed the lives of 203 
million combatants and civilians and squandered vast fortunes).
12
 “War abolitionists,” committed to the view that the horrors of war can be mitigated only its elimination, cling to the hope that 
“at some future point reason will prevail and all international disputes will be resolved by nonviolent means.”  Scott R. Morris, 
The Laws of War: Rules by Warriors for Warriors, 1997 ARMY LAW. 4, 13 (1997).  The Kellog-Briand Pact is a monument to 
this creed.  See Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact or Pact of Paris), Aug. 27, 
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (renouncing recourse to war for the solution of international disputes).  For many, the 
abolition of war is a Kantian imperative outlawing the use of force against human beings.  See IMMANUEL KANT, 
2of rules, known as international humanitarian law (“IHL”),13 to “humanize” armed conflict.14 This 
progressive regulation15 has met nearly universal approbation16: many ethical people, instinctively 
GROUNDWORK ON THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 101 (H.J. Paton trans. 1964) (“Always act so as to treat humanity . . . 
never merely as a means but always as at the same time as an end.”).  For a discussion of war abolitionism, see FRANK 
PRZETACZNIK, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPT OF WAR 182 (1994).
13
 IHL, also known as the “laws of war,” is a set of “articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and 
philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements” that serves as the normative and positive structure of legal relations during 
armed conflict.  MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 44 (1979).  IHL is thus related to, although distinct from, 
“military law,” defined as the “domestic, foreign, and international law associated with the planning and execution of military 
operations[.]”  Robert L. Bridge, Operations Law: An Overview, 37 AIR F. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). Many ancient cultures, 
religions, and belief-systems developed rules distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants and limiting methods and 
means of warfare, and as such the roots of IHL are “as old as war itself, and war is as old as life on earth.”  JEAN PICTET, 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 6-7 (1985); see also LAO TZU, TAO 
TE CHING (citing ancient Chinese doctrine that “he who delights in the slaughter of men cannot have a place in the State.”); 
HOMER, THE ILIAD (S. Butler transl. 1955) (describing those who unjustly shed blood in warfare to be “unfit to pray to the 
gods.”); MICHAEL HOWARD, GEORGE J. ANDREOPOLOUS, & MARK R. SHULMAN, HISTORY, WAR, AND LAW 
(1994) (describing legal constraints of ancient Greek and Roman warfare); Karima Bennoune, As- Salamu Alaykum?  
Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 617-27 (identifying Islamic legal proscriptions on 
methods, means, and objects of warfare); DIETER FLECK (ed.), THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS 15 (1999) (indicating that medieval Japanese war was regulated by a quasilegal code known as bushido); 
THEODOR MERON, HENRY’S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE’S LAWS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 
LATER MIDDLE AGES 7 (1993) (describing regulation of medieval warfare by a set of customs and canon laws known as the 
jus armorum (code of chivalry)).  Still, limits on warfare remained largely customary as late as the Middle Ages, and the 
evolution of a positive regime of IHL traces to the late Renaissance scholars Grotius, Vattel, and Bynkershoek, who carried 
forward medieval chivalric codes while interweaving theories of natural law, theology, and secular morality.   Id. at 211-13.  The 
19th and 20th centuries witnessed the systematic codification of customary principles of IHL, beginning with the Lieber Code, 
drafted by Francis Lieber, a law professor at Columbia University with sons in both the Confederate and Union armies, at the 
behest of President Lincoln.  Kenneth J. Keith, Rights and Responsibilities: Protecting the Victims of Armed Conflict, 48 DUKE 
L. J. 1081, 1090 (1999).  The Lieber Code established explicit rules regarding rights and duties of combatants and non-
combatants, and in particular prisoners-of-war, applicable during the U.S. Civil War.  See Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [“Lieber Code”].  The Lieber Code inspired 
imitations; states borrowed liberally from its provisions in crafting their own military manuals. ASTRID J.M. DELISSEN & 
GERARD T. TANJA, HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 15 (describing Lieber Code as the “Adam and Eve of 
all subsequent law of war manuals”); THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 73-74 (1907) (listing states 
adopting military manuals incorporating the Lieber Code, including Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal); WELLS, supra note 
8, at 4 (noting near-direct translation of Lieber Code in military manuals of Germany, France, and Russia).  Over the next nine 
decades, IHL was progressively codified in treaties, now numbering in the dozens, the object and purpose of which has been to 
provide a conventional framework for the customary rules and principles evolving in the direction of greater protections for 
individuals.  IHL is thus both the point of origin as well as the very core of human rights law.  Theodor Meron, The 
Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 244 (2000) (tracing complementary development of IHL and 
human rights law).  The strand of IHL known as “jus ad bellum” or “Hague law” answers questions such as when resort to 
warfare is permissible and what means and methods may be employed therein, whereas “jus in bello” or “Geneva law” specifies 
who and what are legitimate subjects of war.  See William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 767, 770 (1999) (distinguishing between principle components of IHL). By strictly limiting, 
rather than expressly authorizing, certain forms of conduct in war, IHL is a “prohibitive” legal regime.  Richard Baxter, So-
Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 324 (1951).  Several 
fundamental IHL principles have been distilled: 1) non-combatants are immune and entitled to active protection by belligerents; 
2) a combatant rendered hors de combat by virtue of wounds or surrender may not be attacked; 3) wounded and sick are the 
responsibility of the party in whose power they are located; 4) prisoners of war are entitled to basic rights and privileges, 
including immunity from reprisal; 5) all persons are entitled to be protected against torture and denial of judicial guarantees; 6) 
methods of warfare are limited, and means which cause unnecessary suffering are prohibited; and 7) distinctions must be drawn 
between civilian and military targets, with only the latter subject to attack.  PICTET, supra this note, at 61-62.
14 See Bennoune, supra note 13, at 608 (noting that the essential goal of IHL is to place “humane restrictions” on war).  Not all 
admit this possibility; for many, humanization of war requires its abolition.  Meron, supra note_, at 240.  However, the notion 
that wars can and should be limited by sacrificing some aspects of military expediency to the alleviation of suffering dates to 
antiquity.  See TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBURG AND VIETNAM 20 (1970) (stating that “the concept that the ravages of 
war should be mitigated . . .  by prohibiting needless cruelties” is an “instinct almost as old as human society”); PICTET, supra
note 13, at 6 (contending that “traces of a desire to attenuate the horrors of combat” can be located in earliest mankind); 
QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 160-61 (1965) (correlating “rise of a civilization” with legal regulation of war).
15
 IHL is an ongoing and intensive process of international deliberation and negotiation oriented toward the development and 
codification of formal rules restricting the methods and means of war and protecting certain persons and things from attack.  R. 
C. HINGORANI, PRISONERS OF WAR 195 (1982).  Evidence is discernible in the development of international instruments, 
the jurisprudence of international and domestic tribunals, state practice, and statements by government representatives.
16
 Prior to the advent of the modern IHL regime in the 19th century, military strategists and natural law theorists insisted that the 
“humanization” of war could only obtain in the absence of legal regulations on the ground that mitigating the intensity of war 
would enhance its social acceptability and thereby prolong it.  See, e.g., Lieber Code, supra note 13, at para. 2 (1863) (“The more 
vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity.  Sharp wars are brief.”); WALZER, supra note 13 at 47 (citing Prussian 
3antipathetic to war,17 welcome any anodyne, and few proclaim its absolute independence from legal 
regulation.18  Indeed, the distinction between “murder” and “war” is now difficult to sustain without 
reference to positive law,19 and the term “war crime”20 has entered the popular lexicon21 accompanied by 
images of atrocity that provoke moral outrage.22  Empirically, states and individuals obey IHL at least 
some of the time,23 and the phrase “laws of war” is no longer ipso facto oxymoronic.
B.  Frustration: Compliance Deficiencies
However, incorporation of humanitarian principles—fundamentally moral conceptions—into law 
presents ontological problems, and thus has war proven recalcitrant to legal restraint: the non-derogable 
limitations24 IHL purports to impose have been transcended its entire developmental history.25  Prior to 
General von Moltke for the proposition that the “greatest kindness in war” is not the mitigation of combat but the swift defeat of 
an enemy).  Natural law critics of the legalization of war also base their arguments on efficiency considerations, maintaining that 
the odds of success in war are inversely proportional to the degree of adherence to legal restraints on the conduct of military 
operations, as well as the absolute right to engage the enemy in any manner with any means.  Id.; see also STEPHANIE 
GUTMAN, THE KINDER, GENTLER MILITARY: CAN AMERICA’S GENDER-NEUTRAL FORCE STILL WIN WARS? 
275 (1999) (arguing that in combat the “fiercer, angrier, most-blood-lusting force will win” and that armies must be guided not 
by law but rather “driven by . . . a killer instinct.”); BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING 368 (1989) (“What the 
hell else is war than killing people?”) (quoting Lieutenant William L. Calley, incredulous at his conviction by court-martial in 
1969 of the murder of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai).  A shrinking number of commentators still rejects much of the IHL canon 
as an infeasible, if philosophically attractive, attempt to “shift the balance established between military necessity and 
humanitarian principles in such a way as to hamper the ability of states to use military force[.]”  Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules 
for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 108, 146 (1985).
17 See ROBERT L. O’CONNELL, OF ARMS AND MEN 24 (1998) (noting anthropological research suggesting an inclination to 
“fight by the rules” and limit war is an emotional vestige of intraspecific combat within groups of our hominid ancestors).
18See J. M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 5 (1911) (observing that, by the turn of the 20th century, “no nation . . . has not 
rendered homage to the laws of war”); HINGORANI, supra note 15, at 6 (highlighting formal recognition of obligations erga 
omnes under IHL); WALZER, supra note 13, at 33 (suggesting that recognition of legal responsibility for the conduct of military 
operations has undergone universalization in the post-U.S. Civil War era).
19 See TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 19 (“War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in time of peace . . . [but] 
are not . . . because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors.”).
20
 The term “war crime” refers generally to “one of a list of acts generally prohibited by treaty but occasionally prohibited by 
customary law and . . . committed during armed conflict . . . by a perpetrator linked to one side of the conflict[.]”  Fenrick, supra 
note 13,  at 771.  War crimes are understood to be that limited category of acts committed during armed conflict that are 
prohibited without reference to the status of a belligerent.  See Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal 
Sanctions under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 205, 214 (1977).
21 See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 182-84 (1994) (tracing earliest use of “war crimes” to Nuremburg).
22 See Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 153, 153 (1996) (noting that war crimes “sicken the conscience of civilized society” 
and that “brutal acts of plunder, torture, rape, and murder that [IHL] forbid[s] . . . appall  . . . all of humanity.”); JANIL KASTO, 
JUS COGENS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 41 (1994) (positing that revulsion to war crimes “unites the human race”).
23
 Explanatory theories posit that states comply with IHL in order to preserve their reputations, increase the potential for 
reciprocity, avoid reprisals, and serve the interests of justice.  HINGORANI, supra note 15, at 192-93 (enumerating hypotheses).
24
 Much of IHL has been constructed as absolute, unqualified prohibitions on conduct in war that do not permit derogation even in 
extremis and do not take into consideration the relative justice of the cause.  See WALZER, supra note 13, at 230 (noting that 
“the rules of war are a series of categorical and unqualified prohibitions . . . that . . . can never rightly be violated even in order to 
defeat aggression.”);  OSIEL, supra note_, at 161 (stating that IHL “prohibit(s) [violations] unequivocally, in all circumstances 
and without exceptions[.]”); J. PICTET, COMMENTARIES 193 (1965) (suggesting that IHL has evolved to the point that “no 
possible loophole is left; there can be no excuse, no attenuating circumstances.”).  The notion that the substantive content of IHL 
is the product of a universal consensus—the “general consent of mankind”—supplies the categorical imperative for such 
absolutism.  IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS 63-79 (M. Shefi 
trans., Shatz Stein ed. 1994) (elaborating the absolute proscription of killing human beings in all circumstances).  While the 
absolutist school has much to argue in its favor—namely, clarity, consistency, and the perception of moral superiority in the 
sense that the amelioration of the rigors of war may best be achieved by refusal to permit any derogations whatsoever lest 
loopholes become escape hatches for crafty but malevolent actors, some commentators suggest that the practical exigencies of 
actual military operations are such that absolutism may be ill-suited even to absolutist purposes.  See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 
13,  at 231 (suggesting an alternative, utilitarian doctrine “that stops just short of absolutism” and “might be summed up in the 
maxim: do justice unless the heavens are (really) about to fall.”). Others simply reject the notion that IHL is akin to other species 
of law, contending instead that “[t]he law of war is different [from labor or environmental law] in that there are more gray areas 
than black and white.”  William Hays Parks, The Law of War Adviser, 18 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 357, 385 (1979).
25 See BEST, supra note 20, at 290 (characterizing the observance of IHL as “indifferent and lamentable”); see also MERON, 
supra note_, at 369  (noting that violations of IHL are “not exceptional”); WALZER, supra note 13, at 232 (indicating that 
violations of IHL are routinely committed even by “morally serious” soldiers who are capable of differentiating right from 
4World War II, IHL was enforceable only insofar as states possessed the political will to prosecute their 
own nationals,26 and suppression of violations was left largely to an informal regime of reprisal.27  The 
recent record of compliance is improving yet still sparse.28  Confronted by realist, just-war, and 
behavioralist explanations for failures to restrain self-interested soldiers and states in combat,29 IHL 
scholars, by the 1980s, were lamenting a regime shrinking to the “vanishing point” of international law.30
wrong); MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, & THE LAW OF WAR 161 (1998) 
(stating that “atrocious misconduct has been, if not a virtual constant, then at least persistent and perennial[.]”).  As empirical 
evidence of the frequent violation of IHL, note the creation of judicial fora for the specific purpose, inter alia, of prosecuting 
violations of IHL that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s.  See Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. S.C. Res. 827 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
26
 Obligations under IHL traditionally extended only so far as to the passage of domestic legislation and the domestic 
investigation and prosecution of offenses.  See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.S. 3317, at Art. 129 (limiting international legal obligation of parties to the passage of the necessary domestic 
legislation to provide for effective punishment of offenders).  Enforcement of IHL was left subject to affected states that, in many 
instances, ordered or tolerated systemic violations of IHL.  HINGORANI, supra note 15, at 197.  States loathe on political 
grounds to sanction their military personnel for executing state policies have been even less amenable to exposing themselves to 
embarrassment resulting from the extradition of individuals accused of violating  IHL.  BEST, supra note 20, at 396.
27 See Solf & Cummings, supra note 19, at 205 (surveying modalities employed in the suppression of war crimes).  For a 
definition and discussion of “reprisal,” see infra at note_.
28
 Prior to the establishment of international criminal tribunals in the 1990s, the number of prosecutions of war criminals could be 
counted on the fingers of one’s hands.  See DELISSEN & TANJA, supra note 13, at 201 n.18 (reporting the paucity of 
prosecutions enforcing IHL between 1945 and 1988).  In all likelihood, the majority of war crimes go unreported.  See BEST, 
supra note 20, at 397 (opining that most war crimes go unnoticed, and “what they amount to as a proportion of those that [are 
reported] . . . defies calculation.”).  For a survey of various mechanisms employed or proposed to enhance enforcement of IHL, 
see Jamie Mayerfeld, Who Shall be Judge?  The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of 
Human Rights, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 93 (2003); see also Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in 
Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 19-20, 30, 35, 38-40 (1995).
29
 Explanations for compliance deficiencies cluster in several camps. Legal realists contend that existing enforcement mechanisms 
offer inadequate support for IHL because international law generally, and IHL specifically, is structurally indisposed to the 
governance of state behavior in an anarchical system wherein power remains the primary currency and decisions with respect to 
the conduct of war are rendered with a view toward power maximization, rather than adherence to law; where violation of IHL 
would maximize power it is therefore optimal to do so, and IHL is thus little more than the codification of abstract aspirations 
certain to be disappointed in practice. See Raymond Aron, The Anarchical Order of Power, in CONDITIONS OF WORLD 
ORDER 25, 25, (Stanley Hoffman ed. 1968) (describing the international system as an “anarchical order of power” where might 
equates with right and law is irrelevant); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 279-314 (5th ed. 1978) 
(expressing deep skepticism with regard to the capacity for law to trump power in international relations and in particular in the 
issue- area of armed conflict); KEEGAN, supra note 5, at 63 (summarizing realist pessimism regarding the malleability of the 
nature of the international system by noting that “[t]he most important limitations on warmaking . . . have always lain beyond the 
will or power of man to command.”).  Some realist commentators contend that IHL itself contributes to the perpetuation of war 
by making it “more acceptable, more endurable”.  See F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISAL (1991) (suggesting that 
rather than limit the methods and means of war, those who would make the phenomenon more rare ought to de-legalize 
international conflict to the point they become “unbearable beyond endurance” and therefore less rational as a policy 
instrument.).  Law and economics realists reject the assumption that IHL is governed by a desire to humanize war and suggest to 
the contrary that it is merely a “device for limiting the efficiency of military technology” and thereby equalizing power disparities 
between the powerful and the weak; as such, it is not in the interest for the powerful to consent to or comply with it.  Eric Posner, 
A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. CHJI. L. REV. 297 (2003).
Another school of IHL skeptics, just war theorists, argue that states fighting in a just cause, defined generally as a war 
initiated by legitimate authority for the sole purpose of checking unjust aggression, are obligated to derogate from the positive 
laws of war to the extent necessary to triumph over unjust adversaries.  See S. PUFFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND 
OF NATIONS 1298 (C. & W. Oldfather trans., 1964) (commenting that reason dictates fewer restrictions on the fighting of a just 
war and that, since victory admits of no impediment, parties are permitted “to use force to any degree . . . [they] think 
desirable.”).  In effect, the justice of the cause sanctions and even necessitates violations of IHL, and moderation in the struggle 
against terrorists and rogue states is therefore vice rather than virtue. See VITORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR 180 (suggesting 
that the highest form of morality when threatened by transcendent evil is not adherence to an artificial program of legal regulation 
but victory, whatever the cost to the rules). Just war theory is considerably more complex than herein presented.  For a detailed 
discussion of just war theory, see generally WALZER, supra note 13.
In turn, behavioral theorists fix upon the tension between the rational self-interest of combatants and the self-
abnegation demanded of them by an oft-irrational and incoherent legal regime promulgated without reference to any broad theory 
of human behavior in combat. For behavioralists, it is axiomatic that when confronted by a choice between self-preservation and 
violation of IHL, many “otherwise law-abiding individuals will commit crimes in order to save their own lives; national 
governments will likewise break treaties and international rules if necessary for their own preservation.”  TAYLOR, supra note 
14,  at 33; WALZER, supra note 13, at 14-15 (“The moral theorist . . . must come to grips with the fact that his rules are often 
violated or ignored . . . [because] to men at war, [these] rules often don’t seem relevant to the extremity of their situation.”); 
5C. Formalization: The International Criminal Court
Despite its history, IHL has been resurrected by the post-Cold War passion of its proponents.  Freed of 
the restraints of bipolar paralysis,31 dedicated to the suppression of war crimes as part of a human rights 
agenda,32 and convinced that the path to this goal ran ineluctably through law, the torrent of globalization 
was steered toward the establishment of the first permanent tribunal33 with universal jurisdiction to punish 
FLORY, supra note_, at 9 (warning that “exigencies in battle . . . may be so great as to warrant violation” of IHL by states and 
individuals pursuing self-preservation).  Behavioralists also seize upon the propensity for soldiers to exhibit irrational responses 
to the stressors of combat and, in so doing, to transcend the rules of IHL.  OSIEL, supra note 24, at 161 (suggesting that the 
“frenzy of combat elicits primordial passions that are nearly impossible to restrain[,]” such as a “soldier’s sudden impulse to 
avenge a close comrade who was killed, perhaps through an enemy’s act of deception”).  Empirical data supports the premise that 
compliance with IHL is a function of its conformity to the normative conventions and practical necessities of soldiers. Id. at 31-
32 (identifying “widespread disregard” for restrictive rules of engagement that enhanced the threat to U.S. ground forces during 
the Vietnam War as foundation for the assertion that “[i]t has since become an article of faith among U.S. officers that these rules 
placed American forces in undue danger and were therefore tactically imprudent (and morally indefensible).”); Mark Martins, 
Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV 3, 5 (1994) (asserting that, rather 
than cleave closely to external legal constraints, “[w]hen the shooting starts, soldiers follow those principles that . . . potent 
experiences have etched in their minds . . . [and that] conform to both tactical wisdom and to relevant legal constraints on the use 
of force.”) (emphasis added).  By failing to incorporate exceptions for soldiers’ instincts and passions, the absolutist regime of 
IHL has charted an irrational course toward the rocky shoals of human nature. SeVIRGINIA HELD, SIDNEY 
MORGENBESSER, & THOMAS NAGEL, PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 60 (1974) 
(contending that “the distinctions between what is obligatory and what is prohibited appear to rest on no intelligible grounds or 
persuasive principles.[]”); WALZER, supra note 13, at  47 (conceding the facial irrationality and “alien”-ness of much of IHL in 
relation to the experience of soldiers); BEST, supra note_, at 290 (stating that the “whole IHL enterprise is objectively 
paradoxical and far-fetched: war on the one hand, human nature on the other.”).  In short, for behavioralists, an absolute 
obligation to self-sacrifice is at odds with the instinct to self-preservation, and IHL is “a bunch of rules made up by lawyers who 
sit behind a desk, rather than by real soldiers who have felt the sting of battle.”  Morris, supra note 11, at 4.
30
 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. YBK. INT’L L. 360, 382 (1952) (conceding that 
“if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the 
vanishing point of international law.”).
31 See Eric L. Chase, Fifty Years After Nuremburg: The United States Must Take the Lead in Reviving and Fulfilling the Promise, 
6 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEG. STUD. 177, 182 (1995/1996) (attributing ineffective enforcement of IHL post World War II—a “betrayal” 
and an “assault on the Nuremburg process”—in large measure to Soviet machinations in the UN Security Council that privileged 
political objectives at the expense of justice).
32
 Advocates of IHL concentrate their labors toward ensuring that states investigate and prosecute, or extradite, their own 
nationals for violations of IHL.  VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note_, at 9.  Enhancing universal respect for, and compliance with, 
human rights law as a regime independent from political considerations is the ultimate objective.  BEST, supra note 20, at 400 
(stating that a fundamental objective of IHL advocacy is the creation of supranational institutions with the “authority and power 
so universally effective and irresistible that no national or regional interest will be able to thwart . . . the principles of the law”).
33 See Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
U.N. Doc. 32/A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [“Rome Statute”], at Art. 1 (establishing the ICC as a “permanent 
institution”).  The subject of a permanent international criminal court was first visited in the aftermath of World War I when, in 
1920, the League of Nations appointed an Advisory Committee of Jurists to examine a High Court of International Justice with 
jurisdiction to try crimes “against international public order and the universal law of nations.”  VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 
31, at 16.   Although a commission was appointed by the Allies to prepare the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II and other 
German defendants for war crimes related to the invasion of neutral Belgium, unrestricted submarine warfare, and extrajudicial 
killing of POWs, the proposed High Court did not come to pass.  Commission on the Responsibilityu of the Authors of the War 
and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 117 (1920).  In 1943 the UN War Crimes Commission was established 
to prepare the trial of Axis war criminals, and on August 8, 1945, the Allies created the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 27).  Allied Control Council Law No. 10 of December 20, 1945, granted 
jurisdiction to the IMT to try Nazi defendants charged with crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and 
the first judgment was rendered in October 1946.  VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 18-21. However, the IMT mandate 
was terminated after the Nuremburg trials, and although in 1981 the United Nations General Assembly authorized the 
International Law Commission to codify international crimes as a precursor to a permanent international criminal court, the 
subject, as a practical matter, lay dormant for decades.  Id. at 24-25; see also UNSC Res. 670 (1990), at para. 13 (suggesting that 
criminal liability for violations of IHL with respect to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would attach to individuals but demanding no 
specific enforcement); UNSC Res. 686, 687 (opting to confine criminal responsibility for violations of IHL to states).
In 1993 and 1994, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to restore international peace and 
security, created ad hoc tribunals with jurisdiction to punish individuals for violations of IHL occurring in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia [“ICTFY”], U.N. S.C. Res. 
827 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 of 23 May 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [“ICTR”], U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994) (1994).  Champions of international criminal tribunals “rejoice[d] that [for the first time] . . . a person 
suspected of [violations of IHL] may finally be brought before an international judicial body for a dispassionate consideration of 
his indictment by impartial, independent and disinterested judges coming . . . from all continents of the world.”  The Prosecutor 
6serious violations of IHL by individuals.34   Despite a contentious drafting histoprocess,35 state after state 
acceded to the Rome Statute,36 and the International Criminal Court [“ICC”], hailed as a triumph of 
international civil society over statist impunity37 certain to bring the worst violators to brook,38 entered 
into force in July 2002.39  However, long-standing U.S. rejectionism40 manifested in heated objections.
v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1- AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction by the 
[ICTFY], at 79 (Oct. 2, 1995).  The International Law Commission, hoping to capitalize on the momentum, reconvened a 
Working Group that recommended “that [the UN] convene an international conference . . . to conclude a convention on the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court.”  Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-Sixth Session, 1994, 
UN Doc.A/49/10, paras 23- 91); see also UNGA Res. 49/53, Dec. 9, 1994 (creating an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court).  However, although the ad hoc tribunals have achieved some success, they are not permanent 
tribunals, and lack the efficiency, accrued institutional expertise, and enhanced legitimacy that are often associated with a 
permanent international criminal court.  Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremburg to Rome: A Step 
Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 47, 65 (1999) (elaborating limitations of ad hoc tribunals).
34 See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 25 (providing for criminal responsibility for commission of crimes within ICC 
jurisdiction whether committed “as an individual, jointly with another or through another person”).  Although individual criminal 
responsibility for violations of IHL was arguably a principle of customary international law prior to World War II, the ICC is the 
first permanent international tribunal with a statutory basis for jurisdiction over individual criminal defendants.
35
 The Rome Conference commenced 15 June 1998, and five weeks of intense negotiations ensued during which a “Like-Minded 
Group” of over 80 militarily weak states, committed to a powerful court and supported by an array of NGOs such as Human 
Rights Watch and the ICRC, emerged in opposition to a “Third Group” of states, led by the U.S. and other members of the 
Security Council, concerned about the potential for a court with overbroad jurisdiction.  VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 
2-3.  Multiple U.S. jurisdictional amendments that would have limited prospective jurisdiction were defeated.  See Melissa K. 
Marler, The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes in the Rome Statute, 49 DUKE L. J. 825, 832 
(1999) (describing overwhelming defeat of joint U.S.-Indian jurisdictional amendment that would have permitted the state of 
nationality to declare that its accused national committed the crime in pursuit of official duties and thereby prevented the ICC 
from exercising jurisdiction in the absence of a Security Council referral); VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 60  
(describing defeat of U.S. jurisdictional amendment requiring consent of state of nationality of accused).  Although a Third 
Group succeeded in amending ICC jurisdiction to permit a 7-year exemption from twar crimes, the tide of U.S. influence was 
forced back by a consortium of Like-Minded states and NGOs.  For a discussion of the travaux preparatoires, see M. CHERIF 
BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE ROME CONFERENCE (1999).
36
 The Rome Statute was adopted by a non-recorded vote of 120 in favor, 7 against, and 4 abstentions on 17 July 1998.  See U.N. 
Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, United Nations 
Press Release, L/ROM/22 (Jul. 17, 1998).  The U.S., Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, China, and Israel voted against.  ALTON FRYE 
(ed.), TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 7 (1999).
37
 The signing of the Rome Statute in July 1998 was heralded as long-awaited milestone in the progressive erosion of the consent-
based system of state sovereignty.  For its champions, the ICC symbolizes a transition to an ethically-superior order “in which the 
highest forms of power and legitimacy [are] fused in international organizations, establishing the constitutional supremacy of 
international law over all national law[,] and in which . . . states [are] subordinate to that order.”  Anderson, supra note_, at 84.  
In the ICC, proponents see a future wherein states will ensure that violators of IHL are prosecuted or extradited and enforcement 
of IHL deters would-be transgressors, leading ultimately to greater peace.  VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 9.
38
 Article 5 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC has jurisdiction only over “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole[.]”  See Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 5.  Moreover, ICC jurisdiction is limited to 
cases arising out of armed conflict and does not reach acts committed during “isolated and sporadic acts of violence[.]” Id. at Art. 
8(2)(d).  The Rome Statute thus does not formally criminalize all violations of human rights but rather is addressed exclusively to 
serious violations of IHL. See Meron, supra note 13, at 265. Accordingly, Articles 6-8 create jurisdiction solely over genocide 
and specifically enumerated lists of crimes against humanity and serious war crimes.  Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Arts. 6-8.
39
 Article 126 provides that the ICC would come into existence 60 days after the 60th ratification, and thus the Statute entered into 
force on 1 July 2002.  See http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (listing 
ratifications).  For a discussion of the structure of the ICC, see Robert Cryer, Commentary on the Rome Statute for an 
International Criminal Court: A Cadenza for the Song of Those Who Died in Vain?, 3 J. ARMED CONFL. L. 271 (1998).
40
 During the early 1990s, Congress produced aspirational language supporting an international criminal court.  See, e.g., S.R. 
103-71 (May 20, 1993) (expressing that the “time is propitious for the [U.S.] to lend its support to . . . an international criminal 
court]”); 103 H.R. J. Res. 89, 105th Cong. (1997) (calling on the President to “continue to support and fully participate in 
negotiations . . . to . . . establish an international criminal court”).  The Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, David 
Scheffer, indicated a firm executive commitment to implementing this sense-of-Congress.  Foreign Relations Nominations: 
Congressional Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On For. Rel., Federal Document Clearing House, Jul. 15, 1997.  
However, determined legislative hostility to the ICC had manifested as early as 1994. See 140 CONG. REC. S96, 100 (daily ed. 
Jan. 26, 1994) (offering Amendment No. 1254, proposed by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), to the Department of State 
Authorization Act of 1994, which, although tabled, stated as its purpose “to strike all language . . . relating to support for an 
international criminal court.”).  As international momentum in support of the ICC developed in 1998, Senator Helms pronounced 
the ICC Treaty “dead on arrival” at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee if the U.S. did not retain the power to veto an 
indictment.  See Helms Declares U.N. Criminal Court “Dead-on- Arrival” in Senate Without U.S. Veto, GOV’T PRESS REL. 
Mar. 26, 1998.  Helms further advised that the creation of “any permanent judiciary within the U.N. system would be totally 
inappropriate, insomuch as . . . it would grant the UN a principal trapping of sovereignty.”  Id.  Many legislators joined in the 
characterization of the ICC as a “monster that must be slain. “ See Jesse Helms, Personal View: Slay This Monster, FIN. TIMES, 
7D. Rejection: The U.S.—Sole Indispensable Nation—Actively Opposes the ICC 
1.  Arguments for Public Consumption: Sovereignty, Accountability, Legitimacy
U.S. critics prophesied that, rather than administer universal justice, “rogue” prosecutors and states-
parties,41 eager to circumscribe U.S. hegemony, would prosecute members of the U.S. Armed Forces42 for 
acts not widely-recognized as violations of customary IHL,43 especially the blurry, unsedimented 
Jul. 30, 1998, at 12.  Subsequent to promulgation of the Rome Statute, Congressional Republicans developed a four-point action 
plan: 1) withdrawal of U.S. troops from any state ratifying the ICC; 2) veto any Security Council referral to the ICC; 3) 
withholding of funds to the ICC; and 4) revision of Status of Forces Agreements to preclude extradition of U.S. military 
personnel to the ICC.  Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and Organized Crime Symposium, 23 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 655, 754 (2000). Congressional Democrats have introduced legislation supporting the ICC, but none of their 
proposals have enjoyed significant support.  See American Citizen’s Protection and War Criminal Prosecution Act of 2001, S. 
1296, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Sen. Christopher Dodd, D.-Conn., Aug. 1, 2001); H.R. 2699, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(introduced by Rep. William Delahunt, D.-Mass., Aug. 2, 2001).  Executive opposition has found expression in statements from 
senior Department of Defense officials who, in measured fashion, have sought to limit the criminal exposure of U.S. military 
personnel.  See Department of Defense News Briefing, American Forces Press Service, Thursday, June 11, 1998, Remarks at 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium (statement of Defense Secretary William Cohen expressing concerns that the ICC would 
compromise U.S. interests in providing “one hundred percent protection” to its forces serving overseas); see also Department of 
Defense News Briefing, Thursday, September 14, 2000, Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, July 2000 [“DOD Briefing”] (“We still don't 
think that the ICC in its current configuration is the right thing for the United States to sign on to.”).
41 See Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International Criminal Tribunal and the 
Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 337, 357 (1999) (conceding possibilities for polit icization of ICC by a 
“rogue prosecuto[r]”); Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?, MIL. L. REV. 
156, 200 (2001) (“A politicized ICC . . . could become a sort of human rights advocate, responsive to any and all complaints 
regardless of the source or seriousness of the allegations.”).  The election of Luis Moreno Ocampo, prosecutor of Latin American 
military personnel in highly politicized contexts, as first Chief Prosecutor is unlikely to allay such concerns. Luis Moreno 
Ocampo Named ICC Chief Prosecutor, HARV. U. GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 2003, at 8.
42
 Concerns abound that the ICC might be pressed into service, by states-parties jealous of U.S. wealth and power, to check U.S. 
influence through the malicious prosecutions of U.S. military personnel.  See, e.g., Robert Kagan, Europeans Courting 
International Disaster, WALL ST. J., Jun. 30, 2002, at B7 (suggesting that, as the “dominant economic, political, cultural and 
military force,” the U.S. is particularly vulnerable to the machinations of weaker states that would manipulate the ICC to bring 
unfounded criminal charges against U.S. military forces to neutralize U.S. power); Marler, supra note_, at 833  (noting U.S. and 
French concerns about the potential for politically-motivated prosecutions); Madeleine Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a 
Divided World, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337 (2001) (describing politically motivated prosecution as a weapon in waging 
interstate quarrels); Bill Newel, For Crimes of International Law, a Guide, BOST. GLOBE, Jul. 23, 2001, at A1 (quoting Cherif 
Bassiouni, principal drafter of the Rome Statute, as conceding that political prosecutions in the ICC are a “very real possibility”).  
Experience raises the question whether adjudication of violations of IHL is invariably a political exercise. WELLS, supra note 8, 
at 119 (noting many legal scholars believe the World War II tribunals lacked any basis in IHL as no precedent existed declaring 
conspiracy to wage aggressive war a crime, “following orders” was a permissible defense, and law was applied ex post facto); 
Centre for Human Rights, Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and 
Prosecutors, BERK. J. INT’L L. 102 (2000) (claiming ICTFY is “plagued by a crisis of legitimacy.”); Ron Popeski, Russia 
Criticizes Milosevic Handover, REUTERS, Jun. 29, 2001 (reporting criticism of ICTFY as a “kangaroo court”); Morris, supra
note_, at 354-59 (2001) (noting that states, claiming to be enforcing IHL but conducting war by other means, are resorting to 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute nationals of opponent states) (citing Plainte avec Constitution de Partie Civile, 
http://www.Mallat.com/articles/complaint.htm (June 18, 2001) (Belg.)) (accusing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of 
command responsibility for war crimes committed by Lebanese nationals).  Moreover, concerns about politicization extend to the 
judges.  Darin R. Bartram and David B. Rivkin, Jr., The ICC’s First False Step, WALL ST. J, Feb. 17, 2003, at 18.  The 18 ICC 
judges enjoy broad powers but are without general guidance on the legal principles that will inform their decisions and are not 
directly accountable to states).  Colin Warbrick, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trial, 3 J. ARMED CONFL. 45, 45 
(1998);but cf.  Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International 
Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 271, 284 (2003) (suggesting states exercise significant control over international judicial bodies).
43
 International law consists of treaty-based, as well as customary, sources of law.  See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945) (enumerating sources of international law as treaties, custom, general principles, and the 
opinions of expert commentators).  Customary international law [“CIL”] evolves from the practice of states consistent with the 
subjective understanding that such practice is legally obligatory.  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Denmark & 
Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 4.  State practice, particularly by directly affected states, is the most concrete element.  Michael 
Akenhurst, Custom As A Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 18 (1977). To become binding, the practice must 
be consistent, settled, and uniform.  Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 
433 (1983).  The progressive development of IHL has proceeded largely by codification of the customs of soldiers.  A.P.V. 
ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 2 (1995).  It is universally accepted that the foundational principles of IHL are 
necessity, proportionality, and distinction.  Still, it is arguable that much of the substantive content of the more hortatory 
declarations and conventions has not yet passed into the corpus of customary IHL.  The substantive provisions of military 
manuals vary widely from one state to another, suggesting the absence of a body of custom widely accepted by states. Theodor 
Meron, Determining Customary International Law Relative to the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 2 
AM. U. INT’L L. & POL’Y 471, 491-92 (1987).  Although the ICJ has specifically addressed the question of the requisite degree 
8principles of necessity,44 proportionality,45 and distinction.46  By unjustifiably increasing the criminal 
exposure of U.S. forces engaged in thankless peace and humanitarian operations with which the world 
of consistent practice necessary to constitute custom, determining that it need not be universal, no authoritative judicial 
pronouncement exists to delineate the precise boundaries of customary IHL.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 1, para. 186 (“The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be 
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.”).  Moreover, 
nearly all states are members of IHL treaties; there are no non-parties to whom one can refer to determine whether customary 
IHL obligations are operative.  See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note_, at 5 (stating that, although little support for 
the customary legal basis of a norm may be found in the conduct of state parties where state parties follow a practice solely in 
accord with treaty obligations, if non-parties are doing so it is likely the result of a customary obligation); Meron, supra note_, at 
247 (noting that although the legal obligations of IHL treaties were once limited to parties, the crystallization of the substance of 
those treaties as customary IHL, and the accession of almost all states to those treaties, has rendered moot question as to the 
applicability of such treaties as between non-parties)  Furthermore, even manuals of states legally sophisticated states do not 
identify provisions of various IHL conventions they believe declaratory of custom.  KWAKWA, supra note 3, at 32-24. Worse, 
few studies pointedly address the formation of customary IHL, nor do various international judicial decisions discuss the process 
by which conventional norms are transformed into CIL.  As a result, the substantive boundaries of customary IHL are subject to 
constant contestation.  See Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the 
Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 148 (2000) (indicating that the determination and 
application of customary norms of IHL is a contested process); Du Preez and Another v. Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n 1997 
(3), S. AFR. L. REP. 204, 233 (A) (1997).(“Selecting what is and what is not part of custom is . . . fraught with political 
considerations.”).  Human rights advocates insist that the expanding body of norms and principles articulated since the late 1970s 
constitutes a body of CIL directly applicable to the battlefield.  Most states, however, have elected to incorporate, in criminal 
codes and military manuals, only those rules and principles for which there is evidence of widespread state practice.  Meron, 
supra note_, at 247 (suggesting that human rights groups take an “idealistic” posiiton in regard to customary IHL that even 
otherwise sympathetic experts find “problematic”).  Some commentators restrict customary IHL further, stating that it is official 
statements that delineate the scope and force of legal obligation.  R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary 
International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275, 300 (1965) (stating that the “firm statement by the State of what it considers the 
rule [of customary IHL) is far better evidence of its position than what can be pieced together from [its] actions . . . in a variety of 
contexts.”); Cf. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20, 1974) (holding that official declarations of CIL can 
legally obligate a state).  In short, the content of customary IHL is nebulous and insufficiently articulated so as to give notice. See
PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 167 (1994 (noting that the lack of clarity as to the content of 
customary IHL makes it “virtually impossible . . . for soldiers to know with any surety whether certain orders they might receive 
are lawful or not.”).  The Rome Statute restates rules and principles of IHL as sources of law.  See Rome Statute, supra note 32, 
at Art. 21(1) (providing that primary sources of applicable law are the “Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence” and “applicable treaties and the principles. . . of the international law of armed conflict[.]”).  Despite the 
amorphousness of custom-based IHL, Article 21 endows the ICC with competence to pronounce the “principles of the 
international law of armed conflict.”   Moreover, although Article 9 purports to establish a textual basis for specific elements, 
amendment of the Statute could enable a two-thirds majority of states-parties to define new crimes without reference to practice, 
and further provides that enumerated elements are not dispositive but merely intended to “assist” the ICC in its “interpretation” of 
Articles 6-8.  Id. at Art. 9(1).  By arogating to itself the power to define custom, the ICC may displace state sovereignty.  VON 
HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 43 (stating the Rome Statute “must prevail [in a conflict with domestic law].” Due to this open 
grant to redefine customary IHL, the U.S. is unwilling to subject its Armed Forces to ICC jurisdiction.
44
 The overwhelming bulk of death and destruction incident to war is governed not by positive IHL but rather by “military 
necessity,” the slipperiest, most elastic concept in the IHL canon.  Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: 
The Origins and Limits of the Principles of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 219 (1998).  Traditionally, the customary 
IHL principle of necessity implicitly authorized all operations undertaken in the immediate interest of self-preservation provided 
a minimal threshhold requirement—that they be intended and tended directly toward the military defeat of the enemy—was 
satisfied.  ROGERS, supra note 42, at 5 (defining military necessity as “the principle that a belligerent is justified in applying 
compulsion and force of any kind, to the extent necessary for . . . the complete submission of the enemy[.]”).  However, by World 
War II the range of actions considered permissible by necessity had narrowed.  See United States v. Krupp, 10 WAR CRIMES 
REP. 138-39 (1949) (retreating from the general authorization of military operations by reference to military necessity in holding 
that “[t]o claim that [IHL] can be wantonly—and at the sole discretion of any one belligerent—disregarded when he considers his 
own situation to be critical, means nothing more than to abrogate the laws . . . of war entirely.”); In re von Leeb and Others, 12 
WAR CRIMES REP. 1, 93 (1949) (holding that if necessity constituted general authorization for all belligerent acts “it would 
eliminate all humanity and decency and all law from the conduct of war, and it is a contention which the Tribunal repudiates as 
contrary to the accepted usages of civilized nations.”); United States v. List et al., 11 TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 1255-5 (1949) 
(“Military necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules. [IHL] is prohibitive law.”); LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE, DEP’T ARMY F.M. 27-10 (1956) (defining military necessity as “that principle which justifies those measures not 
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”) 
(emphasis added); W.V. O’Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility, and Vietnam, 60 GEORGETOWN L. J. 616 (1972) 
(stating that military necessity “consists in all measures . . . indispensable and proportionate to a legitimate military end, provided 
they are not prohibited by the laws of war or the natural law[.]”) (emphasis added). An uneasy compromise exists between the 
prohibitionism of IHL regulators and the pragmatism of soldiers.  Henry Shue & David Wippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use 
Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 559, 559 (2002).  Many commentators have 
doubts as to the continued applicability of the principle.  See WALZER, supra note_, at 5-8 (criticizing Athenian justification for 
killing the entire male population of Melos during Peloponnesian Wars on ground that to fail to do so would have inspired 
resistance elsewhere); Francesco Forrest Martin, Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force 
9bailiff has selflessly saddled itself,47 a politicized ICC with a mandate to remake IHL48 will induce 
isolationism.49  U.S. opponents further opined that, despite textual deference to complementarity,50 the 
Rule in the Law of Armed Conflict, 64 SASK. L. REV. 347, 394 n.166 (2002) (rejecting necessity as justification for Allied 
bombing of Dresden).  For others, the proscription of so much conduct heretofore permissible has drained necessity of 
operational significance.  ROGERS, supra note 42, at 3.  To still others, determination of necessity is a balancing test that weighs 
the value of the legitimate objective against the suffering caused in its attainment; it is essentially a proxy for proportionality.  J. 
Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: “Targeted Killings” Under International Law, N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2002). 
Despite theoretical disagreements, necessity, though it does not have a general suspensory effect on IHL, may yet be invoked in 
“exceptional circumstances. . . in regard to acts otherwise prohibited.”  N. Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 442 (1952).  The validity of a defense is fact-intensive, and tribunals called to render judgments accord a 
margin of appreciation to soldiers in recognition of imperfect knowledge of the facts of the battlefields.  See PRZETACZNIK, 
supra note 11, at 36 (stating that although many battlefield actions are “presumptively illegal,” the sole circumstance under which 
necessity is inapplicable as a defense is where the method employed was illegal per se); McCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 249 (1990) (stating that necessity “recognizes the potential impracticability of full compliance with 
legal norms in certain circumstances and . . . may mitigate or expunge culpability for prima facie unlawful actions [.]”).
45
 The customary principle of “proportionality” dictates that military force not be employed to cause damage “excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  HENRY SIDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 254 
(restating the principle as the prohibition against “any mischief of which the conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison to 
the amount of mischief.”); R.R. Baxter, Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165, 178-79 (1972) (defining 
proportionality as the requirement that civilian losses be balanced against military advantage).  “Proportionality,” however, is just 
as elusive as necessity, for it is difficult to assess whether the method and means of warfare are in fact “conducive” to the end 
sought and not excessive in relation to that end.  See WALZER, supra note_, at 129 (“[T]here is no ready way to establish an 
independent or stable view of the values against which the destruction . . . is to be measured.”); BARNETT, supra note_, at 73 
(inquiring whether one must “necessarily assume . . . casualties in order to comply with the requirements of proportionality?”).
46
 The customary IHL principle of “distinction,” which maintains that the only legitimate object of war is to destroy enemy armed 
forces, imposes a strict prohibition against the deliberate targeting of noncombatant personnel and civilian targets.  See
Christopher C. Burris, Re-Examining the Prisoner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 943, 
966 (1987) (discussing origins and application of principle of distinction).  Not all scholars concur with the assumption that 
noncombatants bear no responsibility for war and as a consequence should be spared its direct effects.  See, e.g., The Collected 
Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, eds., vol. III, 151-52 (1968) (suggesting that the 
bombing of civilian targets in World War II “shattered the immunity of civilians, one of the things that have made war 
possible[,]” and in so doing reduced the likelihood of future war); PAUL FUSSELL, THANK GOD FOR THE ATOM BOMB 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 27 (1988) (“The intelligence officer of the U.S. Fifth Air Force declared on July 21, 1945, that ‘the 
entire population of Japan is a proper military target,’ and he added emphatically, ‘There are no civilians in Japan.’”); MAO 
TSE-TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 73 (Samuel B. Griffith transl, 1961 ed.) (postulating that during an insurgency all 
adults become combatants).  Other commentators insist that distinction rests upon reciprocity.  See Emanuel Gross, Use of 
Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against 
Terrorism?, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445, 464 (2002) (examining argument that deviation of one party from the duty to 
distinguish combatants from noncombatantsreleases the other); PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 435-36 (1968) (contending 
that low-intensity conflicts by their very nature “enlarg[e] the area of civilian death and damage that is legitimately collateral[.]”).  
Still others propound a “supreme emergency” exception whereby civilians may be attacked if state survival demands.  JOHN 
RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 98 (1999).  In practice arguments about distinction centers upon not whether civilians may 
be deliberately targeted but rather whether targeting decisions that cause unintended civilian casualties are illegal.
47
 That the only  state  routinely willing and able to liberate the oppressed peoples of the world should endure criminal exposure 
when so doing is offensive to ICC critics.  See Statement of Senator Helms Before the U.N. Security Council (Jan. 20, 2000) 
(“When the oppressed peoples of the world cry out for help, . . . free peoples . . . have a fundamental right to . . . come to the[ir] 
aid. . . [I]f the [U.S.] is to serve as beneficent world sovereign . . . it must not be made to endure penalties by outsiders who object 
to the means it chooses.”). Humanitarian intervention is, however, the scenario feared most likely to trigger ICC prosecution of 
U.S. nationals.  Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: 
Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 4-5(2001/2002).
48 See, e.g., Madeleine Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 34 
(2001) (expressing belief that the relative paucity of precedent for judicial enforcement of IHL will permit the ICC to exploit 
definitional uncertainties and reach interpretations that criminalize erstwhile legitimate conduct); FRYE, supra note 35, at 39-40 
(opining the ICC will become a forum for declaring “spontaneous customary [IHL]” at variance with traditional understandings). 
49 See William Safire, Enter the Globocourt, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 20, 2002, at A27 (“[T]he lack of any effective mechanism to 
prevent politicized prosecutions of [U.S.] service members . . . could create a powerful disincentive for U.S. military engagement 
in the world.”) (quoting U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld).  Critics of the ICC, which is silent as to the legality of 
humanitarian intervention, suggest that the effects will be most pronounced in the area of “optional” military engagements in 
which the U.S. is more invested than any other state.  See Guy Roberts, Assault on Sovereignty: The Clear and Present Danger of 
the New International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 35, 45 (2001) (positing that the prospect of political 
prosecution of U.S. forces engaged in such operations will depress U.S. participation); Smidt, supra note 40, at 199 (contending 
that a politicized ICC will “limit severely those . . . controversial . . .interventions that the advocates of human rights . . . so 
desperately seek from the [U.S.]”); David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 12 (1999) 12 (judging the possibility for politically-motivated prosecutions as “so high . . . that the [U.S.] forces most likely to 
. . . prevent . . . humanitarian violations may actually be deterred from responding[.]”); Christopher M. Van de Kieft, Uncertain 
Risk: The United States Military and the International Criminal Court, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2325, 2340 (2002) (suggesting 
politically-motivated ICTFY war crimes investigation of NATO Kosovo campaign will deter future interventions).
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ICC would subvert U.S. jurisdiction,51 trump U.S. sovereignty,52 and vitiate the procedural rights of U.S. 
defendants.53 Critics railed further at a lack of Security Council oversight they deem essential to ensuring 
the political accountability and democratic legitimacy of the ICC.54
50
 States are obligated to extradite suspects accused of a crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction to a requesting state or to try 
them domestically.  CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO 
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1995).  The principle of “complementarity” transposes this 
principle and provides that an international tribunal may exercise jurisdiction only where the state that would normally do so on a 
territorial, nationality, or other basis is unwilling or unable.  VON HEBEL, supra note 31, at p. 4. The Rome Statute incorporates 
complementarity. Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 17(1)(a)-(b) (determining a case to be inadmissible where it is “being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction, unless the State is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution,” or where the case “has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to 
prosecute . . . unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”).
51
 The Rome Statute oblligates the ICC to defer to a state decision not to prosecute, as well as to a domesticacquittal, provided 
neither is “for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility.” Id. at Art. 17(2), 20(3).  U.S. concerns 
center upon whether the ICC would defer to a decision, based on factual sufficiency, prudential considerations, or other good-
faith grounds, not to prosecute.  See Gurule, supra note 45, at 8-9 (noting debate over whether ICC should intervene only when 
state proceedings were a “sham . . . intended to shield the perpetrator” or more generally to  “correct a perceived miscarriage of 
justice [ .]”).  Domestic critics envisage an activist ICC arrogating jurisdiction to create a peremptory, rather than complementary, 
body that sets aside national adjudications with which it disagrees.  See VON HEBEL, supra note_  (intimating the ICC is a 
“’super’ international appellate court . . . rather than a court intended to complement States.”).  By this view, the ICC is, at best, 
redundant. See Department of Defense News Briefing, Read Admiral Craig Quigley, Sept. 14, 2000 (stating that the U.S. has a 
“stable judicial system . . . fully capable of . . . prosecuting “all allegations of misconduct by U.S. service members.”).  
Exacerbating these concerns is uncertainty as to whether the ICC will permit a state to refuse  “disclosure of evidence which 
relates to its national security.”  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 93(4).  Under U.S. law, judges are deferential toward 
assertions of the state secrets privilege.  See Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (denying motion to compel 
disclosure of information claimed privileged by CIA Director).  Some question whether the ICC will be as deferential.   Jacob 
Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, _YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 139-40 (2002).
52
 The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals of states-parties as well as crimes committed on the 
territory of a member state.  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 12(2). Further, exercise of territorial jurisdiction permits the ICC 
to prosecute nationals of states that have not consented to its jurisdiction provided the territorial state acceptsad hoc jurisdiction 
in the case in question.  Id.  at Art. 12(3).  Moreover, the Security Council may make a referral whether or not the state of 
nationality or territory is a party, thereby creating jurisdiction over the nationals of every state.  Rome Statute, supra note_, at 
Art. 13(b).  Similarly, the ICC Prosecutor may initiate investigation proprio motu of all persons alleged to have committed crimes 
on the territory of member states.  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Arts. 12(3), 13(b), 15.  According to critics, the ICC cannot even 
in concert with the Security Council trump the lack of U.S. consent to jurisdiction over its nationals.  Morris, supra note 46, at 
64.  Still, as written Articles 12-15 would permit, e.g., Iraq to invoke ICC jurisdiction for alleged crimes committed by U.S. 
troops in Iraq while the ICC would be unable to “prosecute Saddam for massacring his own people.”  U.S. Dep’t of State, Press 
Briefing, Jul. 20, 1998.  The U.S., objecting to the jurisdictional breadth of the Rome Statute, proposed unsuccessful amendments 
that would have required the state of nationality of the accused to consent to jurisdiction or, in the alternative, barred the ICC 
from asserting jurisdiction over crimes in any conflict of which the Security Council was seized.  NEIER, supra note_, at 256.
53
 International criminal tribunals must provide minimum procedural protections to defendants.  International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) at Art. 14(3); Trial of Joseph Alstotter & Ors, L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 103 
(1948).  The Rome Statute does incorporates extensive safeguards: defendants may not be charged with ex post facto crimes (Art. 
22) or for conduct committed prior to entry into force (Art. 24); may not be placed in double jeopardy (Art. 20); are presumed 
innocent(Art. 66(1), are entitled to  a statement of charges (Art. 61(3)), counsel of choice (Art. 67(1)(b), (d)), speedy and public 
trials (Art. 67(1)(a), (c)), examine adverse witnesses (Art. 67(1)(e), remain silent “without such silence being a consideration in 
the determination of guilt,” (Art. 67(1)(g); may not be tried in absentia (Art. 63); are entitled to the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence (Art. 69(7)), cannot be compelled to self-incriminate (Art. 55(1)(a)), and are entitled to appeal guilty verdicts as well as 
sentences (Art. 81).  However, predecessor tribunals have a mixed record in implementing such rights.  See supra note 
(criticizing IMT for ex post facto application of laws and violation of principles of nullem crimen sin lege and nullem poena sin 
lege ); Human Rights Center & Centre for Human Rights, supra note_, at 103-04 (criticizing ICTY for murky procedural and 
evidentiary rulings, politicized case selection, and lengthy detentions and trials).  International trial judges have assumed wide 
latitude to draft and amend rules of procedure and evidence, in effect claiming a legislative role.  See Prosecutor v. Tihomir 
Blaskic (Appeal of Judgment), IT-95-14-AR 108 (21 January 1998) (stating that “ it is the judge who finally takes a decision on 
the weight to ascribe to [evidence].  The [ICTFY] is . . . a sui generis institution with its own rules of procedure[.]”).  The 
interpretation of evidentiary and procedural rules by predecessor tribunals has resulted in decisions, inconsistent with U.S. 
conceptions, to admit hearsay.  Id. at para. 7, 16, 17 (rejecting a “blanket prohibition” on admission of hearsay).  That the broad 
interpretive powers available to the ICC might be exercised to deprive defendants of protections inhering in the U.S. legal system 
is of concern. Robert Christensen, UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 391, 409-10 (2001).  ICC defenders insist that international 
criminal proceedings are autonomous from domestic process and “[t]he international . . . standard . . . is that the trial should have 
been ‘fair enough’ rather than . . . ‘fairest of all.’”  Warbrick, supra note_, at 54; King & Theofrastus, supra note 33, at 91 
(querying “whether . . . U.S. constitutional standards must be adopted by the rest of the world, or whether generally accepted 
principles of just treatment . . . will not promote a greater respect for [IHL].”).  Nonetheless, as a matter of domestic law, U.S. 
citizens are entitled to the full protections of the Constitution, including the right to trial by jury, even when tried outside the U.S.  
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which 
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide . . . should not be stripped away[.]”).  Domestic critics claim that 
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Thus, although the ICC commenced operations in March 200355 after garnering the support of a 
majority of states for which it is now the regnant paradigm for enforcing IHL, it lacks the backing of the 
sole “indispensable nation.”56  The U.S. signed, but did not ratify, the Rome Statute,57 and subsequently 
Article III, §2 of the U.S. Constitution grants the sole authority to try U.S. citizens to U.S. courts and that safeguards enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights, including rights to a speedy jury trial, to confront witnesses, and to protection against hearsay, are glaringly 
absent.  Smidt, supra note_, at 219; see also  David M. Baronoff, Unbalance of Powers: The International Criminal Court’s 
Potential to Upset the Founders’ Checks and Balances, _ U. PA. J. CONST. L. 800, 804 (2002) (identifying numerous ICC 
failures to provide defendants procedural safeguards guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution).  Moreover, international tribunals do 
not explicitly accord defendants the wide range of defenses available at common law. See Cryer, supra note_, at 277 (noting that 
the Rome Statute categorically rejects superior orders defense); Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997 
(refusing to recognize existence of a rule of CILor general principle of law with respect to a defense of duress); Matthew 
Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT’L 
L. 52, 109 (1996) (defining purpose of international criminal tribunals to be “confining conflict and circumscribing harm to 
protected persons” and stating that “[d]eveloping doctrinal defenses . . . is of secondary significance.”).   Accordingly, Congress, 
in a precursor to ASPA, found ICC protection of individual rights inadequate as a matter of U.S. law. Protection of United States 
Troops From Foreign Prosecution Act of 1999, H.R. 2381, 106th Cong. §2(5) (1999). 
54U.S. critics question whether the Security Council will retain primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security and the determination of threats to and breaches thereof.  See UN Charter at Art. 24 (providing that the Security Council 
has “primary responsibility” for maintaining international “peace and security”); id. at Art. 39 (according to the Security Council 
sole authority to make a determination of aggression or a threat to or breach of international peace and security).  The relationship 
of the ICC to the UN remains uncertain, and nothing in the Rome Statute, which provides merely that the ICC will be “brought 
into relationship with the [UN] through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties[,]” implies any role for 
the ICC in the maintenance of international peace and security.  Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 2.  However, predecessor 
tribunals, even where established as subsidiary organs of the UN, have been determined to be operationally independent.  
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdiction), Appeals Chamber, IT-94-
1-Ar 72, 2 October 1995, paras. 37-38.  Moreover, crimes within ICC jurisdiction—aggression, genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity—are those most likely to constitute threats to international peace and security and thus within the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council.  Commentators suggest that by exercising jurisdiction over defendants in particular cases 
where the Security Council has not made a  finding of aggression or a threat to or breach of the peace, the ICC Prosecutor may 
presuppose state responsibility for the crimes of which the individual is accused and in so doing usurp the exclusive competence 
of the Security Council. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the Security Council and the Projected
International Criminal Court, 3 J. ARMED CONFL. 97, 103 (1998) (indicating widespread dissatisfaction with potential conflict 
between the Security Council and the ICC over definition and prosecution of aggression).  While some suggest that in practice 
the two institutions will reach an accommodation whereby the Security Council will act as a “filter mechanism” through the 
judicious exercise of discretion, others envision structural conflict due to overlap of the material fields of operation. See id. at 
111-13.  This structural conflict thesis is supported by Article 16, which, rather than commit the ICC to deferring to veto of a 
prosecution by a permanent member of the Security Council, requires an affirmative vote of the entire Council in a resolution 
under Chapter VII to obligate the ICC Prosecutor to defer prosecution.  Because the U.S. can, in theory, exercise its Security 
Council veto power over ICC actions, the U.S. is desiours of preserving UN primacy, and U.S. officials staunchly opposed the 
ICC because it will likely undermine that primacy.  Hearing on the United Nations International Criminal Court Before the 
Subcomm. On Int’l Operations of the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 1, 6 (Jul. 23, 1998).  Failure to preserve 
Security Council primacy threatened to decouple the influence of the U.S. polity, exercised through elected and appointed 
officials, over the ICC; because the determination of what justice is and how it is to be administered is a fundamental 
concomitant of self-government, domestic adversaries assail the ICC as an illegitimate attack on  democracy.  See FRYE, supra
note 35, at 41 (stating that administration of justice is legitimate “to the extent that it rests on popular sovereignty[,]” and that the 
ICC, beyond the control of the U.S. electorate, is therefore democratically illegitimate).   Moreover, although the Rome Statute 
requires the Prosecutor to “analyse the seriousness” of referrals and find a “reasonable basis” to proceed with an investigation 
(Art. 15(2)-(3)), the sole institutional safeguard against abuse of discretion--the Pre-Trial Chamber—is not directly accountable 
to any official of any state. Elizabeth A. Neuffer, U.S. to Back Out of World Court Plan, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2002, at A1.
55 See Julia Preston, U.S. Rift with Allies on World Court Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A6 (noting approval of $40 
million budget for 2003 and adoption of rules for electing judges and a prosecutor).
56
 It ought to be patent that no serious peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention can proceed in the absence of the predominant 
military capability of the U.S.  See Samuel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, FOR. AFF. (Mar.-Apr. 1999), at 35, 37 
(1999) (referring to U.S. as the “indispensable nation” to global order). After the First and Second Gulf Wars, Haiti, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo, even the staunchest opponents of U.S. hegemony would likely concede that the U.S. has a vital leadership role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security and that U.S. participation is a necessary, if not necessarily sufficient, condition 
for success; on at least this ground, the U.S. is indeed the sole indispensable nation.  See Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Address 
Before the Carter Center, (Nov. 13, 1997), http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/971113scheffertribunal.html (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2002) (articulating the case for U.S. exceptionalism by noting U.S. participation in peacekeeping, enforcement of Security 
Council mandates, and humanitarian intervention and stating that “[n]o other government shoulders the burden of international 
security.”); Scheffer, supra note_, at 18 (further elaborating indispensability thesis).
57
 President Clinton signed the Rome Statute on the last possible date--December 31, 2000.  Elizabeth A. Neuffer, U.S. to Back 
Out of World Court Plan, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2002, at A1.  Presidents Clinton and Bush refused to submit the treaty to the 
Senate for its advice and consent as is required for a treaty to have effect as domestic law.  See U.S. CONST., Art. II. §2 
(providing that a treaty becomes law only upon a favorable vote of 2/3 of the Senate).
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withdrew its signature.58  Moreover, the U.S. has flexed economic muscle, and threatened to withdraw 
from peacekeeping commitments, to dissuade ratifications and exempt its nationals from ICC 
jurisdiction.59  The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act60 terminates military aid to states-parties, 
precludes U.S. personnel assignments to missions in their territory, and, with the “Hague Invasion 
Clause,”61 commands the President to employ “all means necessary,” including military force, to rescue 
any U.S. national in ICC custody.62  In short, the U.S. has “washed [its] hands of the [ICC].”63
U.S. hostility strikes the devoted transnational cadre supporting the ICC64 as apostasy given the 
history of U.S. leadership in the defense and promotion of human rights.65  In discourses strewn with 
58
 In May 2002, President Bush informed the UN that the U.S. was no longer a signatory to the Rome Statute.  William Safire, 
Enter the Globocourt, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 20, 2002, at A27.  Whether the President has the authority, as a matter of domestic and 
international law, to “unsign” a treaty is a subject addressed in recent scholarship.  See, e.g., David C. Scott, Presidential Power 
to “Un-sign” Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447 (2002) (arguing that the President has unilateral authority to withdraw a signed 
treaty from the Senate to negate the domestic and international legal consequences of a signature).  Nonetheless, by virtue of the 
withdrawal of its signature, the U.S. is not a participant in the Preparatory Commission, the body with the competence to draft 
procedural and evidentiary rules, nor is it able to vote in the selection of judges or the prosecutor.
59
 In 1998 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under Chairman Jesse Helms, began to insert the following boilerplate 
language expressing opposition to the ICC and warning other states of the consequences of supporting the ICC into the 
ratification of instruments providing for “Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters”:
PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRMINAL COURT.—The United States shall 
exercise its rights to limit the use of assistance it provides under the Treaty so that any assistance provided by the 
Government of the United States shall not be transferred to or otherwise used to assist the International Criminal Court 
agreed to in Rome, Italy, on July 17, 1998, unless the treaty establishing the court has entered into force for the United 
States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as required by Article II, section 2 of the United States 
Constitution.
See 144 CONG. REC. S12985 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998).
Senator Helms accompanied such provisions with warnings of “grave consequences for our bilateral relations with every nation 
that signs [the Rome Statute].” James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, AM. BAR ASSOC. J., Sept. 1998, at 66.  
Clarifying Helms’ warning, Defense Secretary William Cohen advised European allies that their support for the ICC would lead 
to a “re-thinking” of U.S. overseas troop commitments and to the U.S. role in NATO.  Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Presses Case 
Against War Court: Two-Thirds of World Opposes Current Plan, U.N. Conference is Told , INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jul 16, 
1998, at 5.  At the same time, the Clinton Administration, concerned with the ramifications of the ICC with respect to the liability 
of its forces, began to review status-of-forces agreements with states in which U.S. military personnel are deployed to “encourage 
corrective actions in regards to this treaty.” Id.; see also William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International 
Criminal Court, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Dec. 31, 2000) (expressing concerns about politically-motivated 
prosecutions of U.S. forces).  Congress responded with legislation prohibiting the U.S. from providing military assistance to a 
non-NATO state party to the ICC unless that state provided treaty assurances that it would not extradite U.S. military personnel 
to the ICC.  American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002) (enacting H.R. 4775 (S. 2551) 
[“ASPA”], at §2007.  By conditioning U.S. financial and military aid upon cooperation with its agenda, the U.S. has secured 
bilateral agreements that obligate states to refuse requests to extradite U.S. military, and in some cases civilian, personnel to the 
ICC.  See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Aid to Peacekeepers’ Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at A1 (noting explicit 
connection between foreign aid and guarantees of protection to U.S. military forces serving as peacekeepers); see also Kuwait to 
Exempt U.S. on War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at A3 (noting that 14 states had agreed to refuse any requests to 
extradite U.S. nationals to the ICC).  Similar pressure has resulted in exemptions from the EU and the UN.  See UNSC Res. 1422, 
U.N. SCOR, 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1422 (2002) (exempting all peacekeepers in Bosnia from ICC jurisdiction for one year 
on renewable basis); Paul Meller, Europeans to Exempt U.S. from War Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A6 (reporting 
decision by European Union to refuse ICC requests for extradition of U.S. military and diplomatic, but not civilian, personnel 
charged with war crimes).  Recently, the U.S. suspended military assistance to 35 states that refused to grant immunity to U.S. 
citizens.  Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Suspends Aid to 35 Countries Over New International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2003, at A1.
60
 Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002).  ASPA, designed to “protect United States military personnel and other elected and 
appointed officials of the U[.] S[.] . . . against criminal prosecution by [the ICC . . . ]”, prohibits all agencies and entities of the 
U.S., or of any state or local government, from cooperating with the ICC.  Id. at §2006.
61 See Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to 
Terrorism, _ HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (2003) (coining the phrase).
62 See H.R. 1794 (May 10, 2001) (amending, as earlier version of ASPA, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act  2002-03, H.R. 
1646 (2001)) (instructing President to use “all means necessary” to effect release any U.S. or allied personnel detained against 
their will or on behalf of the ICC). 
63
 Ambassador Pierre Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, WASH. POST., May 7, 2002, at A18.
64
 For the most strident proponents of the ICC, the internationalization of judicial tribunals with competence to adjudicate 
violations of IHL is “not a policy choice, but rather a cultural preference, more akin to a . . . religious choice than an argument 
deduced from empirical reason.”  Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense 
of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
13
pious nostrums, universalists deride irresponsible attachments to a realist mode of governance—
organized upon principles of state power and sovereignty66—that more idealist theories and multilateral 
institutions—organized upon general principles of equality and law—are said to have displaced.67  For 
ICC partisans, not only is the Court institutionally superior to the ancien regime,68 but the meritless 
objections actually militate in its favor.69  If the U.S. fears the prosecution of its soldiers, it need only
591, 594-95 (2002).  For this cohort, the international is always superior to the domestic.  See Kenneth Anderson, Secular 
Eschatologies and Class Interests of the Internationalized New Class, in PETER JUVILER & CARRIE GUSTAFSON (eds.), 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 91 (1998) (claiming that an “International New Class,” with
claims to special legitimacy by virtue of their “planetary pretension,” is the engine behind a legal globalization agenda that 
prioritizes enforcement of IHL through the ICC and privileges international institutions over local governance).
65
 Although the U.S. has signed few and ratified fewer of the instruments elaborating “human rights,” to the extent that the 
impetus for the development of international human rights law was born of the Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and the 
development and application of legal standards to punish systematic violations of those standards by U.S. lawyers, one can argue 
that the U.S. has led the promotion and protection of human rights since their legal origins.  Although this argument is 
undermined by the pattern of selective U.S. engagement in the defense of human rights (i.e., in Bosnia, but not in Rwanda; in 
Kosovo, but not in Chechnya or Tibet), this position is buttressed by the fact that few other nations place their troops and their 
treasure at risk in defense of the principles they proclaim. 
66
 Realists contend that only those institutions that reflect the interests of their states-parties can hope to be effective in the 
creation enforcement of law.  See VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 40.  International criminal tribunals depend for their 
success upon the degree to which states are willing to sacrifice their sovereignty to aid in the “fortification of the global rule of 
law.” FRYE, supra note 35, at 9.  Where states are unwilling to comply with IHL obligations, military force is necessary to 
ensure obedience, and only other states possess such currency in abundance; consequently, it to states that institutions must turn 
if IHL is to be enforced, and states will only do so to the degree they perceive inherent advantage.  Moreover, the most powerful 
states will remain beyond the reach of IHL as no other state or states will have the power to enforce violations committed by the 
most powerful states.  The assumption that a stable IHL regime must reflect the practical interests and capabilities of powerful 
states, rather than the moral aspirations of non-state actors or weak states, is central to realist IHL scholarship.
67
 For a discussion of the globalist vision of IHL and the formal institutional enforcement model embodied by the ICC, see 
generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER ET AL., TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1998).  Again, 
however, note that not all academics are so critical of the U.S. position as are the most dedicated of globalists.  See, e.g., 
Anderson, supra note 63 (arguing that “[t]o frame the issue as one of US unilateralism . . . as against the virtuously 
internationalist world gets it wrong” as “some unilateral US actions tend in the direction of US imperialism as an alternative to 
what I have called ‘international legal imperialism,’ the nascent imperialism, the willingness to impose supranational rule, that is 
the consequence of assertions of the sovereignty of supranational institutions.”).  In essence, the conflict between proponents and 
opponents of the ICC may well be the spawn of an existential conflict between European elites who govern international NGOs 
who have seized upon the ICC as a “means to resist, at least at the rhetorical level, American imperialism,” and U.S. democrats 
whose transcendant moral and political principle—consent of the governed—does not permit joining in a “mystical” venture 
toward an international civil society governed by decree from afar.  Id. at 102-10.  Anderson suggests that the scholarly and 
activist community advancing the cause of the ICC has organized theoretical and practical energies around an internationalist, 
legal imperialist agenda of the NGOs and their European elites.  Id. 
68 See HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 86-87 (contending that the ICC is the “best available way to mitigate the corrosive effects 
of mortal combat . . . [g]iven the current realities of international politics[.]”
69
 ICC advocates counter each asserted basis of opposition.  To claims that the ICC Prosecutor will selectively prosecute, they 
stress that the Rome Statute, under Article 20(3)(b), coupled with complementarity, eliminates the opportunity for politicization 
of justice by placing the burden of proof upon the Prosecutor to demonstrate, prior to initiating a prosecution and to the 
satisfazction of two of the three judges in the Pretrial Chamber, that the state of nationality of the accused affirmatively failed to 
independently and impartially administer justice.  See Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery 
to Implement International Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 689 (2002). With respect to the definition of crimes within ICC 
jurisdiction, proponents of the Rome Statute contend that, although the definitions remain fuzzy, the sole method of remedying 
these definitional shortcomings is accession to membership, as only members may participate in the work of the Preparatory 
Committees charged with more precise articulation of the definitions of crimes.  See David, supra not 40, at 404-05.  Further, 
defenders of the ICC point to the recent immunization of UN peacekeepers as a mechanism whereby states disproportionately 
involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations may limit the criminal exposure of their engaged forces.  See (note) 
(asserting that, because Article 8 provides that the only war crimes within ICC jurisdiction are those committed as part of a “plan 
or policy[,]”peacekeepers, the deployment of whom could not possibly be undertaken as part of a plan or policy to engage in war 
crimes, would almost certainly never be haled before the ICC for isolated criminal acts). Insofar as the rights of the accused are 
concerned, supporters of the ICC extol the abundance of provisions in the Rome Statute that ensure protection of criminal 
defendants while suggesting that these provisions provide greater protection than is constitutionally necessary or functionally 
prudent.  See Podgers, supra note_, at 69 (citing claims that the Rome Statute provides “layers of protection” against undue 
prosecutions); see also (note) (stating that jury trial is not applicable to trial of U.S. forces overseas because the Bill of Rights 
have “no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country” (citing 
Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901)); id. (contending that the “list of the due process rights guaranteed by the Rome 
Statute is . . . somewhat more detailed and comprehensive than those in the America Bill of Rights.  Not better, but more 
detailed.”); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 
GEORGETOWN L. J. 417 (2000) (suggesting that the safeguards afforded defendants in the ICC are actually “excessive”).
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ensure that they do not commit war crimes, or punish them when they do.70  By its opposition the U.S., 
according to this globalist philosophy, has stuck itself on the wrong side of history.71
If the asserted bases accurately portrayed the grounds upon which the U.S. eschews participation, 
a quick solution could be crafted:72 the U.S. might accede to the Rome Statute, join in the (re)definition of 
crimes within ICC jurisdiction, secure the permanent immunity of peacekeepers operating under Security 
Council mandate,73 amend the Statute to enhance individual rights, and elaborate complementarity to 
support deference to domestic judicial processes.  However, the etiology of U.S. disaffection is traceable 
less through statutory provisions than to a post-September 11th set of understandings concerning the 
challenge posed by the intersection of international terrorism74 and weapons of mass destruction 
[“WMD”],75 along with the proper role of IHL in the battle against this threat to civilization.76   Although 
these criticisms are not meretricious, a “decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind”77 urges a declaration 
of the causes that impelled the U.S. to reject a venture to which many states have committed themselves.
2.  Criminalization of the War on Terror? The Bush Doctrine and the ICC
70 See FRYE, supra note_, at 27 (contending that the ICC will not substitute its judgment for that of U.S. courts unless the U.S. 
“insist[s] on shielding criminal suspects from legitimate investigation and prosecution[,]” which is highly unlikely because “it is 
firm American policy to prosecute any rogue soldier who might commit a war crime[.]”).  An additional option is to accede to the 
Rome Statute while suspending acceptance of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes for 7 years.  See Rome Statute, supra note 32, at 
Art. 124 (permitting a party to “opt out” of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes for a nonrenewable 7 year period upon accession).
71
 Some critics of the U.S. abandonment of the ICC proclaim a devolution “back to the anarchic world of pre-Nuremburg.” King 
& Theofrostus, supra note 33, at 104-05.
72 See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291, 297 (2000) 
(arguing for qualified U.S. participation in the ICC under certain stated conditions).
73 See FRYE, supra note 35, at 32 (noting proposals to grant such immunity to U.S. peacekeepers out of recognition of the 
“special responsibilities” shouldered by the U.S. in the maintenance of international peace).
74
 Although the very definition of “terrorism” is to some extent a political exercise, the proliferating definitional offerings 
coalesce around the notion that “terrorism” is the threat or use of violence with the intent to cause fear in a target group in order 
to accomplish political objectives.  See generally http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp (listing 12 conventions and 
protocols defining terrorism); ROSLYN HIGGINS & MAURICE FLORY, EDS., TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (listing and discussing instruments related to terrorism).  U.S. federal law defines terrorism as an activity that “(a) involves 
a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and; (b) appears to be 
intended (I) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” 18 USC §3077 (2000).  A leading academic 
definition considers terrorism to be “the threat or use of violence in order to create extreme fear and anxiety in a target group so 
as to coerce them to meet political (or quasi-political) objectives of the perpetrators.”  OSCAR SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 163 (1991).  Although no single definition is universally accepted, the elements of civilian 
targets, violence, and political extortion are found in almost every working definition, and the United Nations has imposed a duty 
upon every state “to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing 
in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of 
force.” S. C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. 7 (1992); see also S.C. Res. 1373, UN SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. 
Doc./S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), paras. 1-3, 6 (Sept. 28, 2001) (obligating all member states to deny financing, support, and 
havens to terrorists and affirming the right of self-defense against “terrorist acts[.]”).
75
 A “weapon of mass destruction” is defined as “any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of . . . toxic or poisonous 
chemicals or their precursors; . . . a disease organism; or . . . radiation or radioactivity.” 50 U.S.C. 2302(1)(2000).
76
 Theories abound in answer to the question, “What is the purpose of law?,” with utilitarians, natural legal theorists, materialists, 
legal positivists, libertarians, socialists, statists, developmentalists, critical legal scholars, and others weighing in with arguments.  
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).  Many of the extant theories of 
law converge around the hypothesis that the purpose of law is to direct and limit government in the collective organization of the 
defense of life, liberty, and property, and to preserve civilization against threats to these core values, a hypothesis central to the 
current work.  See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 6 (1850) (synthesizing several strands of legal theory to postulate the 
purpose of law).  The notion that law serves as firebreak against threats to civilization has acquired purchase in international 
jurisprudence and illuminates the thesis that the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is a threat to which law is 
obliged to respond.  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. (8 Jul. 1996) 
(Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of law is not merely to resolve disputes but to protect civilization).
77 See U.S. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, Jul. 4, 1776, at preambular paragraph (conceding that the international 
community, of which the U.S. was a constituent “People,” was entitled to a statement of causes for U.S. secession from Britain).
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Prior to the attacks of September 11th, 2001, terrorism was widely considered, like 
narcotrafficking or counterfeiting a transnational law enforcement problem necessitating institutional 
cooperation between civilian criminal justice systems of concerned states.78  The U.S. and other states 
scored several apparently major legal victories against international terrorists in civil courts, an outcome 
that seemed to support the utility of the transnational judicial response to terrorism,79 and the negotiations 
toward the Rome Statute nearly included terrorism as a crime within ICC jurisdiction, underscoring 
widespread support for judicial responses to the phenomenon.80  While eradication of the global scourge 
of terrorism may benefit from allied judicial efforts, however, the attacks unleashed on the U.S. that 
infamous morning fundamentally transformed, from the U.S. vantage point, perceptions of the nature and 
magnitude of the danger and, consequently, the proper instrumentalities to employ and objectives to 
pursue in response.81  September 11th—the first day of a new historical era—withdrew the veil of 
ignorance, and the U.S. now concedes that, after a decade of denial,82 it is at war83 against a menace no 
78 See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 313 
(2003); see also MICH. J. INT’L L., supra note_, at 754 (contending, prior to September 11th, that terrorism could be reduced or 
eliminated by states ceding sovereignty to transnational organizations”); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: 
Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (suggesting 
international terrorism is amenable to a civilian solution); Emanuel Gross, Trying Terrorists—Justifications for Differing Trial 
Rules: The Balance Between Security Considerations and Human Rights, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2002) (stating 
that terrorism is “no different than any other criminal offense”); Robinson O. Everett, The Law of War: Military Tribunals and 
the War on Terrorism, FED. LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 20 (arguing that terrorism violates the laws of nations but not IHL).  
Although it offered no assistance in enforcing its pronouncements condemning terrorism, for adherents to the criminal justice 
paradigm the UN was the logical place to which to turn to organize such cooperative efforts.  Smidt, supra note_, at 229.
79
 On November 4th, 1998, Usama bin Laden and members of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization were indicted in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York for orchestrating acts of terrorism against U.S. nationals, including the bombing of 
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar As-Salaam, Tanzania.  See  Indictment, United States v. Usama bin Laden et al,, S(2) 
98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1998) (charging bin Laden and others with conspiracy, bombing U.S. embassies, 224 
counts of murder, leadership of a “terrorist group dedicating to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence,” 
seeking to obtain WMD, issuing orders to his followers to attack U.S. forces in all Muslim countries, and ordering followers to 
commit genocidal war against all U.S. citizens), at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/nyfo/pressrels/1998/11041998.htm.  As the 
capture and trial of these defendants was considered critical to U.S. national security interests, the conviction of several of these
defendants in the spring of 2001 was, at the time, considered to be a national security coup.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Neuffer, Four 
Guilty in Embassy Bombings, BOST. GLOBE, May 20, 2001 (reporting the conviction, on 302 counts, of four participants in the 
destruction of U.S. embassies and the deaths of 224 people, including 12 Americans).
80 See Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 
1 (2002) (discussing negotiating history and prospects for future inclusion of terrorism within Rome Statute).
81
 Immediately following the attacks, President George W. Bush declared a national emergency, and Congress delegated him 
extensive authority to, inter alia, “use all necessary and appropriate force” in defense of the U.S. against the authors of 
September 11th.  See Declaration of National Emergency, Proclamation 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18, 2001) (declaring the 
U.S. to be in a state of emergency by virtue of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001); see also Joint Resolution 23 (JR 23), 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (enacted Sept. 18, 
2001) (authorizing the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons[.]”).  In jettisoning the judicial approach, the Bush Administration determined that the deterrence 
failures that led to September 11th were attributable to the inadequacy of the judicial approach and that future such attacks could 
only be prevented by re-establishing a credible threat of punishment for would-be attackers and that no institution other than the 
U.S. military could mount such a threat. Smidt, supra note_, at 157-58; see also  Ruth Wedgwood, The Law at War: How Osama 
Slipped Away, 66 NAT’L INTEREST 69, 71-72 (2002) (deriding as a “very dangerous intellectual failure” the application of 
criminal law, rather than force, to overcome the scourge of terrorism).  Non-U.S, commentators appear not to have been so easily 
swayed from the criminal justice model.  See, e.g., Keith Hayward & Wayne Morrison, Locating “Ground Zero”: Caught 
Between the Narratives of Crime and War, 140-57, in STRAWSON, ED., supra note_ (contending that the terrorists of 
September 11th are best described by some indeterminate intermediate term between criminals and “agents of war”).  Others 
suggest that the U.S. abandoned the criminal justice model in favor of a military approach during the latter half of the 1990s, well 
before September 11th.  See, e.g., Todd M. Sailer, The International Criminal Court: An Argument to Extend its Jurisdiction to 
Terrorism and a Dismissal of U.S. Objections, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 311, 311 (1999).  However, September 11th
caused the U.S. to “s[ee] the existing evidence in a new light,” and the restructuring of U.S. foreign policy toward military 
solutions to the problem of terrorism dates to that infamous day.  See ASSOC. PRESS, Rumsfeld Defends War, Jul. 10, 2003.
82
 Every year the President must submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the U.S.  See
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, §603(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. §404a (1994) (imposing this obligation).   
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less threatening to its existence than the Great Wars, hot and cold, of the 20th century.84  In response, the 
U.S. has pledged that, while it will mean a long hard struggle to defeat all the individuals, groups, and 
states85 involved, victory in the War on Terror is certain.86
However, the U.S. faces foes that arm themselves with WMD, present no static targets,87 abjure 
legal restraint,88 and deliberately murder civilians.  U.S. armed forces, trained to observe and obey 
limitations imposed by IHL,89 are distinctly disadvantaged by a grossly asymmetrical legal framework in 
The U.S. National Security Strategy, issued in September 2002, rejects the judicial approach to combating terrorism and 
confesses that “[i]t has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of th[e] new threat” and react accordingly.  
See National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) [“NSSUSA”], at 15, available at www. 
whitehouse.gove/nsc/nss.pdf.
83
 The official U.S. assessment is that the attacks of September 11th effected a general declaration of war, by global terrorist 
organizations and their state sponsors, against the U.S.  See Elaine Sciolino, Long Battle Seen: “We’re at War,” He Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A1 (“We’re at war.  There’s been an act of war declared upon America by terrorists, and we will 
respond accordingly.”) (quoting address by President Bush to the National Security Council).  Commentators concur with this 
assessment.  See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 81, 88 n.14 (2003) 
(stating that “[o]nly a  most technical and arid legalism could deny [that the U.S. is in a state of war with al Qaeda].”); Derek 
Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 1-9 (2003) (concluding that the September 11th attacks 
resembled acts of war within the meaning of IHL in that they were extraordinarily severe, orchestrated from abroad by an 
organized enemy, directed against the U.S. as a whole, and treated as such by state governments and international organizations, 
including NATO and the UN).  The War on Terror has not been concluded with the defeat of the Taliban or the Hussein regime 
in Iraq; rather, it has just begun.  See President George W. Bush, Prepared Remarks Declaring End to Major Combat in Iraq, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2003 (“The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11th, 2001, and still goes on . . 
. Any person, organization or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, 
and equally guilty of terrorist crimes.  Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups, and seeks or possesses weapons of 
mass destruction, is a grave danger to the civilized world, and will be confronted.”).  Arguments that juridically speaking it is 
impossible to be at war with non-state actors may well be sound in terms of their fidelity to legal technicalities.  See, e.g., Stacie 
D. Gorman, In the Wake of Tragedy: The Citizens Cry Out for War, But Can the United States Legally Declare War on 
Terrorism?, 21 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 669 (2003) (concluding that under domestic and international law only sovereign 
entitles—i.e., states—possess the legal personality necessary to be the objects of a declaration of war).  However, they miss the 
point that terrorism poses as significant a threat to U.S. vital interests as do states and that the judicial response is inadequate to 
resolve the threat.  See Roberto Iraola, Military Tribunals, Terrorists, and the Constitution, 33 NEW MEX. L. REV. 95, 113 
(2003) (“It is clear that a state of war exists between the [U.S.] and al Qaeda[,]” a terrorist group that “has openly proclaimed war 
against the [U.S.] and has repeatedly carried out attacks against us.”).
84 See Charles Feldman & Stan Wilson, Ex-CIA Director: U.S. Faces “World War IV,” (quoting former CIA Director James 
Woolsey as describing War on Terror as a “Fourth World War,” following World Wars I & II and the Cold War, in which the 
threat to the U.S. is at least as extreme as these earlier conflicts); David Rivkin Jr. & Lee A Casey, That’s Why They Call It War, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2003, at B4 (describing War on Terror as a “long-term life or death struggle” in which the U.S. has 
“never been more threatened.”).
85
 State terrorism and sponsorship of terrorist groups is of special concern because states have the resources to project and sustain 
violence on a systematic, global basis.  See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002) (labelling 
Iran, North Korea, and Iraq an “axis of evil” due to sponsorship of terrorist groups and signaling the U.S. would “not permit the 
world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”).
86 See R. W. Apple, A Clear Message: “I Will Not Relent,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A1 (reporting a presidential address 
to a joint session of Congress on Sept. 20, 2001, in which President Bush stated that the U.S. effort would not stop “until every 
terrorist of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”).
87
 In contrast to states, which present “fixed addresses” against which to direct measures in reprisal for their initial use of force, 
terrorist organizations are a inchoate conglomeration of entities that operate as part of “shadowy” networks independent in some 
instances of the control or direction of the states in which they are physically located, rendering it very difficult to employ anti-
terrorist countermeasures that do not simultaneously inflict harm upon these non-culpable states, many of which are as distressed 
about the presence of terrorists in their midst as are the victims of their terrorism.  See Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our 
Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 47-48 
(2002) (discussing the legal difficulties in directing proportional and precise military force against non-state actors).
88
 Terrorism, the “totalitarian form of war and politics,” rejects any obligation to adhere to the dictates of law or morality and in 
so doing “shatters [IHL].”  , Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-
Defense: Human Rights Versus the State’s Duty to Protect Its Citizens, _ TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 195, 233 (2001).
Among the more reprehensible tactics they employ is sheltering their number in areas populated by civilians in order to “exploit 
the rules of the game . . ., which categorically state that the civilian population must not be involved in the armed conflict.”  Id.  
This and other violations of IHL were committed by forces fighting for the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.  See Neil A. Lewis, 
U.S. Is Preparing to Try Iraqis for Crimes Against Humanity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at A1 (listing Iraqi violations of IHL, 
including mistreatment and extrajudicial killing of POWs, perfidious surrender, fighting in civilian garb, using civilians as human 
shields, employing hospitals and ambulances to military ends, and placing cash bounties on U.S. pilots).
89 See U.S. ARMY, JA-422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 5-2 (2000) (stating the policy of the U.S. to comply with IHL 
under all circumstances to the extent practicable and feasible).
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which morally inferior warriors90 enjoy all its protections but respect none of its obligations.  This legal 
asymmetry, coupled with the destructive capacity of weapons brought rapidly and unexpectedly to bear 
by enemies against whom deterrence is impossible,91 erodes the U.S. military advantage.  The reduction in 
power differential triggered by this synthesis of WMD and terrorists’ exploitation of legal compliance 
disparities renders ultimate U.S. victory more costly, in lives and treasure, and more uncertain.
In light of this strategic reconfiguration, the U.S. has, albeit belatedly, enhanced the flexibility of 
its policy options.  The Bush Doctrine proclaims the rights to employ preemptive measures in self-
defense,92 depose regimes harboring terrorists,93 eliminate terrorist leadership,94 and bring ever-more 
sophisticated weaponry to bear upon these adversaries.95  However, rather than reap gratitude for 
shouldering a disproportionate burden in the War on Terror, the U.S. has been accused of opprobrious 
conduct arising from the proactive use of force, the use of certain weapons systems,96 and collateral 
90 See Michael F. Noone, Jr., Applying Just War Jus in Bello Doctrine to Reprisals: An Afghan Hypothetical, 51 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 27, 32 (2002) (applying pejorative label “warriors” to individuals who war in the absence of legal restraint, and “soldiers” 
to those who accept legal limitations on the available methods and means); see also Alberto R. Coll, The Legal and Moral 
Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297, 297-98 (1987) (relegating terrorists from 
the category of lawful combatants to the pariah category of “unlawful belligerents”).
91
 NSSUSA, supra note 81, at 15 (contending that deterrence is ineffective against the “deadly threat of Islamic terrorists whose 
avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death[.]”).
92
 The U.S. now embraces preemptive self-defense, a doctrine that claims the right of a state to use unilateral force, even in the 
absence of legal authorization from the UN, to eliminate an incipient threat that is not yet operational but which, if permitted to 
mature, could be reduced only at much greater cost. See id. at 15 (stating that the “immediacy of today’s threats, and the 
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit . . . let[ting] our enemies 
strike first.”); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (Dec. 2002), at 
http:/www.whitehouse.gove/response/index/html (“Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially 
devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian 
agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive 
measures.”); David E. Langer, Bush Renews Pledge to Strike First to Counter Terror Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2002, at A3 
(reporting message from President Bush to U.S. troops in Afghanistan stating that the U.S. will preemptively strike against states 
developing WMD and that “America must act against these terrible threats before they’re fully formed[.]”).  For an extended 
discussion of the doctrine of preemptive self-defense at domestic and international law, see infra at note_.
93 See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Washington, D.C., 20 
September 2001, available at www.usembassy.org.uk/bush83.html (“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.  
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.  From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support 
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”).
94
 Targeted killing of terrorist leaders may preclude subsequent acts of terrorism, produce fewer casualties than other options, 
inflict greater disruption on terrorist groups, and leave no prisoners to become causes for future terrorist attacks.  Daniel B. 
Pickard, Legalizing Assassination?  Terrorism, The Central Intelligence Agency, and International Law, 30 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1, 31-32 (2001).  On this basis, the U.S. has added this policy option to its anti-terrorist arsenal.  See John Diamond, 
Shackles Loosened on U.S. Intelligence, USA TODAY, Jul. 9, 2002, at 8A (reporting that the Bush Administration has 
authorized executive agencies to overthrow regimes and eliminate foreign leaders); James Risen & David Johnston, War of 
Secrets: Not Much Has Changed in a System that Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at D1 (reporting that CIA Special 
Activities Division has been activated for covert operations and authorized to use deadly force against terrorists).  For a 
discussion of the domestic and international legal regimes governing assassination, see infra at note_.
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 Examples of sophisticated weapons systems either in development, making their debut, or being used widely in the War on 
Terror include precision-guided munitions [“PGMs”], lasers, depleted uranium munitions, carbon fiber bombs, and unmanned 
aerial vehicles.  See Richard Whitby, High-Tech Hardware in War on Terror, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 8, 2002, at A1.
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 Certain means of war, such as various types of ammunition that cause unnecessary suffering and biological weapons, have long 
been proscribed by treaties.  See e.g., Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (annexed to Fourth Hague 
Convention of 1899, rev’d. 1907), 29 July 1899, at Art. 23(3) (limiting the methods and means of warfare that cause “superfluous 
injury” or “unnecessary suffering”); Hague Convention of 1907 (committing parties to pass domestic military  regulations 
incorporating the protections of POWs provided for therein, precluding the use of many weapons systems, and providing 
protection for religious and cultural institutions); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 (forbidding use of gas and bacteriological 
weapons but not outlawing development); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, April 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 164 (1972) [“BWC”] 
(prohibiting the development, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
[“CCW”], 19 I.L.M. 1524 (1981) (prohibiting weapons that use fragments not detectable by X-ray, regulating mines and booby 
traps, and regulating incendiary weapons); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
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damage resulting therefrom.97  The injection of the ICC into this equation bodes ill for the eventual defeat 
of international terrorism.  Despite the seemingly self-evident fact that U.S. operations are designed to, 
and have the effect of, preventing depredations,98 the constellation of actors hostile to the War on Terror 
may well, if permitted, hijack the ICC as an accomplice in the criminalization of the Bush Doctrine  
(along with the civilians who crafted it99 and the troops who execute it) and the indemnification of 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 13 January 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) (prohibiting development, production, or 
use of chemical weapons); 1997 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction (36 I.L.M. 1507) (1997) (banning the use of land mines).  In recent years a 
movement the purpose of which is to deny technologically sophisticated states the legal capacity to employ advanced weapons 
systems has gained momentum.  See Smidt, supra note_, at 226 (discussing this development); BARNETT, supra note_, at120 
(discussing longstanding efforts to prohibit napalm and fuel-air explosives); Roberts, supra note_, at 22-23 (suggesting that 
cluster bombs, while not illegal per se, may be incompatible with the “fundamental principles” of IHL); Nicholas Wade & Eric 
Schmitt, U.S. Use of Tear Gas Could Violate Treaty, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003, at (reporting contention that U.S. 
use of riot control agents would violate the Chemical Weapons Convention); STUART MASLEN, ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES 
UNDER HUMANITARIAN LAW (2001) (discussing process whereby anti-personnel mines have been proscribed by 
multilateral treaty and efforts to extend the application of the treaty to non-ratifying states).  This effort rests largely upon 
declarations, unsupported by state practice, that the weapons system in question is violative of customary IHL principles.  See, 
e.g., Depleted Uranium: Hague War Crimes Prosecutor Not Ruling NATO Trial Out, LA REPUBBLICA, Jan. 14, 2001, at 14 
(quoting Chief Prosecutor of the ICTFY as stating that the use of depleted uranium [“DU”] munitions by NATO may constitute a 
war crime on the sole ground that DU munitions violate customary IHL); Smidt, supra note_, at 226 (speculating that lasers and 
mines will soon be declared violative of customary IHL despite persistent state dissent); ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons, Jul. 8, 1996 (stating, in an advisory opinion, that the use of nuclear weapons, in addition to other environmental-
altering weapons, may give rise to a violation of customary IHL).  The set of banned weapons recognized by the U.S. is 
considerably narrower than the set claimed by NGOs whose aggressive moves to declare such systems prohibited augur ill for 
technologically sophisticated states engaged in conflicts, such as anti-terrorist operations, where such systems have significant 
utility.  See Carnahan, supra note_, at 732 (discussing controversy in depth).
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 Whereas the customary IHL principle of distinction has traditionally imposed a strict prohibition against the deliberate
targeting of noncombatant personnel and civilian targets, thereby implying that specific intent to target noncombatants or 
civilians is required to prove criminal liability, IHL activists, contending that advances in military technology have facilitated 
much greater precision, now argue that the standard for criminal liability when an attacker misses a military target and causes 
collateral damage should be mere negligence.  See Roberts, supra note 48, at 46 (2001) (stating that the reduction in the burden 
of proof in a case alleging a violation of the principle of distinction will leave combatants and civilian decisonmakers “constantly 
subjected to second-guessing over weapon and target selection” and liable to prosecution for misjudgments made even in 
conditions of great uncertainty).  The subjection of targeting decisions, whether ex ante or ex post, to the review of a judicial 
body such as the ICC is, for many commentators, not a serious option.  Smidt, supra note_, at 229.  The further introduction of a 
negligence, rather than a specific  intent, standard renders this proposal even more objectionable.  See Anderson, supra note 63 
(arguing that even employing this reduced standard, negligence “has to consist of more than a lot of collateral damage, including 
gruesome civilian death and injury, that might be the result simply of a cruise missile aimed in good faith but gone astray.”).
98 See id. at 75 (contending that some interventions “serve . . . to increase the probability of the free choice of peoples[.]”).  It 
seems inarguable that operations in suppression of terrorism can reasonably be thought to fit within this category; the General 
Assembly has approved this thesis in declaring support of terrorists as “acts of aggression” constitutive of an “armed attack” 
against which the right to self-defense appertains.  G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1975), at 
Annex, Definition of Aggression, art. 3(g); see also Constantine Antonopolous, The Unilateral Use of Force by States after the 
End of the Cold War, 4 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 117 (1999) (arguing that UNSCRs 1368 and 1373, which recognize the 
“inherent” right of self-defense against terrorism, implicitly authorize the exercise of such a right).
99
 In the view of a number of senior civilian U.S. decisionmakers, they themselves, and not the troops they dispatch to do battle in 
the War on Terror, are the most valuable prize to be claimed through the manipulation of the ICC agenda by the enemies of the 
U.S. in concert with politically motivated prosecutors and judges.  See FRYE, supra note 35, at 43 (suggesting that the “top 
civilian and military leaders, those responsible for our defense and foreign policy[,] are the real potential targets of the ICC’s 
politically unaccountable prosecutor[.]”).  Recent indictments lodged against senior civilian and military decisionmakers, U.S. 
and otherwise, including the heads-of-state of the U.S. and Israel, in the domestic courts of several states lends credence to this 
speculation.  See, e.g., Green, supra note_, at 314 (discussing phenomenon whereby a number of states, including the UK, 
Canada, Australia, and Belgium, have amended their criminal codes to permit the exercise of universal jurisdiction in order to 
indict senior military and civilian officials of other states for war crimes and crimes against humanity); Jeffrey T Kuhner, Iraqis 
Target Gen. Franks for War Crimes Trial, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at A1 (reporting the filing of a criminal complaint 
against General Tommy Franks, commander of the Liberation of Iraq, alleging command responsibility for the commission of 
war crimes by unknown U.S. soldiers, in a Belgian court granted universal jurisdiction under a 1993 Belgian law); note (reporting 
that Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon, purporting to exercise universal jurisdiction, is seeking the extradition of 46 former 
Argentine military officers accused of having committed human rights abuses during the “Dirty War” from 1973-1983); but see
Paul Geitner, “Universal Jurisdiction” is Removed from War Crimes Law, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 2, 2003 (repoting the 
amendment of the Beligan law after its “abuse and manipula[tion] for political ends” and damage to relations with states with 
which Belgium had had “excellent rapport”) (quoting Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel).
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terrorism.100  In light of ongoing contestation over the parameters of IHL, it is not inconceivable that 
exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of “aggression” as it comes to be defined101 could result, 
particularly if such exercise is at odds with Security Council,102 in an attempt to hale U.S. personnel to the 
Hague to answer charges levied by a state sponsor of terrorism103 for operations that result in unintended 
civilian casualties104 or the use of “disproportionate” force against terrorists.105  The potential for mischief 
100
 To require the U.S. to first absorb a terrorist attack prior to undertaking self-defense measures would be to “giv[e] the bad guys 
a ‘free kick’ at the start of the conflict.”  Robert F. Turner, It’s Not Really Assassination: Legal and Moral Implications of 
Internationally Targeting Terrorists and Aggressor-State Regime Elites, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 787, 804 (2003).
101
 A long quasilegislative history precedes attempts to define the crime of “aggression” at international law.  See Jonathan A. 
Bush, “The Supreme Crime” and its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2324 (2002) (chronicling this history); see also Charter of the IMT, supra note_, at art. 6 (defining “crimes against peace” 
as including “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, 
agreements, or assurances.”).  Although the crime of aggression was included within ICC jurisdiction, the negotiating parties 
could not agree upon a definition.  See Van de Kieft, supra note 48, at 2359-63 (describing various proposed definitions of 
aggression giving rise to individual criminal liabiliy as including an option that would require as a condition precedent a 
determination of state responsibility for an unlawful war, a second option limiting individual liability to those ordering the 
aggressive acts, and a third identical to the first with the exception that peacekeeping operations were exempted).  As a result the 
ICC will not exercise jurisdiction over aggression until the States Parties agree, by a 7/8 majority, to a definition and to any 
conditions precedent and in no event will this occur prior to 7 years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute.  See Rome 
Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 5(1)(d) (granting the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression); id. at Art. 5(2) (providing that 
the ICC “shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 
123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the [ICC] shall exercise jurisdiction[.]”); id. at Art. 121, 123 
(providing rules and procedures for voting amendments to the ICC).  Were the ICC to define aggressuib to rule that a necessary 
and proportional response to a terrorist attack is not a measure in self-defense, such a definitional approach would incriminate 
states operating in self-defense and simultaneously insulate terrorists, along with the states harboring them, from responsibility 
for their actions if states that would otherwise employ force in response to terrorist attacks were dissuaded from doing so out of 
concern that their actions would give rise to legal liability.  See Smidt, supra note_, at 227-28 (commenting that an overbroad 
definition of aggression “may have the unintended consequences of protecting [terrorists].”).
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 Although Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute provides that the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression “shall be 
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,” and although the UN Charter accords the Security 
Council the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Art. 24(1), see infra at note_) and 
the exclusive competence to “determine the existence of any . . . act of aggression” (Art. 39), under the Rome Statute the ICC 
Prosecutor is empowered, in theory, to usurp the authority of the UN Security Council by indicting an individual for the crime of 
aggression without an Article 39 finding by the Security Council that the state of nationality of the individual committed an act of 
aggression, an eventuality anathema to the U.S.  See Jennifer Trahan, Defining “Aggression”: Why the Preparatory Commission 
for the International Criminal Court has Faced Such a Conundrum, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 440 (2002) 
(concluding that the ICC Prosecutor is not restricted by operation of the Rome Statute from making a determination of the 
existence of an act of aggression independent of a contrary Security Council determination); King & Theofrastus, supra note_, at 
100 (indicating that for some members of Congress the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute was a “new and 
capricious attempt” reminiscent of the ICJ judgment against the U.S. for its support of the Contras, to circumscribe the role of the 
Security Council and “reign in U.S. unilateral actions,” such as Grenada, Nicaragua, Libya, and Panama); see also Hearing on the 
Creation of an International Court Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
105th Cong. 60 (“I think I can anticipate what will constitute a crime of ‘aggression’ in the eyes of [the ICC]: it will be a crime 
when the [U.S.] takes any military action to defend its national interests, unless the U.S. first seeks and receives the permission of 
the United Nations.”).  In response to Congressional anxiety over the prospect that the ICC would effectively dilute the U.S. veto 
of sanctions directed against it by the Security Council, the Congress, in the American Servicemen’s Protection Act, stated 
emphatically that “[a]ny agreement within the Preparatory Commission that usurps the prerogative of the United Nations Security 
Council under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations to ‘determine the existence of any . . . act of aggression’ would 
contravene the charter of the United Nations[.]”  ASPA, supra note_, at §2002 (“Findings”).
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 U.S. critics of international institutions rail against the idea that democratic nations are susceptible to legal judgment by 
dictatorships and rogue states.  See Helms, supra note_.  However, the international legal principle of the formal equality of states 
does not permit a distinction to be drawn between democratic states and dictatorships with respect to the question of standing to 
bring a complaint in the ICC.  See Charter of the United Nations, at Art. 2 (enshrining formal legal equality of states).  By the 
same token, the principle does not prevent awarding the chair on the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Conference on 
Disarmament to states such as Libya and Husseinist Iraq respectively.  See N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at A1 (reporting naming 
of Iraq as co-chair of the Conference with responsibilities for monitoring compliance with numerous weapons control treaties 
despite its failure to comply with UN sanctions banning its own possession of various weapons systems).
104
 The Rome Statute prohibits knowingly attacking a target that “will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians.”  Rome 
Statute, supra note_, at Article 8(2)(b)(iv).  To take advantage of the reticence of military planners to run afoul of this legal 
proscription and of the media attention to the casualties that unintentionally result from counterterrorist operations, terrorists 
often cite military targets in civilian neighborhoods.  MARK LLOYD, SPECIAL FORCES: THE CHANGING FACE OF 
WARFARE 230 (1995) (“A government suspected of supporting terrorism has only to produce evidence of heavy civilian 
casualties sustained during a retaliatory raid to divert attention from the iinitial purpose of that raid [because] . . . such evidence is 
often enough to convince a shocked and militarily unsophisticated media that . . . the attack was little more than an outrageous 
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explains why some brand the ICC a pernicious institution that will grant terrorists moral ablution and 
invite further evil,106 and it accounts, in part, for the covert orchestration of much of the War on Terror107
the better to evade a welter of scrutiny108 waxing unsympathetic to U.S. purpose.109
atrocity.”); Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks Outside ABC TV Studio, 28 October 2001, at 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/briefings.html (“[Al Qaeda terrorists] are using mosques for command and control, for 
ammunition storage, and they’re not taking journalists in to show that.  What they do is when there’s a bomb goes down, they 
grab some children and some women and pretend that the bomb hit the women and the children.”).  The possibility—perhaps 
even the probability—exists that when the U.S. targets terrorists hiding in the midst of civilian populations U.S. ordnance “may 
kill innocent civilians per accidens, as an unintentional byproduct of killing the enemy[.]” Cole, supra note_, at 97-98; see also
Steven Erlanger, NATO Powers Accused or War Crimes; Rights Group Says Civilians Targeted in Yugoslavia, PLAIN DEALER, 
Jun. 8, 2000, at 5A (reporting description by Ambassador Scheffer of hypothetical scenario wherein a state party to the Rome 
Statute seeks to indict U.S. nations when U.S. bombs accidentally destroy civilian targets and human shields behind whom 
terrorist are hiding are killed).  Indeed, U.S. operations during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan have 
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians.  Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jul. 21, 2002, at A1 (reporting deaths of hundreds of civilians in Oruzgan Province).  However, as a matter of policy the 
U.S. makes good-faith efforts beyond those of any other state to avoid civilian casualties in its targeting decisions, and it employs 
significant resources technological and personal to advance the principle of distinction as far as possible.  See, e.g., U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, NSIAD-97-134, at 5.2.2 (1997) (requiring pilots to 
place ordinance in a “particular corner, a vent, or a door” to count as a “hit” rather than a miss and thus to protect civilian life and 
property); Emily Eakin, Ethical War?  Do the Good Gus Finish First?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2003, at A1 (reporting that the great 
lengths to which the U.S. Central Command went to avoid accidental collateral damage to civilians actually compromised 
apprehension of members of Al Qaeda); Roberts, supra note_, at 21 (“There are strong reasons to believe US statements that 
civilian deaths in Afghanistan due to the U.S. bombing were unintended.”).  Consequently, U.S. planners, as well as many neutral 
commentators hold “blame [terrorists] for the deaths of innocent people they hide among.” Cole, supra note_, at 97-98 
(elaborating the principle of distinction as understood within the Christian just war theory); see also KEN ANDERSON ET AL., 
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Press Release, Mar. 19, 2003 (attributing obligations to exclude civilians from military targets, 
and responsibility for resulting casualties where civilians are not excluded, to defenders, rather than to attackers).
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 The U.S. accepts limitations on the use of force, imposed under the customary IHL principle of proportionality, in the conduct 
of military operations.  See U.S. ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FM 27-10, Department of the Army Field Manual, 
Washington, D.C., Jul. 1956, rev’d. Jul. 15, 1976, at para. 41 (“[T]he loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks 
must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”).  However, just as the 
precise meaning of the principle of distinction is contested legal terrain, the definition of proportionality, and the application of 
the principle to military operations, is the subject of dispute. See supra at note_.  The injunction not to employ force so as to 
cause damage “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” suggests, to one commentator, that 
the principle of proportionality “favors the option of intentionally killing the head tyrant as a means of ending aggression, rather 
than sending our young men and women onto the battlefield to slaughter—and be slaughtered by—the tyrant’s young men and 
women.”  Turner, supra note_, at 800.  Others argue that proportionality requires a balancing approach.  Still others suggest that 
in determining the proportionality of attacks against certain infrastructure one must take into account the “indirect and cumulative 
effects” of the military action, and not merely the direct effects. Shue & Wippman, supra note 43, at 574.  Although the Bush 
Administration interpreted proportionality to require that strikes against the Taliban military structures and al Qaeda terrorist 
camps be carefully calibrated, in practice it is impossible to adhere to universally-accepted standards of proportionality when 
employing such devastating weapons systems as cruise missiles, heavy bombers, and cluster munitions.  See Adam Roberts, The 
Laws of War in the War on Terror (unpublished manuscript on file with author), at 7 (stating that the principle of proportionality 
is in tension with the U.S. doctrine favoring application of overwhelming force in order to achieve decisive victory quickly and 
with a minimum of casualties).  Consequently, there is space to determine a breach of a legal obligation under almost any 
circumstances.  See Drumbl, supra note_, at 48 (stating that malleability of the principle of proportionality is “reason to be 
concerned over the . . . incipient legalization of the use of . . . force in response to [terrorist] attacks.”). 
106
 The U.S. impression of the ICC as antipathetic to U.S. national security and conducive to malefactors is well-summarized as 
follows: “However well-intentioned advocates for the [ICC] may be, the [ICC] represents a significant threat to the national 
security of the United States and its allies . . . Since the forces of evil will recognize the deterrent influence of such politically 
based prosecutions on potential responders, the leaders of these regimes may make entirely rational decisions to commit acts of 
aggression, knowing they can act without fear of military intervention from foreign forces.”  Smidt, supra note_, at 229.
107
 Covert operations, also known as “special activities” or “special operations,” are a “peculiarly American invention” used by 
every President since the founding of the U.S.  Melvin A Goodman, Espionage and Covert Action, in Craig Eisendrath, ed., 
National Security: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War (2000); Statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director 
of Central Intelligence, Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 5, 1729, 1731-33 
(1976) (detailing long usage of covert operations as instrument in U.S. foreign policy).  Such operations are defined in U.S. law 
as “activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of 
the U.S. Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly[.]”  Executive Order, No. 12,333, at 3.4(h); 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941 
(1981) Covert operations may lawfully be conducted only by the Central Intelligence Agency or by the U.S. Armed Forces unless 
the President makes a finding that another agency “is more likely to achieve a particular  objective.”  Id. at 1.8(3).  “Special 
operations [are] conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, 
political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
areas” and which “requir[e] clandestive, covert, or low visibility techniques[.]”  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, Joint Publication 3-05 (Test): Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (1990), at 3-5 (emphasis added).  The principal 
distinguishing feature of covert operations is that, unlike overt applications of force, they are intended to remain secret from the 
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public in order to permit government officials to plausibly deny responsibility for their effects.  See Foreign Military Intelligence, 
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 755, 
94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Book I, at 490-91 (1976) (citing an early National Security Council document, NSC-4/A (1948), REISMAN 
& BAKER, supra note_, at 305 n.30 (stating that although the doctrine of plausible deniability was formally abandoned in 1974 
it is operative as a matter of policy).  While the domestic legal regime governing covert operations is beyond the scope of this 
article, the President has authority, acting through the National Security Council, to direct the Central Intelligence Agency or the 
Defense Department to engage in covert operations.  See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 and 50 U.S.C.), at 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(5) (1994) (authorizing President to direct 
the CIA “to perform . . . other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security).
108 Where the UN authorizes a military operation, the relevant Security Council resolution provides the broad mission, political 
objective, and legal authority and creates a quasi-contract between the UN and states contributing forces.  Marc. L. Warren, 
Operational Law—A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 33, 48 (1996). Although under international law there is no explicit 
prohibition against covert operations, and even if covert operations often result in greatly minimized use of force as compared to 
overt military interventions, a general presumption against the legality of the use of force pertains.  See UN Charter at Art. 2(4) 
(“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force[.]”).  While tactical considerations of 
secrecy and expedience may suggest that a covert operation is more likely to achieve an outcome otherwise achievable by overt 
force, absent prior authorization by the Security Council the political costs and the risk of legal exposure attendant to a covert 
operation increase geometrically. See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note_, at 75-77, 115 (suggesting that while covert operations 
conducted in accord with IHL may be “contributive and supplementary to rather than destructive of international law[ and 
order,]” the inference of lawfulness does not attach to an unauthorized covert operation any more than it does to an unauthorized 
overt operation); see also W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 3, 19 (1999) 
(arguing that neutralization of terrorist targets by covert means does not excite as much condemnation as does an overt military 
operation, due to the opportunity for the plausible deniability by the attacking state and for 3rd parties to more readily ignore the 
consequences); Jami Melissa Jackson, The Legality of Assassination of Independent Terrorist Leaders, 24 N.C.J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 669, 713 (1999) (identifying increased international legal intolerance of covert operations across state borders).  
However, American presidents have jealously defended their rights and claimed duties to employ covert operations when overt 
military force would carry political and legal risks.  See Marcus Eyth, The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to 
Disclose: That is the Question, 17 BYU J. Pub. L. 45, 68 (2002); Legal Opinion by Lloyd Cutler, President’s Counsel, on War 
Powers Consultation Relative to the Iran Rescue Mission (May 9, 1980), reprinted in Subcomm, on Int’l. Security and Scientific 
Aff. Of the House Comm. On Foreign Aff., War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, 98th 
Cong,., 1st Sess. 50 (1983) (claiming inherent Presidential powers to employ covert operations to rescue U.S. citizens held 
hostage where mission success is surprise-dependent) (relying upon The Hostage Act, Rev. Stat. 2001, 22 U.S.C.§1732) 
(providing that the “President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain 
or effectuate the release [of U.S. citizens held hostage].”  Accordingly, to the extent the U.S. Executive Branch has been 
interested in the legality of covert operations, attention has been focused upon the domestic, rather than the international, legal 
issues.  Inasmuch as international law is considered in the covert operations context, presidents and commentators have opined 
that the U.S. president has the authority, under domestic law, to authorize Executive Branch officials to violate international law.  
See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note_, at 68 (I believe in the right of a country, when it believes that its interests are best 
served, to practice covert activity.”) (quoting President Ronald Reagan); Statement of Assistant Attorney General William P. 
Barr, Office of Legal Counsel, On the Legality as a Matter of Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities That 
Depart from International Law, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House 
of Representatives, Nov. 8, 1989 (concluding that as a matter of U.S. law the president can authorize executive officials to 
conduct covert operations that violate the territorial sovereignty of other states in contravention of customary international law).  
The U.S. has met significant political and legal resistance in response to the War on Terror.  In response it has shielded 
much of its battle plan from public review (and legal attack) and turned to covert operations as its principle weapon.  See Thom 
Shanker & James Risen, Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts by Military Units, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1 (reporting that 
the Department of Defense has issued a classified directive ordering a focus upon the employment of U.S. special forces and CIA 
paramilitary forces to “disrupt and destroy enemy assets” in countries where the U.S. is not at open war and where the local 
government is not aware of their presence); see also Thom Shanker, Jump in Elite Forces’ Budget Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2003, at A10 (reporting expansion of Special Operations Command and authorization to independently plan and execute 
counterterrorist operations).  Shortly after September 11th, President Bush issued a finding that authorized the CIA and Army 
Special Forces to kill two dozen terrorist leaders—the “worst of the worst”—if capture is “too dangerous or logistically 
impossible.”  CIA Gets 007 Tag from Bush: License to Kill, REUTERS., Dec. 16, 2002, at A1 (reporting finding as the “broadest 
discretion ever bestowed on CIA to make use of covert operations).  While the liberal use of covert measures is likely to 
continue, the Bush Administration has not avoided all legal criticism.  The consequences for the rule of law and for democratic 
accountability are beyond the context of this Article; for a broader discussion, see Alberto R. Coll, Unconventional Warfare, 
Liberal Democracies, and International Order, in ALBERTO R. COLL, JAMES S. ORD, & STEPHEN A. ROSE, LEGAL 
AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, 67 INT’L L. STUD. 1 (1995).
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 Very few states have offered more than platitudes in support of the U.S.-led War on Terror, with most either remaining quasi-
neutral and some even adopting an obstructionist approach in the UN Security Council.  The reasons for this are beyond the 
scope of this Article.  The principle exception has been NATO, which in the immediate aftermath of September 11th invoked the 
collective defense provisions of the NATO Charter to offer the U.S. military assistance if necessary.  See North Atlantic Treaty, 
Apr. 4, 1949, art. V, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244 (providing that “an armed attack against one or more of [NATO members] . . . shall be 
considered an attack against them all”); Press Release, NATO Reaffirms Treaty Commitments in Dealing with Terrorist Attacks 
Against the U.S. (Sept. 12, 2001) (reaffirming commitment to mutual defense under Article V of Nato Charter).  Similarly, 
despite a plethora of proclamations, the UN, has never demonstrated a firm commitment to eradicating terrorism, and group of 
Afro-Asian states have carved out exceptions to language condemning terrorism on the theory that citizens of certain states, in 
particular the U.S. and Israel, do not serve immunity on account of the “racist” or “colonial” policies of their governments.  See 
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 14th plen mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/9922 (2001) (stating that ‘[a]cts of pure terrorism, involving attacks against 
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The foregoing is not a veiled attempt to secret national interests within an international rubric: 
there is a less parochial foundation upon which to reject the fruits of Rome.  With their monstrous acts, 
the 19 Islamic terrorists who crashed jets laden with civilian passengers into the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon may have struck targets physically within the U.S., but in so doing they and their 
organizational and state supporters declared war upon Western civilization.110  Quite simply, there are no 
categories of criminality that can contain such acts, and their authors can only be understood as 
barbarians.111  Accordingly, the U.S. has concluded that, after defeating fascism and communism, the free 
world is once more at war:112 the Bush Doctrine,113 disdaining judicial responses for military measures, 
pronounces clearly that the nexus of Islamic terrorism and WMD must be defeated to “prevent the 
triumph of an intolerable tyranny.”114
E.  Accommodation: Toward a Rationalized Theory of the Laws of War
By reference to a series of events in the film Saving Private Ryan,115 a fictionalized account of the
Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944, and to a hypothetical scenario involving a U.S. covert operation to 
eliminate WMD in the custody of terrorists, Part II juxtaposes the two contending paradigms—the code 
of martial honor,116 a regime of professional self-regulation rooted in non-legal norms and obligations and 
innocent civilian populations should be differentiated from legitimate struggles of peoples under colonial, alien, or foreign 
domination for self-determination and national liberation[.]”).  That the U.S. should be chary of submitting to the legal judgment 
of states that propagate the canard that “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” should not be surprising.
110 See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 36 (2002) (stating that the 9/11 attacks 
were specifically directed, religiously motivated blows against icons of the West).
111
 On September 15th, President George W. Bush made a colloquial reference to the terrorists of September 11th as “barbarians” in 
public comments urging Americans to return to their normal lives as much as possible but to anticipate possible future attacks.  
See Bob Kemper & Tim Jones, Bush Warns of Long Fight Ahead, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 2001, at A1 (“The American people 
need to go about their business on Monday, but with a heightened sense of awareness that a group of barbarians have declared 
war on the American people[.]”).  This nomenclature has not yet found a formal place in law.  However, the equation of terrorists 
with barbarians is suitable inasmuch as both are counter-civilizational and both disentitle themselves from the category of rights-
bearing subjects by their transgressions against the rights of others.  See ALEXANDER & RAPOPORT, supra note_, at 294 “the 
terrorist . . . not only violates particular rights, he also rejects the principles on which rights rest, and aims at destroying the 
capacity of the government to protect them . . . [T]he terrorist is . . . an enemy of rights in general . . . The terrorist cannot 
legitimately expect respect for his claims from those to whom he makes them, for he is exempting himself from the rightless 
status to which he would relegate all others purely on the basis of his self-appointment[.]”  The reconceptualization of terrorists 
as modern-day barbarians is indebted to the work of Eric Hobsbawm, who in an influential 1994 essay opined that an ongoing 
process marked by “the disruption and breakdown of the systems of rules and moral behaviour by which all societies regulate . . . 
relations” and the erosion of  “the universal system of . . . rules and standards of moral behaviour, embodied in the institutions of 
states dedicated to the rational progress of humanity: to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness, to Equality, Liberty and 
Fraterntiy or whatever[,]”  was dragging civilization into an abyss wherein a “dangerous classes” of predators “for whom no 
accepted or effective rules and limits of behaviour exist any longer[,] . . . not even the accepted rules of violence in a traditional 
society of macho fighters[,]” would transcend all boundaries of morality in their attacks.  See Eric Hobbsbawm, Barbarism: A 
User’s Guide, 206 NEW LEFT REV. 44, 47 -53 (1994).  For an operationalization of the term, see infra at Part III.
112 See Gross, supra note_, at 523 (suggesting that Islamic terrorism is an existential threat to the “free world”, defined as the 
liberal Western democracies); see also ECONOMIST, The Day the World Changed, 15-21 Sept. 2001 (“The terror . . . this week 
is an assault not just on the [U.S.] but on civilisation itself.”).
113
 Although others have applied the term more narrowly, the “Bush Doctrine” encompasses the broader transformation of U.S. 
policy toward preempting, rather than simply responding to, threats.  See David Sanger, Making Case to Hit First, N. Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 4, 2002, at A1 (labeling as the “Bush Doctrine” the current U.S. strategy that asserts the right to launch pre-emptive strikes 
against any state that could put WMD in the hands of terrorists); compare Benjamin Langille, It’s Instant Custom: How the Bush 
Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145 (2003) (terming 
the “Bush Doctrine” the dichotomization of states into supporters of the U.S. and supporters of terrorism).  The Bush Doctrine is 
thus a major foreign policy redirection from the Clinton Doctrine, which was characterized by the display (as opposed to the use) 
of military power, casualty avoidance, absolute minimization of collateral damage, and “unseemly haste to declare even the most 
modest use (or threat) of force a roaring success.” BARNETT, supra note_, at 130.
114
 The quoted words are drawn from the title of an essay encouraging the U.S. to abandon neutrality and intervene against Nazi 
Germany on the ground that to refuse would constitute an immoral act.  Reinhold Niebuhr, CHRIST. CENT., Dec. 18, 1940.
115
 DreamWorks Studios, 1998.
116 See supra at note_.
23
institutionalized in the system of courts-martial, and the judicial model embodied in the ICC117—to 
illustrate that only the former suppresses violations of IHL while immunizing all but those acts that can be 
genuinely and universally branded criminal in order to grant soldiers a necessary margin of appreciation 
in defending against manifestly evil adversaries bent on destroying civilization.  Part III will resurrect an 
ancient taxonomy denoting terrorists as a species of near-rightless outlaws—barbarians—with regard to 
whom the West may place some aspects of IHL in abeyance and drape its military forces and civilian 
commanders with broad immunities in operations against these malefactors.  Proposals for measures 
likely to draw law and justice into a closer relationship by rationalizing IHL in support its teleological 
mission—the protection of the civilization it defends and reflects118—will be followed by a Conclusion.
II. Saving Private Ryan v. Trying Captain Ryan: A Functionalist Comparison of the Martial Code and 
the ICC in the Enforcement of IHL
A. Saving Private Ryan: The Regime of Martial Honor, Allegations of War Crimes in World War II, and 
the System of Courts-Martial
1.  Martial Honor
Since ancient times, certain acts committed during war have been widely known to be 
“manifestly wrongful, on account of their flagrant inconsistency . . . with [the] professional character as 
an honorable [soldier.]”119  The medieval code of chivalry, which established a detailed set of rules and 
principles for the violation of which one’s knighthood could be stripped, further elaborated this “soldier’s 
code,” also known as the “martial code.”120  Knights engaged in a casuistic process of self-reflection and -
criticism, as well as collective argumentation, over whether particular actions breached this martial 
code.121  By the late Renaissance a set of self-expectations, internalized by a transnational caste of officers 
as a moral and professional behavioral code requiring, inter alia, the minimization of civilian casualties, 
consistent with military objectives, as a matter not of law but of honor, had perfused the practice of war.122
Further, the martial code, by rejecting the “total, unrecognizable alienness” and inhumanity of the enemy 
in favor of a conception of the foe as a fellow professional, directed the honorable soldier to refrain from 
treachery and criminality in combating him.123  As the martial code diffused and matured, a body of 
117
 For a contemporary presentation of the considerations involved in electing either a judicial or a military approach to problems 
in international politics and law, see Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 559 (1999) (bifurcating responses to international terrorism into a judicial model, characterized by the use of the tools 
of the criminal justice system and the creation of norms to support transnational administration of justce through treaties, and a 
military model, characterized by the use of force to disable and disrupt terrorists from carrying out their missions).
118 See OSIEL, supra note_, at 5 (suggesting IHL has reached the stage whereby it is now constitutive of civilization); KASTO, 
supra note_, at 12 (arguing that IHL is “connected with the real existence of society”).
119
 OSIEL, supra note_, at 207.
120 See JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS 78 (1949) (identifying “compassion, fidelity, and justice” as “essential” to the 
chivalric code); MAURICE KEEN, NOBLES, KNIGHTS, AND MEN-AT-ARMS 51-59 (describing chivalric virtues as 
including graciousness to vanquished foes in recognition of shared membership in an international brotherhood-at-arms); 
MERON, supra note_, at 209 (noting that breach of the chivalric code associated with dishonor, shame, and ostracism); 
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR’S HONOR 117 (describing “warrior’s honor” as an ethical system that defines the 
“moral etiquette by which warriors judged themselves to be worthy of respect[.]”).
121
 OSIEL, supra note_, at 17.  Medieval Japanes knights called the martial code bushido.  IGNATIEFF, supra note_, at 117.
122 See OSIEL, supra note_, at 31-32 (“[[Soldiers] ask themselves: ‘What is required of honorable soldiers, here and now?’ rather 
than ‘What does international law require[?]” . . . Martial honor ‘means doing nothing to tarnish that proud heritage’ of one’s 
unit, regiment, or branch of service[.]”).  Under the martial code, a soldier gauges his conduct by asking not whether it was legal 
but rather “[w]ould [my] actions pass muster if . . . evaluated by responsible, respectable soldiers of yesterday and today?”).  
James H. Toner, Teaching Military Ethics, MIL. L. REV. 33, 37 (1993)
123
 BEST, supra note_, at 290.
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collective narrative developed to inform and guide soldiers in the discharge of their duties; when in doubt 
as to their obligations, soldiers conformed their conduct to “stories about the great deeds of honorable 
soldiers” drawn from the “ongoing collective narrative of [their] corps.”124  In other words, as a 
constituent part of their professional honor, soldiers have long recognized an obligation to accept personal 
risks,125 and it is this self-selected and -imposed commitment, undertaken as the price of membership in an 
epistemic community, to upholding the virtues of a shared profession that continues to inspire adherence 
to the humanitarian principles underlying the positive legal regime of IHL.126
Admittedly, martial honor alone does not suppress all violations.  Revenge, fear, and other 
intractable instincts tapped by the horror of war can be overwhelming, and when their discipline 
disintegrates and darker angels of their nature overcome them, some soldiers—no less emotional and 
fallible creatures than their civilian counterparts—do indeed descend into inhumanity.   However, their 
failure to abide by the martial code, which reflects an internal deterrence regime while imposing a more 
stringent standard of conduct than that demanded by IHL,127 strips wayward members of something of 
incalculable value—their status, worth, and identity within the martial caste.128  When the threat of 
professional banishment fails to enforce compliance with this strict behavioral template, the martial code 
subjects individual transgressors to courts-martial129 and the unit(s) responsible to reprisals;130 each regime 
brings internal standards of judgment to bear and can impose, where appropriate to specific delicts, 
sanctions as serious as death.  The propinquity of an accused to the peers called to judge him is simply not 
proof against obloquy, castigation, and excommunication.
However, although courts-martial and reprisals inflict harsh punishment upon dishonorable 
members of the martial caste, at the same time these self-policing regimes are intrinsically disposed to the 
holistic examination of the wide welter of circumstances under which violations in question are alleged to 
have been committed.  Whereas many IHL proponents would impose a duty upon soldiers to utterly 
124 Id. at 21. This narrative identity is conferred largely by anecdotal reference to an accreting stock of stories that detail how 
heroic soldiers behaved in combat, particularly with regard to the avoidance of the infliction of unnecessary suffering.  Id. (citing, 
as exemplary of such stories, Dept. of the Army, Values: A Handbook for Soldiers, sec. 2, Pamphlet 600 (Jan. 1987)).
125 See Statement of General Douglas MacArthur in Confirming the Death Dentence Imposed by a United States Military 
Commission on Japanese General Tomayuki Yamashita for Command Responsibility in the Murder of U.S. POWs, October 1946 
(“The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed.   It is the very essence and reason for 
his being.  When he violates this sacred trust, he no only profanes his entire cult but threatens the very fabric of international 
society.  The traditions of fighting men are long and honorable.  They are based upon the noblest of human traits—sacrifice.”
126 See Anderson, Ottawa (contending that the “sense of a shared profession among men -at-arms” dictates limits of enforceability 
of IHL); MERON, supra note_, at 216 (1993) (“Honour and mercy . . . formed potent forces for civilized behaviour in time of 
war.”); RICHARD HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 5 (1983) (suggesting that restraint in combat 
“d(oes) not stem from conscious articulation of principles of [IHL] so much as from a soldier’s honor[.]”); JEFFREY LEGRO, 
COOPERATION UNDER FIRE (1995) (identifying martial honor as the most important source of control over martial conduct).
127
 Much of the language codified as IHL represents the lowest-common-denominator of what states-parties were willing to 
accept, and thus the prohibitive regime is less stringent than the martial code.  See OSIEL, supra note , at 32 (suggesting that 
while IHL establishes a “a ‘floor’ beneath which no soldier may descend,” the “most effective soldiering, the sort that wins 
medals (and battles) is . . . ‘supererogatory,’ requiring the acceptance of risk . . . ‘beyond the call of duty.’”).
128
 GABRIELE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME AND GUILT 55 (1985). Social control theorists make the more general observation 
that social groups exert much more control over members’ behavior than externally imposed general sources of regulation.  TOM 
R. TAYLOR, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 22-23 (1990) (discussing theories).
129
 The “court-martial” is a domestic military court with jurisdiction to try certain classes of persons for offenses against military 
order and discipline as well as against the laws and customs of war.  See infra at pp._ (discussing the U.S. court-martial in depth).
130
 “Reprisal” is a term in IHL describing retaliation undertaken to induce enemy forces to cease their own violations of IHL.  See 
generally KALSHOVEN, supra note 28.  A reprisal, when undertaken absent a prior enemy violation, would constitute a 
violation of IHL, but when done for the purpose of forcing an adversary to cease violating IHL it becomes legal provided it is 
proportional, temporary, and is preceded by notice.  Id.  Reprisals, or the threat thereof, alter the decision matrix of soldiers.
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abjure self-preservation in obeisance to absolute legal prohibitions on the killing or destruction of certain 
classes of persons and things,131 courts-martial, a more pragmatic forum, reserve judgment to other 
military personnel who, by virtue of their own experience, are able to discern the extent to which 
defenses, such as those grounded in military necessity, ought to be considered in immunization against 
liability or in mitigation or extenuation of guilt.132  The decision to inflict reprisal requires the responsible 
military commander to undertake a similar, if more informal, analysis with respect to the nature of the act 
and whether it was committed out of a reasonable interpretation of military necessity, any potential claims 
that the act did not trammel upon martial honor, and the utility of reciprocal violations in deterring future 
such enemy acts.   In sum, martial honor demands even more of soldiers than laws established by 
outsiders to regulate them, and a rigid yet informal transnational regime vigorously enforces this code 
upon the ultimate pains of professional banishment and death.  However, in recognizing and accepting 
that soldiers have an instinct, a right, and a duty to self-preservation that no law can abridge or even 
regulate in any meaningful way, martial honor deviates from IHLabsolutism in a sense so profound it is 
difficult to overstate.  Nonetheless, few honest observers adjudge martial honor wanting with respect to 
its capacity to preserve humanity in war while successfully defending civilization.
2.  Saving Private Ryan
On the morning of June 6th, 1944, the first of 1 million Allied forces under the supreme command 
of General Dwight Eisenhower invaded Nazi-occupied Europe, with initial landings upon a series of 
code-named beaches in the Normandy region of France.  Among other U.S. formations spearheading 
OPERATION OVERLORD against fierce German resistance was the 75th Ranger Regiment.
The film Saving Private Ryan opens with C Company of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 
already under fire from shore batteries, preparing to disembark from their landing craft and storm Dog 
Green sector of OMAHA BEACH.  The maelstrom of shot and shell obliterates much of the first wave, 
including the majority of C Company, and their commander, Captain John Miller, aware that the success 
of the invasion hangs in the balance, orders the shocked survivors, pinned by withering machinegun fire 
and flak behind tank obstacles at water’s edge, to advance.  Men disintegrate in puffs of warm crimson 
mist as C Company drags forward and redeploys behind a natural berm strewn with pieces of their 
buddies.  With casualties mounting at an incredible rate, Captain Miller orders his troops to advance 
through a draw and eliminate the fortifications atop the bluffs above OMAHA so additional forces can be 
ushered ashore.  Murderous machinegun fire rakes C Company during its struggle up the heights, but as C 
Company and its sister companies turn the tide the German infantry manning the fortifications atop the 
bluffs throw down their weapons in surrender.  Rather than accept surrenders, however, C Company, its 
members enraged at the mass slaughter of so many Americans, mows down the lines of now-defenseless 
131 See WALZER, supra note 12, at 305 (claiming that IHL establishes the absolute rule that “self-preservation . . . is not an 
excuse for violations of the rules of war”).
132 See Telephone Interview with LTC Mark Martens, Deputy SJA, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Oct. 2, 2000 (noting that at a court-
martial proceeding an accused is permitted trial before a jury of military peers who are charged with determining whether 
extenuating or mitigating circumstances such as “heat of passion, lack of sleep or food, [or] extremity of the circumstances” 
should be permitted as partial or complete defenses or factors to be considered in reduction of sentencing); see also TAYLOR, 
supra note 13, 36 (“circumstances arise when military necessity, or even something less, causes [the rules] to be disregarded.  In 
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Germans, as Captain Miller and his first sergeant silently observe.  Although the battle yet rages along the 
invasion beaches, Dog Green is quiet as Captain Miller surveys the beach below, carpeted with the bodies 
of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, his shaking hands betraying unspoken emotions.
Several days later, after he reports to his battalion commander the intelligence gathered from an 
engagement between the remnants of C Company and an entrenched German flak unit defending the 
German withdrawal across Normandy, Captain Miller is ordered to select and lead a squad on what is 
described as a mission of strategic importance the objective of which is the location and evacuation of 
Private James S. Ryan.  The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, upon learning of 
the combat death of Private Ryan’s three brothers in other theaters, has determined that the injury to 
national morale would be too great were Ryan’s mother to lose all four sons in battle, and he orders 
Private Ryan hastened to immediate safety.133  Captain Miller selects a squad of seven and sets out for the 
last known location of Private Ryan, a town deep behind enemy lines.
After a day’s march the squad advances upon a machinegun nest at the base of a destroyed radar 
installation that has been hastily emplaced to delay U.S. forces pursuing the German retreat.  Against the 
advice of his men, who counsel the bypass of the position, Captain Miller, reasoning that, despite the 
importance of his strategic mission, follow-on forces will be forced to eliminate the machinegun if his 
men do not, orders a modified frontal assault that results in the second death within his squad.  After the 
sole surviving machinegunner134 is captured, Captain Miller permits his troops to beat and otherwise abuse 
the terrified, desperate German POW for several minutes while he ponders a course of action, his hands 
once again shaking with the gravity of the situation and the depths of his internal anguish. One member of 
the squad, Private First Class (PFC) Reiben, argues vehemently that the POW should be executed, 
insisting that to release him will result in his rejoining his unit and revealing the existence of the mission 
to the Germans, who will recognize the strategic nature of the mission and initiate a hunt for the squad, 
whereas to take the POW along will encumber and compromise the success of the mission.  Captain 
Miller finally determines that the POW will be blindfolded and released upon his promise to surrender 
himself to the first Allied patrol he encounters.  The parolee, madly repeating the words to American 
movies, deriding Hitler, and attempting to sing the U.S. national anthem the better to prove his love for 
the U.S. and his hatred for Nazism, steps briskly into the distance.  When PFC Reiben quarrels directly 
with Captain Miller, Sergeant Horvath takes him to task for his insubordination, and the two nearly come 
to blows before Captain Miller reorients the unit to the search for Private Ryan.
Private Ryan is located in the village of Ramelle with a subordinate unit of the 101st Airborne 
Division defending a bridgehead, and, after he refuses to accompany the rescue squad until the German 
armored counterattack against his position is defeated, the units are integrated in defense.  During the 
pitched battle, in which U.S. forces absorb heavy losses but hold the position until Allied air patrols 
the heat of combat, soldiers who are frightened, angered, shocked at the death of comrades, and fearful of treacherous attacks by 
enemies feigning death or surrender, are often prone to kill rather than capture.”).
133
 Private Fritz Nyland of the 101st Airborne Division was removed from the European Theater of Operations by order of the War 
Department in June 1944 after it was discovered that all three of his brothers were killed in action in a single week.  See 
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, BAND OF BROTHERS 103 (1992).
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destroy the bridge, the paroled German machinegunner, who has rejoined his SS unit, kills a member of 
the squad in hand-to-hand combat and shoots Captain Miller.  Reinforcements arrive on the heels of close 
air support, and a group of German attackers throw down their weapons and surrender to Technical 
Sergeant (T/5) Upham, a German linguist and intelligence analyst who has emerged from the building 
wherein he cowered for much of the battle.  Although Upham has leveled his rifle at the Germans, the 
paroled machinegunner, recognizing Upham for the timid soul he is and hoping to rattle him, calls him by 
name and derisively informs him in German, loudly so the others can hear, that he is “no soldier.”  
Upham hesitates only a second before shooting the paroled machinegunner, after which he gruffly tells 
the other German detainees to “scatter.”  They do so, and the sole survivors, PFC Reiben, T/5 Upham, 
and Private Ryan, gather around the dying Captain Miller, whose final words challenge Private Ryan to 
live his life so as to earn the sacrifices of the men who died so he might live.  In the final scene, Private 
Ryan, now an aging grandfather surrounded by his extended family, pays his respects at the gravesite of 
Captain Miller in the American Military Cemetery atop the bluffs overlooking Omaha Beach, and as the 
film concludes it is clear that Private Ryan has indeed done everything he could to merit the valor of his 
fallen comrades and that their sacrifice, made to rid the world of the great evil of Nazism, was not in vain.
3.  War Crimes in Private Ryan?
a)  Denial of Quarter
i.  Antiquity
The earliest recorded history of war indicates that the killing of prisoners of war [“POWs”] 
rendered hors de combat135 was common.  The denial of quarter—refusal to grant clemency to combatants 
no longer capable of offering resistance by virtue of wounds or other disability136—is one of the most 
ancient and enduring practices of warfare, conducted by the Greeks, Romans, and others for whom “war, 
naked and unashamed, kn[ew] of no right but the right to kill.”137  For the ancients war was a n 
intercommunal effort bereft of rules or mercy: victory and defeat were absolutes, and all categories of 
persons and property were legitimate targets.138  POWs were killed or enslaved out of enmity,139 with a 
134
 In the film the character is referred to simply as “Steamboat Willie,” so named for his desperate recitation of all the sound bites 
from American culture that he can recall, one of which is the Disney cartoon by that title.
135 Hors de combat is a legal term of art drawn from the French and signifying that an individual has been rendered “out of 
combat” and thus is no longer a combatant. See 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict [“API”], at Art. 40 (defining hors de combat as including those “in the 
power of an adverse party”; those who clearly express “an intention to surrender”; and those who have been “rendered 
unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness” and are therefore incapable of defending themselves).
136
 To conserve space, the analysis of denial of quarter does not distinguish between the refusal to accept surrender and the 
slaughter of POWs whose surrender has already been accepted, although this distinction is relevant to the evaluation of the 
conduct of Captain Miller’s troops on the bluffs above Omaha Beach. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. 
FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 
575-76 (1994) (“[I]n case of close and sustained combat in land war, where the signal of surrender is postponed and resistance 
continued to the very last moment, quarter may in practice be difficult to grant. . . . Determination of the particular time when 
further violence becomes nonpermissible is thus a matter of rough practical judgment[.]”).
137
 SPAIGHT, supra note 17, at 3.
138 See Howard S. Levie, Humanitarian Law and the Law of War on Land, in International Humanitarian Law: Origins (John 
Carey, William V. Dunlap, & R. John Pritchard, eds., 2003), at 181 (“From the caveman to Biblical times, and for centuries 
thereafter, the winner in battle took from the loser not only his life, but also all of his available belongings, including women, 
children, domestic animals, and personal property.”) (citing Numbers 31:7-11); COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 17 (1911) (stating that in ancient times 
“[e]xtermination was the usual practice . . . Sometimes prisoners were sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated and mercy refused 
to children, and to the old and sickly.”).
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preference for the former,140 and soldiers who refused to crucify, mutilate, drown, or torture their captives 
to death141 could be punished as moral reprobates for having committed, in effect, war crimes.142  Dead 
POWs were not necessarily beyond insult: some cultures killed their captives for food.143  Although a 
minority view counseled mercy,144 ancient practice ran strongly in favor of a  norm in which the lives of 
POWs and civilians were forfeit to the captor and their dispatch was acceptable moral conduct.145
     ii. Middle Ages: 1000 A.D.—1648 A.D.
Although the medieval code of chivalry directed knights to extend certain reciprocal rights and 
privileges in combat, including the right of quarter146 to surrendering foes upon the payment of ransom,147
military necessity justified the denial of quarter even to nobility where capitulants might subsequently 
pose a threat were the tide of battle to turn148 or where the execution of POWs would demoralize the 
139 See I Samuel 15:3 (instructing Saul to “go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have; do not spare them, but kill 
both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.”); THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE 
PELOPONNESIAN WARS (REX WARNER transl., 1954), Bk, I. Ch. 50 (“[The Corinthians] sailed in and out of the wreckage, 
killing rather than taking prisoners.”); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Bk. V, §3, The Rules of War, at 205-09 (Desmond Lee transl., 
1974) (citing Socrates as stating that “any . . . taken prisoner should be abandoned to his captors to deal with as they wish.”); 
TACITUS, ANNALS, book II chap. 2 (noting that the Roman general Germanicus urged his legions invading the Rhineland to 
“Slay on, and slay on, do not take prisoners; we shall only have peace by the complete destruction of the nation.”).
140
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OF WAR, POW: THE FIGHT CONTINUES 
AFTER THE BATTLE 3 (1955) [“SDACPOW”].
141 FOOKS, supra note_, at 16, 118-19 (listing methods of execution of POWs used by ancient Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans).
142 See FOOKS, supra note_, at 8 (citing the exile of the Syracusan general Hemocratus for the crime of ordering his troops to 
treat Athenian prisoners with moderation rather than death); id. at 7 (stating that many ancient nations regarded moderation in the 
treatment of prisoners of war as a religious offense); JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF 
MILITARY LAW 262 (1974) (indicating that killing prisoners of war was “practically mandatory under contemporary notions of 
morality” at the time of the Old Testament).
143
 FOOKS, supra note_, at 27.
144 See, e.g., SUN TZU, ON THE ART OF WAR 16 (Lionel Giles transl., 1910) (suggesting that it may be more efficacious to 
accept surrenders rather than kill prisoners); FOOKS, supra note_, at 119 (noting that the ancient Greek Xenophon asserted that 
POWs should treated humanely, and that the Roman Sallust declared that the laws of war would not permit the killing of 
Numidian prisoners taken during the Punic Wars); OSIEL, supra note_, at 176 (indicating that following the surrender of the 
Spanish city of Locha in 203 B.C. the Roman commander Scipio Aemilianus punished his troops who had refused to give quarter 
and publicly apologized for their conduct); CICERO, DE OFFICIIS v. I, at 11: (“The conquered have a right to our respect as 
well as those who have surrendered themselves.”); BLUNTSCHLI, REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC 304 
(M.C. Lardy transl.) (stating that some Hindu tribes adhered to the code of Manou, which proscribed killing POWs).
145
 Although considerations of military necessity per se did not directly enter into the moral calculus of the ancients with respect 
to any duties owed POWs, the logistical requirements of maintaining them did in fact militate in favor of their swift dispatch:
The Greek commander who, after 3000 Persians had escaped him at Plateia, found 260,000 more who wished to 
surrender.  If he had accepted their surrender, how would he have fed them? . . . This was logistically impossible, apart 
from the fact that the whole of Greece could scarcely have absorbed such a sudden increase in the slave population, 
while to have disarmed and released such a horde could have been a recipe for disaster.  Slaughter was the chosen 
solution.
FOOKS, supra note_, at_.
146
 “Quarter” refers to the acceptance of the surrender of the defeated foe. See id. at 113 (noting the origin of the term in a 17th
century war between Spain and the Netherlands in which the parties made a regulation that they would spare the lives of POWs 
upon payment of a ransom equal to 1/4 of their annual salaries and that captives for whom no such payment was made would be 
killed).  To make the declaration of no quarter was to inform an enemy that surrender would be neither requested nor granted and 
that combat would continue until the death of the last enemy soldier or until the attacker decided to cease operations. 
147 See CHRISTINE DE PISAN, THE BOOK OF FAYTTES OF ARMES AND OF CHVALRYE 184 (trans. William Caxton, 
(1489), A.T.P. Byles ed. (1932)) (noting that the medieval laws of war and customs of chivalry suggested that prisoners of war 
ought to be spared in exchange for ransom).
148 See GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, ch. 30, at 253-54 “[Q]uarter should be granted to one who humbles himself and does not try 
to resist, unless the grant of quarter gives reason for fearing a disturbance of the peace, in which case he must suffer . . . [Q]uarter 
is to be granted only when disturbance of the peace is not feared, and otherwise not.”); HONORE’ BOUVET, THE TREE OF 
BATTLES (G.W. Copeland ed., 1949) (composed c. 1387) (“he who in battle has captured his enemy, especially if it be the duke 
or marshal of the battle . . . should have mercy on him, unless by his deliverance there is danger of having greater wars.”); VI 
FRANCISCUS DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES 183 (published posthumously in 1577) 
(Carnegie edn., trans. John Pawley Bate, ed. Ernest Nys, 1917) (“speaking absolutely, there is [no law] to prevent the killing of 
those who have surrendered or been captured in a just war so long as abstract equity is observed,” although “after victory has 
been won . . . and danger is over, [they] are not to be killed.”); PISAN, supra note_, at 222 (stating, in a 1408 compilation of the 
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enemy and aid in victory.149  Moreover, common soldiers and civilians were not subjects of the jus 
armorum, and despite the growing influence of the Church150 most commentators proclaimed support for 
the general right of a captor to kill all common soldiers,151 as well as residents of enemy territory who had 
borne arms or mustered support for the war effort, as enemies of the state.152  Practice followed this 
restatement of customary right: throughout the Middle Ages belligerents routinely dispatched POWs,153
particularly in the context of the “untrammeled savagery”154 of inter-confessional conflicts, and entire 
populations of cities were put to the sword in fits of religious cleansing.155  Conflict beyond Christendom 
was even more brutal: Islamic practice condoned execution of Christian POWs who refused to convert,156
medieval customs of war that, although it is expected that Christian soldiers will extend to each other the grant of quarter as a 
principle of their humanity, prisoners may be killed who would otherwise endanger their captor); MAURICE KEEN, 
CHIVALRY 276 n.7 (1984) (noting that during medieval combat killing POWs in emergencies was permitted and quarter was 
not invariably given).  The most discussed denial of quarter necessity occurred in 1415 when troops under the command of the 
English King Henry V, invading France at the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War, killed French prisoners during the Battle of 
Agincourt.  Although a majority supports the argument that military necessity was a complete justification for the denial of 
quarter, commentators are divided as to whether Henry, his forces outnumbered and convinced that French cavalry reserves were 
about to be committed to battle, had a legitimate claim of military necessity in ordering the execution of enemy prisoners to 
prevent their liberation and resumption of combat operations against the English.  See RICHARD CROMPTON, THE 
MANSION OF MAGNAMITIE (1599; unpaginated), ch. 6 in fine (“uppon such necessary occasion, to kill them was a thing by 
all reason allowed, for otherwise the king having lost diverse valiant Captianes and souldiers in this battell, and being also but a 
small number in comparison of the French kings army, and in a strang countrey, where he could not supply his neede upon the 
sudden, it might have bene much daungerous to have againe joyned with the enemy, and kept his prisoners alive, as in our 
Chronicles largely appeareth.”) (cited in Meron, Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws: Perspectives on the Law of War in the 
Later Middle Ages 166-67 (1993)); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, Act IV scene vi, at 35-38 (suggesting that he did); 
RAPHAEL HOLINSHED, HOLINSHED’S CHRONICLES 38 (R.S. Wallace & Alma Hansen eds., 1923) (original publication 
date 1587) (holding that although the killings were undertaken “contrarie to his accustomed gentleness” and “incontinentlie” they 
were permissible under custom); HARRIS NICHOLAS, A HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF AGINCOURT 124 (2d. ed. 1832) 
(arguing that “imperative necessity” justified the order); 1 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-
SPEAKING PEOPLES 319-20 (1956) (justifying Henry’s order to kill POWs on ground of necessity); KEEGAN, supra note_, at 
84 (suggesting that the order was necessitated by an imminent French counterattack from the rear); HAROLD F. HUTCHISON, 
KING HENRY V 124 (1967) (stating that “[b]y medieval standards Henry was obeying his soldier creed—military necessity 
justified any butchery.”).  But see DESMOND SEWARD, HENRY V 81 (1988) (“[B]y  fifteenth-century standards, to massacre 
captive, unarmed noblemen who, according to the universally recognized international laws of chivalry, had every reason to 
expect to be ransomed if they surrendered . . . was a peculiarly nasty crime.”); ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI 
TRES 211-12 (trans. John C. Rolfe, 1933) (orig. pub. 1598) (describing denial of quarter to soldiers who “threw down their arms 
on the ground . . . [as a grave] crime” and rejecting justification by necessity); PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO 
TRACTATUS 40-41 (1563) (condemning killing of POWs as a “practice most abominable[.]”).
149 See FRANCISCO SUAREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS (Carnegie edn., trans. Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi 
Brown, and John Waldron, 1944) (pub. 1550) (stating that slaughter of POWs may be necessary to terrify the adversary).
150 See FLORY, supra note_, at 13 (discussing early efforts by the Christian Church to improve the treatment of prisoners of war 
by appeals to the “equality and brotherhood” of man); FOOKS, supra note_, at 10 (describing influence of Christianity in 
promoting a custom to allow prisoners to pay a ransom in exchange for their liberation).
151 See III HUGO GROTIUS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE ET LA PAIX ch. 5 (published 1645) (stating that enemies captured in 
war, as well as their descendants in perpetuity, are the property of the captor to dispose of as he should so choose); see also III 
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES ch IV, pt. X (Carnegie edn., Francis Kelsey transl.1925) (“So far 
as the law of nations is concerned, the right of killing . . . captives taken on war, is not precluded at any time[.]”).
152 See GROTIUS, supra note_, at ch. 5 (approving the killing of every inhabitant of a town that refused the request to surrender); 
W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 474 n.2  (8th ed., A. Higgins, 1924) (“quarter was not given to the garrison of a place which 
resisted an attack from an overwhelming force, which held out against artillery in absence of sufficient fortifications, or which 
compelled the besiegers to deliver an assault[.]”); FOOKS, supra note_, at 25 (noting that Oliver Cromwell ordered the execution 
of the entire population of the Catholic city of Drogheda, including thousands of POWs whom he burned alive in a church).
153 See, e.g., FOOKS, supra note_, at 24 (referencing the mutual agreement between the Houses of York and Lancaster to refuse 
quarter during the War of the Roses); id. at 41 (noting the execution of Bulgarian and Turkish prisoners of war by the Crusaders 
at the Battle of Nicopolis on the ground that the advance of the Army of the Sultan rendered it too dangerous to do otherwise); 
MERON, supra note_, at 109 (reporting that, prior to the English denial of quarter at the Battle of Agincourt, the French leaked 
their intention to grant quarter only to English nobles and to amputate the right hand of every English archer).
154
 SDACOPOW, supra note_, at 3-4. 
155 See FOOKS, supra note_, at 23 (describing the common practice during European religious wars of killing all residents of 
captured cities, such as Heidelberg, Magdeburg, and Kempten).
156 See L.C. Green, Enforcement of the Law in International and Non-International Conflicts—The Way Ahead, 24 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 289 (citing 9th century Islamic code distinguishing Muslim from non-Muslim POWs and permitting 
killing of latter provided the offer of conversion was rejected).  Some scholars indicate that in practice Muslim captors would 
30
while Christian Crusaders reflexively denied quarter to Muslims157 to the approval of leading jurists.158
Although merciful captors occasionally granted their captives the status of protected persons,159 savagery 
reigned during the Dark Ages, and it was not until the dawning of the Enlightenment that chivalry began 
to embrace common soldiers and civilians within its normative and protective fold.
iii.  Enlightenment: 1648 A.D.—1800 A.D.
The humanitarian conception of the soldier rendered hors de combat as an unfortunate wretch 
with a claim to protection against mistreatment,160 rather than an enemy of the state deserving of death, 
acquired some purchase in the 17th century, inspired largely by the writings of Enlightenment scholars 
who labored for the humanization of war.161  The development of secular international law subsequent to 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 bolstered this development as POWs came incrementally to be viewed 
as wards of the custodial sovereign rather than as the prizes of the capturing soldier,162 and by the 18th
century, although they could be confined and even sold into slavery163 to prevent their rejoining the fray,164
POWs were no longer reflexively put to death.  State practice gradually incorporated principles of 
restraint codified in domestic military regulations165 and bilateral agreements requiring that enemy POWs 
be granted quarter,166 and during the American Revolution, a weak customary regime of exchange 
permitted parole167 of officers upon their promise to refrain from future participation in the conflict, and 
common soldiers could hope for release without ransom at the termination of hostilities.168 However, the 
release non-Muslim POWs provided the parolees had not committed precapture crimes and pledged, upon their release, teach 
illiterate Muslims to read and write.  Bennoune, supra note_, at 634 (discussing alternate dispositions of non-Muslim POWs).
157
 FLORY, supra note_, at 13.
158 See, e.g., VICTORIA, supra note_, at §§44-48 (holding that the refusal to take Muslim prisoners, and the execution of the 
same, was ipso facto a matter of military necessity).
159 See, e.g., Green, supra note_, at 290 (noting that after the Siege of Limoges (1370) the English knights John of Gaunt and the 
Earle of Cambridge, moved to mercy by the pleas of French captives, countermanded orders denying quarter).
160
 A.J. BARKER, PRISONERS OF WAR 6 (1975).
161 See EMMERICH VATTEL, LE DROIT DU GENS, bk. III, ch. viii, paras. 140-141, 151 (1758 edn., C. Fenwick transl., 1916) 
(commenting that the moment a soldier surrendered he was under the protection of his captor and could not be killed unless he 
had committed a pre-capture crime justifying reprisal and death); MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DE LOIS, bk. 15, ch. 11 (stating 
that soldiers rendered hors de combat were entitled to be spared from further injury); DE MARTENS, PRECIS DU DROIT DES 
GENS MODERNS DE L’EUROPE bk. VII ch. 4, at 272 (18??) (holding that POWs were entitled to quarter except in reprisal for 
denial of quarter on their own part); CHRISTIAN WOLF, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. XVIII, para. 797 (Oxford edn. 1934) 
(published 1734) (“Since once ceases to be an enemy as soon as he is in my power . . . it is not allowable to kill those who have 
surrendered unconditionally.”); JOHANN TEXTOR, SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. XVIII, paras. 17-19 
(Carnegie Foundation edn., 1916) (published late 17th century) (denying the right of a captor to kill a POW rendered harmless and 
distinguishing between categories of former enemies who had promoted the war and willingly taken up arms from those who 
were forcibly conscripted).
162
 SDACPOW, supra note_, at 4.
163 See PUFFENDORF, LE DROIT DE LA NATURE ET DES GENS, bk. VI, ch. 3 (declaring that a conqueror might spare the 
life of a prisoner upon his promise to accept enslavement) (cited in DU PAYRAT, PRISONNIER DU GUERRE 10 (1910)); 
GROTIUS, bk. III, ch.14, §9.
164
 Howard S. Levie, Enforcing the Third Geneva Convention on the Humanitarian Treatment of Prisoners of War, 7 U.S.A.F.A. 
J. LEG. STUD. 37, 37 (1996-97).
165 See Lawes and Ordinances of Warre Established for the Better Conduct of the Service in the Northern Parts, issued by the Earl 
of Northumberland for the Army of Charles I (1640) (“None shall kill an enemy who yeelds and throws down his arms, upon 
pain of death.”) (cited in II FRANCIS GROSE, MILITARY ANTIQUITIES 107 (1788)); Articles and Ordinances of War for the 
Present Expedition of the Army of the Kingdom of Scotland, by the Committee of Estates the Lord General of the Army (1643), 
at Art. VIII (providing that “[murder is no less unlawful and intollerable in time of war, than in time of peace, and is to be 
punished with death.” (cited in GROSE, supra this note, at 132); id. at Art. XV (providing that “if it shall come to pass, that the 
enemy shall force us to battle, and the lord shall give us victory, none shall kill a yielding enemy.”).
166 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, United States-Prussia (1785) (obligating parties to provide reciprocal humane 
treatment, including quarter, to prisoners of war).
167 See infra at pp._ (discussing the concept of “parole”).
168
 Although this customary regime did ameliorate the treatment of some captured personnel and the parole of a great many 
officers, the exceptions nearly swallowed the rule, and the British in particular committed major violations of the tacit agreement 
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practice of denying quarter out of military necessity continued despite the fitful emergence of a protean 
custom,169 and a majority of scholars conceded that, as a matter of law, a surrendering enemy was stripped 
of all rights, including the right to quarter,170 and that any formal legal claims to protection at the hands of 
the enemy were moral, rather than legal.  As such, the POW could be, and often was, summarily killed.171
iv.  Pre-Modern Era: 1800 A.D.—1914 A.D.
As the 19th century progressed, POWs were increasingly viewed as unfortunates rather than 
criminals, and in 1863 the Lieber Code172 marked the first major codification of a developing custom 
favoring the qualified right of surrendering soldiers to quarter.  The Lieber Code generally prohibited 
Union troops to deny quarter173 or kill captured POWs174 on the ground that “[m]en who take up arms 
against one another in public war, do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one 
another, and to God.”175  However, military necessity continued to provide an important exception to the 
waxing force of custom: a provision recognized that under circumstances of “great straits” a commander 
was permitted “to direct his troops to give no quarter . . . where his own salvation makes it impossible to 
cumber himself with prisoners.”176  Moreover, the Lieber Code explicitly denied quarter to enemy units 
“known or discovered to give no quarter[,]”177 and enemy POWs who fit this description could be 
executed within three days of capture.178  Furthermore, the Lieber Code was interpreted in concert with 
other applicable regulations, one of which ordered Union troops to refuse wholesale surrenders by 
Confederate troops eager to quit the war,179 thereby further qualifying its scope and applicability.  In 
to treat POWs with humanity.  See B. TARLETON, A HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1780 AND 1781 30-32 (1968 ed.) 
(chronicling British violations of the emerging custom that required humane treatment of POWs, such as the confinement of 
Ethan Allen in irons on a prison ship and the refusal to grant quarter at the Battles of Waxhaws and Fort Griswold).  Compliance 
with what remained of the regime was secured not through any sense of legal or professional obligation but largely through threat 
of reprisal, as commanders whose captured troops were threatened with execution resorted to reciprocal threats against enemy 
prisoners of war in their own custody to protect their own personnel.  See George L. Coil, War Crimes of the American 
Revolution, 82 MIL. L. REV. 171, 185, 191-92 (discussing the treatment of POWs during the American Revolution).
169 See, e.g., id. at 182-84 (noting that British commanders during the Revolution justified the denial of quarter to American troops 
on the grounds that Americans had made perfidious surrender (see infra at _ discussing perfidy), that British troops were so 
enraged that they could not be expected to have restrained themselves sufficiently to accept prisoners, that ongoing resistance on 
other parts of the battlefield made it impossible to safely accept prisoners, and that the British officer corps had been so 
decimated that there was no functioning chain of command capable of issuing orders to restrain British enlisted soldiers from 
dispatching American prisoners).  Almost without exception, international law scholars expressly approved of a military 
necessity exception to an emerging custom entitling surrendering soldiers to quarter.  See, e.g., PUFFENDORF, supra note_, at 
ch. 3; TEXTOR, supra note_, at ch. XVIII, paras. 17-19; MONTESQUIEU, bk. XII, chap. 3; PRADIER FODERE, TRAITE DE 
DIPLOMATIE, bk. Vi, chap. IX (holding that unless an enemy provides reasonable assurances that he is helpless, quarter should 
be denied); J. BLUNTSCHLI, DROIT INTERNATIONALE CODIFIE, art. 580 (providing that one may have legitimate reasons 
to refuse quarter, such as if enemy resorts to reprisals or it is impossible to take prisoners due to inadequacy of forces).
170 See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A SCIENTIFIC METHOD 409-50 (F. 
Hemelt transl, 1964) (1764) stating that the “customs of certain nations” gave a “general license” to kill all enemy subjects, 
including surrendering soldiers); MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DE LOIS, bk. XII, ch. 3 (supporting the argument that 
extermination of prisoners of war conformed with positive international law); CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, 
QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LIBRI DUO 16 (T. Frank transl., 1964) (1737) (“[E]very force is lawful in war.  So true is 
this that we may destroy an enemy though he be unarmed. . . [I]n short, everything is legitimate against an enemy.”).
171 See Burrus M. Carnahan, Reason, Retaliation, and Rhetoric: Jefferson and the Quest for Humanity in War, 139 MIL. L. REV. 
83, 85 (1993) (indicating that summary execution of POWs was declining in frequency but common during the Enlightenment).
172 See supra at note_.
173 See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 60 (“It is against the usage of modern war to resolve . . . to give no quarter[.]”).
174 See id. at Art. 56 (“A [POW]  is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by 
the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other 
barbarity.”).
175 Id. at Art. 15.
176 Id.  at Art. 60.
177 Id.  at Art. 62.
178 Id.  at Art. 66.
179 See U.S. War Dep’t, General Order No. 207 (Jul. 3, 1863).
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practice, the Lieber Code, although it discouraged denial of quarter upon moral grounds, was of limited 
value in enforcing the rights of POWs against competing claims of military necessity, as both armies 
executed POWs out of expedience and in reprisal for violations real and imagined of the customs of war180
and besieged garrisons were categorically denied quarter after their refusals to surrender.181
Still, the Lieber Code exerted a transnational influence upon the codification of a customary 
preference for granting quarter to defeated enemies that had been “hardening in the heads of decent 
warriors for several centuries[.]”182  A series of states published military manuals incorporating much of 
the Lieber code nearly verbatim,183 and the Brussels Conference of 1874184 and the Hague Convention 
of1907 codified, as a matter of international law, the custom reflected in the Lieber general prohibitions 
against the denial of quarter, whether ad hoc or in an advance declaration.185  Nevertheless, international 
practice, whether justified by claims of military necessity or simply by the relative weakness of any norm 
entitling defeated personnel to protection, belied diplomatic pronouncements and overwhelmed the 
general presumption in favor of quarter for surrendering forces.  Examples abound: despite having 
promised quarter to secure the surrender of the besieged garrison at the Battle of Jaffa (1800), Napoleon, 
unable to feed his own troops, ordered 4000 Arab captives slain.186  French forces fleeing their failed 
invasion of Russia (1812) were denied quarter by Russian cavalry; victorious Mexican forces at the 
Alamo (1836) refused quarter to permanently preclude seasoned veterans from rejoining the Texan 
struggle for independence;187 and during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) Turks were denied quarter on 
the ground that, in the words of the Russian commanding general, “there are circumstances under which it 
is impossible to make prisoners—when your force is small and prisoners might prove dangerous, . . . 
[S]ad necessity force[d] us to shoot them.”188 Both sides took extreme reprisals against POWs during the 
180 See William E. Boyle, Jr., Under the Black Flag: Execution and Retaliation in Mosby’s Confederacy, 144 MIL. L. REV. 148, 
148-50, 154- 55 (reporting a spiral of reprisals and counterreprisals taken against POWs during fighting between Confederate 
forces under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mosby and Union forces under the command of Generals Sheridan, Custer, and 
Grant).  For a comprehensive study and analysis of acts of reprisal against POWs of both armies during the Civil War, including 
execution of POWs, denials of quarter, and maltreatment, see LONNIE R. SPEER, WAR OF VENGEANCE (2002).
181 See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 99 (citing correspondence between garrison commanders and the commanders of besieging 
forces offering the besieged the privilege of parole upon an unconditional surrender while threatening to deny quarter in the event 
further military measures were necessary to overcome the fortifications).
182
 DELISSEN & TANJA, supra note_, at 655.
183 See HOLLAND, supra note_, at  73-74 (1907) (listing states adopting military manuals incorporating the Lieber Code, 
including, inter alia, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal); WELLS, supra note_, at 4 (noting near-direct translation of Lieber 
Code in military manuals of Germany, France, and Russia published between 1880 and 1912).  Commitments to these 
codifications in an era of suspicion and nationalist resentments remained suspect, however, and the traditional position—that the 
“humanitarianism as conceived by many modern civilized nations is a weakness rather than a virtue” and that the enemy could be 
more easily cowed by terror than by kindness—remained dominant.  See, e.g., GERMAN GENERAL STAFF, 
KRIEGSBRAUCH IM LANDKRIEGE (1902) (stating that adherence to customs protective of enemy POWs was incompatible 
with German “frightfulness,” a concept whereby enemies experiencing German ferocity and mercilessness would be all the more 
likely to refuse to give battle in the future). 
184 See 1874 Congress of Brussels (providing, in 146 articles, for the humane treatment of POWs).
185 See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 23(c) (prohibiting killing of an enemy hors de combat); id. at Art. 23(d) 
(prohibiting declaration that no quarter will be given).  However, military necessity carved out exceptions from these codes of 
military regulations.  See, e.g., KRIEGSBRAUCH, supra note_, at (explicitly recognizing that necessity could release troops 
from a general obligation to grant quarter).
186
 JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1985).
187
 FOOKS, supra note_, at 116.  For much of the conflict, neither Russian nor Japanese forces requested or gave quarter.  
SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 94.
188 Id. at 93 (citing V.L. NEMEROVITCH-DANTCHENKO, PERSONAL REMEMBRANCES OF GENERAL SKOBOLEV 
165 (E.A.B. Hodgetts transl. 1884).
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Boer War (1899-1900),189 U.S. commanders ordered the slaughter of all males over ten years of age in 
fighting against Muslim guerrillas in the Philippines (1900-02),190 and in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-
05) Russia ceased granting quarter after receiving reports that wounded Japanese had feigned surrender 
only to shoot Russian troops, who believed the Japanese hors de combat, bypassing their positions.191
Contemporary commentators, while memorializing a general custom proscribing the denial of 
quarter, paid heed to state practice in unequivocally recognizing exceptions rooted in military necessity, 
including in reprisal,192 in circumstances where capturing forces were numerically inadequate to 
effectively subdue surrendering forces without unacceptably increasing the jeopardy of attack from other 
enemy forces not hors de combat,193 and where a besieged force, obstinately resisting surrender beyond 
the point it might reasonably expect to prevail, obligated attacking forces to incur needless casualties 
storming the position.194  In short, although a custom disfavoring denial of quarter was crystallizing 
scholars of the era described a stable, consistent practice, grounded in necessity, to deny quarter.
189 See STOWELL & MUNRO, II INTERNATIONAL CASES 205 (1916) (reporting 1899 massacre of Boer prisoners at 
Elandslaagte and reprisal against British prisoners at Ladysmith during the Boer War in South Africa).  For a general discussion 
of war crimes committed during the Boer War, see Drew L. Kershen, A Symposium on Film and Law: Breaker Morant, 22 OK. 
CITY U.L. REV. 107 (1997).
190 See FRIEDMAN (ed.), THE LAW OF WAR 800 (1972) (discussing the order from Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith to 
Major L.W.T. Waller instructing his Marines to take no prisoners and that “[t]he more you kill and burn, the better you will 
please me.”).  For a discussion of the general suspension of IHL by U.S. forces in the Philippines during the period, see PETER 
MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 51-66 (2001).
191
 FOOKS, supra note_, at 120-21.
192 See F. DE MARTENS, PRECIS DU DROIT DES GENS MODERNS DE L’EUROPE bk VII ch. 4 272 (1899) (holding that 
quarter could be denied in retaliation for denial of quarter by the enemy); FOOKS, supra note_, 120-21 (“To make quarter [with 
respect to] the persons who have abused the confidence of the victor and shoot him in the back after being treated kindly, will 
compromise the success of the battle and perhaps, frustrate the plans of the entire campaign.”); id. (“The commander must 
remember that the blood of one of his own men taken by . . . treachery should be more precious to his eyes than that of thousands 
of such villains committing acts against the laws of war.”).
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 BLUNTSCHLI, supra note_, at Art. 580 (condoning the denial of quarter when capturing forces are too few to adequately 
secure surrendering soldiers without compromising either their mission or their safety); PAUL ERNEST PRADIER-FODERE, 
TRAITE DE DIPLOMATIE (1899), bk. vi, ch. IX (stating that, if reasonable assurances cannot be provided that an enemy is 
helpless, quarter may be denied out of an interest in self-preservation); THOMAS E. HOLLAND, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF 
WAR ON LAND 47, 58 (BRITISH FIELD MANUAL) (1904) (stating that “[a] white flag [indicating a desire to surrender] can 
protect only the force by which it is hoisted,” and then only if every individual member of that force, as well as of other enemy 
forces that might still pose a danger, ceases to resist); SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 266 (sanctioning the execution of prisoners who 
attempt to aid, by whatever means, their “uncaptured comrades” and thus endanger their captors).  However, at least one 
commentator suggested that for capturing forces to execute POWs solely because they would otherwise hamper movement was 
an “inhumane” policy sure to provoke reprisal, even if it could be justified as militarily necessary.  SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 
266 (describing the execution of Peruvian POWs by Chilean captors desirous of moving without encumbrance in 1882 as a 
“wanton act” from which “bloody reprisals are sure to follow.”).
194
 Military history is “full of incidents in which a platoon or squad, having taken casualties  at the enemy’s hands, finally 
prevails.”  OSIEL, supra note_,  at 120.  The proposition that soldiers engaged in a life-or-death struggle should be required, 
immediately upon the indication of a desire to surrender on the part of their mortal enemies, to denature the emotions of rage and 
fear that impel them forward and to stifle any thoughts of reprisal and revenge for the deaths of their comrades struck 19th and 
early 20th century commentators, many of whom were acquainted with combat, as incompatible with reality:
During the heat of battle there is not much opportunity for . . . pity . . .  The soldier’s training does not make him a 
machine to such extent that he is a passive weapon.  The noise of battle, the sight of the dead and dying, the feeling of 
weariness after long hardships, may weaken his sense of fairness, and cause him to refuse to give quarter, and force his 
adversary to drink from the bitter cup of Death, even after he has asked for mercy by surrendering.
FOOKS, supra note_, at 113.
Similarly,
[I]t is often impracticable to grant quarter to troops who resist to the last moment.  No war right of killing is recognized 
in such circumstances; it is simply the necessity of war which justifies the refusal of quarter.  It must often happen that 
in the storing of a trench, when men’s blood is aboil and all is turmoil and confusion, many are cut down or bayoneted 
who wish to surrender[.]
SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 91.
In practice, “Too late, chum,” has often been the response received by 11th-hour would-be surrenderees.  KEEGAN, 
supra note_, at 50-51.  Psychologists have explained that the frenzy of fear, bloodlust, and primordial passion unshackled by the 
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v.  The Great Wars: 1914 A.D.—1945 A.D.
During World War I, several belligerents entered into bilateral agreements governing the status of 
POWs, although few were ratified195 and most parties, including the U.S., accepted few if any legal 
obligations.196  Although some belligerents recognized expanded customary duties, including the general 
obligation to grant quarter,197 in either official policy statements or military manuals,198 most domestic 
military legal systems retained explicit exceptions allowing the denial of quarter under categories of 
circumstances, including military necessity and in reprisal,199 while others expressly ordered their military 
forces to deny quarter in order to sow terror amongst their enemies.200  Moreover, as the very concept of 
surrender remained as shameful to the martial mind as it was to the ancients,201 it was not difficult for 
horrors of combat accounts for the denial of quarter and other abuses of POWs in such circumstances and that the grim practice 
of soldiers is or should be excusable under the defense of temporary insanity.  See, e.g., DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING 
179 (1995); JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM 77-102 (explaining the extreme reactions of soldiers to the 
experience of combat).  While not technically an exception based on military necessity, the denial of quarter predicated upon the 
human emotions that render the actual grant improbable is essential to an explanation for the variation between 19th century 
practice on the one hand and a restatement of an emerging custom relative to quarter on the other.  See HOLLAND, supra note_, 
at 58 (noting that, although the precise definitions are left to practice, after a “stubborn and prolonged siege” an attacking force is 
relieved of a customary obligation to grant quarter and that one who would demand quarter must not delay his surrender until the 
very last possible moment lest he disentitle himself); CARLOS CALVO (1873) at §2138) (suggesting that a garrison may be 
massacred for futile resistance); HALL, supra note_, at (“I believe it has always been understood that the defenders of a fortress 
stormed have no right to quarter[.]”) (citing the Duke of Wellington in correspondence c. 1820); BEST, supra note_, at 349 n.109 
(restating general consensus of commentators that the exception to the right to quarter in the case of “a fortress refusing surrender 
even when its walls had been breached, so that the besiegers had to go through the often hideous business of an assault[,]” 
survived well into the 20th century).
195
 BARKER, supra note_, at 16.
196 See Telegram from Lansing to Stovall, American Minister to Switzerland, U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
Supp. II (stating that the U.S. “does not consider [the] Geneva Convention [of 1906] binding in [the] present war . . . because all 
belligerents [are] not signatory to [the] convention.  Similar interpretation has been consistently given to [the] Hague 
convention[.]” ).
197 See U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, supra note_, at para. 182 (stating that “[i]t is especially forbidden . . . to declare that no 
quarter will be given[.]”);id. at para. 183 (“It is no longer contemplated that quarter will be refused to the garrison of a fortress 
carried by assault, to the defenders of an undefended place who did not surrender when threatened with bombardment, or to a 
weak garrison which obstinately and uselessly persevered in defending a fortified place against overwhelming odds.”).
198 See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING 85 (instructing the Provost Marshal General, by order 
General Pershing, supreme U.S. commander in World War I, “to follow the principles of the Hague and Geneva Conventions in 
the treatment of prisoners, although these [a]re not recognized as binding in the present war.”).  Official U.S. military regulations, 
which superseded while incorporating much of the Lieber Code almost verbatim, denied the force of most, if not all, legal 
obligations.  See U.S. Dep’t of War, Rules of Land Warfare [“Rules of Land Warfare, 1914”], para. 9-34 (War Dep’t Doc. No. 
467, Office of the Chief of Staff, Apr. 25, 1914) (recognizing that belligerents were permitted to “appl[y] any amount and any 
kind of force which is necessary for the purpose of the war” while imposing only the very minimal obligation that soldiers refrain 
from “all such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary[.]”).  However, the Rules of Land Warfare (1914) did impose 
duties and grant privileges arising from customary principles of necessity, humanity, and chivalry.  See id. at paras. 8 & 9.
199
 See id. at para. 368 (stating that failure to make a clear and good faith intent to surrender by either the hoisting of a white flag 
or the disposal of weapons and the clear showing of hands disentitled the enemy to quarter); see also id. (“All troops of the 
enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or to any portion of the army receive none.”).
200 See BARKER, supra note_, at 28 (“As soon as you come to blows with the enemy he will be beaten.  No mercy will be shown!  
No prisoners will be taken!  As the Huns under King Attila made a name for themselves, which is still mighty in traditions and 
legends today, may the name of Germans be so fixed in China by your deeds that no Chinese should ever again dare to look at a 
German askance . . . open the way for Kultur once and for all.”) (quoting Kaiser Wilhelm, reviewing troops in Bremerhaven in 
July 1914); see also Theodore S. Woolsey, Retaliation and Punishment, 9 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 62, 63 (1916) (stating 
that the German General Staff considered IHL superseded by military necessity and that the exercise of humanitarianism with 
respect to enemy POWs was a lapse “into sentimentality and flabby emotion” to be avoided).
201 See BARKER, supra note_, at 29 (describing the aversion to surrender felt by honorable soldiers as the  “age-old idea that it is 
better to die fighting than to be captured”).  So deeply inculcated was this imperative of martial culture that soldiers would fight 
to the death against vastly superior forces to avoid the moral stigma of capture.  See FOOKS, supra note_, at 99 (relating the 
officially-heralded saga of the five-day ordeal of a U.S. battalion commander who, despite being surrounded by a vastly superior 
German force and without rations or medical supplies for his attrited force, refused to surrender).  Moreover, so powerful was the 
obligation to demonstrate bravery in the face of the enemy that soldiers who merely retreated under overwhelming fire knew and 
accepted that they could be executed.  See id. at 102-04 (noting that a French lieutenant, executed for withdrawing his company 
rather than permit it to be overrun by the Germans, conceded that he had been wrong).  The soldierly aversion to surrender 
continues to the present day and is reflected in regulations enjoining U.S. military personnel from voluntary surrender and from 
accepting parole.  See U.S. Code of Conduct for Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, E. O. No. 10631, Aug. 17, 1955, CFR 6057 
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several belligerents to indoctrinate their armies, even if they did not issue direct orders, to neither grant 
nor request quarter,202 nor was it unusual that units would make this decision independent of their 
command structure.203  Throughout World War I, quarter was systematically denied as a standing tactical 
procedure, in reprisal for perfidious surrenders and for posing as casualties only to resume combat,204 out 
of vengeance,205 and out of alleged necessities, including avoidance of encumbrances.206
On balance, the reflections of commentators assessing the lessons of the “Great War” reinforced 
the conclusion that the fabric of a martial custom favoring the grant of quarter continued to be woven 
through with exceptions.  Where rapidity and secrecy were paramount, such as in the case of a small force 
occupying a strategic position in advance of a main body for whom disclosure of their purpose or 
encumbrance by POWs would enhance the likelihood of their own destruction207 and compromise the 
mission of the larger force,208 or where the exigencies of combat precluded the immediate extension of 
protection to all those manifesting an intent to surrender,209 jurists conceded the legitimacy of military 
(1955) (amended by E.O. No. 12633 of Mar. 28, 1988, 53 CFR 10355,  (prohibiting military personnel from voluntary surrender, 
accepting parole, and other acts of disloyalty).  For a discussion of the Code of Conduct and of the shame that continues to attach 
to the act of surrender, see David Hackworth, Neglect of Code Insults Real Heroes, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 1995, at A23.
202
 The U.S. issued orders to troops in forward areas to “hold their positions at any cost,” instructions that implied that they were 
to succeed or die in the attempt, rather than offer surrender if they failed.  FOOKS, supra note_, at 96.  The French high 
command reinforced these orders, instructing U.S. forces joining the battle in 1917 that as they could anticipate German 
perfidious surrenders they should themselves neither grant nor request quarter.  Id.
203 See BARKER, supra note_, at 117 (reporting that U.S. units, including the enlisted personnel of the 28th Infantry Division, 
signed pledges not to grant or accept quarter).  The reasons are not difficult to fathom: during World War I, many soldiers, as 
have soldiers since antiquity, considered the act of surrender to be inherently dishonorable.  FLORY, supra note_, at 67.
204
 Perfidious surrenders, whereby soldiers feign submission to delude and lure the enemy into close proximity only to reclaim 
their weapons and resume fighting at great advantage over adversaries who have relaxed their guard, was a common practice 
during World War I.  See BARKER, supra note_, at 35 (citing widespread German use of perfidious surrender during the Battle 
of the Somme (1916)); FOOKS, supra note_, at 121 (“The practice [of perfidious surrender] was repeated many times during the 
World War, and especially in the Battle of the Somme[,]” to great effect).  In response, defrauded adversaries would execute 
POWs taken subsequently, including those who had committed perfidy as well as others whose only offense was to have been 
members of the same army.  See BARKER, supra note_, at 35 (stating that subsequent to German perfidious surrender at the 
Somme, “[n]o prisoners were taken that day, and it was a long time before German cries of ‘Kamerad’ were accepted with any 
confidence by the British troops involved in the action.”); FOOKS, supra note_, at 117 (relating the explanation offered by the 
commander of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division for the relatively small number of German POWs captured by his troops at the 
Battle of Cantigny (1918): “[W]hen a German officer had held up his hands to surrender, another German shot [an American 
officer], and [a]fter this the captors saw ‘red’ and killed about 380 of the German captives.”).  To the present, soldiers express 
outrage at the perfidious killing of their comrades, and perfidy remains perhaps the most egregious breach of the martial code.  
See BEST, supra note_, at 292 (describing perfidy as, “to borrow a valuable Christian idea, IHL’s ‘sin against the Holy Spirit.’”).
205 See GUY CHAPMAN, A PASSIONATE PRODIGALITY: FRAGMENTS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY _ (1933) (recounting an 
oft-repeated incident wherein, after a prolonged and bloody advance across a series of trenches, a vengeful British sergeant “half-
mad with excitement” took the fieldglasses from a surrendering German officer only to “tuc[k] the butt of his rifle under his arm 
and sho[o]t the officer straight through his head.”).
206
 Toward the end of World War I the great mass of surrendering German s so overwhelmed the capacity of U.S. troops to secure 
and provide for them that decisions were made to kill all German forces either by refusing quarter or subsequent to capture.  See 
FOOKS, supra note_, at 120 (reporting communication received from the commanding colonel to the effect that “[i]n the 
advance on Sedan, just prior to the armistice, November 11, 1918, the 16th U.S. Infantry found it difficult to take all prisoners of 
war who ordinarily are entitled to such treatment because of the great mass of the enemy encountered and overcome.”).
207 See HALL, supra note_, at 474 (allowing that, although the presumption runs strongly in favor of quarter, an exception may be 
made when “it is impossible for a force to be encumbered with prisoners without danger to itself” from other enemy forces, such 
as where “small bodies of troops remai(n) for a long time isolated in the midst of enemies.”); FOOKS, supra note_, at 44 (“There 
are . . . circumstances in which surrender cannot be accepted, because to do so will endanger the victor’s own safety (not enough 
water, food, being grossly outnumbered[.]”).
208 See id.  at 121-22 (“Troops sent on reconnoitering duties far in advance of the remainder of their forces, or who occupy an 
important strategic point, a bridge, exploration of a forest, ravine, or a fortification which is the key to a position for the purposes 
of holding until the main body of their forces arrive, must not be too considerate for any small group of the enemy which 
frustrates such mission.).”
209
 Writing in response to his own experiences during World War II, Fussell expresses the intellectual and moral disruption 
occasioned by the stochastic combat environment by noting that the “relative few who actually fought know that the war was not 
a matter of rational calculation.  They know madness when they see it. FUSSELL, WARTIME, supra note_, at 284.  Under such 
conditions, the exercise of dispassionate ethical and moral judgment and unfaltering compliance with formal legal rules expected 
by lawyers and others ignorant of the combat environment is more than perhaps ought to be expected.
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necessity.  Although a minority contended that the grant of quarter to persons rendered hors de combat
had reached the status of an absolute obligation from which soldiers were not permitted to derogate,210
most continued to view the grant of quarter through the prism of state practice, from which it appeared as 
a custom-based privilege with respect to which the recipient could assert an entitlement only in the 
absence of any military necessity that would move the grantor to deny it.  In the interwar period, 
humanitarians tried to harden this conditional custom into something more protective of soldiers hors de 
combat, but the resulting Geneva Conventions of 1929, in some senses simply an expansion upon the 
membership of their conventional predecessors, added little more than an additional declaration that 
POWs were immune from reprisal and entitled to protection from the moment of capture.211
Attempts to stamp a legal imprimatur upon the customary regime governing quarter were not 
confined to the international arena, as several states made minor modifications to their respective military 
manuals in recognition of the interplay between developments in IHL212 and the trajectory of state 
practice.213  Nonetheless, states continued to veer from the increasingly restrictive positive law crafted by 
diplomats and glossed by legal scholars and hewed instead to the restatements of custom proffered by 
their military establishments: updated military manuals retained the primacy of the actual practice and 
usage of soldiers atop the hierarchy of sources of obligation incumbent upon their armed forces,214 and the 
210 See ALBERIC ROLIN, LE DROIT MODERNE DE LA GUERRE 287-88 (1920) (holding that “neither supreme necessity and 
imminent danger” permit denial of quarter or the killing of POWs subsequent to capture, as the obligation to accept surrender and 
treat POWs with humanity is absolute); cf. HALL, supra note_, at 474 (limiting the scope of a military necessity exception to the 
obligation to grant quarter to the vanishing point by holding that “prisoners who cannot safely be kept can be liberated, and the 
evil of increasing the strength of the enemy is less than that of violating the dictates of humanity, unless there is reason to expect 
that the prisoners if liberated, or a force successfully attempting rescue, would massacre or ill-treat the captors.”).
211 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929, at Art. 2 (extending protective rules and 
principles of Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 and establishing comprehensive rules for protecting POWs).
212 See U.S. War Dep’t, RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1934) [“Rules of Land Warfare, 1934”], reissued in substantially 
identical form as RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1940), at para. 2 (updating the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, and making 
explicit reference to parts of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1929 as having legal
effect as between parties under the rubric of the “written rules or laws of war[.]”); see also TM-27- 250, “Cases on Military 
Government” (1943) (supplementing the Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, and elaborating cases concerning the rules of armed 
conflict that created legal obligations for the U.S. and members of its armed forces); TM 27-251, “Treaties Governing Land 
Warfare” (1944) (explaining the legal significance of obligations undertaken by the U.S. between 1929 and 1937 under treaties 
interpreting the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1907 and 1929 respectively).  For a discussion of the specifics of these 
instruments and manuals, see generally DONALD WELLS, THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE (1992).
213
 Law reflects and shapes practice, just as practice reflects and shapes law, and the disposition of POWs during war is 
determined by the complex relationship between positive law, custom, and the practical exigencies of combat. See FLORY, supra 
note_, at 10 (“The treatment of prisoners is strongly influenced by the relation between international law and necessity[.]”).
214
 Neither the 1934 or 1940 revisions to the Rules of Land Warfare withdrew support for the foundational basis of the martial 
code, namely the promotion of chivalric virtue to the extent possible in light of the practical reality of military necessity.  See
RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1934), supra note_, at paras. 3 & 4 (restating as its central principle the defense of the chivalric 
code with deference to military necessity).  As such, although the U.S. did not craft its military manuals in order to grant carte 
blanche to its armed forces, nonetheless U.S. military regulations did not incorporate obligations to POWs derived from IHL 
treaties in a manner inconsistent with the promotion of chivalry or the military mission of its armed forces.  See id. at para. 22 
(stating that “[t]he object of war is to bring about the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible by means of 
regulated violence.”); RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1940), at para 22 (same).  Specifically, although both the 1934 and 1940 
revisions drew upon language in the 1914 Rules of Land Warfare recognizing that surrendering enemies are generally entitled to 
quarter, neither revision repealed the explicit exception which provided that under certain circumstances military necessity might 
permit the denial of quarter to surrendering enemies.  See RULES OF LAND WARFARE 1934, supra note_, at para. 33 
(restating para. 182 of the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, to the effect that surrendering enemy personnel are generally entitled to 
quarter); but see id. at para. 85 (providing that a commander could deny quarter on the grounds that it was necessary to do so in 
the interest of self-preservation or that caring for enemy POWs interfered with his mission); Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, supra 
note_, at para. 368 (detailing exceptions to the general entitlement to quarter).  To an important extent, the retention of exceptions 
based on necessity to the general obligation to grant quarter comports with the internal value system of soldiers of the era for 
whom, as in earlier periods, the concept of surrender was suspect on its face as an ostensibly dishonorable act that would 
disentitle the soldier offering his surrender to honorable treatment, whether from his own comrades or from the enemy. See
BARKER, supra note_, at 203 (suggesting that troops were expected, as a matter of martial honor, to govern themselves in 
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martial cultures of a number of militaries retained a disdain for the very concept of surrender.215  Thus, as 
World War II erupted, the denial of quarter was condoned, whether explicitly or tacitly, by several 
leading states, resulting in a round-robin of reprisals.216  Following their invasion of the Philippines, 
Japanese troops drove, at bayonet point, over 40,000 Allied captives to their deaths on the Bataan Death 
March (1942),217 a number exceeded by the Red Army after the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad (1943) after 
which more than 105,000 German POWs were dispatched outright and on the march to gulags.218  German 
forces repeatedly denied quarter to Allied troops,219 most notoriously at Malmedy during the Battle of the 
Bulge (1944),220 and Allied soldiers reciprocated against Axis troops,221 including a mass execution of SS 
camp guards during the liberation of Dachau (1945).222
accord with obligations to refuse surrender, parole, voluntary disclosure of information to the enemy, and inducements to 
disloyalty).  In short, the absence of an absolute prohibition against denial of quarter in military manuals may reflect this 
unfavorable assessment of the honor and entitlements of a surrendering soldier.
215
 Since antiquity, soldiers have been inculcated in a martial culture that ascribes dishonor to the act of surrender and insists that 
good warriors simply do not permit themselves to be taken prisoner.  See supra at note_.  Although by the outbreak of World 
War II civilian diplomats and lawmakers had drawn this martial value into some discord with their humanitarian objectives, 
surrender remained anathema to the martial mind as well to the cultural imperatives of several of the belligerent parties, which 
adjudged the surrendering soldier to be traitorous.  See FOOKS, supra note_, at 42-43 (noting that the official Soviet response to 
a Nazi request for a POW exchange advised that “[t]here are no Russian POWs” as the “Russian soldier fights on till death” and 
“if he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community.”); id. (noting the Japanese 
attitude toward surrendering forces was one of contempt \and that their own forces were absolutely forbidden to surrender); 
INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, PRISONERS OF WAR 17 (1948) (indicating that neither the Soviet nor Japanese 
governments recognized any interests with respect to their POWs on the ground that surrender was antithetical to their culture); 
SDACPOW, supra note_, at 20 (referencing the U.S. Code of Conduct, promulgated in 1953, which codified a set of customary 
obligations incumbent upon U.S. soldiers, including the following: “Art. II.  I will never surrender of my own free will[.]”).
216 See, e.g., FUSSELL, supra note_, at 283 (citing BRITISH HANDBOOK OF IRREGULAR WARFARE (1942)) (“Never give 
the enemy a chance; the days when we could practice the rules of sportsmanship are over . . . Every soldier must be a potential 
gangster . . . Remember you are out to kill.”).
217
 Although Japanese forces did not summarily execute all their POWs, the standing Japanese practice was to forcibly march 
them to death and to shoot or bayonet stragglers; the practical result was identical to the summary refusal to grant quarter.  See, 
e.g., Trial of Baba Masao, 11 WAR CRIMES REP’TS 56 (1947) (chronicling forcible evacuation of Allied POWs in Borneo that 
resulted in the death, by exhaustion and shooting, of nearly all the captives).  For a detailed discussion of Japanese transgressions 
against law and/or martial custom during World War II, including the denial of quarter, see LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, 
THE KNIGHTS OF BUSHIDO (1954); see also James R. Dawes, Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law, 11 YALE J. L. 
& HUMAN. 215, 234-35 (1999) (detailing Japanese abuses of British POWs in Southeast Asia).
218
 BARKER, supra note_, at 35.
219 See The Nuremburg Judgment, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Opinion and 
Judgment, (1946) (citing regulation issued by the German High Command to members of the German Armed Forces calling for 
“ruthless and energetic action . . . by force of arms (bayonets, butts, and firearms)” against Soviet POWs and threatening any 
German soldier “who does not use his weapons, or does so with insufficient energy” against Soviet POWs with punishment); The 
Dostler Case, U.S. Mil. Comm’n, Rome, Italy, Oct. 12, 1945, at I LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 22 (1945) (convicting
commander of the German 75th Army Corps, General Anton Dostler, for ordering on 25 March 1944 the summary execution of 
fifteen uniformed U.S. POWs captured while on a mission to demolish a railway tunnel between La Spezia and Genoa); Abbaye 
Ardenne Case, 4 WAR CRIMES REP’TS 97 (1945) (condemning the commander of a Nazi SS Regiment for having counseled 
his men to deny quarter to Allied troops); Trial of Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert, (United States Mil. Comm’n, Augsberg, 
Germany, June 13, 1945), II LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56-57 (1948) (convicting two members of a German unit for the 
denial of quarter to a wounded U.S. officer); Trial of Kapitanleutnant Heinz Eck and Four Others For The Killing Of Members 
Of The Crew Of The Greek Steamship Peleus, Sunk On The High Seas [“The Peleus”] (Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, Oct. 
17-20, 1945), I LAW. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 12 (1947) (convicting German submarine commander for machinegunning 
survivors of a sunken ship); LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA 22-23 (discussing 
German refusals to grant quarter to, and subsequent executions of captured, British at Dunkirk in 1940); id. at 26-27 (reprinting 
U.S. reports of a German massacre of captured U.S. troops at St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge in 1944); id. at 41 (relating 
German executions of U.S. airmen captured unharmed but later shot on the false claim that they were “attempting to escape”); 
BARKER, supra note_, at 57 (discussing denials of quarter between British and German troops in North Africa in 1942-43); 
AMBROSE, supra note_, at 112 (noting that German troops cut the throats of paratroopers caught suspended from their 
harnesses, and thus effectively hors de combat, during the Normandy invasion).
220 See Malmedy Massacre Trial, U.S. Military Commission, Dachau, Germany, (12 May- 16 July 1946) (convicting 72 soldiers 
of I Panzer Corps for denying quarter to U.S. troops surrendering during Battle of the Bulge in Malmedy, Belgium, Dec. 1944).  
For a discussion of the Malmedy Massacre, see JAMES WEINGARTNER, CROSSROADS OF DEATH: THE STORY OF THE 
MALMEDY MASSACRE AND TRIAL (1979).
221 See RICHARD FALK, GABRIEL KOLKO, & ROBERT JAY LIFTON, CRIMES OF WAR 224 (1971) (contending that U.S. 
troops denied quarter to Axis soldiers, albeit with significantly less frequency than their adversaries); see also MAX HASTINGS, 
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Moreover, the belligerents seized upon the advent of large-scale guerrilla warfare and commando 
operations223 to further clarify, and even codify, the preexisting martial custom conferring upon military 
authorities wide latitude to self-define and apply exceptions to the general entitlement to quarter.  
Although the legal status of missions undertaken to disable or destroy industrial and other strategic 
installations beyond the traditional theater of operations was the subject of dispute during World War II,224
for the Nazi general staff, operations against infrastructure were ipso facto illegal methods of warfare, on 
the asserted grounds that members of units engaged in such missions did not themselves grant quarter or 
otherwise comply with IHL, and thus warranted reprisal in the form of the eradication of all members of 
the enemy units concerned.225  With the infamous Kommando Befehl (Commando Order) in October 
1942,226 Germany ordered its armed forces to deny quarter to all Allied forces on “so-called Commando 
missions in Europe or Africa[,]”227 and this instruction remained in effect for the duration of the war.228
Allied soldiers branded as “commandos” were executed with the official explanation that they were killed 
“in Kamf oder af der Flucht” (in battle or attempting to escape.”)229  A similar, but informal, regime 
governed the conflict in Yugoslavia, where, with few exceptions, no belligerent granted quarter.230
The academic literature in the aftermath of World War II reveals that, despite the progressive 
development of IHL and its normative influence upon eminent international lawyers, the martial code had 
yet to be displaced as the lodestar guiding state practice.  Although statements of absolutism with respect 
to the quarter were working their way into some commentaries,231 scholars continued to recognize the 
OVERLORD, D-DAY AND THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY 11-12 (1984) (stating that “overall it seems doubtful whether 
[the denial of quarter] was done on a greater scale by one side or the other.”); AMBROSE, supra note_, at 206 (chronicling a 
reported incident wherein a heavily decorated and widely respected U.S. officer is rumored to have impulsively machinegunned 
German POWs on a work detail); STEPHEN AMBROSE, CITIZEN SOLDIERS _ (2001) (reporting that the commander of the 
101st Airborne Division, General Maxwell Taylor, ordered his troops to deny quarter to German soldiers during OVERLORD).  
After World War II, a German newspaper published the names of 369 German soldiers alleged to have been denied quarter by 
U.S. troops, but a German court, under U.S. military administration, refused to assert jurisdiction.  See
(http://www.scrapbookpages.com/DachauScrapbook/DachauTrials/MalmedyMassacre03.html).
222 See Thomas Farragher, Vengeance at Dachau, BOST. GLOBE, Jul. 2, 2001, at A1 (reporting that in U.S. soldiers of the 45th
Infantry Division, after liberating Dachau, executed least 17 SS guards at least in part in reprisal for the Malmedy massacre).
223
 “Commando operations” is a broad term that include missions undertaken outside the actual theater of war to demolish military 
installations, sabotage industrial plants, sink warships in harbor, provide intelligence to partisan groups, rescue prisoners, and 
otherwise disrupt and damage enemy capacity to conduct traditional military operations.
224 See Baxter, Spies, supra note_, at_ (discussing legal status of commando operations during World War II).
225 See KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 190-92 (summarizing the argument offered by the Legal Department of Oberkommando 
der Wehrmacht that commandos were not entitled to the protections of the customs of war as 1) they did not themselves grant 
quarter to civilians or soldiers, 2) they wore German uniforms when engaging German forces, and 3) even when they did wear 
proper uniforms and observe the laws and customs of war they were not honorable soldiers inasmuch as honorable soldiers did 
battle against other soldiers and did not join “terror and sabotage groups.”).  In fact, many of those recruited to these extremely 
dangerous units had indeed been drawn from the ranks of convicted military personnel, who presumably had less to lose than 
other soldiers, and some “generally behaved in a perfidious manner totally unbefitting the honourable profession of arms” by 
denying quarter and by the perfidious wearing of German uniforms.  BARKER, supra note_, at 21.  Nonetheless, not all 
members of the German High Command concurred with this legal judgment: Admiral Canaris believed that the Kommando 
Befehlung was applicable only to commandos captured in civilian clothing or German uniforms and not to properly uniformed 
soldiers, regardless of their missions.  KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 190-92. 
226 See 26 I.M.T. Doc. 498-PS (“Commando Order” directive of 18 October 1942).
227
 “From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they 
are to all appearances soldiers in uniform, or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be 
slaughtered to the last man..”  Id.
228 See 26 I.M.T. Docs. 551-PS.
229
 KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 190.
230
 KEEGAN, supra note_, at 54.
231 See, e.g., 2 H. WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-80 (7th ed., A. Keith, 1944) (stating that by the end of World War II 
the privilege of quarter was crystallizing into a near-absolute right).
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legal legitimacy of exceptions carved out of the general rule in the interest of self-preservation.232  In sum, 
although the customary regime governing warfare had evolved since ancient times to enhance the 
protections owed to soldiers rendered hors de combat, state practice butted up against this evolving 
regime, and at the time of the Normandy invasion in June 1944, martial honor, reflected in the contents of 
military manuals and above all in the intersubjective understandings and practice of the professional 
soldierly caste, did not categorically proscribe denial of quarter to enemy soldiers offering their 
surrenders, nor did it absolutely preclude execution of POWs under circumstances of military necessity.
b) Violation of Parole
Although in ancient times most members of a defeated force could expect a swift death,233 POWs 
were on occasion granted a limited parole234 and released to permit them to serve as intermediaries in 
diplomatic negotiations and as couriers of the news of a defeat to a conquered people.235  Honor was 
enough to ensure the effectiveness of the grant of parole: anecdotal evidence indicates that POWs granted 
their release returned after their service as emissaries even armed with the knowledge that return meant 
sure death.236  By the Middle Ages more POWs were released upon their promise to refrain from further 
acts of belligerency,237 and special feudal courts punished breaches of the jus armorum, including 
breaches of parole agreements, committed by dishonorable knights.238  During the Enlightenment the 
concept of the soldier as a servant of his government not responsible for its policies began to take root,239
and as it did the system of parole was augmented by a regime whereby, although poor prisoners could 
often expect the sword, wealthy captives could hope to secure parole upon the payment of a ransom.240
By the late 17th century parole was no longer accompanied by a financial transaction, and during the 
232 See FLORY, supra note_, at 159 (affirming that in “very unusual circumstances” capturing personnel may deny quarter).
233 See infra at note_.
234
 “Parole” is a legal term used with respect to POWs to refer to an agreement between the surrendering soldier and his captors 
(or, in the modern era, with the detaining state) whereby the captors release the prisoner in consideration for his promise to 
refrain from rejoining the conflict, contributing to the war effort, or, in some cases, leaving a certain geographic area.  See Gary 
D. Brown, Prisoner of War Parole: Ancient Concept, Modern Utility, 156 MIL. L. REV. 200, 200 (1998) (defining parole under 
international law) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1300.7, TRAINING AND EDUCATION MEASURES 
NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE CODE OF CONDUCT, encl. 2, para. B(3)(a)(5) (Dec. 23, 1988)).  Although parole is 
granted and accepted under great duress, it is an agreement with moral, and legal, consequences.  WALZER, supra note_, at 146.
235 See Brown, supra note_, at 202 (noting the Carthaginian practice of granting parole to POWs for these purposes).
236 See PIERINO BELLIO, DE RE MILITARY ET BELLO TRACTUS (1563), reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (J. Scott ed., 1936) (chronicling the return of Regulus to Carthage after his parole to Rome where 
he urged the Senate to abandon Roman POWs (including himself), to death).
237 See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAL ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (1688), reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1150 (J. Scott ed., 1934) (asserting that the grant of parole obligated an individual to refrain from 
belligerency against the grantee and his sovereign).
238
 The primary constitutive force behind the medieval regime of parole was the honor of the soldier to whom it was granted.  See
BALTHAZAR AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFICIIS BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARY LIBRI (1582), reprinted in 2 
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (J. Scott ed., 1912) (describing violation of parole as a breach of a sacred trust).  
Strong though it was, honor was not always adequate to bind knights to their promises; death or other punishment was visited 
upon the parole violator.  T. KEEN, LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 27-34 (1965); see also Green, supra
note_, at 291 (describing conviction of a French knight in chivalric court for violating parole); MERON, supra note_, at 168 
(discussing case of an English knight who escaped his French captors before receiving parole and was ordered back to custody).
239 See VATTEL, LE DROIT DE GENS, supra note_ (asserting that because quarrels were between states and not men, 
individual soldiers were entitled to their release under the natural law principle of respect for human dignity).
240 See KEEGAN, supra note_, at 321.  The payment of ransom to further secure the promise of the parolee largely ceased with 
the Treaty of Westhpalia in 1648, and ransom was replaced by reciprocity: each contesting government had interests in the return 
of its prisoners, and the release of POWs came to be governed on this basis.  See GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, bk. II, 
ch. 14, §9 (1625) (describing reciprocal paroles of POWs as advantageous, or at least not disadvantageous, to both sovereigns on 
the ground that prisoners, while in the custody of the detaining power, were as if already dead to the cause of their governments). 
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American Revolution captured officers of both forces241 were routinely released upon their promises 
simply to refrain from further belligerency.242  Although by the late 18th century the violation of parole was 
no longer universally treated as a capital crime,243 it remained an ignominious offense.244
The Lieber Code described parole as “pledge of individual good faith and honor to do, or to omit 
doing, certain acts after he . . . shall have been dismissed . . . from the power of the captor”245 and 
explicitly prescribed death for violation of the conditions attached to the grant.246  The solemnity of the 
grant dictated that it be offered only where the honorableness of the grantee could be accurately 
determined and where the agreement could be recorded; consequently, the Lieber Code restricted the 
grant of parole to officers247 and to non-combat situations,248 and it required an exchange of written 
documents.249  Moreover, as parole was conditioned upon a promise secured by honor, it could be 
accepted, but not imposed, under the Lieber Code.250  Although the parole regime during the U.S. Civil 
War collapsed under the weight of reciprocal violations,251 subsequent 19th and early 20th century 
codifications, domestic252 as well as international,253 as well as the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme 
241
 Parole was not exclusive to officers: enlisted personnel were occasionally granted the option in lieu of confinement. Carnahan, 
supra note_, at 115 (describing parole of enlisted personnel of the Virginia Militia by British General Benedict Arnold).
242
 Although the promise to abstain from further acts against the enemy was standard consideration for a grant of parole, during 
the American Revolution, capturing forces imposed additional conditions, including obligations to refrain from criticism of the 
opposing side and to respond to a summons if requested.  See CHARLES H. METZGER. THE PRISONER IN THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 193 (1971).
243
 The traditional punishment for a parole violator was death, particularly if the violator was subsequently recaptured under arms.  
FLORY, supra note_, at 124; see also SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 296-97 (noting the hanging of a U.S. officer, Colonel Hayne, 
by the British in 1782 for violating parole); id. (indicating that aggravating circumstances justifying death include being in 
possession of arms and attempted assassination).  However, some commentators restricted the ultimate sanction to mercenaries.  
See, e.g., GENTILI, supra note_, at 18.  Additionally, belligerents entered into agreements to specify lesser punishments for the 
offense.  See, e.g, Treaty of Amity and Commerice, U.S.-Prussia, 8 Bevens 78, 8 Stat. 162, entered into force Aug. 8, 1786 
(providing, inter alia, that violation of parole would result in imprisonment at close confinement rather than death).
244 See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 297 (indicating that a parole violator was “shunned by gentlemen”).
245 See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 123.  The standard promise given in exchange for parole was to not conduct belligerent 
acts during the present conflict unless exchanged for a POW of the other belligerent.  Id. at Art. 130.
246 See id. at Art. 124 (“Breaking the parole is punished with death when the person breaking the parole is captured again.”); id. at 
Art. 130 (“[C]ases of breaking parole . . . can be visited with the punishment of death.”).
247 See id. at Art. 126 (“Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole[.]”);id. at Art. 127 (“No [enlisted soldier] can 
give his parole except through an officer . . . The only . . . exception is where individuals, properly separated from their 
commands, [are] without the possibility of being paroled through an officer.”). 
248 See id. at Art. 128 (“No paroling on the battlefield . . . is permitted[.]”).  Both the U.S. and the Confederate armies refused to 
recognize paroles granted on the battlefield on the ground that the duressive environment under which they were granted vitiated 
any validity they might otherwise have possessed.  FLORY, supra note_, at 130 (citing U.S. War Dep’t, General Order No. 49 
(1863), at art. 1, §7) (“No prisoner of war can be forced by the hostile government to pledge his parole[.]”).
249 See id. at Art. 125 (requiring that names and ranks of paroled soldiers be memorialized and exchanged between governments).
250 Id. at Art. 133. Because acceptance of the grant of parole was voluntary, the parolee continued to be obligated, upon his honor, 
to abide by the terms of his parole.  See HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (4th ed. 1895) (discussing legal 
obligations under parole).  Paroles secured under the use of or threat of force were of no legal significance.  Id.
251 See Brown, supra note_, at 205 (attributing the failure of the Civil War parole regime to the return to arms of 37000 
Confederate parolees and to the execution of civilians sympathetic to the Confederacy).  
252
 The military manuals of numerous states conferred jurisdiction upon military courts to try violations of parole and sentence 
those convicted to death, including France, Germany, Japan, and the U.S.  SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 297 (citing sources); THE 
LAWS OF WAR ON LAND, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, adopted Sept. 9, 1880 [“OXFORD MANUAL”] at 
Art. 78 (“A prisoner liberated on parole and recaptured in arms, forfeits his rights as a prisoner of war[.]”); BULLETIN 
OFFICIEL DE MINISTRE DEL LA GUERRE 229-29 (1893) [France], at Art. 35 (same); RULES OF LAND WARFARE 1914, 
supra note_, at Arts. 72-82 (restating Lieber Code with respect to parole).
253 See Brussels Convention of 1874, supra note_, at Art. 33 (“Any prisoner of war liberated on parole and recaptured bearing 
arms against the Government to which he had pledged his honour may be deprived of the rights accorded to prisoners of war and 
brought before the courts.”); Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 12 (Prisoners of war liberated on parole and 
recaptured bearing arms against the Government to whom they had pledged their honour . . . forfeit their right to be treated as 
prisoners of war, and can be brought before the courts.”). 
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Court,254 supported the moral basis for parole as well as the right of states to harshly punish violators.  
Violations of parole continued to excite moral outrage and although most were punished with 
imprisonment at hard labor,255 some were condemned to death.256  During World War I, the custom of 
parole fell into desuetude after serial violations early in the conflict,257 and the subject was little revisited, 
apart from in the context of restatements of domestic military manuals,258 prior to World War II.259
Thus, as of June 1944, POWs who accepted release upon the promise to refrain from further 
belligerency were expected to abide by their agreements; those who did not could expect death upon 
recapture.260
c.  Reprisal against POWs
Belligerents have threatened and undertaken acts of reprisal261 to deter and punish violations of 
the laws and customs of war, including the abuse of POWs,262 throughout history.  Enlightenment 
commentary expressed approval for the use of reprisals by otherwise law-abiding states as necessary to 
deter unlawful adversaries,263 and during the American Revolution, the threat of reprisal was required to 
induce Britain to terminate its denial of quarter to and maltreatment of U.S. POWs.264 In the U.S. Civil 
War the “infliction of retaliatory measures” against enemy POWs265 was a permissible means to transform 
the conduct of the enemy.266  Soldiers committing perfidious surrenders in World War I might expect to be 
254 See U.S. ex rel. Henderson v. Wright, Case No. 17,777, 28 Fed. Cas. 796, 798 (1863) (holding that parole is a “sacred 
obligation” the violation of which dishonors the national character and damages the “national faith”).
255 See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 296-97 (suggesting that by the late 19th century opinion was divided as to whether the 
appropriate punishment for a parole violator was death by hanging or strict confinement at labor).
256
 Military courts treated violations of parole as serious offenses: during the Boer War, parole violators were occasionally 
punished by death.  See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 88 (discussing parole violations during the Boer War and noting the execution 
of a paroled Boer officer recaptured under arms in a British uniform). BRITISH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 298 (1884) 
(providing for death for violations of parole in “aggravating case[s]”); CODE MILITAIRE, Art. 204, §2 (“Every  [POW] who, 
having broken his parole is recaptured with arms in hand, is punished with death.”) (cited in WELLS, supra note_, at 152).
257
 Brown, supra note_, at 208.
258
 For example, the revisions to the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, simply renumbered sections of the U.S. military regulations 
and added almost nothing of substance.  See WELLS, supra note_, at 152 (documenting the near-verbatim recodifications of the 
1914 Rules in 1934 and 1940).
259 See HALL, supra note_, at 490 (glossing the question of parole in brief).
260
 Within the martial code as of 1944 the punishment for dishonor was commensurate with the crime, and for those who 
purported to resume the status of combatants after promising to surrender that status in exchange for their release, death was an 
appropriate sanction.  FLORY, supra note_, at 262.
261
 “Reprisal” is a legal term describing an act undertaken to induce enemy forces to cease violating the rules and customs of war.  
See generally FKALSHOVEN, supra note_. A reprisal, if undertaken prior to an enemy violation, would constitute a violation of 
the laws and customs of war, whereas when done solely for the purpose of forcing an adversary to discontinue its prior violation, 
it may be adjudged legal or, at the very least, permissible.  Id.  Reprisals may consist of acts that mirror those of the adversary 
(“in kind”) or other acts (“not in kind”), but resort to reprisal has been considered to require the failure of other means, formal 
notice to the adversary, and limitation of otherwise illegal acts consistent with the requirements of proportionality.
262
 BARKER, supra note_, at 196.
263
 DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 20 (1777).
264 See Coil, supra note_, at 183-84, 191- 92 (noting that threats of reprisals against British POWs were successful in protecting 
some U.S. POWs against execution); see also WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 15-16 (stating 
that a “right of relatiation” [i.e., reprisal] existed during the Revolutionary War in cases of the denial of quarter).
265
 Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 59.  Examples of reprisals explicitly permitted include the denial of quarter to troops that 
offer no quarter.  Id. at Art. 62, Art. 66. Such resort was effective: in reprisal for Union executions of Confederate POWs, 
Confederate Lieutenant Colonel John Singleton Mosby ordered 27 Union POWs to draw lots to determine which seven would be 
hanged in reprisal.  To the corpses notes were pinned with the following text: “These men have been hung in retaliation for an 
equal number of Colonel Mosby’s men, hung by order of General Custer at Front Royal.  Measure for measure.”  Cited in Boyle, 
Jr., supra note_, at 148-50.  
266 See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 27 (stating that “[a] reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of 
securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage” than reprisal).  
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employed as human shields or summarily executed, upon their eventual capture, in retaliation,267 and 
reprisals against POWs, to include execution, were employed by the Allies and the Entente268 and justified 
by scholars as necessary deterrent measures.269  In the immediate aftermath of World War I, international 
efforts to limit reprisals against POWs failed to dislodge the settled practice of states in responding to and 
deterring injuries to their armed forces,270 and diplomats settled for the requirement that reprisals against 
POWs be limited to where the act was justified as having been undertaken to protect POWs of the 
capturing state.271  Thus, although the Geneva Conventions of 1929 purported to subvert the custom-based 
regime of reprisal and institute an absolute prohibition on reprisals against POWs,272 this declaration made 
few inroads into the mass of state interests in deterring mistreatment of their own soldiers, and for the 
duration of World War II reprisals remained relatively commonplace and practical measures neither 
generally disfavored by nor inconsistent with the martial code.273
4.  The Court-Martial of Private Ryan
No disciplinary or judicial measures were taken against any of the characters in Saving Private 
Ryan.  The most brutal eleven months of the war lay ahead, and Allied efforts were tightly focused upon 
defeating the Nazi war machine.  To have exposed soldiers to the threat of punishment in cases where 
allegations of misconduct would have been considered of questionable merit would have chilled the 
aggressiveness necessary to survival in combat and dulled the very instrument essential to victory.  Even 
more importantly, by the standards of the martial code in June 1944, none of the acts or omissions were 
clearly colorable as prosecutable war crimes, and it is almost inconceivable that any commander would 
have investigated, let alone charged, any defendants.274  Nevertheless, to develop the argument that the 
267 See FOOKS, supra note_, at 121 n.2 (stating that, after the author, a British officer, came under fire from German 
machinegunners who feigned surrender only to inflict heavy casualties before their subsequent capture, the U.S. captors marched 
the German POWs before their advance to obtain a ceasefire from other German units).
268
 PRZETACZNIK, supra note_, at 136.
269 See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 465 (“The right to inflict reprisals—to retaliate—must entail the right to execute in very 
extreme cases.  Otherwise there would be no effective means of checking the enemy’s very worst excesses.”); see also
KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 74 (“[N]o army could reasonably be expected to renounce in war so effective and powerful a 
weapon for the redress or cessation of supposed intolerable wrong upon its own nationals at the hand of the enemy as immediate 
or threatened reprisal on enemy units within its own hands.”) (quoting Chariman Lord Younger of the International Law 
Association at the Hague Conference on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1921).
270
 Domestic military manuals expressly permitted reprisal at the time of World War I.  See, e.g., Rules of Land Warfare 1914, 
supra note_, at para. 383 (“Persons guilty of no offense whatever may be punished as retaliation for the guilty acts of others.”).
271 See International Law Association, 30th Conference, The Hague, 30 August-3 September 1921, Proceedings Concerning the 
POW Code: Report of the Conference by the Treatment of Prisoners of War Committee, Vol. I, 188-246, at Art. 13 (“All 
reprisals, as such, on prisoners of war are deprecated . . . [POWs] shall in no case be subjected to reprisals except in retaliation 
for acts committed or sanctioned by their own Governments in connection with the treatment of [POWs].”).
272 See Geneva Conventions of 1929, POW Convention, supra note_, at Art. 2 (providing that “[m]easures of reprisal against 
[POWs] are forbidden.”).
273 See PRZETACZNIK, supra note_, at 137 (noting execution of 80 German POWs by French Partisans in reprisal for execution 
of 80 Partisans, as well as German execution of 10 Italian POWs for every German soldier killed in the Battle of Rome in March 
1944); Matthew Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War, 15 
DICK. J. INT’L L. 1, 60-68 (1996) (noting pattern of reprisals against POWs during World War II).
274
 The Army routinely investigates various civil and criminal matters.  See DEP’T ARMY, REG. 15-6, BOARDS, 
COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES: PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS 
(Aug. 24, 1977).  If no formal accusation is made, the issue may be disposed of by this informal investigative procedure.  
However, when a soldier is formally accused of a crime, the Uniform Code of Military Justice [“UCMJ”] requires a pretrial 
investigation unless it is waived by the accused.  See 10 U.S.C. §§801-946 (2003) (UCMJ), at Art. 32 (providing for public
adversarial hearing to determine whether charges should be proferred).  Under the UCMJ, the convening authority has the 
ultimate discretion to determine whether to charge an accused subsequent to an Article 32 investigation, as the report of that 
investigation is merely advisory.  See Everett, supra note_, at_.  Moreover, the decision to launch an investigation, whether 
informal or formal, is a discretionary act driven not solely by legal considerations.  See Christopher D. Booth, Prosecuting the 
“Fog of War?” Examining The Legal Implications of an Alleged Massacre of South Korean Civilians by U.S. Forces during the 
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martial code is superior to international adjudication as arbiter of the moral and legal legitimacy of the 
conduct of soldiers in war, as well as the sole mechanism of social control whereby to achieve the objects 
and purposes of IHL without compromising the survivability of soldiers and the civilization they defend, 
this Article will analyze the likely result of a U.S. Army court-martial275 of Private Ryan and other 
members of the rescue squad on charges of denial of quarter and reprisal against the German POW for 
violation of parole.  The substantive elements of the crimes with which defendants might have been 
charged will be those as they existed in 1944.276  However, because the rules of court-martial have evolved 
Opening Days of the Korean War in the Village of No Gun Ri, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 933, 951 (quoting then Secretary 
of the Army Louis Caldera) (“[The Army” will not investigate every firefight, every battle” in which its soldiers might be alleged 
to have committed crimes).  Commanders have indeed convened courts-martial to try members of their commands for serious 
violations of IHL, even during total wars such as World War II.  See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note_, at 286 (noting numerous courts-
martial records of members of the U.S. Armed Forces under the UCMJ for the deliberate killing of POWs); RICHARD 
WHITTINGHAM, MARTIAL JUSTICE: THE LAST MASS EXECUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 259 (1971) (referencing 
the court-martial of U.S. Army Private Clarence Bertucci for the deliberate killing of 8 sleeping German POWs in a detention 
camp in Utah).  However, the decision to convene a court-martial hinges, at least in part, upon the political purposes and risks at 
issue: for example, in the waning days of World War II, U.S. Army troops executed most of the SS guards at the Dachau 
extermination camp, yet, upon learning of the massacre, their commanding general, General George S. Patton, made the 
prudential decision not to investigate the matter lest it cause embarrassment to the Allies and blur the moral distinction between 
the forces of liberation and those of subjugation.  See HOWARD A BEUCHNER, THE HOUR OF THE AVENGER (reporting 
that Patton rejected the proposal to court-martial the U.S. soldiers with the following words: "Public outrage would certainly have 
opposed the prosecution of American heroes for eliminating a group of sadists who so richly deserved to die.").  In contrast, 
although the Confederate commandant of the Andersonville POW camp, Captain Henry Wirtz, did his best to improve the 
miserable prison conditions he inherited from his predecessor, the U.S. court-martialled him for unlawful reprisal against POWS 
because “the public mood after a long and bloody war needed a scapegoat.”  WELLS, supra note_, at 94-95.  Commanders are 
understandably loathe to trigger judicial proceedings the politico-military ramifications of which are unpleasant, for courts-
martial serve purposes in addition to the administration of criminal justice, and thus it is solely within the discretion of the 
commander to determine whether a soldier will be investigated, as well as whether he will be tried and, if convicted, punished.  
See FM 27-10, Dep’t of the Army (1956), at para. 507(b) (locating prosecutorial authority and discretion in the commander); 
DEP’T ARMY, FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY LAW 58 (1980) (describing breadth of discretion of convening authority 
with respect to trial and sentencing); ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS 
TO MUSIC 73 (1969) (explaining that a court-martial is a not a judicial forum but an “instrumentality of the executive power of 
the President for the enforcement of discipline in the armed forces” that permits broad exercise of discretion).
275
 States derive their ultimate military jurisdiction “from the bare fact that the person charged is within the custody of the Court; 
his nationality, the place where the offence was committed, the nationality of the victims are not generally material.”  U.N. War 
Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals x (1949).  However, the sources of and authority for the military 
jurisdiction of the U.S. are augmented by custom stretching back to Rome, by the Constitution, and by positive legislation.  
English courts-martial borrowed liberally from Roman law, and in turn the Continental Congress, during and subsequent to the 
American Revolution, adopted much of the English system to regulate the relationship between members of the Armed Forces 
and the U.S.  DEPT of ARMY, FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY LAW 1 (1980).  With Article I, §8, cl. 14, the Framers of 
the U.S. Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces,” and recognized that the exigencies of military discipline would require a special system of military courts distinct 
from Article III courts.  See U.S. Const., Vth Amend. (exempting “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger” from the requirement of prosecution by indictment and, inferentially, 
from the right to trial by jury); see also O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (recognizing the constitutional bases for 
Congressional authority to create a system of military justice distinct from civil justice) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 
(1942)).  In 1951 Congress exercised this constitutional grant and enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice [“UCMJ”] to 
regulate the conduct of all Armed Forces personnel and to define and provide for the punishment of crimes which, but for the 
military status of the accused, would be tried and punished under applicable federal or State law.  See UCMJ, supra note_.  By 
executive order in 1984, the Manual for Courts-Martial was created to aid in the application and interpretation of the UCMJ and 
to provide rules of evidence and procedure.  See E.O. 12473, 49 FR 17152, Apr. 13, 1984 (amended most recently Apr. 11, 
2002). In addition, the respective service secretaries of the military components promulgate regulations governing the 
administration of military justice to which personnel are subject in accordance with 10 U.S.C.§3012, and the decisions of Courts 
of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals (the “Supreme Court of the Military”), general and special orders of 
the Department of Defense and of post and combat commanders, and military customs complement and conclude the sources of 
law applicable to courts-martial.  AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, HANDBOOK OF MILITARY LAW 3 (1918).
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 The term “war crime” is a legal term-of-art for a “violation of [IHL] by any person . . . , military or civilian[, and] [e]very 
violation of [IHL] is a war crime.”  FM 27-10, para. 499; see also 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1241 (identifying “war 
crimes” as a species of “international crime,” defined as act “universally recognized as criminal, which [are] considered . . . grave 
matter[s] of international concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state[.]”).  IHL, 
as part of the “law of nations” to which Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution makes reference, is part of the law of the U.S. 
even in the absence of specific incorporation provided it is not in conflict with a treaty or statute or a previous executive or 
judicial determination.  See The Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (establishing that customary international law is part of the 
law of the U.S. “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision[.]”).  However, subject 
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in the intervening years, and as this analysis is undertaken in support of the claim that the contemporary 
system of courts-martial, as the institutionalization of the martial code, is more suitable to the defense of 
law and civilization in the ongoing War on Terror than is the ICC, the court-martial of Private Ryan et al. 
will observe the procedures and structure of contemporary court-martial proceedings.277  The 
matter jurisdiction over allegations of violations of IHL by members of the Armed Forces, otherwise known as “war crimes 
jurisdiction,” is slightly more complex.  Although the doctrine of self-execution of treaties is beyond the scope of this Article, it 
suffices to note that IHL instruments have been interpreted as non-self-executing agreements that require specific domestic 
implementing legislation incorporating their provisions in domestic law as a further condition in order to create obligations 
binding in U.S. courts, including courts-martial.  See U.S. v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding the 
Geneva Conventions and other IHL instruments to be non-self executing agreements that did not create a cause of action in U.S. 
courts independent of domestic implementing legislation); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) (incorporating the doctrine of 
self-execution in U.S. law).  Moreover, rather than attempt the complex task of codification and specific incorporation of IHL 
Congress has chosen to incorporate by reference in the UCMJ, and consequently an analysis of evolving external sources is 
required to determine jurisdiction over offenses and persons in a particular case.  See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 18 (providing 
that “courts-martial shall . . . have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to [the UCMJ] and may adjudge 
any punishment permitted by the law of war.”); see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that the incorporation of 
IHL treaties and customary IHL by reference is a permissible exercise of Congressional Article I, §8, cl. 7 authority to “define 
and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations[.]”); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1946) (“[Congress] has 
incorporated by reference . . . all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be 
included within that jurisdiction.”).  Accordingly, U.S. policy is to charge soldiers with violations of the UCMJ, rather than with 
violations of IHL, and as such the court-martial proceeding is an adjudication under domestic, rather than international, law.  See
FM 27-10, supra note_, at para 507 (“Violations of the law of war committed by persons subject to the law of the [U.S.] will 
usually constitute violations of the [UCMJ], and, if so, will be prosecuted within the United States under that code[.]”); 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) (explaining that “ordinarily persons subject to the 
[UCMJ] should be charged with a specific violation of the [UCMJ] rather than a violation of the law of war.”); Levie, supra
note_, at 3 n.29 (stating that, strictly speaking, courts-martial apply U.S., and not international, law).  The War Crimes Act of 
1996, which provides that “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are punishable under federal law, theoretically 
creates independent war crimes jurisdiction in Article III courts, and it provides that grave breaches of any of the Conventions are 
punishable by jail or death.  See War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-92, 110- Stat. 2014 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2441) 
(1996) (stating that the U.S. incorporates into domestic law the “grave breaches” provisions of the Geneva Conventions as 
prescribing punishable war crimes); see also William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on Signing the War Crimes Act of 1996, 2 
Pub. Papers 1323 (Aug. 21, 1996) (stating that the War Crimes Act “provides the U.S. with clearer authority to prosecute 
violations of the laws of war.”).  However, in practice any alleged acts or omissions that would constitute grave breaches of the 
Geneva and Hague Conventions are expressly outlawed only in the U.S. military manual and are charged and prosecuted under 
relevant provisions of the UCMJ. See FM 27-10, ch.8, §1, para. 502 (prohibiting, as grave breaches, the “making use of poisoned 
or otherwise forbidden arms or ammunition, treacherous request for quarter, maltreatment of dead bodies, firing on localities 
which are undefended and without military significance, abuse of or firing on the flag of truce, misuse of the Red Cross emblem, 
use of civilian clothing by troops to conceal their military character before battle, improper use of privileged buildings for 
military purposes, poisoning of wells or streams, pillaging or purposeless destruction, compelling prisoners of war to perform 
prohibited labor, killing without trial spies or other persons who have committed hostile acts, compelling civilians to perform 
prohibited labor, violations of surrender terms.”); see also Robinson O. Everett, Did Military Justice Fail or Prevail? Son Thang: 
An American War Crime, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1434 (1998) (stating that in practice the UCMJ is the only viable procedure 
whereby to prosecute an accused service member and that to proceed under the War Crimes Act would still necessitate resort to 
the UCMJ).  The U.S. does take an expansive view of its treaty-based obligations with respect to prosecuting violations of treaty -
based IHL, despite its disfavor for direct incorporation and its preference for implementing legislation.  See FM 27-10 (“It is the 
intent of the United States to follow the Geneva Conventions of 1949 regardless of whether or not the treaty is legally binding 
upon or followed by the enemy nation.”). Nonetheless, breaches of customary IHL are not specifically addressed in any positive 
source of military law, although Congress retains the authority to prescribe with respect to “offenses against the Law of Nations,” 
and arguably has an international legal obligation to do so, although the manner in which it chooses to incorporate customary 
IHL remains its prerogative.  For an extended discussion of domestic jurisdiction over alleged violations of IHL, see Michael L. 
Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155 
(2000).  Because the corpus of IHL is in a constant state of flux, it is essential to distinguish the body of law applicable in 1944 
from that applicable in 2003 to evaluate the extent to which Private Ryan et al. discharged their legal obligations with respect to 
the UCMJ and its forebears, the manner in which the regime of courts-martial would address any delicts, and the contemporary 
compatibility of this regime with the joint defense of law and civilization.
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 Prior to 2000, Private Ryan et al. would have been, by virtue of his discharge from the U.S. Army, immune from court-martial 
for any transactions occurring in 1944, irrespective of the question of any applicable statutes of limitations, as under existing law 
only active-duty personnel were subject to court-martial (see infra), and discharged members of the Armed Forces could not be 
recalled involuntarily to active duty unless they were entitled to receive retired pay, which is generally paid only to those who 
have served more than twenty years on active duty.  See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) (holding that Congress lacked 
the power to subject civilians who had “severed all relationship with the military,” regardless of prior military status or the nature 
of the crime, to trial by court-martial under existing federal law; Willenbring v. Neurater, 48 M.J. 152 (C.A.A.F. 1998) 
(upholding Toth); BISHOP, supra note_, at 63, 292 (discussing long-standing opposition with the Department of the Army to 
proposed amendments to this jurisdictional gap to permit court-martial of honorably discharged service personnel).  Moreover, 
despite a 1968 General Assembly resolution declaring statutes of limitations inapplicable with respect to war crimes, the U.S., 
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contraposition of the likely results of a court-martial wherein current substantive laws governing parole 
and reprisal are applied offers evidence in further support of this claim.
a) U.S. v. Private Ryan et al., July 1944
On July 5th, 1944, following an Article 32 investigation278 sparked by a New York Times article 
under the byline of a reporter who had accompanied the 101st Airborne Division into Normandy and 
described in detail the Battle of Ramelle, including the shooting of the German POW “in cold blood,” the 
commanding general of the 75th Ranger Regiment, Major General Lucian Truscott, reluctantly ordered the 
courts-martial of Private Ryan, PFC Reiben, and T/5 Upham.279  T/5 Upham was charged with a violation 
of Article 118 of the UCMJ, “Murder,” for shooting the German machinegunner whom he had taken 
prisoner in Ramelle.280  PFC Reiben was not charged with a violation of Article 118 for denying quarter to 
surrendering Germans on the bluffs overlooking Omaha Beach as the prosecution determined that there 
was not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction;281 however, Reiben was charged with a violation of 
while it has expressed support for expansive jurisdiction over war crimes in theory, has never recognized any obligations under 
international law with respect to the waiver of otherwise applicable statutes of limitations or other impediments to jurisdiction in 
cases such as that of Private Ryan et al., nor are commentators inclined to suggest that such non-applicability has ripened into 
customary international law.  See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity of 1968, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, U.N. GA Res. 2391 (prohibiting applicability of any statute of 
limitations for grave breaches enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949) (signed by only 41 states but not by the U.S.); see 
also Scott R. Morris, Killing Egyptian Prisoners of War: Does the Phrase ‘Lest We Forget’ Apply to Israeli War Criminals?, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 903, 910-20 (1996) (disputing claims that the non-applicability of statutes of limitations for war 
crimes or crimes against humanity is part of CIL).  For a thorough discussion, see Robert H. Miller, The Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 476 (1971).
However, a transnational trend in favor of waiving statutes of limitations with respect to war crimes garnered judicial 
and Congressional notice. See, e.g., Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (C. D. Cal. 1985) (noting that the U.S. 
officially favored the Non-Applicability Convention even if it had not signed the instrument).  Over Army objections, with the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act [“MEJA”] Congress expanded the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction over war crimes 
to include civilian personnel as well as discharged former military personnel, although the latter category of defendants is still 
entitled to court-martial as opposed to an Article III court, and waive the constructive statute of limitation imposed by way of the 
more limited personal jurisdiction predating the Act.  See MEJA, P.L. 106-523, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§3261(a) (creating jurisdiction in Article III courts over civilian personnel alleged to have committed war crimes while 
accompanying the U.S. Armed Forces overseas); id. at (c) (providing that such jurisdiction is complementary to courts-martial); 
id. at (d) (expanding personal jurisdiction of courts-martial to include discharged military personnel accused of having committed 
prosecutable offenses while members of the Armed Forces but not previously tried by court-martial or by a foreign government).  
Although if MEJA were invoked as the basis for jurisdiction Private Ryan et al. might have defenses on constitutional as well as 
common-law grounds were they to assert that they are not members of the “land or naval forces, or in the Militia[,]” neither 
question need be reached here.  See U.S. CONST., Vth Amend. (providing that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”); see also U.S. v. McDonagh, 14 M.J. 415, 419 
(C.M.A. 1983) (holding that retroactive application of a criminal statute by courts-martial violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, as 
does retroactive application of a judicial construction of a statute) (citing U.S. Const., Vth Amend.).  Similarly, any evidentiary or 
ethical problems triggered by the trial of “’old men’ for crimes committed [sixty years] ago” is beyond the scope of this Article.  
H. McCoubrey, The Concept and Treatment of War Crimes, 1 J. ARMED CONFL. L. 121,  133 (1996) (discussing ethical and 
evidentiary issues associated with long-delayed war crimes prosecutions).
278 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 405 (governing procedural rules in Article 32 investigations).
279
 A general court-martial can be convened only by the President, the secretary of a military service, or a senior commanding 
officer.  UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 26.  To protect the substantive rights of the accused, the convening authority cannot also be 
the accuser.  Id. at Art. 22(b).  Forthis reason, each convening authority is advised by an experienced attorney.  Id. at Art. 34.
280
 Article 118 of the UCMJ provides in pertinent part that “Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or 
excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he . . . has a premeditated design to kill; . . . intends to kill or inflict great bodily 
harm; . . . [or] is engaged in an act that is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life . . . shall 
suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.”  UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 118.  Lesser included offenses 
under Article 118 include (in)voluntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, and assault with intent to commit murder or 
manslaughter.  Id.  Article 119 of the UCMJ, “Manslaughter,” provides that conviction can occur where “(b) Any person subject 
to this chapter who, without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being—(1) by culpable 
negligence; or (2) while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an offense, other than those . . . in [Article 118], directly 
affecting the person; is guilty of involuntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct.”).
281
 All of the potential prosecution witness to the events that might have led to an Article 118 prosecution of PFC Reiben—U.S. 
soldiers who made the Omaha landings and the German soldiers who contested them—were dead as of July 1944.  Had there 
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Article 128, “Assault,” for his physical abuse of the German machinegunner subsequent to capture, and of 
Article 134, “Misprision of Serious Offense,” for concealing the commission of violations by Private 
Ryan and T/5 Upham.282  Private Ryan was charged with a violation of Article 134 for concealing the 
commission of violations by T/5 Upham.  The defendants were arrested and confined in late June 1944,283
informed of the charges,284 advised of their rights, and appointed defense counsel.285  At arraignment286 the 
defendants each entered a plea of not guilty.287  Shortly after the arraignment, Private Ryan refused a grant 
of immunity to testify against T/5 Upham.288
 The trial judge denied defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground that the specifications failed 
to state offenses,289 and after other preliminary matters, including the pretrial orientation of the members 
of the court conducted by General Truscott,290 the common trial commenced291 before a panel of five 
members, two of whom were enlisted soldiers.292  As all defendants stipulated to the facts as presented in 
the specification of charges,293 the prosecution was relieved of the potential embarrassment of having to 
call as witnesses enemy POWs.  However, each defendant offered a series of affirmative defenses294 to the 
charges and submitted a witness list that included experts to testify in support of these defenses.295  All 
defendants offered the defense of ignorance or mistake of fact as to the criminality of the offenses with 
been an available eyewitness, the prosecution had been determined to charge PFC Reiben as well with a violation of Article 118, 
Murder, for denying quarter to the German defenders on OMAHA BEACH.
282 See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 134, para. 95 (providing for punishment at discretion of a court-martial for wrongful 
concealment of the commission of a serious offense by another that is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the Armed 
Forces).  Failure to report the commission of a violation of the “law of war” is a violation of Department of the Army regulations.  
See DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 350-4, TRAINING IN UNITS, ch. 14 (19 Mar. 1993) (requiring, inter alia, that “[s]oldiers report 
all violations of the law of war to their superiors.”).
283 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 305 (providing for pretrial confinement of the accused).
284 See id. at Rules 308, 602 (providing for notification to the accused of charges against him).
285 See generally WILLIS E. SCHUNG (ED.), UNITED STATES LAW AND THE ARMED FORCES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, COURTS-MARTIAL, AND THE RIGHTS OF SERVICEMEN (1972) 
(detailing the extensive procedural protections of the accused in court-martial proceedings); see also U.S. v. Tempia, 16 
U.S.C.M.A. 629, 633 (1967) (stating in dictum that many of the Bill of Rights are applicable to defendants in courts-martial 
proceedings).  Among other aspects of the due process accorded the accused in a court-martial is the entitlement to civilian 
counsel.  MCM, supra note_, at Rule 506.  U.S. courts-martial provide more extensive safeguards to defendants than the civil 
legal systems of the vast majority of states, and greater protections than those afforded at international tribunals.  See Martins, 
supra note_, at 673-74 (discussing safeguards afforded defendants in courts-martial and comparing these with other fora).
286 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 904 (governing arraignment).
287 See id. at Rule 910 (listing possible pleas and providing for procedural safeguards).
288 See id. at Rule 704 (governing grants of immunity).  Where the ability of the U.S. to obtain a conviction is uncertain, it is not 
uncommon for the government to offer a grant of immunity in exchange for testimony, although the perception that in so doing 
the U.S. permits wrongdoing to go unpunished is particularly acute in cases of war crimes.  For a recent discussion of the 
political and legal issues attendant to the question of a grant of immunity in courts-martial adjudicating allegations of war crimes, 
see Booth, supra note_, at 952.
289 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 907 (providing procedures for a motion to dismiss on grounds of a lack of jurisdiction over the 
person or the offense or that the specification does not state an offense).
290
 The Manual for Courts-Martial was amended in 1969 to reduce the influence of the convening authority upon the court and 
enhance the perceptions of its impartiality, although some suggest that the practice of pretrial orientation of the court for the 
purpose of influencing its decisionmaking continues.  See SHERRILL, supra note_, at 77.
291 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 812 (providing for joint and common trials of defendants and stating that “each accused shall 
be accorded the rights and privileges as if tried separately.”).
292
 The Sixth Amendment right to trial by a jury of peers is inapplicable to courts-martial.  Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39- 45 
(1942); see also United States v. Loving, 41 MJ 213, 285, 287 (1994), aff'd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 748 (1996); United States 
v. Curtis, 32 MJ 252, 267 (CMA 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991).   Accused servicemembers are instead tried at general 
court-martial by a panel of at least five service members who are chosen by the commander who convenes the court-martial on a 
"best qualified" basis.  See Art. 25(d)(2), UCMJ, 10 USC 825(d)(2); United States v. Tulloch, 47 MJ 283, 285 (1997).  In the 
event an enlisted soldier so elects, a minimum of 1/3 of the jury must be enlisted personnel.  MCM, supra note_, at Rule 805.
293 Id. at Rule 811 (providing that parties may stipulate to any fact, written statement, or testimony of a witness).
294 See id. at Rule 916 (describing a defense as an admission of the commission of the objective acts constituting the offense 
charged but denying criminal responsibility); id. at (c)-(k) (listing available affirmative defenses, including justification, 
obedience to orders, self-defense, accident, entrapment, coercion, inability, ignorance, and lack of mental responsibility).
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which they were charged,296 while T/5 Upham and PFC Reiben offered the defenses of justification, 
obedience to orders, and lack of mental responsibility.  The prosecution, relying on the stipulation of the 
defendants as to the facts that Upham had killed the German POW in the presence of the other two 
defendants, that PFC Reiben had physically abused the German POW, and that neither PFC Reiben nor 
Private Ryan had reported the events leading to the charges against other defendants that they had 
witnessed, presented a brief and direct case-in-chief to prove the unlawfulness of defendants’ actions.
With respect to T/5 Upham, the prosecution introduced into evidence relevant provisions of the 
Rules of Land Warfare (1940),297 the Geneva Conventions of 1929,298 and the Hague Convention of 
1907299 to establish that the denial of quarter, and the execution of POWs, were categorical violations of 
IHL as it existed at the time of the alleged offenses for which defenses were unavailable as a matter of 
law.300  Even if, arguendo, military necessity could ever justify the extrajudicial killing of POWs,301 the 
prosecution further argued, it was a defense unavailable to Upham, who could have availed himself of 
295 See id. at Rule 703 (governing the employment of expert witnesses).
296 See id. at Rule 916(j) (providing that “it is a defense to an offense that the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an 
incorrect belief of the true circumstances such that, if the circumstances were as the accused believed them, the accused would 
not be guilty of the offense.”).
297
 RULES OF LAND WARFARE 1940, supra note_, at para. 33 (restating para. 182 of the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, to the 
effect that surrendering enemy personnel are generally entitled to quarter).
298 See Geneva Conventions of 1929, supra note_, at Art. 2 (stating that POWs “shall at all times be humanely treated and 
protected, particularly against acts of violence” and “[m]easures of reprisal against them are forbidden.”).
299 See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 23(c) (“It is especially forbidden . . . (c) to kill or wound an enemy who, 
having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion[.]”).
300
 The argument that the denial of quarter and the extrajudicial killing of POWs is absolutely prohibited was made before the 
International Military Tribunals at Nuremburg and Tokyo and before other U.S. military tribunals and commissions adjudicating 
the guilt of Nazi and Japanese defendants charged with the denial of quarter and the killing of U.S. POWs in the period from 
1944-1951.  See, e.g., Nuremburg Judgment, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 57 et seq., I WAR 
CRIMES REP. (1947) (refusing to consider defenses and sentencing the authors and executors of the Kommand Befehl and the
execution of Allied POWs to death); The Jaluit Atoll Case, 1 WAR CRIMES REP. 71 (1945) (sentencing the commander of 
Japanese naval forces who executed U.S. POWs to death for violation of Article 23(c) of the Hague Convention of 1907 and Art. 
2 of Geneva Convention of 1929); The Essen Lynching Case, 1 WAR CRIMES REP. 88 (1945) (sentencing German officer to 
death for permitting a crowd to kill 3 British POWs); The Dostler Case, U.S. Mil. Comm’n, Rome, Italy, Oct. 12, 1945, at I LAW 
REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 22 (1945) (convicting commander of the German 75th Army Corps, General Anton Dostler, for 
ordering summary execution of fifteen uniformed U.S. POWs captured while on a mission to demolish a railway tunnel between 
La Spezia and Genoa); Abbaye Ardenne Case, 4 WAR CRIMES REP. 97 (1945) (condemning commander of a Nazi SS 
Regiment for counseling his men to deny quarter to Allied troops); Trial of Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert, (United States 
Mil. Comm’n, Augsberg, Germany, June 13, 1945), II LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56-57 (1948) (convicting two members 
of a German unit for denial of quarter to a wounded U.S. officer); Trial of Amberger, 1 WAR CRIMES REP. 81 (1946) (same); 
“Trial of Bury and Hafner,” 3 WAR CRIMES REP. 62 (1945); “Trial of Schosser,” 3 WAR CRIMES REP. 65 (1945) (same); 
“Trial of Rauer,” 4 WAR CRIMES REP. 113 (1946) (same); The Hostage Case, II WAR CRIMES REP. 1230 (1948) (rejecting 
applicability of defenses and convicting principals and accessories of, inter alia, denial of quarter to Allied POWs).
301
 To permit necessity to trump the “accepted usages of civilized nations” would, in the words of the IMT, “eliminate all 
humanity . . . and decency from the conduct of war.”  High Command Case, 11 WAR CRIMES REP. 462, 541 (1950); see also
Einsatzgruppen Case, IV TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1317 (holding that recognition of an expansive view of military necessity urged 
by the defense would cause “the rules of war . . . [to] quickly disappear.”).  Unless incorporated into the positive law, the defense 
of military necessity to a violation of the customs of war was, according to the U.S. at the time of the post-World War II war 
crimes trials, absolutely unavailable.  See Justice Case, 3 TRIALS WAR CRIM. 954, 1127 (1947) (holding that military necessity 
may serve as a defense only where expressly incorporated into specific provisions of IHL).  The very specific question of 
whether military necessity could every justify derogation from the martial code, to include proscription against the denial of 
quarter or execution of POWs, was reached by U.S. and international military tribunals in several post-World War II trials and 
answered invariably in the negative.  See, e.g., Trial of Baba Masao, 11 WAR CRIMES REP. 56 (1947) (rejecting defense of 
military necessity to the charge of denial of quarter despite evidence that an Allied landing was anticipated, and did in fact occur, 
in the area of operations from whence U.S. POWs were forcibly removed and killed); The Peleus, supra note_ (convicting a 
German submarine commander of denial of quarter to the survivors of a sunken ship despite evidence that Allied air surveillance 
might otherwise have spotted the survivors and led to the detection and destruction of his submarine).  The case of Thiele and 
Steinert is even more squarely on point with respect to the position of the prosecutor in U.S. v. Ryan et al.: members of a small 
German unit surrounded by numerically superior U.S. troops who killed a U.S. POW to avoid detection and probable death were 
convicted of denial of quarter under the Hague and Geneva Conventions by a court-martial that rejected military necessity as 
absolutely unavailable. 3 WAR CRIMES REP. 56 (1948).
48
alternative, non-lethal methods of preventing the harms that Upham asserted the execution of the POW 
had been undertaken to prevent.  Specifically, Upham might have bound or otherwise secured the POW, 
disabled him in some fashion, or simply released all the POWs unharmed.302  The prosecution called the 
eminent scholar Hersch Lauterpacht, who testified that under IHL as it existed at the time of the alleged 
offense, defenses to the denial of quarter were categorically unavailable.303  A second prosecution 
expert—a former British infantry officer now a law professor at Oxford—testified that the defense of 
military necessity was applicable only to acts undertaken under circumstances where compliance with the 
law was a “genuine material impossibility,”304 and that Upham either could have complied with the 
obligation to grant quarter or else was obligated to release surrendering German troops on parole.  
In regard to the proffered defense of superior orders, the prosecutor argued against its 
applicability with respect to war crimes and contended that, even if it applied, not only was the killing of 
enemy POWs not within the scope of the orders given to Upham305 but that even if such an action could 
have been reasonably construed otherwise, whether as a reprisal or on other grounds, it was an illegal 
order306 that Upham knew or should have known was illegal307 and thus he was duty-bound, as a matter of 
transnational military custom308 as well as U.S. military regulations,309 to disobey.  To the defense of a lack 
302 See OSIEL, supra note_, at 132-33 (suggesting that the question of liability for denial of quarter turns on whether non -lethal 
alternatives, such as the disabling of the POWs by bindings, were reasonably available).
303 See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW , 183-84 (6th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1943) (categorically rejecting any defenses 
to the charge of denial of quarter).
304 See McCoubrey, supra note_, at 135 (suggesting that in the situation where a submarine commander is unable to carry out 
search-and-rescue operations on behalf of the survivors of a torpedoed vessel, due to his vulnerability to detection while on the 
surface, he may avail himself of the defense of military necessity to the charge of denial of quarter as compliance with the 
obligation to rescue would constitute a “genuine material impossibility”)
305 Captain Miller issued verbal, and not written, orders to the rescue squad, and the defense stipulated to the fact that the orders 
did not specifically authorize the killing of enemy POWs or any derogations from the laws of war.
306
 The prosecutor read Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, providing that POWs are “in the power of the hostile 
Government, but not of the individuals or formation which captured them[,]” and forbidding “[m]easures of reprisal against 
them[,]” into the record to establish the categorical illegality of reprisals under IHL and that Upham could not characterize his 
actions to have been a legal reprisal against the German POW.
307 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 916(d) (providing that if a defendant knows an order to be illegal, or a “person of ordinary 
sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful[,]” he is obligated to disobey).
308
 The post-World War II jurisprudence of the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals authoritatively established the position of the 
Allies that, notwithstanding any contrary domestic practice, a “[s]oldier is bound to obey only the lawful orders of his superiors” 
and thus “[i]f he receives an order to do an unlawful act, he is bound neither by his duty nor by his oath to do it.”  Jaluit Atoll 
Case, supra note_, at 5 (citing U.S. v. Carr, 25 F. Cas. 306, 307-08 (1872)); see also Dostler Case, supra note_ (rejecting a 
superior orders defense to the charge of denial of quarter on the ground that such a defense was unavailable under IHL and that 
the accused had a duty to disobey the unlawful order); Hostage Case, supra note_, at (rejecting the availability of a superior 
orders defense as the “rule that a superior order is not a defense to a criminal act is a rule of fundamental justice that has been 
adopted by civilized nations extensively” and only lawful orders are entitled to obedience).  Moreover, the formal rules of 
procedure and evidence promulgated by the Allies to govern prosecution of German and Japanese war crimes cases utterly 
proscribed application of the superior orders defense.  See Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, Rules Promulgated for War 
Crimes Cases (1945), at 16(f) (“The official position of the accused shall not absolve hum from responsibility, nor be considered 
in mitigation of punishment.  Further, action pursuant to order of the accused’s superior, or of his government, shall not constitute 
a defence but may be considered in mitigation of punishment[.]” (cited in Albert Lyman, A Reviewer Reviews the Yokohama War 
Crimes Trials, 17 J. B. ASS’N. D. C. 267, 274 (1950)).
309 See, e.g., Court-Martial of General Jacob H. Smith, Manila, Philippines, April, 1902, S. Doc. 213, 57th Cong, 2nd Sess., 5-17 
(1902) (convicting commander of U.S. expeditionary force in the Philippines, Brigadier General Smith, of a violation of good 
conduct and discipline for issuing orders in violation of Article 60 of the Lieber Code that suggested it would be permissible to 
deny quarter); see also JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, v. VII 187 (1906) (discussing the 
Smith court-martial and the issue of unlawful orders).  A mere eight months before the courts-martial of Private Ryan et al., the 
section of the Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, concerning the defense of superior orders was rewritten to relegate it from the status 
of a complete defense to a qualified defense inapplicable to the denial of quarter.  DEP’T OF THE ARMY, RULES OF LAND 
WARFARE (1944), at para. 345.1, “Liability of Offending Individuals.” (providing that “the fact that [offenses against the “laws 
and customs of war”] were done pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction may be taken into consideration in 
determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment.”).  The purpose of the 1944 revision, made at 
the order of General George C. Marshall—the source of the orders to rescue Private Ryan—was to harmonize regulations 
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of mental responsibility,310 the prosecutor argued that, even conceding that he was profoundly enraged by 
the perfidy of the German POW and the death of Captain Miller, T/5 Upham retained sufficient mental 
responsibility that, in conjunction with the presumption of mental responsibility that attaches to every 
soldier, he was disqualified from offering this defense.311  Finally, the prosecution attempted to prove that, 
by virtue of the extensive U.S. Army regulations governing the laws of land warfare and the manifest 
illegality of his actions, T/5 Upham either knew or should have known that killing an enemy POW 
rendered hors de combat was categorically illegal.  Experts—military psychiatrists and professors of 
military law—testified for the prosecution with respect to all aforementioned defenses.
In the case against PFC Reiben, charged with assault in violation of Article 128 and misprision of 
a serious offense in violation of Article 134 for concealing the commission of violations of the UCMJ by 
Private Ryan and T/5 Upham, the prosecution presented its case first as to the assault charge, attacking 
the defenses of justification based on military necessity, obedience to orders, and lack of mental 
responsibility on grounds virtually identical to those in the case against Upham.  The prosecution 
contended that no exigent circumstances required PFC Reiben to cause bodily harm to the German 
POW312 subsequent to his capture, as there was no imminent threat from other enemy forces and U.S. 
troops outnumbered the sole surviving German, who offered no physical resistance.  The prosecution 
further argued that neither PFC Reiben nor any other member of the rescue squad had received orders 
instructing or otherwise urging them to mistreat enemy POWs, and that notwithstanding the influence of 
the emotions associated with the death of T/5 Wade, PFC Reiben presumptively retained sufficient 
responsibility for his actions that he could not assert the defense of lack of mental responsibility as a 
matter of law.  With respect to the misprision charge, the prosecutor supplemented the stipulation, in 
which PFC Reiben stated that he had observed T/5 Upham shoot the German POW but had not 
subsequently reported the shooting, with evidence that PFC Reiben either knew or should have known 
that Upham’s actions were criminal, that PFC Reiben had the opportunity, but did not elect, to report, and 
that under U.S. military regulations the denial of quarter is a serious offense.313  The prosecution made 
effectively an identical case against Private Ryan on the misprision charge and then rested.314
Following a brief recess, the defendants’ joint motion for a finding of not guilty was denied,315
and the defendants presented their case.  T/5 Upham testified that he was justified in shooting the German 
POW on the ground of military necessity.  According to Upham, his squad had been virtually eliminated 
by enemy action, and with only three remaining soldiers it was impossible to accept the surrender of all 
six German POWs without compromising his mission: the safe evacuation of Private Ryan from the 
governing the conduct of U.S. Armed Forces with those the Allies had proposed would govern the prosecution of German and 
Japanese soldiers who, it was anticipated, would claim to have been following superior orders.  WELLS, supra note_, at 10.
310 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 916(k) (providing that it is an affirmative defense if at the time of an offense an accused was 
“unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his . . . acts” by virtue of a “severe mental disease or defect”).
311 See id. at Rule 916(k)(2) (providing that a “mental condition not amounting to a lack of mental responsibility . . . is not a 
defense[.]”); id. at (3)(A) (providing that an accused is “presumed to have been mentally responsible[.]”).
312 See id. at Art. 128(b)(1) (providing that the elements for assault are the attempt to cause physical harm to another through the 
use of unlawful force or violence).
313 See supra at note_.
314 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 913 (governing presentation of the merits).
315 See id. at Rule 917 (governing motions for a finding of not guilty after presentation of the U.S. case-in-chief).
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theater of operations.  Had he granted quarter, the three survivors would have at the very least been 
greatly encumbered in their movements; at worst, the six enemy POWs, along with other German forces 
known to be concentrated along the planned avenue of evacuation and preparing for counterattack against 
the Normandy beachhead, might well have overwhelmed their captors316 and defeated a mission assigned 
strategic significance by the Army Chief of Staff.  Upham further testified that in shooting the German 
POW he had acted consistently with lawful mission and standing orders317 requiring him to evacuate 
Private Ryan at all costs in the face of a uncertain enemy threat all along his planned axis of maneuver 
and that to have accepted the additional encumbrance of POWs and threat this would have entailed would 
have been in contravention of his orders as he understood them.318  Further, Upham testified that he lacked 
mental responsibility for killing the German POW as a consequence of extreme “battle fatigue”319 coupled 
with uncontrollable outrage over the death of his commander at the hand of a perfidious parole violator320
on whose behalf he had, days earlier, urged his unwilling comrades to grant parole.  Finally, Upham 
testified that he believed it was legally permissible to shoot an enemy POW for parole violation without 
resort to judicial process, particularly under the circumstances outlined in his earlier testimony.
Following the testimony of T/5 Upham, PFC Reiben and Private Ryan corroborated prior 
testimony as to their objective and subjective understandings of the enemy threat and of the importance 
attached to their mission by the General Staff of the U.S. Army.  PFC Reiben testified further that he had 
not believed it possible to accept the surrender of the German POW due to concerns over the likelihood of 
imminent contact with a numerically superior enemy force, that he had believed it necessary to use a 
moderate degree of force to establish physical control over the POW, and that he had believed, insofar as 
he knew and understood applicable law, that Upham had been justified, by necessity and by reference to 
squad orders, in killing the POW and that based upon his military training he did not believe that he, 
Upham, or Private Ryan had violated any laws in failing to report the circumstances of the death of the 
POW through the chain of command.  Private Ryan reiterated the testimony of PFC Reiben, denying that 
316
 Although the U.S. Theater Provost Marshal was prepared to process, in the first few days after D- Day, as many as 50,000 
German POWs in accordance, as far as possible, with the requirements of the Geneva Conventions of 1929, Allied military 
planners were very concerned that once Allied forces extended the beachhead inland the ratio of enemy POWs to capturing 
Allied troops would threaten not only their capacity to comply with legal obligations but also their physical security.  See 
AMRBOSE, supra note_, at  (noting that by 20 June 1944, German POWs outnumbered their captors by a ratio of 150:1).
317 See www.army.benning.mil (Rogers’ Rangers) (listing the standing orders under which U.S. Army Rangers have served for 
more than two centuries and which supplement their general and mission orders to the present).
318 See OSIEL, supra note_, at 128 (stating that fact-finders in courts-martial have traditionally undertaken an analysis of 
defendants’ understandings of the lawfulness of their orders and whether such understandings were reasonable under the 
particular circumstances of each case).  Courts-martial have traditionally been instructed to consider whether an accused might 
reasonably have mistaken his conduct as lawful on the ground that he reasonably believed that he was acting pursuant to the 
orders of his superior.  Id. (citing U.S. v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1968)).
319
 “Battle fatigue” is a historically-dated term for what is now described as post-traumatic stress disorder [“PTSD”], a mental 
condition characterized by and caused by shock, trauma.  See AM. PSYCH. ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL IV (rev.), at 309.81 (describing PTSD as the development of characteristic symptoms of fear, helplessness, persistent 
re-experiencing of the event, numbing of general responsiveness, and increased arousal “following exposure to an extreme 
traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or 
other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of 
another person).  Sustained exposure to combat can induce or exacerbate PTSD and warp the normal moral calculus of soldiers.  
See ERIC T. DEAN, JR., SHOOK OVER HELL: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS, VIETNAM, AND THE CIVIL WAR 1997); 
Dennis Grant, Psychological Damage of Combat, 148 AM. J. PSYCH. 271 (1991).
320 See supra at note_.  The defense argued in effect that the violation of parole on the part of the deceased German POW was the 
proximate cause not only of the death of Captain Miller but of the reaction of T/5 Upham.  
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in the course of his military training he had ever been instructed that failure to report an offense was a 
violation of Army regulations.
After a recess, a series of expert witnesses testified for the defense, beginning with the defense of 
military necessity.  The first two, retired former colonels in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps 
and now law professors, testified that the U.S. Army Rules of Land Warfare expressly sanctioned the 
denial of quarter under limited circumstances, including self-preservation and the preservation of the 
military mission.321  These experts further testified that, although the denial of quarter was normally a 
manifestly illegal act not justifiable by military necessity or superior orders, it could, under certain 
circumstances, be excused where a small unit, operating behind enemy lines in a high-threat environment, 
could not accept prisoners as to do so would necessitate abandoning the mission or disclosing it to the 
enemy.322  The third, a former British military lawyer, did not share the opinion that the refusal to grant 
quarter could be justified; however, he stated that in circumstances such as those faced by the defendants 
the denial of quarter was “understandable” and excusable.  Although all three experts conceded on cross-
examination that an order to withhold from enemy POWs the legal protections afforded by relevant IHL 
treaties would be an illegal order not entitled to obedience, and that obedience would support the charge 
of murder,323 each expert insisted that military necessity had always been available, and continued to be 
available, as a defense to a charge of murder arising from the denial of quarter in exceptional 
circumstances,324 and that to refuse to permit “individuals confronting calamities” to act in the interest of 
self-preservation would “only succeed in bringing the law [of war] into disrepute.”325
With respect to the defense of superior orders, defense experts testified that, whether deliberately 
or indeliberately, illegal orders are frequently issued326 to subordinates who are nevertheless obligated to 
comply327 and that U.S. Army regulations,328 as well as the Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal,329 explicitly 
provided that even if an order to deny quarter would necessarily be illegal, the very existence of that order 
321 See Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, supra note_,  at para. 85 (providing that a commander may deny quarter on the ground it is 
necessary in the interest of self-preservation or that caring for enemy POWs interferes with his mission).
322 See WHEATON, supra note_, at 210-11 (stating that military necessity, though often a “fictitious and ubiquitous” claim, 
excuses the denial of quarter when the likelihood of victory or the rapidity or secrecy of movement would be greatly 
compromised otherwise); see also SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 91 (stating that quarter may be denied where the numerical strength 
of the prospective POWs exceeds the strength of the prospective captors and thus would threaten their safety).  Neither of these 
authors served in the U.S. Army JAG Corps; however, the substance of their publications is substantially the same as the 
testimony which experts with practical and academic backgrounds in operational law—the sort of witnesses the defense would 
call—would have been likely to offer, and thus it is presented as if it were offered by former JAG officers now in legal academia.
323
 BARKER, supra note_, at 27-28, 
324 See supra at notes_ .  The jurisprudence of the IMT supported the defense expert testimony that the defense of military 
necessity was to be counted as among the survivors, rather than the victims, of World War II.  See, e.g., Flick Case, VI TRIALS 
WAR CRIM. 1187, 1192, 1201, 1206 (1952) (stating that it might be “reproached for wreaking vengeance rather than 
administering justice if it were to declare as unavailable to defendants the defense of necessity,” a principle with “wide 
acceptance in American and English courts and . . . recognized elsewhere”).  
325 See Lippman, supra note_, at 110.
326
 OSIEL, supra note_, at 157.
327
 A defense expert cited the case of General Karl Stenger, a German commander charged with issuing orders directing 
subordinates to deny quarter and to kill all POWs in their custody but acquitted, despite substantial inculpatory evidence, on the 
supposition that “no Prussian general officer would have issued such an order[.]” (cited in CLAUDE MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG 
TRIALS 151 (1921).  Although his subordinates were nevertheless convicted of having denied quarter (ostensibly on their own 
initiative), the charge, and the penalties, were mitigated by virtue of the suspicion they had been ordered to deny quarter.  George 
G. Battle, The Trials Before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Germans Accused of War Crimes, 8 VA. L. REV. 1 (1921).
328 See Rules of Land Warfare 1940, supra note_, at paras. 345, 347 (providing that U.S. Army personnel will not be punished for 
war crimes ordered by their superiors).
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was, depending upon the factual circumstances, either a defense or a mitigating factor. These witnesses 
further testified that soldiers could be lawfully ordered to undertake acts that would otherwise amount to 
war crimes but for the fact that the purpose of the ordered acts was in reprisal for prior violation(s) of the 
laws and customs of war by the enemy;330 that soldiers were duty-bound to execute these orders; and that 
reprisal against a parole violator could reasonably and in good faith have been considered to be within the 
scope of the orders issued to the rescue squad to which Upham had been assigned.331  On the question of 
the lack of mental responsibility, a psychiatrist testified that combat soldiers are exposed to sleep 
deprivation, poor nutrition, and emotional and physical trauma that conspire to warp normal moral 
judgments and render the application of formal legal rules by those who to whom such experiences are 
foreign a “morally questionable exercise.”332  According to this witness, where battlefield failure, and even 
personal destruction, are introduced into this decisional climate, the likelihood that soldiers’ conduct will 
depart from the positive law increases by orders of magnitude333 in proportion to the intensity of the 
combat.334  In his opinion, considering that the defendant had immediately prior to his execution of the 
parole violator witnessed the latter kill his commander, T/5 Upham was suffering from an extreme case of 
battle fatigue that had destroyed his capacity to judge the moral and legal consequences of his acts.335  A 
military historian testified further to the effect that the defense of lack of mental capacity, predicated upon 
battle fatigue, had long been available to soldiers accused of exacting revenge upon enemy soldiers and 
units for depredations against their own units.336
329 See Nuremburg Charter, supra note_, at Art. 8 (“The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a 
superior . . . may be considered in mitigation of punishment[.]”).
330 See II OPPENHEIM, supra note_, at 453.
331
 This precise question was presented in the Dostler Case, during which General Dostler offered the defense of superior orders to 
the charge of denial of quarter to U.S. POWs.  See Dostler Case, I TRIALS WAR CRIM., supra note_, at 2.  The accused 
contended that the Hitler’s Kommando Befehl, ordering the denial of quarter to Allied commandos, was legal inasmuch as it was 
undertaken in reprisal for Allied denials of quarter and as such left no alternative but to obey.  Id. at 28.  However, the military 
commission hearing the case convicted the defendant without providing any legal reasoning to support its rejection of the 
superior orders defense or the argument that the Kommando Befehl rendered the shooting of the U.S. POWs a legitimate reprisal. 
See  KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 192-301 (discussing the intersection of the superior orders defense with reprisals).
332
 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, XVIIIth Corps (Airborne), Oct. 2, 2000.
333
 The destruction that omnipresence of threats to physical survival can wreak upon the moral frame of reference through which 
soldiers view the world is almost beyond the capacity of those who have not experienced combat to comprehend:
For the common soldier, at least, war has the feel, the spiritual texture, of a great ghostly fog, thick and 
permanent.  There is no clarity.  Everything swirls.  The old rules are no longer binding, the old truths no 
longer true.  Right spills over into wrong.  Order blends into chaos, love into hate, ugliness into beauty, law 
into anarchy, civility into savagery.  The vapor sucks you in.  You can’t tell where you are, or why you’re 
there, and the only certainty is overwhelming ambiguity[.]
TIM O’BRIEN, THE THINGS THEY CARRIED 88 (1990).
334 See Smidt, supra note_, at 155 (correlating the displacement of the moral compass of soldiers off its normal bearing with the 
increase in combat intensity and associated spike in destruction and death).
335 See Everett, supra note_, at 1429 (outlining, from the point of view of a JAG lawyer and a military judge, the standard 
arguments in support of a defense of lack of mental capacity to a charge of a war crime).
336
 The phenomenon whereby soldiers are unable to restrain themselves from exacting revenge when capturing enemy forces that 
shortly before were killing their comrades is well-documented, and although the defense of lack of mental responsibility resulting 
from the emotional trauma of such circumstances has not uniformly led to the acquittal of soldiers charged with denial of quarter, 
it has been treated by courts-martial as an admissible defense and as an extenuating and mitigating factor.  See Drew L. Kershen, 
A Symposium on Film and the Law: Breaker Morant, 22 OK. CITY U. L. REV. 107 (discussing the admission and adjudication 
of the defense of a lack of mental responsibility in the 1900 court-martial of British soldiers for denial of quarter to Boer POWs 
captured wearing British uniforms who had ambushed and killed the commander of the defendants, and suggesting that the pre-
capture conduct of POWs would normally have been considered as extenuating and mitigating circumstances).  Even more 
frequently, under such circumstances the denial of quarter to enemy POWs has been treated as a forigiveable, and even 
understandable, reaction to extreme provocation not subject to referral to the military criminal justice system.  The following 
exchange, conducted between a senior noncommissioned officer and the author, an officer in the British Army, following the 
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Defense counsel then introduced several Army publications in support of the defense of 
ignorance, claiming that although ignorance of the law does not justify its violation as a general rule the 
government recognized as a matter of official policy that IHL “does not in some cases possess either the 
exactness or the degree of publicity which pertains to municipal law[.]”337 thereby affording the ignorant 
violator a defense.  A series of retired members of the Judge Advocate General corps and professors of 
military law testified that knowledge of IHL, an increasingly complex regime, could not be presupposed 
even in officers, let alone enlisted soldiers, by virtue of the uneven and incomplete distribution of such 
knowledge in the training provided by the Army338 as well as the capacity of soldiers to absorb such 
complex material in the context of other training obligations.339  These experts concluded that it was 
reasonable for Upham to have relied on his superiors and to have believed that such orders were legal 
even if he had been mistaken.340  Finally, the defense introduced as character witnesses341 members of the 
101st Airborne Division whose lives Private Ryan had saved in combat on the night of June 5th, 1944 
resulting in the award of the Silver Star;342 the defense also entered into evidence copies of the citations 
issued to Private Ryan and PFC Reiben upon their respective awards of Bronze Stars343 for heroism in 
combat in Italy in early 1944.  After the defense concluded its case-in-chief, the court adjourned.
The next morning the judge, acting sua sponte, issued a finding of “not guilty” as to PFC Reiben 
and Private Ryan344 and ordered their release from custody.  The prosecution proceeded to its closing 
argument as to the remaining defendant, T/5 Upham.345  The prosecutor described the denial of quarter to 
execution of German POWs by a British soldier, “S___”, subsequent to the storming of a German trench in World War I, is 
representative of this oft-repeated practice:
’What the hell ought I to do?’
‘I don’t see that you can do anything,’ I answered slowly.  ‘What can you do?  Besides I don’t see that S____’s really 
to blame.  He must have been half mad with excitement by the time he got into that trench.  I don’t suppose he ever 
thought what he was doing.  If you start a man killing, you can’t turn him off like an engine.  After all, he is a good 
man.  He was probably half off his head.’
‘It wasn’t only him.  Another did exactly the same thing.’
‘Anyhow, it’s too late to do anything now.  I suppose you ought to have shot both on the spot.  The best thing now is to 
forget it.’”
GUY CHAPMAN, A PASSIONATE PRODIGIALITY: FRAGMENTS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1933).
337
 Dep’t of the Army, International Law, v. II, Pamphlet 27-161-2, at 246 (1962).  
338 See WELLS, supra note_, at 120-21 (making this argument); OSIEL, supra note_, at 126 (noting that in the court-martial of 
Lieutenant Calley for the unlawful killing of noncombatants in My Lai during the Vietnam War, the defense of “following 
superior orders unreasonably believed to be lawful” was reinforced by evidence that Calley had been inadequately trained in IHL, 
leading to a reduction in the charges against him) (referring to U.S. v. Willliam Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973), 22 U.S.C.M.A. 
534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973), habeas corpus granted, 382 F. Supp. 650 (1974), reversed 519 F.2d 184 (1975), cert. den. 425  U.S. 
911 (1976)); DELISSEN & TANJA, supra note_, at 200-01 (indicating that confusion and ignorance with respect to IHL 
remained endemic within the armed forces of many states as late as the 1990s due to inadequate military education programs).
339 See Dov Shefi, The Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces: His Functions and Powers, 100 MIL. L. REV. 119, 119-
20 (1983) (stating that the “prolific development” and “great complexity” of IHL requires significant study, guidance, and 
expertise in the translation to the battlefield where faculties are dedicated to the defeat of the enemy, leaving little additional 
capacity to parse the meaning of the commandments of an unclear legal regime). 
340 See OSIEL, supra note_, at 356 (elaborating the “reasonable error” approach to the defense of superior orders where the 
analysis centers upon whether a defendant’s mistaken belief in the legality of his orders was reasonable under the circumstances).
341
 At courts-martial, evidence supporting the inference of the good character of the accused consists primarily of citations for 
heroism in combat as well as the testimony of witnesses whose lives the accused has saved.  Everett, supra note_, at 1432-33.
342
 The Silver Star—the third-highest decoration for military valor awarded by the United States—is awarded to a person “who . . 
. is cited for gallantry in action while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States” but where the circumstances to 
not justify the award of the Distinguished Service Cross.  32 C.F.R. 578.7 (1996).
343
 The Bronze Star is a decoration for military valor awarded for “heroic or meritorius achievement or service . . .while engaged 
against an enemy of the United States[.]”  E.O. No. 9419 (February 4, 1944) (superseded by E.O. No. 11046) (Aug. 24, 1962).
344
 Rule 917 of the Manual for Courts-Martial provides that the court, acting sua sponte, “shall enter a finding of not guilty of one 
or more offenses charged after the evidence on either side is closed and before findings on the general issue of guilt are 
announced if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense affected.”).
345 See id. at Rule 919 (providing procedures for closing arguments and rebuttal by the government).
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the German POW as an act of premeditated murder that was no less criminal, under domestic and 
international law,346 by virtue of the despicable status of the victim as a parole violator in the armed forces 
of a state at war with U.S.  The prosecutor then recapitulated the arguments that none of the defenses 
were applicable, either as a matter of law or in the factual circumstances presented, on the grounds that 
Upham knew that the denial of quarter was categorically illegal or at least illegal in circumstances 
wherein he had the option to use nonlethal means to reduce the threat to the squad and the mission, and 
that notwithstanding the stressors of combat Upham possessed the requisite mental capacity to freely 
chose actions that he knew were illegal.  In conclusion the prosecution described Upham as having 
engaged in an illegal reprisal, dressed up as military necessity”347 against an enemy soldier, for whom he 
held personal animus, the effects of which were to bring grievous harm and disrepute upon, as well as 
compromise the good order and discipline of, the U.S. Army; the prosecution thus requested that the 
panel find Upham guilty of murder in violation of Article 118 of the UCMJ.
The defense then began its closing argument by restating that T/5 Upham acted pursuant to lawful 
orders issued by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and transmitted to him through his commanding 
officer, Captain Miller, requiring him to safely evacuate Private Ryan from a position deep behind enemy 
lines during the height of a German counterattack, and that in this threat posture obedience to these 
orders, particularly after the Battle of Ramelle further attrited the rescue squad, required him, as senior 
enlisted soldier in command, to deny quarter to an enemy soldier who had previously demonstrated his 
perfidy by violating his parole.  The defense insisted that the laws and customs of war permitted an 
exception to a general presumption in favor of quarter in circumstances where an understrength unit was 
physically unable to take prisoners and the would-be prisoner in question—a parole violator—was the 
permissible object of reprisal, and that in any event Upham was so overcome by the stressors of combat 
that even had he been instructed in the course of his military training that his spontaneous decision to kill 
the German POW was legally impermissible, which he had not, he would have been unable, as a result of 
a lack of mental capacity, to refrain from so doing.  In effect, the defense propounded a standard for the 
panel in determining the guilt of the defendant which would require the panel to enter a finding of not 
guilty unless the panel could clearly conclude that the defendant knew his actions to be illegal and 
intended to violate a legal obligation.348  Finally, the defense encouraged the panel to
346
 The prosecutor stated that duties of combatants, whether U.S. or foreign, included those obligations imposed by applicable 
treaties limiting conduct in war, and that, because Congress had ratified such treaties and consented to their incorporation in 
domestic law, to the extent domestic and international law were in disharmony (which disharmony the prosecutor did not 
recognize in the instant case) the international obligations governed.  For arguments that IHL is a peremptory regime that trumps 
inconsistent domestic law, see Lippmann, supra note_, at 110. 
347
 BARKER, supra note_, at 283 (describing thusly the defense of military necessity offered by the Nazi defendants at 
Nuremburg in response to the charge of war crimes for killing POWs). Although the martial code admits of and concedes terrain 
to military necessity, it does not categorically justify all acts, including manifestly unlawful acts, alleged to have been undertaken 
in light of necessity; rather, the martial code immunizes legitimate acts essential to self-preservation and to the accomplishment 
of a mission but rejects the necessity defense in cases where other options were available and would have been chosen by 
honorable soldiers. See TALYOR, supra note_, at 338 (“[I]f military law does no more than track operational considerations jot 
for jot, mirroring commanders’ calculations of military necessity, it becomes largely superfluous.  But if it departs too greatly 
from these considerations, it quickly comes to be ignored and . . . thereby ceases even to be formally binding.”).
348
 Some commentators suggest that legal culpability in courts-martial should be restricted to those circumstances where an 
accused knew his actions to be illegal.  See HELD et al., supra note_, at 66 (noting advocacy in favor of this more stringent 
standard of proof based upon actual knowledge of illegality and intent to commit an illegal act).
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look past the dusty books written by old lawyers who never smelled a whiff of cordite, never seen gouts of 
blood gushing from the shattered hulk of a buddy, never had to decide whether to protect their buddies and 
lose their innocence or keep their innocence and lose their buddies.  Look past murky rules that make sense 
only from the safety and comfort of Washington and seem as bizarre moralistic posturings to the brave but 
terrified American boys locked in an existential struggle against an evil regime that every day violates more 
rules of war than the eminent experts testifying before this court could ever hope to identify and record and 
catalogue.  This is a normal man under abnormal circumstances made all the more aberrant by the perfidy 
and treachery of the deceased, a willing and eager exponent of a criminal government, and he did nothing 
more than protect himself and accomplish his mission as ordered by the Chief of Staff of this United States 
Army.  There is a ocean of difference between peace and war, between those who went to war and those 
who have stayed behind, between the murderous criminals who run the government that declared war upon 
our nation and this bewildered young man sitting before you.  Does deliberately killing an enemy soldier 
who has proven his untrustworthiness constitute a war crime?  If it is, then how do you justify the carpet-
bombing of Hamburg and Tokyo and the deliberate roasting to death of women and children in the name of 
breaking the enemy’s will to fight?  One of the greatest ironies of human history is the fact that if you kill 
one hundred thousand civilians with bombs dropped from an airplane you’re a hero, whereas if you shoot 
one enemy soldier for perfidy you get a seat in the docket at court-martial with a firing squad looming in 
the wings.  Do not erect an insurmountable double-standard for those who are struggling merely to survive 
in a world gone mad.  Do not profane the very ideals and principles you exalt by punishing this man unless 
you yourselves would wish to bear the burdens of your own judgment and unless you can proclaim 
precisely how, during that frightful fortnight, you would have managed to retain your life and your sanity 
while faithfully discharging your duty would it have been you, rather than he, who your government tapped 
to hold that no-man’s land between the civilization the so-called laws and customs of war have been 
instituted to defend and the relentless advance of modern-day barbarians for whom any imperative, save for 
the urge to conquest, death, and destruction, is but a nuisance to be circumvented by deception and force.349
With this, the defense rested, and on rebuttal the prosecutor urged the panel not to permit a “code of 
complicity between brothers-in-arms” or the “natural sympathies for those fighting in a noble cause” to 
prevent the administration of justice in accordance with law.350  Following this the court adjourned.
The following morning, after reviewing proposed jury instructions submitted by the parties,351 the 
judge provided the members of the panel with a detailed statement of the law with respect to the elements 
that constituted the charge of “Murder,” Article 118 of the UCMJ, along with the lesser-included 
offenses352 of Article 119, Manslaughter,353 as and proffered defenses, as well as a detailed statement of the 
law with respect to military necessity, the extent of any duty to obey illegal orders, the effect of mental 
capacity on legal responsibility for one’s actions, and the effect of ignorance of the law.  The judge then 
charged them with answering a series of question to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
including 1) whether the denial of quarter to an enemy POW was categorically illegal as a matter of U.S. 
law (and if so they were to return a finding of guilty); 2) whether the defendant’s orders expressly ordered 
the denial of quarter or could reasonably have been construed to authorize denial of quarter; 3) if the 
answer to #1 was negative, whether under the circumstances of the case the defendant had any available 
defenses to the charge of murder; and 4) if the answer to #3 was affirmative, whether one or more of these 
349
 The defense summation is loosely patterned after that offered by Major J.F. Thomas, counsel for Lieutenant “Breaker” Morant, 
at his court-martial before a British panel in 1900, as well as an editorial from former U.S. Navy Secretary James Webb 
castigating the absolutism of NGOs that sought to prosecute U.S. soldiers for alleged violations of IHL during the Korean War.  
See Kershen, supra note_, at 115 (discussing the Morant court-martial): James Webb, The Bridge at No Gun Ri, WALL. ST. J., 
Oct. 6, 1999, at A22 (arguing against absolutism and in favor of the martial code in the post hoc review of the legitimacy of 
actions undertaken by soldiers in combat).
350 See Lippmann, supra note_, at 110 (stating that a “code of complicity among armed comrades complicate[s] the reconstruction 
of events and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders” at courts-martial).
351
 MCM, supra note_, at Rule 920(c).
352 Id.  at Rule 920(e).
56
defenses constituted a complete or partial defense or a factor in mitigation.  The judge then expressly 
advised the members of the panel that, if they reached Question #4, they were permitted to consider any 
environing circumstances supported by the evidence354 in determining whether an ordinary soldier in the 
position of the defendant could have a) reasonably mistaken the circumstances under which he shot the 
German POW to be such that it was militarily necessary to deny quarter to preserve his own life, the lives 
of his fellow soldiers, or the success of the mission, or b) reasonably understood himself to be acting 
pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of superior orders355 that were not manifestly illegal,356 or c) 
reasonably been unaware that his actions were illegal, or d) unable to understand the illegality of his 
actions due to a lack of mental responsibility.357  The judge then instructed the panel to consider the extent 
to which the defendant departed from the standard practice of the U.S. Army in the European Theater of 
Operations as he had witnessed that practice.358  Finally, the judge instructed members of the panel that to 
reach a finding of guilty a two-thirds majority was required.359
The members of the panel retired to deliberate in closed session360 and the senior member, a 
colonel on the staff of General Eisenhower, initiated deliberations361 by suggesting that the duty of the 
panel was solely to determine whether the government had established that the killing of the German 
POW was unlawful,362 as the question of whether the defendant had committed the act had already been 
definitively resolved by stipulation.   Without dissent, the panel, by informal voice vote,363 swiftly and 
unanimously answered Question #1 in the negative, concluding that, on the basis of evidence as to 
applicable law and as to the actual practice of soldiers in battle, denial of quarter to an enemy POW was 
353 See UMCJ, Art. 119, “Manslaughter” (criminalizing the unlawful killing of a human being “in the heat of sudden passion 
caused by adequate provocation” with the intent to kill). Maximum punishment for manslaughter is 15 years confinement, 
dishonorable discharge, and forfeiture of pay and allowances.  Id. at Art. 119(e)(1).
354
 The “infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice,” and as “terrain, 
weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to 
form new patterns of physical encounter.”  Richard D. Hooker, Jr., The Mythology Surrounding Maneuver Warfare, 23 
PARAMETERS 27, 30 (1993).  Consequently, the judge at court-martial instructs the panel to treat each case arising out of a 
hostile engagement as an event sui generis whose facts are to be ascertained, assessed, and adjudicated not by reference to some
artificial template but on its own merits.
355
 In connection with the determination of the defendant’s interpretation of his orders, the judge instructed the panel to determine 
what standard of lawfulness the defendant had been trained to apply in the course of his military education.  See TAYLOR, supra
note_, at 159-60 (describing standard court-martial instructions to the panel on the issue of the lawfulness of orders).
356
 The “manifest illegality” standard creates an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant executing a manifestly illegal order 
possesses the requisite knowledge of the criminal character of the order and as such is guilty of the underlying act as a matter of 
law.  Lippmann, supra note_, at 55.
357
 Following the conclusion of the evidence, the judge gives the panel detailed jury instructions as to the elements of the crime(s) 
specified and other matters of law, including the elements of and availability of affirmative defenses and the presumption of 
innocence.  Everett, supra note_, at 1426.  Moreover, in charging a jury the court frequently provides express instructions to 
consider “a host of environing circumstances[,]” and to attempt in so doing to assume the perspective of the “ordinary soldier.”  
OSIEL, supra note_, at 128 (citing U.S. v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1969)).  Although the “ordinary soldier” standard would appear 
to be an objective measure, in practice it is “calibrated to the defendant’s background, rank and circumstance, thus taking into 
account the typical conscript’s level of understanding and the conflicting pressures placed upon him,” and far more is demanded 
of an officer than of an enlisted soldier in assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s subjective interpretations of the law 
relevant to the acts and omissions giving rise to the charge(s) against him. Lippmann, supra note_, at 53.
358
 The defenses in court-martial are essentially equitable, rather than legal, in nature, and to ensure that a specific act that is not 
far removed from conduct either authorized or encouraged by higher elements in the chain of command is not treated as a 
criminal act it is necessary, in the interests of justice, to view that act against the backdrop of the prevailing practices of the 
Army.  TAYLOR, supra note_, at 155-56.
359 See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 52 (10 U.S.C. §852(a)(2)) (requiring a 2/3 majority for a guilty finding).
360
 MCM, supra note_, at Rule 921 (providing for secret deliberation on findings).
361
 Rank is immaterial in the deliberations of the court-martial panel.  See id. at Rule 921(a).
362 See id. at Article 118(b)(1)(c) (requiring, to establish the crime of murder, that the killing be proven “unlawful”).
363
 Voting as to innocence or guilt is conducted by secret written ballot, although votes on other questions may be held by 
whatever means the members elect.  Id. at Rule 921(c).
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not categorically illegal.364  On Question #2, the members unanimously concluded that the orders issued 
by the Chief of Staff and transmitted down the chain of command did not expressly obligate Upham to 
deny quarter.  However, although the three officers, only one of whom had experienced combat, 
disdainfully rejected the defense argument that the orders in question were susceptible of an interpretation 
authorizing the killing of Germans attempting surrender, the two enlisted members, both of whom came 
ashore on Omaha Beach with the 1st Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment and were lightly wounded in 
subsequent combat, insisted that an order from the command apex of the U.S. Army to evacuate a private 
soldier was so remarkable that ordinary measures of force protection could not apply and the denial of 
quarter, as well as any other measures necessary to the success of what was presumptively a mission of 
strategic significance, could have been constructively authorized; moreover, the enlisted members 
pronounced that they themselves might have interpreted the orders in this fashion and, to the 
consternation of two of the officers, offered anecdotal evidence from their combat experience that enlisted 
soldiers in circumstances such as those faced by T/5 Upham—executing orders to complete a mission of 
national importance with severely attritted forces in a fluid threat environment characterized by 
overwhelming enemy strength and enemy perfidy along the planned axis of maneuver—neither granted 
nor expected quarter.365  Although the enlisted members did not sway the officers, only three of the five 
members found against the defense on the question of whether an interpretation of the defendant’s orders 
to authorize denial of quarter was reasonable under the circumstances.
In regard to Question #3, the panel began with the defense of military necessity, which fared the 
same as the defense of superior orders with which it was treated by the two enlisted members as closely 
intertwined.  The two enlisted soldiers reiterated their argument that even if the post hoc review of others 
might reach a different conclusion, military necessity might have justified the killing of the German POW 
from the perspective of the defendant, who could not have been certain, given the heavy attrition his 
squad had suffered and the concentration of enemy forces preparing to counterattack against the Allied 
salient, that he could successfully evacuate Private Ryan encumbered by an enemy POW whose perfidy 
had already been established by the violation of his parole and the bearing of arms against his former 
captors.  Although heated criticism of this argument, centered upon the contention that the defendant 
could have simply released the German POW without appreciably increasing the threat profile or further 
compromising the mission and without committing a putative violation of law, failed to budge the 
agitated junior members of the panel, to whom this argument was the “the sort of wishful armchair 
officer’s thinking that winds up getting men killed,” it had the reverse effect with respect to a lieutenant 
whose injuries sustained during training in England in early 1944 had resulted in his reassignment from 
the 82nd Airborne Division to a pending assignment as an airborne instructor in the U.S.  By the end of a 
lengthy debate over the precise meaning of military necessity, the enlisted members of the panel were 
prepared to accept the defense of necessity and move directly to acquit the defendant, while the lieutenant 
was as yet undecided.  With tempers flaring, the sergeant-at-arms excused them for the day.
364
 The members of the panel in the case of U.S. v. Private Ryan et al. did not have the benefit of the jurisprudence emanating 
from the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals in reaching their findings.  See supra at notes_.
365 See supra at note_ (chronicling such incidents in military history of WWII).
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In the calmer atmosphere of the next morning, the panel pressed on to the consideration of the 
remaining defenses.  All members immediately rejected the defense of a lack of mental responsibility, 
with the enlisted soldiers expressing particular indignation that the defendant would have permitted his 
counsel to employ the argument that he had not been in possession of his faculties.  “First he says he 
knew what he was doing and why, that he had to complete the mission, and now he says he was out of his 
mind over his captain,” fumed one of the enlisted soldiers.  “Don’t blame him, it’s the lawyer,” the other 
reminded him.  On the defense of ignorance, all but one of the panel concluded that the defendant had not 
known that the denial of quarter was arguably an illegal act and that the military training he received had 
not instructed him otherwise.  “Might be a good idea to add another week to basic training,” opined the 
lieutenant, to shrugs from the others.  The sole member who rejected the ignorance defense, a major of 
infantry and a veteran of the World War I Battles of St. Mihiel and Cantigny, did so on the ground that he 
believed that the defendant had in fact known the status of the law, including, in his estimation, the fact 
that the law permitted reprisals in the field against a parole violator.  “When you catch one in arms after 
he granted his parole, you shoot him.  That’s something every soldier knows.  Last time I checked it’s the 
first rule in the law book, Rule M1,” the major said, to grim smiles from the enlisted soldiers.366  “It ain’t 
like the Nazis,” one of the enlisted soldiers added.  “He didn’t kill him in cold blood.  He gave a war 
criminal what he had coming.  Any of us would’ve done the same thing.  That’s war.”367  In other words, 
T/5 Upham had acted lawfully, and now three members were prepared to acquit the defendant of murder.
In recognition of the vector along which deliberations were traveling, the colonel suggested that a 
finding of guilty on the specification of Murder was impossible and that, because none of the defenses 
proffered had been ruled complete defenses, the panel should consider the lesser-included offense of 
Manslaughter as well as the cumulative effect of various defenses and any extenuating or mitigating 
circumstances.  An enlisted soldier countered with the possibility of considering Article 134, para. 
60(c)(3), Assault with Intent to Commit Voluntary Manslaughter, 368 but because this offense had not been 
specified the judge, responding to a query, instructed that this was not within their jurisdiction.  The panel 
deliberated for hours without progress: the enlisted soldiers and the lieutenant were committed to the 
defense of necessity, the colonel strongly favored conviction, and the major was inscrutable.369
366
 The M1 Garand Rifle was the primary personal weapon carried by U.S. soldiers in the European Theater of Operations in 
1944.  Reference to “Rule M1” is a sardonic acknowledgement that the most important principles and customs governing war are 
those that are practiced on the battlefield, that soliders are expected to kill enemy soldiers with their M1 rifles, and that no 
positive legal regime can regulate soldiers’ conduct unless it is compatible with the custom of reprisal, which continues to hold a 
most prominent place in the martial code.  At the court-martial of Lieutenant Morant for denial of quarter to Boer POWs, Morant, 
asked under what rule of military regulations he had ordered the execution of POWs, replied “We caught them and we shot them 
under Rule 303,” referring to the caliber, .303, of the British-issued Enfield rifle.  Kershen, supra note_, at 111.
367
 Adjudication of individual criminal responsibility on the part of commanders who issue orders to others to commit war crimes, 
or on the part of those who commit such crimes after a long opportunity for repose, is arguably a less morally and legally 
complicated exercise than is the determination of the liability of those who act in the heat of battle, while under threat from their 
enemies, on their own initiative.  See BARKER, supra note_, at 27-28 (stating that it was less difficult at the post-World War 
tribunals to attribute criminal liability for war crimes to “decisionmakers far from the scene of the action” than to prove the 
liability of “those who carry out . . . orders[.]”).
368
 Article 134 of the UCMJ punishes “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, 
[and] all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces[.]” UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 134(a).  Art. 134(a)(2)(b) 
specifically provides for punishment for a “[b]reach of custom in the service,” defined as the “long established practices by which 
common usage have attained the force of law in the military[.]”
369
 This intense internal debate, rather than frustrate administration of military justice, is essential to the determination of the 
requirements of martial honor as applied to the specific case before a jury of military peers and is protective of the rights of the 
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Late that afternoon, the panel voted by show of hands as to the guilt or innocence of T/5 Upham.  
Only one—the colonel—voted to convict on the charge of Manslaughter, and following the vote, the 
colonel posed this question to the other members: “Do we really want the defendant to walk away from 
this with nothing?  Can we really say that Upham was not morally culpable at all?  Even though that Nazi 
was a dishonorable son-of-a-bitch, is what Upham did the way we as soldiers are supposed to behave?”370
The four other members of the panel pondered for a long moment, and one-by-one shook their heads save
for one of the enlisted men.  “I reckon not,” the other enlisted soldier said.  “If he had really wanted to he 
could have had one of the other POWs tie that German up, or better yet had them all tie each other up.  
But he had a score to settle.  Not too sure I blame him, although . . .” he said, trailing off into thought.371
The colonel then proposed that the panel convict T/5 Upham of Manslaughter but take into 
consideration extensive factors in mitigation of the sentence,372 reminding them that they had authority to 
pronounce any sentence they should choose.373  The panel deliberated for another three hours and then, 
late in the afternoon, returned to the courtroom to announce its findings.374  On the charge of 
Manslaughter, Article 119, UCMJ, the panel convicted T/5 Upham by a vote of 4-1.  In the sentencing 
hearing, which followed immediately, the prosecution admitted that T/5 Upham had no prior convictions 
and that there was significant rehabilitative potential but argued that the deliberate nature of the offense 
should be considered as an aggravating factor375 and that the maximum sentence of fifteen years’ 
confinement, along with a forfeiture of benefits and a dishonorable discharge, was appropriate.376  The 
defense introduced evidence that Upham, only 19 years old, had been an exemplary civilian and soldier 
who had volunteered at 17 rather than wait to be drafted, and whose services, including his native fluency 
in German and French, were very much in need.  The defense contended that the likelihood of a repetition 
of the offense was minimal as Upham would not likely be assigned again to a combat unit (his duties had 
accused as well as the integrity of the profession of arms.  OSIEL, supra note_, at 285 (describing process whereby military 
professionals debate and resolve standards of virtue crucial to the functioning of the martial code).
370
 The fundamental question of liability in courts-martial can only be resolved by a determination of whether the accused was 
morally culpable, within the framework of reference of honorable soldiers, of any wrongdoing; the “arcane and logically 
irresolvable questions” of whether particular descriptions of the accused’s conduct violated various textual and customary 
prescriptions and proscriptions, though of great interest to IHL lawyers, are far less relevant.  OSIEL, supra note_, at 356.
371
 As one military scholar notes, even the most honorable soldiers may find that, subject to the stress and exigencies of combat, 
there is simply “no time to even ask this question . . .: ‘What kind of person do I want to be, and what would such a person do?’”  
Reed Bonadonna, Above and Beyond: Marines and Virtue Ethics, 178, in ROBERT L. TAYLOR & WILLIAM ROSENBACH, 
EDS., MILITARY LEADERSHIP (1996).
372 See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 52 (providing that the members of a court-martial also determine the sentence and may take 
into consideration factors in mitigation, aggravation, and extenuation).
373
 In some senses, the power of the jury in courts-martial to pronounce a very lenient sentence amounts to a form of quasi-
nullification in cases where equity demands its application.  Perhaps the most (in)famous example occurred during World War II, 
when a black Army officer, charged with physical violence for allegedly pushing an officer attempting to prevent him from 
entering an officer’s club designated for whites only, was, although convicted of the charge,sentenced by a court-martial jury to 
pay a $150 fine despite being eligible for the death penalty.  See James Allison, Mutiny At Freeman Field: The Life and the Art of 
James Gould Cozzens, 92 BLACK HIST. NEWS (May 2003) (discussing jury nullification in the court-martial of 2LT Roger C. 
Terry in 1945).  Jury nullification occures with respect to even the most serious of crimes: in the court-martial of Lieutenant 
Duffy for ordering the murder of an unarmed Vietnamese POW in 1969, the jury, after hearing testimony that other officers had 
been given orders to deny quarter but nonetheless convicting Duffy of murder, amended the first two findings to find Duffy 
guilty of conspiring to commit involuntary manslaughter, and sentenced him to confinement for six months and forfeiture of 
$250.00 per month for six months. U.S. v. Duffy, 47 C.M.R. 658, 1973 WL 14807 (ACMR). .
374
 MCM, supra note_, at Rule 922 (proving that findings are announced immediately in the presence of all parties).
375 See id. at Rule 1001 (providing procedures for adversarial hearing on sentencing and the introduction of evidence as to general 
character, rehabilitative potential, and evidence in aggravation as well as mitigation and extenuation).
376 See MCM, supra note_, at Art. 119(e)1) (providing for a maximum penalty of 15 years confinement, dishonorable discharge, 
and forfeiture of pay and benefits upon conviction of manslaughter).
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theretofore been largely in support of Army intelligence at brigade echelon) and as he now knew that 
execution of a parole violator was contrary to law.  The defense argued further that Upham could best be 
rehabilitated, and the interest of the U.S. would best be served, were he to remain subject to Army 
jurisdiction.  The defense proposed, in lieu of confinement, a sentence of forfeiture of pay and benefits, 
reduction in rank to E-1, and a bad conduct discharge377 subsequent to the termination of the war against 
Germany, and supported this proposal with precedential evidence suggesting that in addition to their 
already broad equitable powers courts-martial have great discretion to pronounce lenient sentences, such 
as admonishment378 and other disciplinary punishments,379 upon a conviction of denial of quarter during a 
“desperate struggle . . . with a cruel and savage foe” such as those against which the U.S. was now pitted.
Following arguments as to sentencing, the judge instructed the panel that the maximum sentence 
for manslaughter was 15 years’ confinement and instructed the members on procedures for voting,380 at 
which time the panel retired to deliberate.  Three hours later the panel returned and the colonel, as 
president of the court-martial, pronounced the sentence:381 one year confinement, forfeiture of six months’ 
pay, reduction in rank to E-1, and a general discharge, with the one year confinement suspended382 and the 
remainder of the sentence deferred until the end of the war against Germany.383  A petition for clemency, 
signed by four of the five jurors, accompanied the sentence.384  With that the court-martial adjourned.385
The next morning the Staff Judge Advocate [“SJA”] assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment to 
assist Major General Truscott in determining whether and how to exercise his command prerogative386
reported his recommendation that the sentence be executed as pronounced.  However, rather than do so 
General Truscott, who had argued vehemently against the courts-martial of Private Ryan et al. only to be 
overruled by General Eisenhower, transmitted the trial record to the Judge Advocate General of the Army 
with an expression of his views387 that “the killing of the German POW without judicial process was a 
377
 Punitive discharge, forfeiture of pay and benefits, reduction in rank, and formal admonishment are distinctively non-penal 
military punishments for which the Manual for Courts-Martial makes specific provision.  See id. at Appendix XII, President’s 
Table of Maximum Punishments.  The use of non-penal sanctions, even with respect to the punishment of serious crimes, is not 
unique to domestic law or to the system of courts-martial: in post-civil war Bosnia, where domestic prosecutions are difficult to 
conduct due to evidentiary, political, logistical, and financial difficulties, the UN mission has recently begun, with some success, 
to introduce non-penal sanctions to reach the conduct of thousands of culpable individuals who remain in official positions in 
public life, including the domestic constabulary, despite having committed prosecutable crimes, including genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity, during the civil war.  See Gregory L. Naarden, Nonprosecutorial Sanctions for Grave Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law: Wartime Conduct of Bosnian Police Officials, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 342-52 (2003) (discussing 
the regime of non-penal sanctions administered by the UN in Bosnia).
378 See U.S. v. Private Ryan et al., Defense Motion in Support of Proposed Sentence (citing Court-Martial of General Jacob H. 
Smith, Manila, Philippines, April 1902, S. Doc. 213, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5-17, at 17) (sentencing BG Jacob H. Smith to be 
“admonished by the reviewing authority” for having issued orders to subordinates directing denial of quarter to enemy guerrillas).
379
 SHELDON GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS, THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT 31-32 (1944).
380
 MCM, supra note_, at Rule 1005.
381 Id. at Rule 1007.
382 Id. at Rule 1108.
383 See id. at Rule 1101 (providing for deferment of sentence by the convening authority or officer with jurisdiction).
384 Id. at Rule 1106(d)(3)(B).
385 Id. at Rule 1011.
386 See id. at Rule 1106 (providing for assistance of legal counsel to convening authority in determining a course of action with 
respect to the sentence of court-martial).  The role of the SJA is to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence and make 
recommendations for action in light of the service record of the accused and other relevant considerations.  Id.  Although the 
convening authority normally accepts the SJA recommendation, he has “absolute power to disapprove the findings and sentence, 
or any part thereof, for any reason or no reason[,]” and thus the SJA role is simply advisory.  DEP’T ARMY, supra note_, at 58.
387 See DEP’T ARMY, supra note_, at 58 (“In those unusual cases in which a convening authority is in disagreement with his 
[SJA] or legal officer as to the effect of any error or irregularity respecting the proceedings, as to the adequacy of the evidence, or 
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regrettable, but momentary, lapse in the maintenance of the discipline and honor that distinguish our 
Armed Forces from those of our enemies,” that after further reflection he “could not clearly conclude that
T/5 Upham had committed any offense under the military regulations as they are commonly understood 
by the enlisted soldier,” and that the execution of the sentence “would not serve the interests of justice but 
would rather, if widely publicized, be detrimental to the morale and fighting spirit of the troops under my 
command who are even now preparing for an invasion of Germany that will require the maximum 
devotion from every available soldier if victory is to be ours.”  In short order, the Judge Advocate General 
of the Army relayed his opinion, in respect to which the Chief of Staff, writing under separate cover, 
concurred, that in light of further review, General Truscott had articulated an adequate basis for 
disapproving the sentence of the court-martial388 as well as, in his discretion, ordering a rehearing389 or a 
dismissal of the charge.390  With the major offensive against Germany already underway, and with an 
immediate rehearing thus impracticable391 if Upham was to be returned to service, General Truscott 
elected to dismiss the charge against T/5 Upham and immediately ordered his transfer to the headquarters 
of the 3rd Army, soon to be commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton.  
On December 26th, during the Battle of the Bulge, T/5 Upham was killed in combat in the town of 
Bastogne, Belgium.  Six months later Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies.
That a court-martial convened to try Private Ryan et al. in 1944 could not adjudge the killing of a 
parole violator to disencumber a unit engaged in a mission of strategic importance during a counterattack 
by a numerically superior foe to be the sort of dishonorable and egregious violation of the martial code 
disentitling a soldier to continued membership in the martial caste is not surprising.  The putative victim 
had not conducted himself as a honorable soldier and thus could not claim all the privileges and 
immunities attendant to that status, and the treatment meted out by T/5 Upham was precisely that which 
the martial code would have prescribed, albeit after judicial determination of guilt, were Upham to have 
accepted his surrender.  Moreover, the claims of military necessity and ignorance of the law struck a 
chord with those members of the jury to whom, as enlisted infantry soldiers, the vicissitudes of combat 
and the extraordinary requirements of survival in battle were not alien but for whom scienter of the “black 
letter” of IHL, a body of regulations so uncertain that even experts could disagree as to its precise 
commandments, was, through no omission or fault of their own, glaringly absent.  While Upham might 
not have exhibited that degree of professionalism, temperance, and martial virtue demanded by his peers, 
neither did he entirely excommunicate himself from their fellowship by executing a dishonorable member 
of the armed forces of an atavistic regime dedicated to the destruction of the civilization the defense of 
which, on the afternoon in question, was his duty.  In short, the jury, in consideration of all the 
circumstances, including conflicting expert statements as to the rules of IHL, issued a judgment that 
as to what sentence can legally be approved, the convening authority may transmit the record of trial, with an expression of his 
own views and the opinion of his . . . legal officer, to the Judge Advocate General of the armed force concerned for advice[.]”).
388 See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 1107(d)(1) (“The convening authority may for any or no reason disapprove a legal sentence, 
and change a punishment . . . as long as the severity of the punishment is not increased[.]”).
389 See id. at Rule 1107(e)(1) (providing for rehearing as to charged offenses or sentence at discretion of the convening authority).
390 See id. at Rule 1107(c )(2)(A) (allowing convening authority to set aside a guilty finding and dismiss a charge).
391 See id. at Rule 1107(e)(1)(B)(iii) (stating that “[I]f the convening authority finds a rehearing as to any offenses impracticable, 
the convening authority may dismiss those specifications and, when appropriate, charges.”).
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reproached and disciplined Upham for his true crime—falling short of a professional ideal that demands 
of soldiers that they accept significant additional personal risks before they deny quarter to even the most 
reprehensible POWs—without inflicting inordinate punishment disproportionate to the offense, without 
conceding any absolute obligation to grant quarter, and without branding Upham, of whom the Army still 
had great need in its titanic struggle against the Axis, as beyond the pale of the martial code and thus unfit 
for duty.  With the spectre of Nazism looming large as a backdrop, the seriousness of the delict in 
question assumed its proper proportion, meriting disciplinary, rather than penal, sanction. 
b) U.S. v. Private Ryan et al., 2003
The drive to humanize war gained impetus from World War II, and the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 [“GCs”],392 consisting of four multilateral treaties, updated and enlarged the IHL regime and 
imposed upon parties393 the obligation to pass domestic legislation criminalizing “grave breaches”394 of 
their provisions.  Denial of quarter and reprisal are specifically and categorically prohibited as grave 
breaches;395 the Geneva Conventions, on their face, appear to obligate parties to render inapplicable any 
392 See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, [“GCI”]; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
[“GCII”]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War [“GCIII”]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War [“GCIV”].  Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. (1950) (increasing categories of 
persons entitled to POW status, improving treatment of POWs, improving post-conflict repatriation procedures, and codifying a 
specific set of war crimes, known as “grave breaches”).  These Care known collectively as the “Geneva Conventions.” 
393
 The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by almost all states and can thus be considered binding not only upon parties but 
upon non-parties as customary IHL.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 
Merits, Un. 27, 1986, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, 114 (holding that common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is declaratory of 
customary IHL); Meron, supra note_, at 252 (stating that Common Article 6/6/6/7 of the Geneva Conventions, providing that 
parties may conclude bilateral agreements conferring protection upon individuals greater than that afforded in the Geneva 
Conventions, has attained the status of a quasi-norm of jus cogens and is evidence of customary IHL); ICRC COMMENTARY 
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (J. Pictet ed.), at 368 (suggesting that Common Article 3 is declaratory of a customary 
international obligation to suppress all breaches of the Geneva Conventions); Howard S. Levie, Enforcing the Third Geneva 
Convention on the Humanitarian Treatment of Prisoners of War, 7 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEG. STUD. 37, 38 (1996-1997) (arguing more 
broadly that the substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions are enforceable against non-parties as customary IHL).  For a 
minority of commentators, the substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions have attained the status of customary norms of 
jus cogens from which no derogation is permitted.  See Rumudiger Wolfrum, The Decentralized Prosecution of International 
Offenses Through National Courts, 24 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 183, 1888 (1994) (suggesting that the entirety of the Geneva 
Conventions is directly applicable as customary IHL in domestic courts); Alexide, The Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in 
Contemporary International Law, 172 RECUEILS DES COURTS 223, 262-63 (1982) (same).
394
 Although any violation of the Geneva Conventions might theoretically be categorized or described as a “war crime,” the 
Conventions provide that only certain acts constitute such exceptionally opprobrious violations of IHL, known as “grave 
breaches,” that parties are obligated to take measures to actively suppress them, largely by implementing domestic legislation 
criminalizing these acts and prosecuting those who commit them.  See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces I in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) 85-133, at Art. 49 (creating the 
duty to suppress and prosecute grave breaches of GCI); Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War III of 
August 12, 1949, at Art. 129 (creating same duty under GC III); GC IV, supra note_, at Art. 146 (creating same duty under GC 
IV).  Specific grave breaches include, inter alia, “wilful killing” and “torture or inhuman treatment” (GC I, Art. 50; GC III, Art. 
130) and “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health . . . or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the 
rights of fair and regular trial[,]” (GC III, Art. 130; GC IV, Art. 147).  Not all delicts constitute grave breaches under the Geneva 
Conventions; only those analogous to felonies under domestic law, or violations of norms of jus cogens under customary 
international law, committed by members of the military forces of parties to the conflict qualify and thereby impose upon states-
parties investigatory and prosecutorial duties , whereas acts better characterized as misdemeanors do not.  See ICRC 
COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 617-20 (J. 
Pictet, ed.) (elaborating distinctions between grave breaches and other violations of the Geneva Conventions); see also M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (1998) (further elaborating this distinction and contrasting state duties with respect to grave 
breaches and other violations of the Geneva Conventions); KASTO, supra note_, at 46-47 (suggesting that grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions have been so classified because they constitute violations of norms of jus cogens, norms whjch are non-
derogable and which are “essential to the protection and coexistence of the peoples and States members of the international 
community” and which are “derived from the legal conscience of the international community as a whole.”).
395
 Grave breaches include, inter alia, willful killing or inhuman treatment of protected persons, willfully causing unnecessary 
suffering, extensive destruction or appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, willfully depriving a POW or the 
right to a fair trial, taking of hostages, and forcible relocation or deliberate targeting of civilians.  See (note).
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defenses, such as military necessity or superior orders, to domestic prosecutions of individuals accused of 
the denial of quarter and of reprisal,396 as well as to investigate, prosecute, and punish all violations with 
“effective penal sanctions.”397  Extending individual criminal responsibility for violation of the prohibitive 
regime of IHL still further, the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions [“AP I”]398 frontally 
396 See Art. 3(1) (Common) to the Four Geneva Conventions (“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members 
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely . . . To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any 
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds . . .”) (emphasis added); see also GC I, supra note_, at Art. 46 (“Reprisals against . . . personnel . . . protected 
by the Convention are prohibited.”); id. at Art. 50 (“Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those 
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons . . . protected by the Convention: wilful killing . . .”); GC III 
supra note_, at Art. 13 (“[POWs] must at all times be humanely treated.  Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power 
causing death or seriously endangering the health of a [POW] in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious 
breach of the present Convention.  In particular, no [POW] may be subject to physical mutilation . . . Measures of reprisal against 
[POWs] are prohibited.”) (emphasis added); id. at art. 130 (“Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those 
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons . . . protected by the Convention: wilful killing . .”).
397
 GC III, supra note_, at Art. 129.  The legal effect of the Geneva Conventions, in the estimation of the ICRC and other NGOs, 
has been to further extend that prohibitive regime of IHL to encompass within the field of individual criminal responsibility 
actions that theretofore were either condoned or excused on grounds such as military necessity.  See ICRC, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (note) (stating that with respect to the obligations of parties to prosecute abuses of POWs, 
including denial of quarter, “[n]o possible loophole is left; there can be no excuse, no attenuating circumstances.”); see also
OSIEL, supra note_, at 132 (stating that GCIII prohibits killing POWs “even on grounds of self-preservation or because it 
appears certain they will regain their liberty.”).  However, the Geneva Conventions are imprecise as to what constitutes “effective 
penal sanctions,” and states-parties may discharge their obligations by prosecuting those whom an investigation indicates may 
have committed grave breaches.  See GCI, supra note_, at Art. 49(2); GCII, supra note_, at Art. 50(2); GCIII, supra note_, at Art. 
129(2).  Moreover, the Geneva Conventions, contemplating a regime of complementary jurisdiction, accord states-parties the 
latitude to investigate and prosecute under their own domestic laws without obligating them to submit to international 
supervision.  GCIII, supra note_, at Art.99(1.  Whether, by exploiting this indirect enforcement mechanism, states may thereby 
attenuate their obligations under the Geneva Conventions, is a matter open to debate.  See BOTHE, MACALISTER-SMITH, & 
KURZIDEM (EDS.), NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1990) (indicating 
that the extent to which states-parties to the Geneva Conventions discharge their duties under those instruments varies 
considerably in substance and procedure); Esgain & Solf, The 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War: Its Principles, Innovations, and Deficiencies, 4 N.C. L. REV. 537, 580-81 (1963) (discussing variations in imposition of 
effective penal sanctions for violations of the Geneva Conventions across the range of states-parties); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions Under the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 
12, 1949, 8 RUTGERS CAMDEN L. REV. 185, 196 (1977) (suggesting that complementary jurisdiction in an international 
tribunal is contemplated by the Geneva Conventions where domestic prosecution is inadequate or ineffective); Oren Gross, The 
Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 783, 792 (1995) (suggesting 
that the principle of universality of jurisdiction permits states other than the state of nationality of the accused to assert 
jurisdiction in the event that state does not undertake good-faith investigation and prosecution); ANTONIO CASSESE, ED., 
THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 212 (1980)(noting that some hold that the duty to prosecute 
grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions is incumbent only upon belligerents, while others maintain that universal 
jurisdiction obligates all states to prosecute grave breaches).
Whether states-parties elect themselves to investigate and prosecute allegations of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions they remain obligated under the customary international legal principle aut dedere aut judicare (“extradite or 
prosecute”), to which the Geneva Conventions make explicit reference at Articles 49/50/129/146, to either undertake a good-faith 
investigation and, where appropriate, to initiate prosecution, or, in the alternative, to extradite to a state-party that will do so.  M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR 
PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW x (1995).  The U.S. officially recognizes this obligation as a state-party.  See U.S. 
Department of the Army, Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare (1956), at 183-84 (stating that the duty to investigate 
and prosecute those who commit grave breaches includes not only enemy war criminals but also U.S. nationals).
398 See API, supra note_.  The API, an instrument largely the work of the ICRC, updates the Geneva Conventions in light of an 
additional three decades of state practice.  See Solf & Cummings, supra note_, at 219 (tracing the role of the ICRC in the 
development of the API).  The principle supplementation of the API concerns the addition of grave breaches, including making 
civilians, public works and installations, the ICRC emblem, and cultural or religious objects the object of attack and unjustifiably 
delaying the repatriation of POWs.  See API, supra note_, at Arts. 11(4), 85(3)-(4).  In addition, the API obligates states-parties 
to cooperate with the UN “in situations of serious violations of the [Geneva] Conventions or of [the API],” (Art. 89), as well as 
with international fact-finding commissions (Art. 90), in the suppression of grave breaches.  The API has come under criticism 
for introducing controversial positions into IHL, including the legitimization of decolonization (Art. 1(4)), the legal protection of 
terrorists (Art. 44), the withdrawal of the protection of GCIII from mercenaries (Art. 47), the definition of a military objective 
(Art. 52), and the prohibition of attack upon certain military objectives (Art. 56), and the question of whether these or other 
provisions of AP I are binding upon non- parties as customary IHL or as norms of jus cogens is open to considerable debate and 
will be discussed infra at note_.  Although most states have ratified the API, a number of states have either declined ratification 
or attached a series of reservations purporting to limit legal obligations under that instrument despite ratification.  See CASSESE, 
supra note_, at 243 (noting that the “Western powers” were “very reluctant” to embrace API without reservations); David Turns, 
64
rejects the military necessity defense and reinforces the absolute, nonderogable obligations to grant 
quarter and refrain from reprisal399 incumbent upon parties to AP I and, arguably, as a matter of customary 
IHL,400 even in regard to a parole violator captured under arms.401
Although national military establishments had labored for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries 
to defend against encroaching legal absolutism with a pragmatic approach that privileged necessity in its 
intersection with humanitarianism, in the aftermath of World War II the military manuals of the leading 
powers began to reflect a generalized strategic withdrawal from this position toward an accommodation, 
and even to an extent a convergence, with the treaty-based regime codified in the Geneva Conventions.402
Specifically, in 1956, U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10 [“FM 27-10”],403 declared denial of quarter404 and 
reprisal against POWs405 to be categorically illegal as a matter of international and domestic law and, save 
for exceptional circumstances, non-justifiable by military necessity.406  Moreover, FM 27-10, an 
Prosecuting Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position of the United Kingdom, 4 J. ARMED CONFL. 1 
(1998) (describing the UK position with respect to API and the reservations it has taken to that instrument limiting domestic 
prosecutions for violations of its provisions).  The U.S. has signed the API but since taken the position that it is a “fundamentally 
flawed” instrument that would “politicize [IHL] and efface the distinction between terrorists and lawful combatants, and 
accordingly has not ratified that instrument.  See Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of 
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
419-31 (1987).  Nonetheless, the U.S. has publicly accepted that some of the provisions of the API are declaratory of customary 
IHL and are thus binding in courts of the U.S.; no official statement clarifying precisely which provisions, however, has yet to be 
offered.  For an argument that AP I is neither customary IHL nor expressive of norms of jus cogens and therefore not binding 
upon non-parties, see KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 301; Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of 
International Law on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 759, 766 (1994) (“It is generally accepted that the 
Geneva Conventions have achieved the status of customary international law even if Protocol I . . . ha[s] not.”).  For a contrary 
argument, see Kenneth J. Keith, Rights and Responsibilities: Protecting the Victims of Armed Conflict, 48 DUKE L. J. 1081, 
1095 (stating that although some commentators consider the API to be an instance of “la trahison des clercs” (treachery of the 
intellectuals), the fact that more than 150 states have ratified suggests that it has become declaratory of customary IHL).
399 See API, supra note_, at Art. 40 (“it is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or 
to conduct hostilities on this basis.”); see also id (“a person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized 
to be hors de combat, shall not be made the object of attack.”); id. at Art. 40 (prohibiting issuance of an “order that there shall be 
no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis.”); id. at Art. 20 (“Reprisals . . . are 
prohibited.”).  The obligations created by AP I with respect to quarter are absolute, even in the case of a greatly outnumbered unit 
physically unable to take prisoners.  Id. at Art. 41 (requiring that even “under unusual conditions of combat which prevent . . . 
evacuation [of enemy POWs], they shall be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their safety.”).
400 See supra at note_.
401
 The Geneva Conventions recognizes that POWs who are paroled “are bound on their personal honour scrupulously to fulfil . . . 
the engagements of their paroles or promises.”  GC III, supra note_, at Art. 21.  However, under Article 20 reprisals are expressly 
prohibited against parole violators, who are entitled to judicial process and to the protected status of POW in the interim.  See GC 
III, supra note_, at Art. 85 (stating that POWs “prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to
capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.”); PICTET, supra note_, at 181 (stating that the 
Geneva Conventions afford parole violators the opportunity to defend against charges of breaking parole).
402 See W. Michael Reisman & William K. Lietzau, Moving International Law from Theory to Practice: The Role of Military 
Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict, in 64 UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES, THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 1 (Horance B. Robertson, Jr., ed., 1991) (discussing this trend).
403
 THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual FM 27-10, Washington, D.C., 18 Jul. 1956 
[“FM 27-10”] (updated without significant changes in 1976).
404 See FM 27-10, supra note_, at para. 28, “Refusal of Quarter” (“It is officially forbidden . . . to declare that no quarter will be 
given.”) (quoting, almost verbatim, Article 23(d), Hague Regulations of 1907, supra note_); id. at para. 29, “Injury Forbidden 
After Surrender” (“It is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer 
means of defense, has surrendered at discretion. (quoting Article 23(c), Hague Regulations of 1907, supra note_).
405 See id. at para. 497(c) (stating that reprisals “against the persons or property of [POWs] . . . are forbidden[,]” although reprisals 
against enemy forces not yet in the control of the U.S. forces are permitted) (citing GC III, supra note_, at Art. 13).
406 See id. at Art. 3 (stating that the “[p]rohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by ‘military necessity’ which has . . . 
been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war[.]”); see also id. (limiting 
the definition of military necessity to justify only “those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for 
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”).  Some scholars argue that FM 27-10 effected the complete 
rejection by the U.S. Army of the defense of military necessity to allegations of war crimes.  See, e.g., WALZER, supra note_, at 
130-31 (stating that subsequent to FM 27-10 an accused soldier can no longer “justify his violation of the rules by referring to the 
necessities of his combat situation or by arguing that nothing else but what he did would have contributed significantly to 
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affirmation of principles of existing IHL in light of the experience of World War II407 promulgated “to 
provide authoritative guidance to military personnel on the customary and treaty law applicable to the 
conduct of warfare [,]”408 directly addresses the question of whether military necessity can ever justify 
denial of quarter in the negative:
A commander may not put his prisoners to death because their presence retards his movements or 
diminishes his power of resistance by necessitating a large guard, or by reason of their consuming supplies, 
or because it appears certain that they will regain their liberty through the impending success of their 
forces. It is likewise unlawful for a commander to kill his prisoners on grounds of self-preservation, even in 
the case of airborne or commando operations, although the circumstances of the operation may make 
necessary rigorous supervision of and restraint upon the movement of prisoners of war.409
Finally, FM 27-10 identifies the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, to include denial of quarter 
and reprisal, as punishable war crimes410 under the UCMJ,411 and imposes upon those under UCMJ 
jurisdiction to refuse to obey illegal orders and to report violations of FM 27-10 and the UCMJ.412
However, despite their willingness to incur limitations upon their sovereign prerogatives, states, 
with respect to the denial of quarter has cleaved far more closely to their historical pattern than to the 
modern prohibitory regime.  During the Korean War  (1950-1953), North Korean forces, unwilling to 
spare food for POWs, frequently shot them instead,413 and in the Sinai Campaign (1956) Israeli forces, 
claiming military necessity, executed scores of Egyptian POWs.414   During the Vietnam War (1954-
1975), political pressure to maximize numbers of enemy dead (known as “body counts”) as tangible 
evidence of battlefield successes, coupled with the psychological stress of combat, led U.S. forces and 
victory[.]”).  However, the use of the language “generally rejected” seems to suggest that some vestige of a military necessity 
defense might yet remain available to a defendant charged with violation of the provisions of the UCMJ.
407 See WELLS, supra note_, at 11 (discussing the drafting of FM 27-10, written primarily by Prof. Richard Baxter of Harvard 
Law School and an officer in the U.S. Army JAG Corps).  FM 27-10 has been as influential in the transformation of the military 
regulations of other states as was the Lieber Code in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
408
 FM 27-10, supra note_, at para. 1.
409 Id. at para. 85.  FM-27-10 states further that military necessity is “generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the . . . 
laws of war[.]”  Id. at para.3.  Subsequent Army publications, designed to train soldiers in the laws of war, reinforce the 
categorical prohibition of the denial of quarter first articulated, as a matter of U.S. military law, in FM 27-10:
His patrol is operating an area believed to be heavily infested with enemy soldiers.  He discovers a young man hiding in 
a shallow hole.  Though dressed as a farmer and unarmed, he thinks he is an enemy soldier and fears his presence may 
jeopardize the unit’s security.  May this captured person be killed?  The answer is no. . . . No one can be harmed or 
killed who, in the language of the Convention, has “fallen into our hands” . . . Murder or physical abuse never is, has 
been, or will be humane treatment.  It is strictly prohibited.  Furthermore, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
murder is a capital offense.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note_, at 97 
410
 FM 27-10, supra note_, at para. 502 (listing, inter alia, “wilful killing” of POWs as violations of the Geneva Conventions); id.
at para. 504, “Other Types of War Crimes” (listing, inter alia, “[k]illing without trial spies or other persons who have committed 
hostile acts” as a punishable war crime).
411 See id. at para. 506(c) (stating that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other war crimes “committed by persons 
subject to [U.S.] military law . . . constitute acts punishable under the [UCMJ].”).
412
 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note_, at 101.
413 See EUGENE KINCAID, WHY THEY COLLABORATED 43 (1953) (“In the first five months of the (Korean) war, North 
Korean . . . often shot soldiers they could have taken prisoner . . . simply because they did not want to bother with them[;] . . . 
[t]hey had little food . . . and they had no place to put them[.]”).
414
 In October 1956, an Israeli parachute infantry company inserted 100 miles behind enemy lines near the Mitla Pass in Sinai 
captured a platoon of Egyptian troops.  However, Egyptian forces in the vicinity, which already greatly outnumbered the Israelis, 
were increasing, and the Egyptian Air Force enjoyed operational superiority.  Ordered to redeploy elsewhere to prepare for 
another parachute insertion, and without adequate numbers to guard or relocate the POWs, several of whom were taunting his 
forces with the threat that “the Egyptian Army will slaughter you![,]” the Israeli commander positioned the POWs face-down in 
the sand and directed their execution, claiming years later that military necessity justified his actions.  See Morris, supra note_, at 
905-08 (“I didn’t give an explicit instruction, and I didn’t ask for one.  Only a fool can ask his commander for permission to do 
what he has to do.”) (quoting General Arye Biro, Israeli Defence Forces (Ret.), then-commander of the company in question).
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their allies to deny quarter and undertake reprisals,415 and the summary execution of POWs is a present 
feature of enduring conflicts wherein military necessity abuts conflicting legal prohibitions.416
The schizophrenic quality of state conduct, revealed in the disjunction between concrete 
expressions of commitment to evolving IHL and serial violations of that very regime, has not escaped the 
notice of contemporary commentators, who themselves are divided on the question of quarter.  For one 
group, “circumstances arise when military necessity . . . causes rules to be disregarded[,]” and “small 
detachments on special missions” ordered to execute strategic missions deep behind enemy lines are 
justified by military necessity417 in denying quarter to enemy forces on the ground that to release prisoners 
415
 Numerous sources document a widespread practice of denying quarter during the Vietnam War.  See, e.g., JOHN DUFFET 
(ED.), AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNAL 310 (1968) (concluding that as of 1968 “finishing off of the wounded on the battlefield and summary executions are 
frequent [practices during the Vietnam War]”); ESQUIRE, Aug. 1965, at (reporting the execution of enemy wounded by a U.S. 
Army captain in the Special Forces following an unsuccessful ambush as a relatively commonplace occurrence)(cited in FALK 
ET AL., supra note, at 270-71).  Much of the responsibility for this practice is attributed to the pressure to produce body counts 
to satisfy domestic critics of the war, as well as public opinion, that American military operations were succeeding.  See, e.g., 
FALK ET AL., supra note_, at 246-47 (stating that the policy that U.S. forces would deny quarter was not instituted by formal 
order but rather emerged from pressure to produce “body counts” emanating from the highest echelons).  In the absence of orders 
to the contrary, the pressure to increase enemy dead was translated at the company and platoon level, and tacitly authorized by 
higher echelons, as an order to deny quarter, as the following statement by an infantry platoon commander in 1969 illustrates:
I decided I was not going to take any more prisoners.  If at all possible I was not going to let the situation arise where a 
prisoner might be taken . . . I told all my men that if they were going to engage someone, not to stop shooting until 
everyone was dead . . . Nobody ever said anything against this policy and I think most of the men agreed with it.  My 
company commander felt the same way I did about it . . . I know in my case, platoon leaders never got any guidance on 
treatment of prisoners.  Battalion HQs never said anything about them.  There was no SOP, there was never a request 
that we take any prisoners.  The only thing we ever heard was to get more body count, kill more VC!  We heard that all 
the time; it was really stressed.  The only way anybody judged a unit’s effectiveness was by the number of body counts 
they had . . . That is really the only mission we have in the field, to kill the enemy.”
Cited in FALK ET AL., supra note_, at 248-52.
Combat-invoked emotions such as rage and the desire for revenge contributed to the denial of quarter as well.  See id. at 248-52 
(“Before these two friends were  hit I had sort of a lukewarm feeling against the enemy[,] . . . [b]ut after seeing them hurt so bad I 
had a true hatred for all VC and from then on I wanted to kill as many of them as I could.”) (quoting a U.S. Army platoon 
commander); see also DAVID A. HALBERSTAM, THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE (1965) (reporting upon the capture a 
group of “cocky” Viet Cong who shouted “anti-American slogans and . . . curses” their U.S. Marine captors “simply lined up the 
seventeen guerrillas and shot them down in cold blood[.]”); Raymond R. Coffey, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, Nov. 19, 1965: 
(reporting execution of North Vietnamese wounded following a battle); Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War 
Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 12 (1972) (noting that orders given to company commanders before the battle of My Lai to effectively 
deny quarter were issued in part as a matter of revenge against a “hidden enemy that have been clobbering us” and from whom it 
was now possible to “get our pound of flesh”) (citing battalion mission orders to company commanders) TAYLOR, supra note_, 
at 36 (noting, during the Vietnam War, that “[i]n the heat of combat, soldiers who are frightened, angered, shocked at the death of 
comrades, and fearful of treacherous attacks by enemies feigning death or surrender, are often prone to kill rather than capture.”).
416 See INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, supra note_, at 130 (stating that “It is well known that the rule [prohibiting denial of 
quarter] . . . is often broken” and “All that can be hoped for is that responsible commanders hold [rule violations] to a
minimum.”); HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 50 (stating that denial of quarter remains common practice); WALZER, supra 
note_, at 308 (indicating that, although denial of quarter is becoming more rare, the practice continues).  In 1993 an Israeli naval 
special forces unit, Shayetet 13, was conducting anti-terrorist operations near a terrorist camp in Lebanon when it was discovered 
by a group of terrorists.  Shayetet 13 killed one terrorist and captured a second, but a third escaped.  The captured terrorist 
attempted to escape despite having been bound with rope, and after the commander was refused permission to evacuate the 
terrorist with his unit, he elected to disable him by shooting his legs.  Despite his wounds, the terrorist was able to escape into 
nearby brush, and the commander, concerned that permitting escape would endanger his force, ordered one of his soldiers to 
execute the terrorist.  Upon formal investigation, the Israeli JAG determined that the commander had acted out of military 
necessity in preserving his men and his mission and that no charges should be specified against any persons.  See Bagaz 2888/99 
Advocate Holander v Hayoaz Hamishpati Lamemshala (Isr. 1997).
417
 Some scholars, in supporting a military necessity exception to a general rule prohibiting denial of quarter, restrict the 
application to circumstances colorable as requiring the execution of POWs in the interest of self-preservation, thereby 
disallowing justifications predicated primarily upon concerns that their release might compromise missions.  See WALZER, 
supra note_, at 305 (“But if it is only the safety of the unit that is in question . . . the proper appeal would be to self-preservation[, 
as] [h]e argument from necessity has not . . . been accepted by legal writers . . . [while] the argument from self-preservation has 
won greater support[.]”); HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 78 (“[E]ven those who say that the prisoners may be killed are not 
necessarily relying on the principle of military necessity—a much narrower principle of (state) self-preservation will suffice.”).
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would “greatly endanger the success of the mission[s] or the safety of the unit[s].”418  To permit enemy 
forces the freedom to jeopardize the mission or the survival of one’s own forces would, for this scholarly 
camp, constitute an exercise of “asinine ethics.”419  Furthermore, this non-absolutist camp accepts that 
denial of quarter may be excusable, or at the very least not the cause for severe legal remonstrations, by 
reference to the psychological dimensions of the circumstances giving rise to the decision to refuse 
surrender420 and to the moral and legal culpability of the soldier(s) offering surrender: parole violators, by 
virtue of their own misconduct, expose themselves to the penalty of death,421 even if they remain entitled 
to due process in a judicial forum,422 and expressions of outrage at their perfidy that take the form of 
summary execution are understandable, if not permissible, under positive law.  Other scholars argue that 
the legal prohibition against denial of quarter is absolute and that even in the unusual circumstance where 
the grant of quarter would threaten the mission or the lives of the forces to whom an offer of surrender is 
made, there can be no exception in extremis: “The law is quite clear . . . Quarter may not be denied nor 
may prisoners be executed because they are burdensome.”423  According to this position, it is an 
“obligation of soldiering as an office” to accept the additional risks posed by the release of POWs,424 and 
418
 TAYLOR, supra note_, at 36 (stating further that “no military or other court has been called upon, so far as I am aware, to 
declare such killings a war crime.”).  Others, while striving hard to refuse any exceptions to a general prohibition against denial 
of quarter, admit that “[t]here may be time in war when it is permissible to kill combatants who have laid down their arms and 
tried to surrender.”  HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 76; BEST, supra note_, at 348-50 (recognizing that when “hard-pressed 
troops in continuing action find themselves with prisoners on their hands whom they have no means to conduct under guard to 
safety away from the combat zone[,]” denial of quarter is neither unexpected nor unjustifiable on the ground of necessity); PAUL 
RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 435-36 (accepting that “in fluid, jungle situations in which the [POW] is liable to return quickly to 
the status of combatant, there being no stockades in which to insure that he will remain a non-warrior[,]” it is permissible to deny 
quarter); OSIEL, supra note_, at 355-56 (allowing that despite the absolutist language of sources of conventional IHL, the 
general practice of states reveals that military necessity can still be invoked in justification of the denial of quarter under 
circumstances where to grant quarter would compromise the outcome of a mission); WALZER, supra note_, at 250 (“In a 
supreme emergency, indeed, it may be necessary ‘to hack one’s way through[.]’”).
419
 MAO TSE TUNG, BASIC TACTICS 98 (1966) (stating in explanation that in the case described by other authors it is 
impossible to take prisoners and that if it is not feasible to disarm and disperse enemy forces it is obligatory to execute them).
420 See BEST, supra note_, at 348-49 (stating that “[t]here are limits to the amount of humanitarian observance that desperately 
fighting flesh and blood can actually stand” and that “when a well-protected machine-gunner, defending his safely-retreating 
compatriots, succeeds in killing a great many of his attackers before at the last moment emerging (if he is very unwise, with a 
confident smile) to surrender to their surviving mates[,]”that grief-stricken and enraged soldiers should deny quarter to the 
would-be POW should not come as a surprise); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note_, at 75-76 (“It may be observed that in 
case of close and sustained combat in land war, where the signal of surrender is postponed and resistance continued to the very 
last moment, quarter may in practice be difficult [due to the emotional state of the attackers] to grant.”).
421 See Brown, supra note_, at 212 (noting that the death penalty remains among the sanctions currently available to punish parole 
violators); HINGORANI, supra note_, at 65 (noting that surrendering soldiers who have committed war crimes pre-capture are 
occasionally denied quarter on this ground).
422
 POWs who violate parole are disentitled to POW status but may not be subjected to summary execution and are entitled to 
defend themselves against the charge of breach of parole.  See GC III, supra note_, at Art. 5 (stating that POWs are entitled to 
protection from the time of capture until repatriation); id. at Art. 85 (stating that POWs may be prosecuted under the laws of the 
Detaining Power for acts committed pre-capture); Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 12 (stating that a parole 
violator recaptured bearing arms must “be brought before the courts.”).
423
 INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, supra note_, at xi; see also ROGERS, supra note_, at 147 (“A long-range patrol 
ambushes a group of enemy soldiers and in the exchange of fire kills all its members except one who is wounded.  A soldier is 
ordered to kill the wounded man because the patrol cannot take him with them and if he is left behind he may endanger the patrol 
by reporting its existence.  The order is illegal, so the soldier carrying it out would be liable to prosecution[.]”); M. 
GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 103 (1959) (“A commander is not entitled to kill his prisoners to 
preserve his own forces, even in cases of extreme necessity . . . [whether] because they slow up his movements, weaken his 
fighting force because they require a guard, consume supplies, or appear certain to be set free by their own forces.”); Mark S. 
Martins, LTC, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Telephone Interview, 2 Oct. 2000 (stating that each 
member of the U.S. Army recognize that “’you may find yourself behind enemy lines, and in order not to be a war criminal you 
may have to expose your mission.’ You accept this as the quiet professional you are.”).
424
 WALZER, supra note_, at 305.
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the killing of enemy forces that have indicated their intention to surrender is always a war crime425
immune from excuse or justification.426  Enemy soldiers over whom military personnel are unable to 
exercise custody without compromising their own safety or the success of their mission simply cannot be 
dispatched, although they may be otherwise rendered incapable of inflicting injury.427  Moreover, reprisal 
is categorically prohibited.428  In short, an exegesis of scholarly texts demonstrates little more than the 
academic community is a house divided on the question of the legality of the acts and omissions at issue.
In the sixty years since the court-martial of Private Ryan et al., the positive rules of IHL and the 
military regulations governing members of the U.S. Army, have waxed increasingly formal and 
prohibitive,429 drawing the legal issues of the conduct at issue into sharper focus and thereby increasing 
the likelihood that the defendants’ conduct would be discerned as illegal and that they would be 
prosecuted.  Moreover, a number of U.S. Army courts-martial convened over the past several decades 
have sentenced soldiers to periods of confinement for the crime of murder arising from denials of 
quarter,430 providing important precedent as to applicable law as well as guidance to a jury in determining 
whether and how far the conduct of the defendants departed from that expected of honorable members of 
the martial profession.  Thus, it is not inconceivable that a court-martial convened in 2003 might accept 
the absolutist pronouncements of the drafters of the various IHL instruments, which brook no claims that 
military necessity or lack of knowledge about the boundaries of the permissible in combat can ever 
absolve an accused of even partial legal responsibility for violations, and thus conclude, upon the same 
evidence available to the court-martial of 1944, that military necessity as it has been shaped by the 
evolution of positive law and practice can no longer be invoked to justify the denial of quarter and that, 
given the much broader dissemination of knowledge about and training in IHL to which Upham had been 
exposed, in the form of FM 27-10 and a much more intensive military education,431 Upham either knew or 
425 See DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note_, at 100 (stating that even under extreme circumstances “[t]he decision to execute (murder) 
the prisoner . . . is . . . a war crime . . . , and . . . the one doing this can be tried and executed.”).
426
 Some members of the absolutist school-of-thought accept the argument that a superior orders defense might serve as a partial 
excuse where the accused lacked any possible moral choice other than to deny quarter.  See, e.g., HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 
58 (stating that a superior orders defense to a charge of denial of quarter is available only to those accused who were subject to 
execution as the “announced, probable, and understood penalty for disobedience” and as a result lacked true moral choice in 
determining whether to follow the order).
427 Capturing forces may take actions to reduce the threat posed by the release of enemy POWs provided such measures are 
“legal, humane, and . . . fit the military situation.”  See DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note_, at 100 (stating that such options include 
the detachment of several soldiers to evacuate the POW, the binding and gagging of the POW for forced march in 
accompaniment of the detaining forces, and the secreting of the POW in a hidden location for subsequent evacuation).
428
 Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1972) (“[C]oming after the event and 
when the harm has already been inflicted, reprisals cannot be characterized as a means of protection.”).
429 See supra notes_. 
430 See, e.g., Ex parte Keenan, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 108 (1969) (holding that there is an absolute duty to disobey an order to deny 
quarter and sentencing a soldier convicted of denial of quarter to 5 years’ imprisonment) (citing cases).  During the Vietnam War, 
U.S. courts-martial tried over 100, and convicted 60, defendants for the crime of murder.   BISHOP, supra note_, at 291.
431
 The API imposed upon parties the duty to ensure that “legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military 
commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to 
be given to the armed forces on this subject.”  API, supra note_, at Art. 82.  Although the U.S. does not concede any specific 
legal obligations under the API, in the past twenty years U.S. Army JAG lawyers, whose mission is “to support the commander 
on the battlefield by providing professional legal services as far forward as possible at all echelons of command throughout the 
operational continuum” and to provide authoritative guidance to soldiers of all ranks in the lawful discharge of their duties, have 
accomplished the purpose of Article 82, transforming the defense of ignorance to simultaneously render it less frequently 
available but, where available, more likely to succeed.  DEP’T OF ARMY, FM 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS 1 (Sept. 1991).  
Determining the extent of law applicable to combat has become an increasingly complex endeavor in a modern era in which non-
state actors and other nontraditional combatants have proliferated, technologies have become more potent and more precise, and 
instruments purporting to declare IHL have continued to accrete.  See Timothy P. Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game 
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should have known that the killing of a POW was manifestly unlawful. A present-day court-martial might 
therefore conclude that denial of quarter was categorically illegal under the UCMJ and that the defenses 
accepted in partial mitigation of sentence—necessity and ignorance—are unavailable to T/5 Upham, 
whose deeds dragged his brothers-in-arms into disrepute and who thus deserved public disassociation 
from the corps of honorable soldiers.  By this analysis, Upham would be convicted of murder or 
manslaughter and serve a lengthy prison sentence.432
However, this outcome is as unlikely at present as it would have been in the last year of World 
War II, even conceding that IHL is in a constant state of development and that acts which would have 
been permissible at one point in time have been proscribed with the progression of that regime.433
Although the post-World War II revision of military regulations in reflection of the increasing absolutism 
in the IHL regime may overcome any hesitancy to investigate and charge the defendants, the ultimate 
determination of their guilt or innocence remains the responsibility of their peers, for whom, despite the 
codification of a prohibitory legal regime, the defenses accepted in partial mitigation by the 1944 court 
might be at least as persuasive.  Moreover, neither the regime of IHL nor FM 27-10 are directly 
incorporated in the UCMJ,434 and, notwithstanding the fact that these sources directly proscribe the 
conduct in question, the jury, in evaluating the defendants’ conduct, would likely be instructed, consistent 
with the rights that defendants are guaranteed under the system of courts-martial, to consider whether a 
defense such as military necessity, under the specific circumstances, could justify killing an enemy parole 
violator who posed a potential threat to their physical safety and the success of their mission.  By the 
same token, the 2003 jury would be instructed to determine the extent to which ignorance of IHL, a body 
of regulation no less difficult for the enlisted soldier to fathom than that which existed in 1944, should be 
Disguised as Enlightened Policy: United States Law of War Obligations during Military Operations Other Than War, 150 MIL. 
L. REV. 152, 173 (1999) (noting that the failure of the U.S. to authoritatively state which provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols are binding frustrates attempts at compliance by combat commanders); Shefi, supra note_, at 119-20 
(stating that translating the “prolific development” in IHL, much of it unclear, into something of use to soldiers who are “usually 
more preoccupied in fulfilling the task of insuring military success than in carrying out the law” requires significant study, 
guidance, and expertise typically to be found only in JAG lawyers).  Despite the trends in law, technology, and strategy, the 
expert legal guidance provided by JAG lawyers at all phases of the planning and execution of military operations denies the 
combat commander the opportunity to claim a lack of knowledge that his actions are legally impermissible, on the contemporary 
battlefield, “where time permits, it is now objectively unreasonable for an American commander to refrain from consulting such a 
legal advisor whenever there is any ground for doubting the legality of a contemplated use of force.”  OSIEL, supra note_, at 
345.  At the same time, combat commanders and their subordinates, entitled to reasonably rely upon the guidance of legal 
advisors whose approval of their plans is evidence of the presumed legal propriety of their intended objectives and methods, are 
partially insulated from the legal consequences of decisions made in reliance upon the judgment of JAG lawyers that upon post 
hoc review are determined to have been unlawful.  See Jonathan Tomes, Indirect Responsibility for War Crimes, MIL. REV. 37, 
43 (1986) (“It is difficult to accuse a commander of lack of concern about the law of war if he has a Staff Judge Advocate 
approval of a plan.”).  Modifications to military manuals have augmented the work of JAG lawyers in enhancing “awareness of 
the objects of the use of forces and sensitivity to ethical, moral, and legal considerations in the conduct of warfare.”  R.R. Baxter, 
Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165, 182-83 (1978).  The supporting system of military education further 
inculcates soldiers in their legal obligations during wartime through courses in IHL conducted in basic and advanced individual 
training, as well as at the Army JAG School.  For a complete listing of all such courses in the system of U.S. Army military 
education, see http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO.
432
 Although not without a legal foundation, such a punishment would run the risk of criticism as a “revisionist moral judgment 
half a century after the fact” that elides the question of fundamental fairness to a defendant whose conduct, by the standards of 
his era, was neither manifestly unlawful nor wholly at odds with the martial code.  Webb, supra note_, at A22 (making this 
argument in regard to criticisms over U.S. hesitancy to investigate allegations of U.S. massacres of civilians in the Korean War).
433
 An example in support of this assertion is the March to the Sea by General William T. Sherman in 1864-65 during the U.S. 
Civil War, during which Union forces committed acts legal at that time that would today constitute grave breaches of IHL, 
including denial of quarter and deliberate destruction of civilian property.  See generally Thomas G. Robisch, General William T. 
Sherman: Would the Georgia Campaigns of the First Commander of the Modern Era Comply with the Current Law of War 
Standards?, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 459 (1995).
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considered in defense or in mitigation of the charge of murder, as well as the extent to which state 
practice in regard to denial of quarter should be considered in determining whether Upham comported 
himself in the manner expected of soldiers.435  Furthermore, the similarity of the threat posed by Islamic 
terrorists to the Nazi regime might sway members of a jury toward acquittal or toward a sentence that 
nullifies much of the legal consequences of a guilty verdict, and the jury might well struggle toward a 
conclusion along the lines of the following: that Upham, despite having committed a technical violation 
of the laws and customs of war, violated none of the constitutive tenets and precepts of the martial code in 
taking reprisal against a parole violator and that his conduct, although not to be extolled as the epitome of 
martial honor, merits mere disciplinary, rather than penal, sanctions, particularly in the context of a global 
challenge to fundamental national interests such as is posed by the intersection of international terrorism 
and the proliferation of WMD.  On the basis of such a finding, the jury might well impose lenient 
sanctions similar to those pronounced by the 1944 court-martial.
In summary, the essential point is that a determination of the legal responsibility of a soldier 
accused of a violation of IHL under the system of military justice entails an searching inquiry by fellow 
members of the military community—the group most directly injured in reputation as well as life and 
limb by violations of the martial code and thus the party with the greatest incentive to claim standing to 
complain of violations and to police its own ranks—conducted under conditions of relative normative 
autonomy,436 to ascertain not whether the accused ran afoul of a provision of positive law drafted by 
outsiders without obligations to the martial caste but whether, in consideration of all the surrounding 
434 See supra at note_.
435
 IHL may well remain as impenetrable to the average enlisted mind in 2003 as it did in 1944.  See DEP’T OF ARMY, 
PAMPHLET 27-161-2, 2 International Law, at 246 (1962) (conceding that ignorance of IHL may well excuse soldiers from 
liability for its violation since IHL “does not in some cases possess either the exactitude or degree of publicity which pertains to 
municipal law.”). Although the U.S. has mandated adherence to IHL at all times in every military operation as official policy, it 
has made little if any effort to authoritatively determine which of the various sources of conventional and customary IHL creates 
legal obligations that bind the U.S. Armed Forces.  See Timothy P. Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game Disguised as 
Enlightened Policy: United States Law of War Obligations during Military Operations Other Than War, 150 MIL. L. REV. 152, 
166-74 (1993) (discussing U.S. failure to specify with precision the obligations it accepts under IHL and suggesting that, until 
such a specification is forthcoming, the best insight into U.S. policy with respect to the extent of these obligations is an 
observation of U.S. practice).  Although federal legislation enacted in 1996 indicates that the grave breaches provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions, various articles of the Hague Conventions of 1907, and the texts and protocols of “such convention[s] to 
which the United states is a party” are applicable sources of law in the domestic prosecution of “war crimes” in federal district 
courts, as of 2003 IHL remains such a muddled and conditional body of regulation that, with the exception of manifestly 
unlawful acts, it is virtually impossible for soldiers to know with certainty what is prohibited in war.  See War Crimes Act of 
1996, supra note_ (enumerating various provisions of IHL the violations of which constitute criminal offenses punishable in 
federal district courts, although not displacing courts-martial jurisdiction in the case of military personnel).  Moreover, enlisted 
soldiers inquiring of their superiors as to whether their orders are lawful in a desire to tailor their conduct in accordance with the 
law might find themselves being told simply “Not to worry, the complexities are beyond your ken; just obey the order, unless it 
calls for atrocities.”  OSIEL, supra note_, at 108.  Consequently, soldiers in 2003 attempting to meet their legal obligations might 
be left with little more guidance than their peers of 1944, and the absence of support at higher levels in the chain of command 
might well be dispositive of whether a superior orders defense to an alleged violation of IHL is permitted.  For an in-depth 
discussion of the superior orders defense, see infra at note_.
436
 Proponents of the martial code rest their faith on two principle assumptions.  The first is that “actions performed by 
professionals in professional roles can be evaluated only with respect to criteria internal to the professional practice.”  See Arthur 
Applbaum, Are Lawyers Liars?, 4 LEG. THEORY 62, 73 (1988).  The second is that “[a]n approach to professional ethics that 
casts itself as an interpretation of [the] ordinary moral experience [of soldiers] . . . would do well to stay close to the terms of 
soldiers’ self-understanding.”  OSIEL, supra note_, at 18.  To falsify the first assumption it would be necessary to demonstrate 
that professionals are less well-suited to self-regulation than outsiders; to attack the second it would be necessary to show that 
soldiers’ understandings of the requirements of their profession and the moral experiences associated with soldiering can be 
readily moulded by external, particularly legal, regulations that are contrary to those understandings and experiences.  For 
reasons discussed supra, attempts to falsify either assumption and impose legal modification inconsistent with the values that are 
internal to the military caste are unlikely to prevail.  Id. at 164-65 (stressing that the only legal regulations likely to transform the 
behavior of soldiers are those which build upon “existing commitments and self-understandings.”).
71
circumstances, the accused can fairly be said to have failed in his duty to his brothers-in-arms by 
engaging in unchivalrous or otherwise reprehensible acts that shock the martial conscience and would, if 
unpunished, shame and dishonor the martial profession.  Although the normative universe in which this 
more parochial model of justice operates refuses to accept the subordination of its internal values to 
external review or to impose punishment for acts undertaken in self-defense or in furtherance of the 
military mission, it is ultimately conducive to a more holistic and stricter standard of judgment, for 
despite the absence of any provision of IHL proscribing a particular act a court-martial might well 
adjudge the author to have transgressed against his obligation under the martial code.437  In sum, under the 
martial code positive law is significantly less dispositive of the boundaries of permissible conduct, and of 
the consequences for overstepping these boundaries, than the professional and ethical judgments of 
members of the profession of arms.438  Nevertheless, a court-martial convened in 2003 to evaluate the 
conduct of Private Ryan et al. is likely to accept that T/5 Upham, while not wholly blameless, has neither 
committed an act worthy of professional banishment nor demonstrated himself beyond moral redemption, 
and the punishment levied under the martial code is likely to foster his rehabilitation and continued 
service to the military mission: now, as then, the defense of civilization. 
B. Trying Captain Ryan: International Legal Absolutism, Allegations of Crimes in the War on Terror, and 
the International Criminal Court
1.  International Legal Absolutism: The Judicial Model
Legal absolutists,439 deeply skeptical that professional self-regulation is sufficient to suppress 
violations of IHL by members of the armed forces whose mission, after all, is to win wars rather than to 
observe law,440 and unwilling to cede any regulatory terrain, reject martial honor as a thoroughly 
437
 In other words, as compared to the judicial model the martial code
prohibits a greater range of conduct but makes it easier to argue it is excusable to go beyond the bounds in certain 
circumstances: while strict on the rules themselves, it is relatively more lenient in allowing exceptions to them . . . [It] 
allows a small area at either extremity, that which is absolutely permissible and that which is absolutely impermissible, 
but concentrates its energies upon the middle ground where the debate takes place.  Transgressing the boundaries 
becomes something which requires justification . . . In addition to the realms of [clear] permission and prohibition is the 
area of debate where what is normally prohibited can be argued for if the circumstances are sufficiently compelling.
Id. at 285.
Put slightly differently, humanization of war is the product of overweening notions of custom, honor, and professionalism, and 
“There is no substitute for honour as a medium for enforcing decency on the battlefield, never has been, and never will be.”  
Kenneth Anderson, TIMES LIT. SUPP., Jul. 31, 1998 (reviewing First in the Field: The Unique Mission and Legitimacy of the 
Red Cross in a Culture of Legality) (quoting John Keegan).
438
 “Law is only one among several kinds of norms that govern [martial] life.  In striving to influence a given societal sphere, law 
ignores these other norms, assuming its supremacy over them, at its peril . . . Law’s efforts to avoid atrocity inevitably intersect 
with and rely upon the continuing efficacy of these other norms and mechanisms, which have historically played a much greater 
role toward this end.”  Id. at 162-63. More general research suggests that formal legalization, while it may advance the interests 
of “compliance communities”—particularly lawyers whose influence and financial interests are served thereby—does not 
enhance compliance in every context and is not necessarily preferable to regulation by other means, including professional self-
regulation.  SeeMiles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 661 (2000).
439
 “Legal absolutism” is the school-of-thought that posits that it is never justifiable to violate positive law in the pursuit of moral 
values as law, the universal distillation of natural legal principles and moral virtue, is the highest value human beings can serve; 
in contrast, legal relativism holds that where a positive law is intolerably incompatible with the requirements of justice, the 
provision of positive law must be disregarded.  See GUSTAV RADBRUCH, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1932) (elaborating 
theory of legal relativism).  For a thorough discussion of legal absolutism and legal relativism, see generally KENNETH 
CAUTHEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL RELATIVISM (1998).
440 See, e.g., WELLS, supra note_, at 178 (stating that IHL cannot safely be entrusted to the care of those “who understandably 
are preoccupied with winning wars and who cannot be expected to [interpret IHL] with a view to humanizing war[.]”); OSIEL, 
supra note_, at (explaining that even many of those who cannot be classified as legal absolutists are suspicious of military self-
regulation).  When challenged, legal absolutists point to the failure of the successively revised editions of the military manuals of 
leading states to directly incorporate the proliferating series of declarations of new sources of customary IHL as evidence that the 
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inadequate substitute for the judicial model.441  For legal absolutists, a penchant for law overrides 
considerations of non-legal solutions to practical problems, and the threat of harsh punishment, rather 
than the compliance pull exerted by an internal code of conduct, is necessary to condition and influence 
the battlefield behavior of soldiers cossetted behind military culture; thus, only a powerful ICC, freed 
from the influence of self-interested states and their military establishments and superior in the hierarchy 
of sources of rules and regulations, can promote respect for and observance of IHL.  Furthermore, for 
legal absolutists, ignorant of the moral universe of soldiers and distrustful of military self-judgment,442
claims in defense of acts otherwise classed as violations of IHL, reliant as they are upon subjective 
interpretations of variables the measurement of which is beyond the experiential realm of all but combat 
soldiers, are wholly incompatible with exceptions to the universal positive commands constituting the 
IHL regime.443  Failures to suppress violations of IHL are thus manifestations not of the inherent 
unsuitability of positive law to the practical needs of soldiers in combat but rather of the moral culpability 
of the perpetrators, and the solution lies in the punishment of the actors, the enhancement of penalties to 
support the deterrent value of the regime, and the creation of additional rules to strengthen the judicial 
model.444  For obdurate absolutists, military justice is a proxy for military impunity,445 and the system of 
courts-martial is an obscurant institution comprised of tendentious assemblages of cronies convened to 
afford legal shelter to guilty soldiers that will hold stubborn sway until swept aside by law.  The next 
military profession is insufficiently committed to the principles underlying IHL.  WELLS, supra note_, at 17.  Although courts-
martial are sometimes accused by civilian critics of offering defendants inadequate procedural protections against the influence of 
commanders bent on securing their convictions, some legal absolutists further fault courts-martial as an overly lenient institution 
that abuses the privilege of self-regulation to insulate its members from deserved punishment.  See BISHOP, supra note_, at 22 
(condemning military justice as a regime that “knows what it wants and systematically goes in and gets it.”).  Legal absolutists 
making the latter of these criticisms ignore evidence controverting the notion that courts-martial are a rubber-stamp for 
commanders.  See David A. Schleuter, The Twentieth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Military Justice for the 1990s—A 
Legal System Looking for Respect, 133 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1-29 (1991) (discussing decades of revisions to system of courts-martial 
that have enhanced fairness to parties and the integrity of proceedings).
441
 By and large, the civilian polities of democratic states, who for reasons beyond this work, disparage the concept of martial 
honor and despise the martial caste, are quite willing to impose dangerous legal constraints and uninformed retrospective moral 
judgments upon their armed forces, and they are unwilling and in many cases unable to critically evaluate the argument that 
military honor is superior to other institutions in suppressing violations of IHL.  OSIEL, supra note_, at 39-40 (discussing the 
legal consequences of the disjunction between civilian society and the military profession within democratic states).
442
 Legal absolutists tend to hail from the ranks of those with no military experience and even less interest in acquiring insight into 
the moral universe of soldiers than their fellow civilians, and as such they tend to be much more critical of soldiers’ conduct than 
do those whose greater understandings temper any impulses to condemn.  Id. at 162-63; see also RAMSEY, supra note_, at 503 
(describing legal absolutists as very often “intellectuals and churchmen . . . [who] have forgotten if they ever knew the meaning 
of a legitimate military target . . . [and] simply do not know the qualitative difference between ‘murder’ and ‘killing in war.’”).  
Distrust of and disdain for soldiers’ moral competence to self-regulate is so great that for legal absolutists, soldiers are bound by 
their externally-imposed legal formulations even where such formulations are incomplete, incoherent, and even contrary to 
soldiers’ self-understandings.  WALZER, supra note_, at 43-44 (stating that the “moral reality of war is not fixed by actual 
activities of soldiers but by the opinions of mankind” and in particular the “activity of philosophers, lawyers, [and] publicists[.]”).  
Whereas for proponents of the martial code an understanding of and appreciation for the experience of the combat soldier is 
essential to understanding the utility and limits of IHL, for legal absolutists such knowledge is, at best, superfluous.
443 See OSIEL, supra note_, at 285 (stating that, in direct contrast to the martial code, which permits exceptions to its code of 
conduct yet imposes a much broader set of regulations consistent with its more holistic regulatory purpose, the approach to the 
prevention of violations of IHL advanced by legal absolutists is more “lenient in terms of the content of the rules themselves but 
strict in terms of its demand for their observance” and insists that acts that are prohibited are absolutely prohibited and may not 
be excused by claims such as necessity, ignorance, or other defenses available under the system of courts-martial).
444
 The position that IHL compliance deficiencies are the result not of substantive inadequacy of the law itself but of deficiencies 
in enforcement deficiencies that in turn are rooted in the lack of effective criminal sanctions is central to IHL legal absolutism.  
See Joyner, supra note_, at 162 (stating the absolutist credo that “[w]ar crimes flourish in direct proportion to the . . . deficiency 
of law enforcement.”); see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990) (referring to the model of human 
behavor that links legal compliance to the effectiveness of penalties as “instrumentalist”).
445 See King & Theofrastous, supra note_, at 69 (areguing, in reference to My Lai, that the “de minimis punishment” court-
martials sometimes impose is proof that courts-martial effectively immunize soldiers from responsibility for war crimes).
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section illustrates how legal absolutism, expressed through the ICC, might adjudicate alleged violations of 
IHL arising in the context of a U.S. covert operation designed to eliminate WMD in the custody of 
terrorists, a fictional scenario representative of future conflicts in the Age of Terrorism.446
2.  Prosecutor v. Task Force Ryan et al.
In 1998 Juma Namangani, age 34, an ethnic Uzbeki447 and a former Red Army paratrooper and 
veteran of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, formed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [“IMU”], an 
Islamic terrorist organization committed to the establishment of Islamic republic in Uzbekistan448 and a 
“virtual partner” with Al Qaeda.449  Namangani, a born-again Muslim who traveled to Saudi Arabia in the 
early 1990s to steep in the Wahhabist sect of Islam,450 declared jihad to remove the secular government of 
Uzbekistan and establish a pan-Central Asian Islamic republic, and by 1999 IMU, its forces gathered in 
bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and its coffers bursting with funds from the intelligence agencies of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, Islamic charities in Europe,451 and the trafficking of opium between Afghanistan 
and Europe,452 was launching increasingly successful attacks against government targets in the Fergana 
Valley, a region on the frontier near Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the stronghold of indigenous 
Wahhabism.453  In 2000 President Karimov, a major ally in the U.S. anti-Taliban coalition, requested and 
received assistance, and U.S. Special Forces based in Tashkent began to train the Uzbeki Army in 
counterterrorism.  However, the power of the IMU increased apace, and by spring 2001, General Tommy 
Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, commented on a visit that he “believe[d] it [wa]s possible for 
very small numbers of committed terrorists to bring great instability . . . to the people in the region.”454
General Franks proved prescient: when the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda455 and the Taliban456
regime commenced with heavy bombing of targets in northeastern Afghanistan on October 7th, 2001, 
446 See James B. Motley, Coping with the Terrorist Threat: The U.S. Intelligence Dilemma, in STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, ED., 
INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 165 (1987) (asserting that terrorism is the 
“characteristic form of warfare of this age[.]”).
447
 The Uzbeki people are a Central Asian nationality that traces their ancestry to Uzbek Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan.  
AHMED RASHID, JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 23 (2002).
448
 Uzbekistan, with the capital city in Tashkent, is a landlocked, arid, predominantly Muslim nation slightly larger than California 
which is bordered by Afghanistan Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.  Prior to 1991 it was a constituent 
republic of the Soviet Union.  Despite extensive natural gas and petroleum reserves and a high literacy rate, it is a very poor 
nation, with a per capita GDP of only $2500, and in addition to its natural resources opium production is a major industry.  
Uzbekistan, with an overwhelmingly homogenous population of 25 million largely of Uzbeki ethnicity, is governed by an 
authoritarian, corrupt regime led by President Islam Karimov which has a poor record on human rights and democratization 
issues.  See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2002, Uzbekistan, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html.  The secular Karimov regime has been  repressive on religious issues, 
preventing the Muslim majority from engaging in the free expression of their faith. RASHID, supra note_, at 85.
449 Id.  at 173.
450 Id. at 136-50.
451 See id. at 8, 137-50 (tracing IMU financing to Saudia and Iranian intelligence agencies and to Islamic charities in the West).  
IMU, Al-Qaeda, and other allied Islamic terrorist organizations maintain front businesses and solicit donations from Muslim 
charitable organizations to support their operations.  http://www.state.gov/www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/fsbinLadin.html;
452 See RASHID, supra note_, at 137-50 (detailing the sources of IMU finance, including trafficking of heroin and other opium 
products between Central Asia and Europe).
453 Id. at 8, 45.
454 Id. at 192 (quoting General Tommy Franks, U.S. Army, U.S. Central Command (commanding) (now retired)). 
455
 Al Qaeda is a multi-national organization of several thousand armed terrorists established in the late 1980s to "unite all 
Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs" by overthrowing non-Islamic governments and 
expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Islamic states.  See http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.  It is commanded by the 
charismatic Usama bin Laden, the wealthy son of a Saudi businessman, who has ordered all Muslims to kill US citizens—civilian 
or military—and their allies everywhere. Yassin El-Ayouty, International Terrorism Under the Law, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 485, 487 (1999).  Al Qaeda is responsible for a host of acts of international terrorism, most notoriously the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th, 2001 which killed more than 3,000 innocents, mostly civilians.  Prior to 
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After Namangani, the commander of joint IMU-Taliban operations in that sector, was killed in battle, his 
second-in-command, Tahir Yuldashev, withdrew IMU and Al Qaeda forces in strength, slipped through 
the noose, and crossed the border into the Fergana Valley, and by late 2003 IMU-Al Qaeda forces had 
defeated the Uzbeki Army in a series of battles.457  Success bred converts, and early 2004, IMU forces, 
bolstered by additional troops drawn from allied Islamic terrorist organizations,458 captured Tashkent, 
executed President Karimov, and proclaimed the Islamic Emirate of Uzbekistan.459  Yuldashev, the Emir 
of Uzbekistan, moving swiftly to create a Wahabbist state, declared Uzbekistan bound by no legal 
obligations save those imposed by Shari’ah (Islamic law),460 and soon the teaching of foreign languages, 
the failure of men to wear beards, and the provision of co-educational academic and medical services 
became punishable by stoning and amputation.461  Worse was to come: in summer 2004, U.S. human 
intelligence sources reported that an international gathering of terrorists in Tashkent had assembled to 
plan the “eviction of the U.S. from the Muslim world and the liberation of Jerusalem,”462 and, on the third 
anniversary of September 11th, 2001, members of Al Qaeda launched simultaneous attacks upon U.S. and 
international targets across Central Asia, destroying the U.S. embassies in Tashkent, Astana, Kazakhstan, 
and Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, the offices of the Amoco Oil Company in Astana and Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 
the offices of the World Bank and the UN Development Program in Fergana City, and the headquarters of 
the 10th Mountain Division at its base in Khanabad, Afghanistan.  Among the more than 5000 people 
killed were the directors of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The U.S. immediately declared a national emergency,463 passed domestic legislation authorizing 
military action against those responsible,464 and dispatched investigatory teams to Central Asia.  In the 
coalition attacks in October 2001, Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, but it has now dispersed in small groups across Asia and 
the Middle East.  CIA World Factbook, supra note_, Afghanistan.
456
 U.S. initially supported the Taliban to promote security for pipeline projects and end the drug trade, but cut support in response 
to serial violations of the human rights of women and children in 1997.  VINCENT IACOPINO, THE TALIBAN’S WAR ON 
WOMEN 35 (1998).
457
 Events presented from July 2003 and forward are fictional.
458 See Testimony of Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Near E. and S. Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 106th Cong. (Nov. 2, 1999) 
(testifying that by the late 1990s Uzbekistan had become a safe haven and a recruiting base for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 
Algerian Armed Islamic Front, Kashmiri separatists, and other terrorist groups).
459 See IACOPINO, supra note_, at 27 (noting that the victorious Taliban renamed the country the “Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan”).
460 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Afghanistan Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (Jan. 30, 1997) (cited in Marjon E. Ghasemi, 
Islam, International Human Rights and Women’s Equality: Afghan Women under Taliban Rule, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 445, 445 (1999) (describing the same process instituted by the Taliban immediately subsequent to their 
seizure of power in Afghanistan in 1996).
461 See IACOPINO, supra note_, at 3 (describing the arbitrary detention, torture, disappearance, and cruel punishment of 
thousands of Afghanis under the Taliban).
462
 In the summer of 2003, Al Qaida claimed to have completely reorganized following the devastating U.S. attacks on its bases in 
Afghanistan, and spokesman Thabet bin Qais is reported to have stated that Al Qaida is “way ahead of the Americans and its 
allies in the intelligence war,” that American security agencies still are ingnorant of the changes the leadership has made,” and 
that an “attack the size of the Sept. 11 attacks'” is being devised against the U.S.”  See Sarah al-Deeb, Al Qaida Reportedly Plans 
Big New Attack, ASSOC. PRESS, May 8, 2003.
463
 The text of the declaration is as follows:
Declaration of National Emergency by Reason Of Certain Terrorist Attacks By the President of the United States of 
America, A Proclamation: A national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks in Central Asia, and the 
continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, 
President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States, I hereby declare that the national emergency has existed since September 11, 2004, and, 
pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), I intend to utilize the following statutes: sections 
123, 123a, 527, 2201(c), 12006, and 12302 of title 10, United States Code, and sections 331, 359, and 367 of title 14, 
United States Code.  This proclamation immediately shall be published in the Federal Register or disseminated through 
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aftermath of what came to be known as “9/11 2” the CIA belatedly discovered that Usama bin Laden and 
Al Qaeda had taken shelter in Uzbekistan,465 and President Bush demanded that the Yuldashev regime 
either extradite a list of suspects, including Usama bin Laden,466 or else accept responsibility for their 
actions on the theory of vicarious state responsibility.467  Yuldashev, disclaiming any criminal association 
with bin Laden, refused to surrender any Muslim suspects without a determination of their guilt in an 
Islamic court;468 within a week the Supreme Islamic Court of the Emirate of Uzbekistan “exonerated” bin 
Laden and other senior leaders of Al Qaeda of all charges of terrorism.469  Outraged, the President 
dispatched several carrier battle groups to the Mediterranean and, at a White House news conference, 
declared that “countries like Uzbekistan must know that if they harbor terrorists they cannot complain if 
we bomb.”470  Late in 2004, the day after the U.S. announced the major enhancement of the capabilities of 
its special operations forces,471 a joint U.S.-Israeli intelligence operation472 determined that several Iraqi 
microbiological scientists who had escaped after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in April 2003 had 
surfaced only to recommence their work in Uzbekistan,473 sparking fears that the Yuldashev regime was 
the Emergency Federal Register, and transmitted to the Congress.  This proclamation is not intended to create any right 
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or 
any person. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of September, in the year of 
our Lord two thousand four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-
ninth.  GEORGE W. BUSH
(Patterned after the Declaration of the same title issued on September 14th, 2001 in response to the attacks on September 11th).
464
 In a Joint Resolution dated September 12, 2004, Congress, recognizing in a series of “whereas” clauses the right to self-
defense, the threat posed by terrorist attacks to the “national security” of the U.S., and the “inherent powers of the President to 
take action to deter and prevent acs of international terrorism” against U.S. interests, passed legislation authorizing “the use of all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2004, in order to prevent any future acts of terrorism 
against the United States.”  See (note).  The Joint Resolution further authorized the President to “use United States Armed Forces 
against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against U.S. nationals, property, and interests in Central Asia” and 
provided that such authorization was consistent with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution. (note).
465
 The sheltering of members of other tribes is an ancient Central Asian tradition followed by contemporary terrorists of the 
region that is agnostic as to the moral virtue, or lack thereof, of the guest, and it was this tradition which in part provided the basis 
for the Taliban to provide sanctuary to Usama bin Laden.  See Tim McGirk, Pakistan Seizes a Suspect in the U.S. Embassy 
Bombings, TIME, Aug. 31, 1998, at 34 (reporting that the Taliban reluctance to release bin Laden stemmed from a Central Asian 
tradition so absolutist that it mandates sheltering from their pursuers “even your own worst enemy or a murderer[.]”).
466
 Usama bin Laden, the mastermind, financier, and spiritual leader of Al Qaeda, has been in hiding for over a decade and has 
declared a jihad against all U.S. citizens and interests.  See El-Ayouty, supra note_, at 492 (noting issuance of a fatwa, or 
religious commandment, by bin Laden in 1996 calling for war of genocide against Americans).
467 See Michael Lacey, Self- Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 293, 305 (presenting the argument that states are responsible for the actions of terrorist groups they permit to operate 
within their borders on a theory of vicarious state responsibility).
468
 This is the precise position taken by the Taliban regime with respect to bin Laden and other members of Al Qaeda upon the 
U.S. demand for their extradition to the United States in 1998.  See Taliban Willing to Discuss What to Do With Osama bin 
Laden, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 29, 1998 (reporting an agreement reached with the Taliban to try members of Al 
Qaeda in an Islamic court provided the U.S. provided credible evidence).
469 See Afghans Silence but Won’t Expel bin Laden, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 13, 1999, at 32A (reporting the 
acquittal of bin Laden in a Taliban court).
470 See Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Fed. News Service, Oct. 
8, 1998, at 1 (testimony of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan) (cited in Stephanie R. Nicolas, Negotiating in the Shadow of 
Outlaws, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 385, 392 (2000)).
471
 The U.S. Special Operations Command [“SOCOM”], headquarted at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, has been the 
recipient of greatly increased budgets since 2000, with much of the resources dedicated to procurement of troops and weapons 
systems for the War on Terror.  See Thom Shanker, Jump in Elite Forces’ Budget Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A10.
472
 Israeli collaboration with U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq was critical in unmasking Iraqi concealment of its WMD 
programs in the late 1990s.  See Allison Van Lear, Loud Talk About a Quiet Issue: The International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
Struggle to Maintain the Confidentiality of Information Gained in Nuclear Facility Inspections, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
349, 355-56 (2000) (detailing extensive U.S.-Israeli intelligence coordination in the context of the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq).
473
 Despite coalition efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of and debrief Iraqi weapons scientists, many of the senior Iraqi weapons 
scientists are as yet unaccounted for.  Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russian scientists who had been detailed to 
biological weapons programs dispersed to China, Syria, Iran, and Egypt, ostensibly to resume such work in those states.  See
Annual Report: Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements 9, 
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developing biological weapons.474  The following week the Uzbeki government official responsible for 
weapons programs defected while at a conference in London, corroborating CIA reports and providing 
additional details, including partial information about Al Qaeda plans to deploy BWs in reservoirs across 
the U.S.475  The Director of Homeland Security,476 in consultation with the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency,477 estimated that Uzbekistan was less than ninety days from testing its arsenal478 and ordered his 
staff to begin planning the declaration of martial law and the commandeering of vaccinations.479
http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm.  It is not inconceivable that Iraqi weapons scientists might seek other 
employment opportunities in their field in states able and willing to pay for their services and shelter them from apprehension.
474
 Poisonous weapons, a subset of WMD, are organized into three categories: 1) biological weapons [“BWs”] (consisting of 
living organisms, whether bacteria or viruses, disseminated for ingestion by a target population to create an epidemic, which are 
capable of auto-reproduction), such as anthrax, cholera, ebola, plague, and yellow fever; 2) toxins (consisting of harmful 
substances produced by living organisms but which are not themselves living organisms and are thus incapable of reproduction), 
such as botulim and staphylococcus; and 3) chemical agents (consisting of inorganic, harmful substances), such as mustard gas 
and chlorine.  See Matthew S. Meselson, Chemical and Biological Weapons, SCIENTIFIC AM., May, 1970, at 303 (discussing 
taxonomy of poisonous weapons); James R. Ferguson, Biological Weapons and U.S. Law, 278 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 357, 359 
(1997) (discussing various categories of infectious and toxic agents).
BWs, the first category of poisonous weapons, vary in lethality, incubation period, and their capacity for diffusion.  
David R. Franz, Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological Warfare Agents, 278 J. AM. MED. 
ASSOC. 399 (1997).  They are typically delivered by bombs and other systems that cause the lethal organisms to disperse as 
aerosolized particles, although they can also be delivered by terrorists using less sophisticated means, including the use of crop-
dusting aircraft, in the air circulation systems of large buildings, in food and water supplies, and by mail.  Raymond A. Zilinskas, 
Iraq’s Biological Weapons: The Past as Future, 278 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 418, 420 (1997) (listing traditional methods of 
delivery of BW); Jeffrey D. Simon, Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat, J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 428, 429 (1997) 
(discussing methods of dissemination of BW by terrorists).  Even the most lethal agents are difficult to control due to the 
complexities in managing their wind dispersal patterns.  John D. Steinbruner, Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses, 
109 FOR. POL’Y 85, 87-88 (1997-98).  As a consequence, many states have foresworn BWs and destroyed existing stockpiles 
and turned to other weapons systems for strategic defense.  See Scott Keefer, International Control of Biological Weapons, 6 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107,108-09 (1999) (discussing trend towards demilitarization in field of BWs since late 1960s).
However, despite their inherent unpredictability, BWs are potentially very effective weapons to terrorist organizations.  
BWs, the “poor man’s atomic bomb,” are tremendously lethal in small quantities and can thus be ported and distributed to great 
operational effective without the use of significant manpower.  See Robert P. Kadlec et al., Biological Weapons Control: 
Prospects and Implications for the Future, 278 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 351, 351 (1997) (discussing the aspects of BWs that 
render them especially suited to use by terrorists, including lethality and portability); DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, 
July 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 14095268 (“Five pounds of anthrax, properly dispersed, would kill over 200,000 in 
Washington, D.C.”); see also Vaccine Improves Odds Against Anthrax, REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, Apr. 6, 
1998, available in 1998 WL 194056 (F.D.C.H.) (“When inhaled, an unvaccinated, unprotected person has about a one percent 
chance of surviving a concentrated anthrax exposure.”) (discussing the chance of survival after inhaling anthrax used as a 
biological weapon).  Moreover, as their effects are often not observed for days, the radius of lethality can expand to cover a wide 
target population as victims, unaware of their condition, move about, continuously infecting others.  Id.  Further, BWs are 
relatively simple and cost-effective to produce, and they can be manufactured in otherwise innocuous-seeming facilities such as 
pharmaceutical laboratories, light industrial facilities, and even in civilian residential infrastructure.  See David G. Gray, “Then 
the Dogs Died”: The Fourth Amendment and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 567, 574 
(1994) (discussing the relative ease of producing chemical weapons and BWs).  Because BWs can be readily produced in these 
“dual-use” facilities (facilities that have a second, or “dual,” purpose other than their military character) it is difficult to detect 
their manufacture and easy to deny the same.  See Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 559-60 (1999) (discussing the ease with which any dual-purpose production facility can be readily 
converted from the manufacture of chemical weapons or BWs to the production of pharmaceutical drugs).
475 See Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects After the Gulf War, 86 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 524, 524 (1992) (indicating that a primary method of verification of human intelligence reports with regard to the existence of 
clandestine WMD programs has been defector reports); see also Vernon Loeb, Iraqi Defector Says Saddam Was Near to Building 
A-Bomb, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2000, at A2 (reporting that reports of the chief Iraqi nuclear scientist, Khidir Hamza, who 
defected to the U.S., were instrumental in establishing proof of the status of Iraqi efforts to obtain nuclear weapons).
476
 The Department of Homeland Security [“DHS”] was created on Oct. 8, 2001, to develop and coordinate the implementation of 
a comprehensive national strategy to secure the U.S. from terrorist threats or attacks.  See The White House, the Office of 
Homeland Security, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/
477
 Over the past seven years the U.S. perception of the threat posed by BWs has transformed dramatically.  Whereas BWs were 
once conceived of as a weapon unlikely ever to be used by virtue of their possession solely by the Soviet Union and perhaps a 
handful of other states against which the deterrent threat posed by U.S. nuclear weapons was sufficient, the troubling diffusion of 
BWs has altered U.S. calculations.  In 1996, Congress passed legislation in recognition of the fact that the U.S. lacked adequate 
plans and countermeasures to defeat the threat posed by the possession of BWs by terrorists and rogue states.  See Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. §§2301—66 (1996) [“DAWMDA”].  The Nunn-Lugar 
Amendment to DAWMDA included significant Congressional findings that supported establishment of a specialized agency 
tasked to meet this threat.  See Nunn-Lugar Amendment No. 4349, S. 1745, 104th Cong. (1996) (noting that no specific response 
unit existed for emergencies involving chemical or biological weapons).  After President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,868 
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This revelation did not catch the U.S. completely by surprise: although Uzbekistan ratified the 
Biological Weapons Convention [“BWC”] in 1996,480 this was not the first time an avowed member of a 
non-proliferation treaty had violated the terms of its membership by producing the prohibited weapons in 
question,481 and the notion that a small and impoverished state could inflict massive devastation upon the 
U.S. had been on the minds of policymakers for over a decade.482  However, the BWC did not of its own 
effect constitute prior authorization of the use of military force to ensure compliance,483 and the 2001 
declaring a national emergency in response to the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and 
economy of the United States” posed by the proliferation of WMD, Congress expressed the sense that the use of WMD was an 
“abhorrent” act in contravention of international law that “should trigger immediate and effective sanctions.” See Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, S.495, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (finding further, throughout Title II, 
§207(a), that the “threats posed in chemical and biological weapons to the United States Armed Forces deployed in regions of 
concern will continue to grow . . .” that “the use of chemical and biological weapons will be a likely condition of future conflicts 
in regions of concern,” and that “the United States Armed Forces should make countering the use of chemical and biological 
weapons an organizing principle for U.S. defense strategy and for the development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training, 
and exercising policies of the United States Armed Forces.”).  Despite these legislative and executive statements of policy, by 
1998 little concrete progress had been made to enhance preparedness against an attack against the U.S. using BWs.  See U.S. 
Lags in Biological Warfare Protection Threat Said to Be On the Rise, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 27, 1997, at 
A6 (stating that “the United States is poorly prepared to defend its armed forces from the rising threat of germ warfare attack and 
lags even more in protecting Americans at home.”).
In March 1998, however, a then-secret executive branch conference revealed the magnitude of U.S. unpreparedness, 
and in October 1998 the Department of Defense merged several agencies to create the Defense Threat Reduction Agency with 
the mission to address the problem of growing weapons proliferation and the threat from WMD in the possession of terrorist 
groups and rogue nations.  Dep’t of Defense, Establishment of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Research Intelligence 
Database, Oct. 1, 1998 (transcript of the Department of Defense announcement on the establishment of the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency).  According to then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Today’s harsh reality is too powerful to ignore: at 
least 25 countries have, or are in the process of developing, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the means to deliver 
them . . . We must confront these threats in places like Baghdad before they come to our shores.”  Id.  The Director of DRTA, 
upon assuming his post, warned that “[t]he deterrent capability of the United States is still very effective against national states . . 
. [but] . . . it’s not so clear that it has the same effect on transnational organizations.”  New U.S. Agency to Deal with Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Threat, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 2, 1998 (cited in Matthew Linkie, The Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency: A Note on the United States’ Approach to the Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 16 J. CONTEMP. H. L. & 
POL’Y 531, 532 n.8 (2000)).  Although DTRA has centralized responsibility for enhancing U.S. capacities to respond to and 
deter BW attacks launched against the U.S., the employment, by terrorist groups, of BWs against the U.S. remains the most 
immediate and serious threat facing the nation. EISENDRATH, supra note_, at 15.
478 See Michael Lacey, Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 293, 293 (positing, in a fictional scenario, a U.S. strike to eliminate the weapons program of a terrorist group on the 
ground that the terrorist group was only three months’ removed from developing operational nuclear weapons).
479
 In the event of a terrorist attack with BWs upon the U.S., the probable response of the U.S. government would include the 
declaration of martial law, the closure of federal and State borders, and the commandeering of vaccines.  ASSOC. PRESS, 
Martial Law Possible in Biological Terror Scenario, Aug. 4, 2001; see also Telephone Interview with Cliff Ong, State of Indiana 
Director of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, August 16, 2003).
480
 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and 
on their Destruction, entry into force 1975 [“BWC”] (prohibiting the production and stockpiling of BWs).  The earliest positive 
legal prohibition on BWs was found in the Lieber Code, which prohibited the use of poisonous weapons.  See Lieber Code, supra
note_, at Art. 16.  However, current prohibitions and regulations derive from the instruments of IHL governing chemical 
weapons, which preceded BWs to the arsenals of belligerents.  The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 (supra note_ at Art. 23(a) 
specifically forbade the employment of poisoned weapons by parties to that convention, and the use of “bacteriological methods 
of warfare” (although not the development of BWs) was prohibited after WWI.  See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8061.  The BWC, which entered into force in 1972, is currently the primary legal instrument governing BWs.  It 
prohibits the development, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons, and it has been ratified by almost 150 states.  For a list of 
parties to the BWC, see http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.
481 See David Sloss, It’s Not Broken, So Don’t Fix It: The International Atomic Energy Safeguards System and the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 841, 842 (noting that Iraq, during the 1970s and 1980s, was able to conduct a 
clandestine nuclear weapons program even while a non-nuclear weapon state-member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty).
482 See Michael Mandelbaum, Lessons of the Next Nuclear War, FOR. AFF. 22 (Mar.-Apr. 1995) (“It doesn’t take a superpower 
to pose a nuclear threat.  A small, poor country with a few [WMD] and the means to deliver them could wreak terrible damage on 
the United States.”).
483 See Fred C. Ikle, The New Germ Warfare Treaty is a Fraud, WALL ST. J., Jul. 27, 2001 (reporting the frustration of the Bush
Administration with the lack of provisions to enforce the BWC).  The lack of enforcement provisions is characteristic of 
conventions designed to prevent the proliferation and use of WMD.  See Scott Silliman, Symposium: Contemporary Issues in 
Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that IHL instruments regulating 
WMD, including the BWC, lack enforcement mechanisms); see also Linkie, supra note_, at 553-54 (describing more generally 
the shortcomings of international law in guiding states seeking to control the threat of WMD due to a lack of explicit enforcement 
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collapse of the BWC Protocol,484 which would have appended enforcement mechanisms to the treaty, left 
the U.S. in search of multilateral enforcement mechanisms to secure Uzbeki compliance with the BWC.  
Uzbekistan categorically denied possession of WMD, and U.S. pressure to permit inspection and 
verification led the UN Secretary General to dispatch a delegation at the invitation of Uzbekistan.  
However, Yuldashev ejected the UN weapons inspectors after three days, declaring that they were in fact 
U.S. intelligence officers,485 and further requests to inspect were met with demands for financial assistance 
as a precondition.  When the U.S. and Britain sought to have the problem defined in the Security Council 
as a threat to international peace and security486 and to have Yuldashev declared criminally responsible for 
his breach of the BWC,487 critics of the U.S., domestic as well as foreign demanded proof, which the U.S., 
unwilling to jeopardize the sources and methods whereby it had developed its information and unwilling 
provisions in relevant conventions and the legal and political difficulties in drafting and applying military sanctions to violators).  
Although the U.S. contemplated invading Iraq in 1997 to eliminate WMD in possession of the Hussein government and did in 
fact do so in 2003, the legal authority upon which it relied was not any enforcement provision of any IHL instrument but rather 
relevant Security Council resolutions.  See Thomas C. Wingfield, The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Military 
Commander: Protecting Very Large Secrets in a Transparent Era, 162 MIL. L. REV. 180, 180 (1999) (discussing legal sources 
of justification for U.S. plans to eradicate Iraqi WMD in the mid-1990s).
484
 Ironically, although the U.S. was at the forefront of efforts to create a Protocol that would create mechanisms to monitor and 
enforce state compliance with the BWC, it was American objections to verification and enforcement mechanisms proposed at the 
Fourth Review Conference of the BWC that doomed the long-anticipated Protocol.  For the U.S., a proposal that would have 
obligated states-parties to declare whether they possessed BW defense programs and, if so, to submit to random site visits that 
would include not only defense installations but such potentially dual-use facilities as pharmaceutical plants and medical research 
facilities, was “incurably flawed” on the grounds that, inter alia, it would threaten national security and reveal pharmaceutical 
industrial secrets without contributing to the enforcement of the BWC.  See Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. Special Negotiator 
for Chemical and Biological Arms Control Issues, Statement by the United Nations to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons 
Convention States Parties, Geneva, Switz. (Jul. 25, 2001), at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htm (presenting grounds 
upon with the Bush Administration rejected the proposed BWC Protocol); see also Alexander Higgins, U.S. Rejects Anti-Germ 
Warfare Accord, ASSOC. PRESS, Jul. 25, 2001 (“In our assessment, the draft protocol would put national security and 
confidential business information at risk.” (quoting Ambassador Mahley).  Although a majority of the 56 states in attendance 
favored adopting the Protocol, an instrument that represented the fruits of 7 years’ negotiation, following the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Review Conference talks were suspended.  Germ Warfare Talks Suspended: U.S. Pullout Makes Accord Useless, 
Delegates Say, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 4, 2001.  Many commentators expressed outrage at the U.S. position; UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan stated that the U.S. is “practically standing alone in opposition to agreements that were broadly reached by 
just about everyone else” and urged the U.S. to “close ranks with the rest of the international community.”  Id.  To date, talks 
have not resumed, and the BWC continues to lack any enforcement provisions.
485
 When UNSCOM, the UN team of weapons inspectors dispatched by the Secretary-General to locate Iraqi WMD, began to 
make progress in late 1998, Iraq responded by ejecting UNSCOM and declaring that some of its members were espionage agents 
of the U.S.  Allison Van Lear, Loud Talk About a Quiet Issue: The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Struggle to Maintain 
the Confidentiality of Information Gained in Nuclear Facility Inspections, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 349, 354-55 (2000).  
Although it is unclear whether there was any substance to the allegation, it provided justification and political cover for an action 
that might well have otherwise precipitated a swift, decisive military response to force Iraq to submit to inspection.  Id. at 356-59.
486
 When the UN Security Council makes the finding that a situation constitutes a “threat to international peace and security,” 
under the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council is empowered to take any of a series of escalating measures in 
response, ranging from the creation of an investigative and advisory commission to the imposition of an economic embargo on 
the offending state and ultimately to the authorization of the use of force against the offender.  See Charter of the United Nations, 
supra note_, at Arts. 36-43.  However, even where a threat to international peace and security is apparent, a Security Council 
response depends upon the political will of its members and cannot be presumed.  See Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of 
Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 724, 
728 (noting that despite the ongoing threat to peace and security posed by Iraqi refusal to permit weapons inspections are 
required by UNSCR 687, the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, insisted that ‘some sort of consultation with other 
members” was required before enforcement action could be undertaken).
487
 The issuance of a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, indicating international condemnation 
of a particular individual and expressing the intent to hold him criminally responsible for his actions, is effectively an 
international “arrest warrant,” and one such warrant was the catalyst for the U.S.-led mission to capture Mohammed Farah 
Aideed, the warlord responsible for the conflict in Somalia, in October 1993.  See UNSCR 865, U.N. SCOR, 3280th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/865 (1993) (condemning attacks on UN personnel and “reaffirm[ing] that those who have committed or ordered the 
commission of such criminal acts will be held individually responsible for them.”).  Although refusal to permit international 
inspections is not in and of itself a criminal act under IHL, it can be considered evidence of potential violations of legal 
obligations.  See Robert A. Bailey, Why Do States Violate the Law of War?: A Comparison of Iraqi Violations in Two Gulf Wars, 
27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L/ & COM. 103, 112 (2000) (making this assertion).
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to spend months making such a demonstration, was hesitant to provide.488  A Russian-Chinese-French 
bloc prevented the issue from coming to a vote,489 and with Iraq and Iran sitting as heads of the UN 
Disarmament Committee490 and no further assistance forthcoming in the UN system, the U.S. shifted 
diplomatic gears and attempted to assemble a “coalition of the willing” to compel Uzbeki compliance, 
commencing with NATO and U.S.-allied Islamic states.491  However, in the absence of a Security Council 
resolution authorizing force, only Britain, Australia, Italy, Poland, and Croatia, states with whom the U.S. 
had shared all or some of its sensitive intelligence, committed to a U.S.-led coalition,492 and in a press 
conference denouncing NATO and Security Council inaction the President of the U.S. warned that “any 
country who would threaten . . . our people with . . . biological weapons . . . [will] be met with a 
devastating response that would be quite swift and overwhelming.”493
488
 The production of proof that a state is in possession of prohibited weapons is a time-consuming process made all the more so 
by the machinery of the UN system.  See Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and Organized Crime 
Symposium, MICH. J. INT’L L. 655, 716 (discussing bureaucratic inefficiencies and glacial pace of the UN system); Michael A. 
Lysobey, How Iraq Maintained its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: An Analysis of the Disarmament of Iraq and the 
Legal Enforcement Options of the United Nations Security Council in 1997-1998, 5 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 135, 
152-53 (2000) (describing determination of material breaches of peace and security as “plodding” and subject to the “whim of 
whatever political and economic factors are motivating the Council.”).  Moreover, proof requires the sharing of intelligence, 
something states are loathe to do with all but their closest allies for fear that revelation of the evidence will permit deductions as 
to how the evidence was acquired (methods) and by whom (sources), as well as the possibility that reviewers sympathetic to the 
target might share the intelligence with the target. Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism,  
50 Syracuse L. Rev. 249 (2000); see also Linkie, supra note_, at 573 (explaining that the U.S. cannot reveal all its evidence 
without compromising the human intelligence sources, who may be placed within terrorist organizations or supply networks, or 
disclosing its methods of interception and decryption of enemy communications); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: 
The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 567 (1999) (“[I]n the midst of a . . . war, a country defending its 
territory and its nationals will rarely be able to disclose intelligence sources in a public forum.”).  Moreover, even after reviewing 
the evidence, states unwilling on other grounds to approve a proposed military operation to sanction the state in violation are far 
less likely to concede that the proferred evidence is probative of the existence of the weapons in possession of the accused state.  
Id.  Despite its post-hoc production of physical evidence that the Sudanese Al Shifa facility it destroyed had been producing 
chemical precursors for VX nerve gas, the U.S. continued to face claims, contrary to the evidence, that the facility was engaged 
in the benign purpose of producing animal feed and that the U.S. strike was an unlawful reprisal.  Linkie, supra note_, at 569.  
For a discussion of this case, see Pentagon and C.I.A. Defend Sudan Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at A5; Serge 
Schmemann, U.S. Fury on Two Continents, How Can Terror Best Be Combatted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at A11.
489
 Russian, Chinese, and French opposition to military action to enforce relevant Security Council Resolutions requiring Iraq to 
disarm prevented the use of UN collective security, and thus upon the Iraqi suspension of UNSCOM activity in August 1998 the 
UN, rather than impose the “unavoidable and explicit” military consequences promised, was left in the position of offering Iraq 
financial inducements to comply.  See generally  Lysobey, supra note_, at 101 (discussing the failure of collective security and 
enforcement of Security Council resolutions in the case of Iraq).  
490
 Ironically, Iraq and Iran—states which have been sanctioned for the use and possession of WMD and which are both suspected 
of currently possessing WMD—were co-chairs of UN Conference on Disarmament, the UN agency responsible for monitoring 
compliance with nonproliferation treaties, from January through June 2003, during which time Iraq was in material breach of 
numerous UN Security Council resolutions requiring its disarmament.  
491 See El-Ayouty, supra note_, at 496 (recommending that the U.S. create a pan-Islamic military force to acquire both the 
military strength, intelligence cooperation, and political legitimacy necessary to defeat Islamic terrorists).
492
 The legal justifications for the use of force against Iraq in the period between the ceasefire in March 1991 and the overthrow of 
the Hussein regime in April 2003 (Second Gulf War) were twofold: 1) UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, 
which expressly linked the ceasefire ending the First Gulf War with “unconditional . . . acceptance” of the elimination of WMD 
and verification by UNSCOM (see UNSC Res. 687 (April 3, 1991), 30 ILM 847 (1991)), and 2) the continued Iraqi violation of 
the terms of the ceasefire by virtue of the continued possession of WMD, which violation constitutes an ongoing threat to the 
peace and security the restoration of which UN members were authorized, by UNSC Res. 687 to effect.  See Wedgwood, supra 
note_, at 724 (1998) (discussing legal justifications for coalition operations against Iraq).  In other words, everything hinged upon 
UNSCR 687; in the absence of Security Council authorization, military operations against Iraq could have been justified, under 
the Charter framework, only by a claim of self-defense which would be more difficult to support on the ground that the evidence 
necessary would have been proof of the existence of Iraqi WMD coupled with an Iraqi intent to use those weapons.  It is 
precisely this evidence that has yet to surface even after several months’ occupation of Iraq, and precisely this sort of evidence 
that, in the scenario in this Article, the U.S. is unwilling to publicly disclose. 
493 See Frontline: Interviews: William S. Cohen, 3-4 
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/interviews/cohen.html) (cited in Keefer, supra note_, at 114) (quoting 
the former Secretary of Defense with respect to responses to the use of WMD against the U.S.).
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On January 3, 2005, electronic intercepts of telephone and radio communications between senior 
members of Al Qaeda and Uzbeki officials corroborated the reports of U.S. agents within the Uzbeki 
opposition that the Namangani regime and Al Qaeda were collaborating on the production and planned 
use of BWs,494 and the next day a Special National Intelligence Estimate495 presented by the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency [“DCIA”] to the President concluded that the Government of Uzbekistan, in 
consortium with Al Qaeda, was producing and stockpiling weapons-grade anthrax and ebola in an ancient 
mosque in a densely populated urban neighborhood496 in Namangan (a city of 430,000 in the northern 
Fergana Valley),497 that Usama bin Laden had ordered a wave of BW attacks on major U.S. cities to 
commence with the inauguration of the President on January 20th, and that in preparation the stockpiled 
weapons were to be moved to Al Qaeda cells in the U.S. within 48 hours.498  After a brief discussion with 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [“CJCS”] and the National Security Adviser, the President, 
concerned about the repercussions of failure and the possibility that members of Congress might delay 
and even refuse his proposals, rejected overt military options499 and ordered CJCS to present plans to 
494
 The National Security Agency [“NSA”], the federal agency charged with the protection of U.S. government communications 
and the interception of foreign communications, or SIGINT, intercepted and decoded exchanges between the Qadhaffi regime 
and the Libyan People’s Bureau in East Berlin, including an order from Libya to carry out a terrorist attack on U.S. military 
personnel, a response that the attack would occur the next day, a confirmation of the attack, and assurance that the attack was 
untraceable.  See Bob Woodward & Patrick E. Tyler, Libyan Cables Intercepted and Decoded, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at 
A1.  NSA monitors the communications of enemy states and terrorist organizations for the purpose of countering hostile 
intentions and acts.  See http://www.nsa.gov.
495
 A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) is a judgmental assessment based on a consensus of the intelligence 
community as to a time urgent and specific problem that presents a grave threat to national security.
496
 The siting of military facilities within civilian areas makes it inordinately difficult for attacking forces to preserve the principle 
of distinction and separate civilians from military objectives.  See supra at note_ (discussing principle of distinction).  The 
objective of actors who situate such facilities is to effectively remove legitimate military objectives from the list of those targets 
an adversary committed to preservation of innocent life will choose to attack.  For a discussion of this strategy, see infra at note_.
497
 Electronic interception of communications between officials at the Al Shifa factory and Iraqi weapons scientists corroborated 
the role of Al Shifa in the production and transshipment of chemical weapons, and similar intercepts revealed the possibility that 
a facility in a populated suburb of Khartoum, Sudan, was being established as a production center for WMD.  Linkie, supra 
note_, at 571.  On the strength of this intelligence, President Clinton ordered the destruction of both facilities.  See President 
William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Departure for Washington, D.C., from Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, 34 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1642 (Aug. 20, 1998).  The production and storage of WMD in densely populated civilian centers, a 
strategy designed to safeguard prohibited weapons from preemptive attack, is of particular concern in IHL.  See infra at notes_.
498
 A congressional investigation suggests up to 70,000 members trained by Al Qaeda are in the U.S. prepared to initiate terrorist 
missions on command.  David Pace, Up to 120,000 Were Trained by al-Qaida, Senator Says, ASSOC. PRESS, Jul. 14, 2003.
499
 While an overt military strike against a “rogue state . . . producing biological weapons at a clandestine factory which are to be 
used in a terrorist action against the United States” would, particularly if approved by the UN Security Council, satisfy the 
requirements of IHL with respect to the right under jus ad bellum to undertake military action, to conduct operations openly, 
particularly if preceded by “elaborate discussions in the Security Council with a view to agreeing on some coordinated response 
or authorization for a unilateral action[,]” would “alert the rogue state, allowing it the time to take evasive action and increasing 
the likelihood and extent of casualties which would be suffered by the state contemplating the preemptive action.”  Reisman, 
supra note_, at 17-18; see also Johnson, supra note_, at 303-04 (stating that in the case of potential attack by WMD, the need to 
act with alacrity and the languid pace of diplomatic negotiations may dictate that covert operations, even where unauthorized by 
the UN, are preferrable to all other policy options, especially large-scale overt operations that increase the likelihood of civilian 
casualties).  To maintain the secrecy essential to limiting casualties and to mission success, covert operations are preferred in 
such circumstances.  See Wedgwood, supra note_, at 567 (stating that the political advantage of submitting military operational 
plans to multilateral bodies such as the UN for approval is more than outweighed by the compromise of secrecy and that by 
publicizing operational plans “[a] country may even have to reshape its military operations in order to avoid alerting the 
enemy[.]”).  Moreover, covert operations are perhaps less likely to be perceived by other states, if their existence ever becomes 
publicly known and acknowledged, as the sort of serious “assaults on the international order” that unauthorized overt military 
interventions, which tend to be undertaken on a far broader scale and for a much more extended duration and with far greater 
effects, are often claimed to constitute.  See Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 284, 284-85 (1992) (explaining that covert operations tend to be of more limited scope, intensity, duration, and 
discoverability than overt operations, and are consequently less likely to arouse hostile scrutiny).  Covert operations can also 
confer domestic political benefits: they need reduce risks, minimize losses in lives and treasure, and are less likely to be revealed 
in the event of their failure, thus creating less domestic political liability than overt military operations, and they “give Presidents 
[who need not report them to Congress until after the fact] freedom from . . . difficult and annoying democratic constraints.”  
EISENDRATH, ED., supra note_, at 83.  Thus, even if overt options might generally more defensible, legally and politically, 
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conduct a covert operation with the primary mission500 the destruction of the BWs and the secondary 
objective the capture or elimination of bin Laden if found at or near the target.501  The plan provided that 
the neither the participation of U.S. Armed Forces nor responsibility for the results was to be attributed to 
the U.S. until the President authorized such disclosure.  The proposed rules of engagement [“ROEs”]502
than covert operations, and even as a “more honorable option[,]” there are circumstances where covert operations are preferred as 
policy options, and legal and political arguments in support of the choice to operate covertly.  Johnson, supra note_, at 305.
500
 A “mission” is “the primary task assigned to an individual, unit, or force” and  “the elements of who, what, when, where, and 
the reason therefore[.]”  DEP’T ARMY, FM 101-5-1, OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS 1-47 (21 Oct. 1985).
501
 As a matter of international law, most commentators conclude that the policy of killing terrorist leaders, whether labeled 
assassination or simply an act of anticipatory self-defense, does not contravene convention or custom.  See J. Nicholas Kendall, 
Israeli Counter-Terrorism: “Targeted Killings” Under International Law, _N. C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2002) (arguing that 
although customary IHL prohibits assassination of the civilian political leadership of states, it does not prohibit the killing of 
terrorists in self-defense under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense); Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear 
Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 33 (1994) (same).  Domestic law is somewhat more restrictive: Executive Order 
No. 12,333, promulgated by President Ronald Reagan, provides that “[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the [U.S.] 
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”  E.O. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).  However, assassination may 
well “offer the best available remedy” in combating terrorism.  Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored 
Assassination During Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 231, 249 (1991); see alsoThwarting Terrorist Acts by 
Attacking the Perpetrators or their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State’s Duty to Protect its 
Citizens, TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 195, 229 (discussing utility of a policy of assassination of terrorists).  Moreover, 
precisely what is meant by “assassination” is unclear, as EO 12,333 does not provide any insight into the meaning of, or the 
limitations on, assassination.  W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW., 
Dec. 1999, at 4, 4, 7 (contending that the fact that the U.S. has continued post-EO 12,333 to engage in “the use of military force 
to capture or kill individuals whose peacetime actions constitute a direct threat to U.S. citizens or U.S. national security” suggests 
that the order is meant to have limited applicability); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 
MIL. L. REV. 89, 119 (1989) (arguing that the killing of terrorists are lawful acts undertaken in self defense and not 
assassinations, which term implies killing civilian political leaders for political, rather than military, purposes); Patricia Zengel, 
Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER L. REV. 615, 635 (1992) (stating that the definitional ambiguity 
attached to the term “assassination” allows for a flexible approach that “leaves potential adversaries unsure as to exactly what 
action the U.S. might be prepared to take if sufficiently provoked”).  Accordingly, several Presidents have claimed the right to 
assassinate leaders and members of terrorist organizations and have issued policy guidance to the Department of Defense to this 
effect.  See David E. Sanger, Bin Laden is Wanted in Attacks, “Dead or Alive,” President Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at 
A1 (quoting President Bush in speech to Department of Defense officials on Sept. 17, 2001 as granting authority to the Armed 
Forces to kill , rather than capture, bin Laden); Paul Richter, Clinton Administration Reserves Right to Assassinate Terrorists, 
MINN. STAR TRIB., Oct. 30, 1998, at A23.  Consequently, the U.S. Army maintains that “the clandestine, low visibility, or 
overt use of force against legitimate targets in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace, where such individuals or 
groups pose an immediate threat . . . does not constitute assassination.”  Alan Einisman, Ineffectiveness at Its Best: Fighting 
Terrorism with Economic Sanctions, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 299, 323 (2000) (citing U.S. Army sources).
502
 “Rules of engagement,” or “ROEs,” are statements of the means and methods by which the military chain of command 
authorizes subordinates to employ military force against specific targets and limits the degree of permissible force.  F.M. Lorenz, 
Law and Anarchy in Somalia, 23 PARAMETERS 27, 29 (1993-94); see also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATION 1-02, 
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (23 Mar. 1994) (defining ROEs as “[d]irectives issued by military authority 
which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States Forces will initiate and/or continue combat 
engagement with other forces encountered.”).  ROEs are drafted, disseminated, and interpreted by JAG officers in collaboration 
with combat commanders and their staffs.  Standard ROEs, which conventional soldiers carry into battle on printed cards, direct 
soldiers to engage armed civilians only in self-defense, to arrange the evacuation of civilians prior to attack where possible, to 
obtain approval from proper command authority prior to the use of certain weapons systems, and to use only that degree of force 
necessary and proportional to the threat.  John Embry Parkerson, United States Compliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting 
Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 53-54 (1991); see also Martins, supra note_, at 6 (explaining that 
ROEs, regardless of their specific provisions, are interpreted to permit soldiers to use the degree of force “which is required to 
decisively counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of US forces or other 
protected personnel or property.”).  ROEs do not preclude the use of force in self-defense; on the contrary, standing ROEs require 
members of the Armed Forces to use whatever force is necessary to accomplish what is known as “force protection”.  See Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01A, 
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (15 Jan. 2000) (providing that the right to use force in self-
defense is never limited); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY (23 Mar. 1994) 
(updated April 1997) (requiring members of the Armed Forces to participate in force protection, defined as a “[s]ecurity program 
designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, 
accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal 
protective services, and supported by intelligence[.]”).  Moreover, soldiers are required to remain alert and responsive to changes 
in their mission and threat dictated by events, and ROEs are to be interpreted in light of these variables.  Mark S. Martins, Rules 
of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994).  Overly restrictive ROEs 
can “handicap and endager U.S. forces, especially ground troops[.]”  Mark S. Martins, Deadly Force is Authorized, but Also 
Trained, 25 ARMY LAW. 1, 1 (2001).  Thus, although ROEs are, by nature, restrictive regulations that limit the legal use of 
force as a matter of domestic law, ROEs are guidelines, rather than categorical prohibitions, and the interpretation of decisions 
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drafted by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Ryan,503 provided that 1) temporary 
detention of noncombatants was authorized for security reasons or in self-defense, but personnel were 
advised that enemy combatants were unlikely to be uniformed or to grant quarter; 2) known or suspected 
terrorists were to be eliminated if capture was not feasible as inadequate lift capacity was available to 
evacuate significant numbers of enemy POWs and the successful completion of the mission precluded 
diversion of resources; and 3) best efforts were to be used to prevent civilian casualties and destruction of 
civilian property without compromising the requirements of force protection.
Within hours the President, in an operations order limiting civilian access to the National Security 
Adviser and DCIA,504 approved a CJCS plan, OPERATION JEREMIAH,505 calling for a Special Forces 
assault force to infiltrate Uzbekistan, proceed to and seize the mosque, and destroy the weapons, with 
execution to commence within 18 hours.  Although the President instructed his staff to “do what needs to 
be done and worry about the legal niceties later[,]”506 the White House Office of Legal Counsel drafted a 
Memorandum507 outlining relevant legal authority508 and a finding in support of the operation:509
I, President George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, find that the grave acts of violence 
committed by foreign terrorists against U.S. nationals and interests, coupled with the possession of 
weapons of mass destruction and the intent to use these weapons against the U.S., constitutes an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and 
hereby authorize covert action by the Armed Forces of the United States to eliminate this threat.
soldiers make while operating under the restraint of ROEs are “viewed from the perspective of the man on the scene—who may 
often be forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—and without the 
advantage of 20/20 hindsight.’”  Martins, supra note_, at 5 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).
503
 A JAG officer is assigned to draft a classified Legal Annex to each military operation clarifying relevant IHL issues and 
providing instruction as to compliance.  Bulman, supra note_, at 169.
504
 The decision to restrict access to aspects of a military operational plan is consistent with applicable federal law and is 
necessary in order to preserve operational security.  See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 1992 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (authorizing classification of 
operational plans and restricting access of cabinet officials).
505 See Jeremiah 21:4-6 (“Thus saith the LORD God of Israel; behold, I will turn back the weapons of war that are in your hands, 
wherewith ye fight against the king of Babylon, and against the Chaldeans, which besiege you without the walls, and I will 
assemble them into the midst of this city. And I myself will fight against you with an outstretched hand and with a strong arm, 
even in anger, and in fury, and in great wrath.  And I will smite the inhabitants of this city, both man and beast: they shall die of a 
great pestilence.”).
506 See ASSOC. PRESS, Martial Law Possible in Biological Terror Scenario, Aug. 4, 2001 (quoting Suzanne Spaulding, former 
attorney with the Central Intelligence Agency, on the legal protocol that would in reality be pursued by executive branch officials 
responding to a terrorist attack with BWs against the U.S.).
507
 For an example of a memorandum of law providing the President with a legal opinion as to the authority of the President to 
commit U.S. Armed Forces to engage in operations, see Authority of the President to Use United States Military Forces for the 
Protection of Relief Efforts in Somalia, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 8, Dec. 4, 1992.
508
 Among the sources of legal authority cited by the White House Counsel in support of the covert action against Uzbekistan was 
a 1996 statute in which Congress found that “the President should use all necessary means, including covert action and military 
force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist 
training facilities and safe havens[.]”  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §324(4), 110 
Stat. 1255 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2377.
509
 Under federal law, the President may not authorize covert operations unless he determines that “such an action is necessary to 
support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security[.]”  Intelligence 
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 441, Aug. 14, 1991, at §503(a) (requiring that such a finding be in writing 
unless time does not permit).  However, although special operations forces are frequently used in execution of covert operations, 
the mere fact of special operations forces participation in a military mission does not convert a traditional military mission into a 
covert operation, which is legally distinct in that the role of the U.S. is intended to remain unacknowledged.  Nonetheless, 
because a proposed amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, known as the “Cambone Understanding” after the 
sponsor, would redefine all special operations missions as covert operations requiring a Presidential finding as a condition 
precedent to their deployment, this scenario incorporates such a finding.  Bill Gertz, Congress to Restrict Use of Special Ops, 
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003 (reporting impending amendment of Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991).
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 The next evening—a moonless night—twenty-four U.S. Army Special Forces510 soldiers of the 3rd
Special Forces Group, headquarted at the JFK Special Warfare Center in Fort Bragg, North Carolina but 
already prepositioned in Afghanistan511 and trained for OPERATION JEREMIAH,512 crossed the border 
and parachuted into the arid Alay Mountains in Uzbekistan from MH-53J Pave Low helicopters flown by 
the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.  Upon landing, the two Alpha teams accessed 
prepositioned gear and weapons, mounted camouflaged dune buggies, and sped north down the 
mountains and through the Fergana Valley, bypassing areas of human settlement toward Namangan.  The 
heavily-laden teams disembarked on the city outskirts, buried unneeded equipment in a cultivated field, 
established communications and received confirmation of their mission, and proceeded on foot the final 
several kilometers toward the Central Mosque.  As the teams maneuvered through the twisted streets, 
several unarmed men in civilian clothing rounded a corner, reacted in surprise, and began running in the 
opposite direction, shouting warnings in Uzbeki.  After brief hesitation, the commander of the mission 
and of Alpha One, Captain James F. Ryan, grandson of Private Ryan, ordered a team member to kill the 
would- be messengers. This done, the teams proceeded otherwise unmolested toward their objective.
A dozen lightly armed sentries in Islamic civilian dress, posted in the porticoes, surrounding 
gardens, and twin minarets, guarded the compound.  Within minutes Alpha One established perimeter 
security while Alpha Two moved into position, quickly and quietly eliminated the sentries, and accessed 
510
 The United States Special Operations Command [“USSOCOM”] was formed on 1 April 1987 and tasked to train and equip 
special operations forces as the branch of the Armed Forces with primary responsibility for a variety of rapid-reaction, critical 
missions of strategic importance, including, inter alia, counterterrorism. See P.L. 99-661, §1311 (1986) (“Cohen-Nunn 
Amendment”) (Nov. 14, 1986) (mandating creation of USSOCOM, a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict within the National 
Security Council, and the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict); 
Department of Defense Authorization Act (1986), P.L. 99-145, 99 Stat. 760 (29 July 1985) (codified at §1453) (providing that 
“The special operations forces of the Armed Forces provide the United States with immediate and primary capability to respond 
to terrorism.”); 10 U.S.C. §167(j) (providing that the statutory missions of special operations forces include “short-duration, 
small-scale offensive activities such as raids, ambushes, hostage rescues, and ‘surgical’ strikes to neutralize, seize, or destroy 
critical targets that could include weapons of mass destruction and associated production facilities” and counterterrorism).  
Special operations forces are “specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or 
rescue . . . is a political . . . imperative.”  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Pub. 3-05 (Test), Doctrine for 
Joint Special Operations (1990), at E-5.  Special operations, governed by political considerations, “requir[e] clandestine, covert, 
or low-visibility techniquest,” and they differ from conventional operations in the “degree of physical and political risk . . . [and] 
operational techniques.”  Id.  By capitalizing upon “speed, surprise, audacity, and deception” they “accomplish missions in ways 
that minimize risks of escalation and maximize returns compared with orthodox applications of military power[,]” rendering 
special operations forces particularly suited to covert counterterrorism missions.  JOHN M. COLLINS, SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES: AN ASSESSMENT 6 (1994).  As such, in practice special operations forces play an inordinate role in 
the “protect[ion] [of] their parent society against disorder, intimidation, and terrorism.” LLOYD, supra note_, at 204.
Special forces, drawn from each of the components of the Armed Forces and task organized into Special Operations 
Groups, are one of the components of the broader community of special operations forces, which include psychological 
operations, civil affairs forces, Rangers, Marines, and aviators.  U.S. Army Special Forces, known colloquially as “Green 
Berets,” are the most elite soldiers in the Army, selected on the basis of general proficiency, maturity, intelligence, imagination, 
cognitive flexibility, determination, and experience as well as familiarity with local cultures, languages, and the politico-
economic climates in the geographic regions in which they are operational.  Carl W. Stiner, U.S. Special Operations Forces: A 
Strategic Perspective, 22 PARAMETERS 4, 6, 9(1992).   When deployed, Special Forces soldiers operate in 12-man “Alpha” 
teams, each of which is a self-contained unit, and employ streamlined communications links, technical and tactical proficiency, 
and an understanding of the incident environment to preserve secrecy and accomplish their missions.
511
 U.S. Army Special Forces troops have been posted to a number of locations in or near the Middle East and Central Asia 
following September 11th.  See, e.g., Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Moves Commandos to Base in East Africa, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A20 (reporting stationing of hundreds of SF soldiers in East Africa for missions against Al Qaeda); 
Patrick E. Tyler, Yemen, an Uneasy Ally, Proves Adept at Playing Off Old Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002 (reporting increase 
in U.S. Special Forces presence in Yemen in 2002).
512
 U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers have been training for covert counterterrorist operations at a high operational tempo 
following September 11th, and have developed a number of missions for rapid execution on short notice.  See ASSOC. PRESS, 
Reviewing Ideas for Fighting Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A10 (reporting high-level covert operations planning 
within SOCOM for counterterrorist mission post-September 11th).
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the building.  While Alpha One maintained security, Alpha Two moved through the assembly, down the 
ornate corridors, and into the madrasa, where, within the living quarters for the religious teachers and 
students.  There, stored in sealed crates readied for shipment and stamped with markings indicating their 
contents to be religious literature, were what Alpha Two estimated, and subsequent scientific testing 
established, to be more than two tons of weapons-grade anthrax genetically modified to be extremely 
antibiotics-resistant and readily dispersible by inhalation.513  While Alpha Two collected samples and 
planted a series of incendiary, chlorine dioxide, and high explosive devices throughout the weapons 
cache,514 Alpha One, maintaining security, began to come under fire from a rapidly gathering number of 
armed men, dressed in civilian clothing but suspected to be Al Qaeda terrorists.  Alpha Two emerged 
from the mosque, requested evacuation, and joined Alpha One in suppressing opposition as the force of 
the battle mounted.  Although the U.S. force had begun to absorb casualties, none were serious, and the 
coordinated and accurate fire from the Alpha teams inflicted far more devastating consequences upon the 
enemy, a number of whom burst into houses and dragged unarmed civilians, including women and 
children, into the streets as human shields against U.S. fire.515  Despite their best efforts, which included 
the use of non-lethal weapons such as blinding lasers516 and riot control agents517 to disorient and disable 
attackers, the Alpha teams were unable to prevent civilian casualties as they defended against the Al 
Qaeda assault, and by the time the MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters began circling overhead, hundreds of 
bodies littered the streets surrounding the Central Mosque.518  As several companies of Uzbeki infantry 
encircled U.S. forces, the Black Hawks dropped ropes, lifted the Alpha teams to safety, and brought 
suppressive fire to bear before speeding southward through the airspace of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan to the U.S.S. Carl Vinson waiting on station in the Arabian Sea.
Minutes later, as the recorded voice of the muezzin began calling the faithful to prayers from 
loudspeakers atop the Central Mosque, chlorine dioxide gas began seeping into the surrounding 
neighborhood, and thousands of civilians rising from their beds were afflicted with hacking coughs, 
headaches, and shortness of breath.  Panicked soldiers and civilians fled as the mosque began to burn and 
the flames jumped to nearby houses, and within a quarter hour a series of explosions tore through the 
513 See http://www. mercola.com/2001/oct/10/anthrax_highlights.htm (discussing properties of anthrax)
514
 The destruction of anthrax requires either extremely high temperatures or exposure to potent biocides such as chlorine dioxide. 
See http://www.epa.gov/epahome/hi-anthrax.htm#FORRESPONDERS.  The oxidizing effects of chlorine dioxide are enhanced 
by high temperatures. See http://www.inchem.org/documents/icsc/icsc/eics0127.htm.  Consequently, the choice of a combination 
of incendiary, biocidal, and explosive devices would likely be used to neutralize a large volume of anthrax.
515
 This practice was employed by Somali warlords to some effect against U.S. forces operating to provide humanitarian relief 
during the civil war in Somalia in 1992-1993.  See Lorenz, supra note_, at 36 (discussing numerous violations of IHL by Somali 
warlords during the Somali Civil War).
516
 Tactical blinding lasers are specially designed to temporarily blind enemy forces in order to provide force protection without 
causing unnecessary casualties, and special operations missions and hostage rescue situations are particularly suitable uses.  See
Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
705, 729 (1996) (“A blinding laser rifle may be useful from a humanitarian standpoint in dealing with hostage situations, where 
enemy forces are using civilians as a shield.  Blinding some or all of the enemy forces may . . .permit the hostages to escape.”).
517
 “Riot control agents” are chemical irritating substances such as CS gas and pepper spray used to temporarily “distract, deter, or 
disable disorderly people”  without permanent injury to permit friendly forces to operate unimpeded.  DEP’T ARMY, FIELD 
MANUAL 19-15, ch.9, Riot Control Agents (25 November 1985).
518
 Even where women and children divest themselves of the privileges of noncombatancy by taking up arms, members of the 
U.S. Armed Forces are very reluctant to fire upon them.  See Lorenz, supra note_, at 39 (describing emotional difficulties 
encountered by U.S. forces in Somalia engaged by armed women and children).  Where women and children are employed 
against their will as human shields, the reluctance expands to include the reluctance to bring fire down upon their captors lest 
innocents become inadvertent and unintended casualties.  Id.
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stricken mosque.  Thick clouds of smoke drifted on a gentle breeze blowing from the east, smudging the 
rising sun from view.  The Central Mosque burned to rubble over the course of the day.
One hour after U.S. forces departed Uzbekistan, the UN Secretary-General received a personal 
letter from the President which noted that Uzbekistan was a “Barbary State upon which the civilized 
world had no choice but to impose law and order,”519 that there was no distinction between terrorists and 
those who harbored them, that “in light of the present anarchic and hostile world environment the U.S. 
must defend itself in every possible way,”520 that “the world had reverted to [a] primitive system”521
because the Security Council had “repeatedly and materially breached its obligations to the world 
community” and “damaged its credibility as an enforcer of international law,”522 that the U.S. had “acted 
pursuant to the right of self-defense confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,” and 
that the “target struck, and the time and method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks 
of collateral damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including the rules of necessity and 
proportionality.”523 At H-Hour Plus Three, 8:00 P.M. Eastern Time, the President of the United States 
addressed the nation in a live broadcast carried by national networks around the globe.  In his hour-long 
address, the President stated that “today we have done what we had to do.  If necessary, we shall do it 
again.”524  The President stated further that the “reckless threats and attacks on Americans” had created an 
“imminent danger” against which the U.S. was “entitled to take measures necessary to defend our nation 
and its people.”525  Although the U.S. “regretted the loss of civilian life,”
I was forced to order this action, as an obligation of the office with which the American people have 
entrusted me, for five reasons: First, because we have convincing evidence that Al Qaeda, supported and 
sheltered by the Yuldashev regime, are the authors of the recent attacks on American citizens and property 
in Central Asia; second, because Al Qaeda had executed murderous terrorist attacks on the United States in 
the past, most notoriously on September 11th, 2001; third, because we have compelling information that 
Uzbekistan and Al Qaeda were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and those of other 
countries; fourth, because these terrorists and their state sponsors had acquired biological weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction which they had stored in a place of worship and which they intended to 
use in a genocidal war against this great nation; and fifth, because the failure of the UN and NATO to play 
a serious role in the maintenance of peace left us no choice but to act alone.526
The President stated that although the U.S. would continue to observe international law it would not 
“respond like a man in a barroom brawl who will fight only according to Marquis of Queensbury 
519 See Al-Ayouty, supra note_, at 492 (arguing in 1999 that Afghanistan, under the Taliban, had abdicated state responsibility to 
suppress terrorism and “should be treated as a Barbary State” upon which “law and order should be imposed . . . from the outside 
until it cooperates internationally with the extradition or the apprehension in prosecution and punishment of all those implicated 
in th[e] genocidal war against the American people.”).
520
 Johnson, supra note_, at 293-94.
521
 Myres McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 507, 597-98 (1963).
522
 Lysobey, supra note_, at 103-04.
523
 This language is drawn from correspondence delivered by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to the UN Secretary-
General formally notifying the UN of the U.S. attack on terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.  See Bill Richardson, 
Letter Dated 20 Agust 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council (Aug. 20, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (1998), available at 
http://www.undp.prg.missions/usa/s1998780.pdf.
524
 These precise words were uttered by President Ronald Reagan in announcing the bombing of Libya in reprisal for the attack on 
a West Berlin disco in 1986.  President Ronald Reagan, Address (Apr. 14, 1986), in WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at A23.
525 See Statement of President George Bush (Dec. 20, 1989) (Office of the Press Secretary, The White House) (announcing the 
U.S. intervention in Panama).
526
 This “quote” is very loosely patterned after the statement offered by President William Clinton as justification for U.S. attacks 
against Al Qaeda in 1998.  Statement of President William Jefferson Clinton, Aug. 18, 1998.
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Rules,”527 because “the world isn’t Beverly Hills, it’s a bad neighborhood at two o’clock in the morning.528
Law will not be perverted by evildoers into an instrument to be used to restrain and threaten people who 
desire to live in peace and justice.  We will defend ourselves against enemies who store weapons of mass 
destruction in houses of worship and who hide behind their own women and children when called to 
task.”   He concluded by promising that
the United States “will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer . . . If we wait for threats to fully 
materialize, we will have waited too long.”529  The “survival of states is not a matter of law,”530 but rather a 
question of courage.  We will remain vigilant in the defense of civilization against barbarism, and those 
who by their actions declare themselves beyond the pale of human civilization shall be treated accordingly 
by a nation aroused as never before in its history.  They shall reap that which they sow.  As the Book of Job 
teaches us, we shall “put out the lamps of the wicked, . . . and they shall be like straw before the wind, and 
chaff that the storm carries away.”531
The next day, President Yuldashev angrily denounced OPERATION JEREMIAH, which he 
claimed was responsible for more than 800 civilian casualties,532 reiterated his claim that Uzbekistan 
possessed no prohibited weapons, and demanded that the Security Council meet in emergency session to 
impose sanctions.  Although a Sino-Soviet effort to pass a resolution in the Security Council condemning 
the U.S. action failed in the face of a U.S.-UK veto,533 the UN Secretary-General angrily condemned the 
operation in an open letter published in the New York Times, the General Assembly passed a resolution in 
denunciation,534 calling upon the U.S. to “arrest and prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in accordance with international law,”535 and most of the “street” across the world, 
viewing pictures of the carnage and the destroyed mosque, was outraged.536  Within forty-eight hours, 
527
 Johnson, supra note_, at 293-94 (quoting an unidentified former CIA officer).
528 See Johnson, supra note_, at 293-94 (quoting a statement by G. Gordon Liddy, former CIA officer and Watergate conspirator, 
made on the campus lecture circuit).
529
 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy 
at West Point (June 1, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020523-2.html.
530
 Dean Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 1963 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 13, 14 (remarks made in 
context of the Cuban Missile Crisis). 
531 See Job 21:17, 18.
532
 Many of the claimed civilian casualties that resulted from the firefight with the Alpha Teams were terrorists who had entered 
into battle in civilian clothing.  The separation of legitimate civilian casualties from terrorists or irregular forces is often not 
attempted by the regimes that support terrorism or by the NGOs who lend credence to their claims.  See WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 
1990, at A22 (reporting that as many as 30% or more of the “civilian” casualties reported in the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 
were in fact members of the Noriega-led Panamanian Defense Forces who chose to fight in civilian clothing).
533
 The Soviet Union and China attempted and failed, due to a U.S.-UK-French veto, to issue a resolution condemning the U.S. 
attack on Libya in 1986 and rejecting the Article 51 justification offered by the U.S.  See Ivan Zverina, U.S., Britain, France Veto 
U.N. Condemnation of Raid on Libya, UPI, Apr. 21, 1986.  An Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha in 1981 was 
condemned under Chapter VII, however, when no permanent member of the Security Council exercised a veto.  U.N.S.C. Res. 
487 (June 19, 1981).  See infra at note_ (discussing the Israeli action and subsequent legal analysis).
534
 In response to the U.S. attacks on terrorist facilities in Libya in 1986, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning 
the military action.  See G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 78th mtg., 1986 U.N.Y.B. 257.
535
 The General Assembly resolution cited a 1973 Resolution calling for every state to cooperate in the arrest and prosecution of 
persons suspected of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.  See Principles of International Cooperation in the 
Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (G.A. Res. 3074, 
U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 28th Sess., 2187th plen. Mtg., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Docs A/9326 and A/9030 (1973).
536
 Much of public opinion across the globe was intensely critical of the U.S. decision to attack terrorist facilities in Sudan and 
Afghanistan in 1998, an operation undertaken for the same purposes, against the same sort of threat, and in the same 
circumstances of a lack of multilateral political support in the United Nations.  See Bashir Maa, Missiles Will Only Make Matters 
Worse, HERALD (Glasgow), Aug. 24, 1998, at 13.  To some extent, the expression of short-term outrage for the attack upon the 
targeted state is the product of informational asymmetry remediable only by the risky dissemination of the information 
motivating the targeting decision: where a state undertakes a preemptive strike under circumstances such as those presented 
herein, “the targeted state is often able to command instant sympathy, while the preemptive attacker may require more time to 
publicize its intelligence information and elaborate its justifications, both of which may ultimately prove to be more persuasive to 
the international decision process.”  Reisman, supra note_, at 17-18.
87
international anti-U.S. sentiment exploded when CNN began broadcasting reports537 that several thousand 
Uzbeki civilians had been hospitalized with symptomatology including fever, malaise, and respiratory 
distress, and preliminary toxicological reports provided by the Uzbeki national medical service and the 
World Health Organization [“WHO”] indicated exposure to chlorine dioxide and anthrax.  Within the 
next two days fifty thousand Uzbekis were hospitalized and the WHO reported ten thousand Uzbeki 
fatalities.  Although the U.S. offered to airlift antibiotics and experts from the Center for Disease Control, 
President Yuldashev rejected the U.S. offer, and within five days post-raid more than seventy-five 
thousand Uzbekis were dead.538  A joint communiqué promulgated by the League of Arab States and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference condemned the “use of biological weapons against Uzbeki 
civilians” as an “unlawful act of aggression and a crime against humanity,”539 and the UN Secretary-
General met with President Yuldashev in Tashkent and demanded that the U.S. launch an investigation 
“to determine the criminal responsibility of those involved in the attack on the house of worship.”
In his second national address, the President of the U.S. stated that the outbreak of anthrax in 
Uzbekistan, while unfortunate, had resulted from the partially successful attempt to eliminate BWs that 
the Yuldashev regime had permitted Al Qaeda to stockpile and that any civilian casualties resulting from 
the U.S. action were thus directly attributable to Al Qaeda and to the Uzbeki Government; consequently, 
the U.S. would not be investigating any parties involved in the operation but would rather be decorating 
them, where appropriate, for heroism.  Congress passed a joint resolution commending the President and 
the members of the Armed Forces that conducted OPERATION JEREMIAH, and polling indicated over 
90% domestic approval.  Two weeks after the strike, President Yuldashev personally lodged a declaration 
with the ICC Registrar accepting, on behalf of Uzbekistan, as the territorial state, the exercise of ICC 
jurisdiction with respect to the U.S. attack on the Central Mosque540 and requesting that the ICC 
Prosecutor “investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons 
should be charged with the commission of . . . crimes.”541  Within a week, the Prosecutor concluded on the 
537
 Journalists evaluating the claims of innocence proferred by rogue regimes and terrorist groups in response to U.S. military 
operations undertaken to destroy WMD in the past have not generally been critical of such claims and have instead given them 
credibility in their coverage.  See David, supra note_, at 376 (noting that journalists reported rather uncritically the Iraqi claims 
that a military command-and-control facility located in a civilian area in Baghdad was in fact a bomb shelter protecting civilians).
538
 The incubation period for inhaled varies between 1-5 days, but exposure left untreated for the first twenty-four hours is fatal in 
over 90% of cases.  Keefer, supra note_, at 110 n.9.
539
 This language is drawn from a similar communique issued after the U.S. attack on terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in 
1998.  See Letter Dated 23 September 1999 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/1999/997, annex, para. 7 (1999).
540
 Uzbekistan signed the Rome Statute on December 29, 2000, although as of July 2003 has not ratified that instrument.  For a 
list of current parties, see http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp.  Non-party 
states may accept the jurisdiction of the ICC in a particular case.  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 12(3).  The “opt-out” 
provision permits states, upon acceding to membership, to accept ICC jurisdiction generally while declining with respect to war 
crimes for a 7 year period.  Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 124 (“[A] State, on becoming a party . . . , may declare that, for a 
period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 [war crimes] when a crime is alleged to have been committed 
by its nationals or on its territory.”). Critics of the ICC interpret the opt-out provision as allowing a state willing to commit war 
crimes to accede to the Statute only to opt out of war crimes jurisdiction, thus insulating its personnel from ICC prosecution for 
war crimes while a nonparty dispatching peacekeeping forces to that state would find them immediately subject to ICC war 
crimes prosecutions.  See Transcript of Statement by Head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Diplomatic Conference on the 
Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 
U.S. Dep’t of State Dispatch, Aug. 1, 1998.
541 Id. at Art. 14(1).
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basis of information submitted by Uzbekistan, other UN members, and human rights NGOs542 that a 
reasonable basis existed to investigate, and he submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for 
authorization.543  The Pre-Trial Chamber found a “reasonable basis to proceed” and that the case was 
within ICC jurisdiction and thus authorized the investigation.544  U.S. efforts to procure a Security Council 
resolution deferring the investigation for 12 months were trumped by a Sino-Soviet veto.545
On March 15, 2005, after a month-long investigation during which an additional 40,000 Uzbeki 
civilians died from anthrax inhalation, the Prosecutor sparked a firestorm with his announcement of the 
indictments of each member of the Alpha Teams, the commander of SOCOM, CJCS, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the President on multiple counts of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in 
the context of OPERATION JEREMIAH.546  Although the U.S., a non-party to the Rome Statute, brought 
a jurisdictional challenge, the ICC, self-determining its jurisdiction,547 held that the case was properly 
before it and that the U.S. decision not to investigate was made to shield persons from criminal 
responsibility, rendering it admissible.548  The indictment charged all defendants with “Crimes Against 
Humanity” under Article 7(a), (f), and (k)549 and “War Crimes” under Article 8(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) 
542
 The Prosecutor has discretion to seek information from any “reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate” in determining 
whether to bring an indictment, including “non-governmental organisations.”  Id. at Art. 15(2).
543 Id. at Art. 15(3).  Under these circumstances—the evidence relied upon to launch a military operation is wholly within the 
control of the attacking state, the defending state denies the existence of WMD, and the attacking state refuses to conduct a 
domestic investigation—it might well be “difficult to see how [the Prosecutor] would be able to conclude . . . that no crime 
within the Court’s jurisdiction has been committed.”  David, supra note_, at 398-99.  Moreover, even if the attacking state agreed 
to share its intelligence and conduct a domestic investigation, the ICC might elect to conduct its own investigation to 
independently corroborate or refute the evidence proferred by the attacking state and to establish its independence.  Id.
544
 Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 15(4).
545 See id. at Art. 16 (providing that the UN Security Council may adopt a resolution under Chapter VII deferring an investigation 
or prosecution for a renewable 12-month period); see also Todd M. Sailer, The International Criminal Court: An Argument to 
Extend its Jurisdiction to Terrorism and a Dismissal of U.S. Objections (elaborating the “Singapore Compromise” achieved at 
the drafting conference which permits deferral of an investigation or prosecution if all 5 permanent members of the Security 
Council “believe that the ICC would interfere with the Council’s efforts to further international peace and security.”).  The power 
of the UN Security Council to block the exercise of ICC jurisdiction is predicated upon Article 103 of the UN Charter (the 
international “Supremacy Clause”) which ensures that “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.”  UN Charter, supra note_, at Art. 103.  The Security Council has exercised this power previously.  
See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom and U.S.) (Provisional Measures) (Orders of 14 April 1992), ICJ Rep. 1992, at 1 
(holding that UN Security Council could, under UNSCR 748 (1992) bypass an existing treaty mechanism for the prosecution of 
individuals in order to determine, a priori, the question of state responsibility for the crimes in question).  Whether it will do so in 
a given case is a political question.  A U.S. proposal that would have automatically stayed ICC actions in any matter of which the 
Security Council was seized under Chapter VII was defeated.  Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: 
The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 321-22 (1998).
546
 The prosecution of senior U.S. military commanders and civilian government officials in an international tribunal for their 
actions in ordering and planning military operations has been attempted previously, albeit unsuccessfully.  See FRYE, supra 
note_, at 1 (noting that in 1999 the Russian Foreign Minister denounced the NATO campaign in Kosovo and called for U.S. and 
NATO commanders to be prosecuted in the ICTFY).
547 See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 19 (providing that the ICC “shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction [.]”).
548 See id. at Art. 17 (providing that a case is within ICC jurisdiction if a decision not to investigate or prosecute “resulted from 
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute[,]” and that unwillingness is to be determined by considered 
whether “[t]he national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility[.]”).  
Some scholars interpret “unwillingness” to require the Prosecutor to show “devious intent” on the part of a state.  HEBEL ET 
AL., supra note_, at 131.  Others suggest that “the [ICC] could find the case admissible and exercise its jurisdiction, rather than 
defer to [U.S.] proceedings conducted in good faith[,]” on the ground that the Rome Statue creates the presumption that a 
decision not to investigate or prosecute is ipso facto a manifestation of “devious intent.”  Gurule, supra note_, at 11.  Several 
scholars question  further whether a U.S. decision to investigate, followed by a decision not to prosecute, would be shielded by 
the doctrine of complementarity.  See, e.g., David, supra note_, at _.
549
 “‘[C]rime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; . . . (f) Torture; . . .  (h) 
Persecution against any identifiable group . . .; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 7.
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and 8(2)(b)(i), (ii) (iii), (iv), (ix), (xiii), (xvii), (xviii), (xx),550 and charged the President and the Defense 
Secretary with command responsibility551 for “Aggression”552 under Articles 5, 25,553 27,554 and 28.555
550 See id. at Art. 8(2)(a) (defining “war crimes” as, in addition to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, “(i) Wilful killing; 
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment[;] (iii) Wilfuly causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; [and] (iv) Extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity[.]”);id. at Art. 8(2)(b) (defining as “war crimes” 
other “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, . . . namely . . . (i) intentionally 
directing attacks against the civilian population as such . . . ; (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects . . . ; . . . 
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects . . . clearly excessive in retaliation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; . . 
.(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, [and] hospitals . . . provided they are not military objectives; . . . (xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons; 
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices; . . . [and] (xx) 
Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of [IHL], provided that such weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute[.]”).
551By virtue of their unique responsibility commanders are obligated, as “society’s last line of defense against war crimes,” to 
“control . . . a military force’s organic capacity for destruction and the conduct of their subordinates.”  Smidt, supra note_, at 165, 
167.  Command responsibility is “the legal and ethical obligation a commander assumes for the actions, accomplishments, or 
failures of a unit.” DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, , 1-1 (May 1997).  Theoretically, command responsibility 
extends up the chain of military and civilian command to the highest reaches of power, although in practice it is largely 
immediate military commanders who are under a duty to ensure that their subordinates observe IHL.  C. J. GREENWOOD, 
COMMAND AND THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 35 (1993).  Prior to World War II the limits of commanders’ 
responsibility extended only so far as to preclude issuance of unlawful orders.  ROGERS, supra note_, at 130 (stating that 
criminal liability for acts of subordinates that do not flow from superiors orders is a “comparatively recent development”); 
RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1917), supra note_, at para. 366 (stating that although commanders who issued illegal orders 
could be held criminally liable, mere toleration of unlawful conduct was insufficient).  Neither the Nuremburg nor the Tokyo 
Tribunal directly criminalized failure to prevent atrocities.  See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 7, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548 (“Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices 
participating in the formation or execution of a common plan or conspiring to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible 
for all acts performed by the persons in the execution of such plans.”).  Still, the enduring legacy of prosecutions of Axis war 
criminals, and one of the grounds opponents seized upon to brand these proceedings “victor’s justice,” is the extension of liability 
on a negligence theory.  See Yamashita Trial, IV WAR CRIMES REP. 35 (convicting commander of Japanese Army, 
Philippines, for murder of U.S. POWs despite no charge or evidence that he knew or approved, on the inference that given their 
scale he must have known they were occurring); U.S. v. Soemu Toyoda (Official Transcript) (convicting Commander in Chief of 
Japanese Fleet of command responsibility for failure to learn of violations committed by his troops);  “High Command Case,” 
supra note_, at 568 (convicting commanders where a “personal dereliction . . . amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the 
[unlawful] action of [their] subordinates[,]” including execution of U.S. POWs, constituted “criminal negligence.”).  Still, the 
World War II prosecutions did not create an absolute liability standard for commanders, who “cannot keep completely informed 
of the details of military operations of subordinates,” nor did they equate mere knowledge of violations with criminal liability.  
Dostler Trial, I WAR CRIMES REP. 22 (holding that “mere knowledge of the happening of unlawful acts does not meet the 
requirements of criminal law” and that a commander could be held liable only where he “orders, abets, or takes a consenting part 
in the crime.”); IV WAR CRIMES REP. 35 (“It is absurd . . . to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his 
soldiers commits a murder or rape.”).  The contemporary formulation provides that criminal responsibility can be imputed to the 
commander, even if he did not issue orders requiring violations of IHL, only if he had effective control over forces under his 
command (the “structural element”) and either knew or should have known that his subordinates would commit the violations 
(the “mental element”) and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent and/or punish their commission (the “physical 
element”).  See API, supra note_, at Art. 87 (“Any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control 
are about to commit, or have committed a breach of the law of war, is obliged to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent 
violations of the law[.]”).  This restrictive contemporary standard is adopted in the Rome Statute at Art. 28 and in U.S. military 
regulations, which require that the prosecutor prove either that the commander issued a direct order requiring a subordinate to 
execute a manifestly unlawful act or that the commander is grossly negligent in supervising subordinates.  See FM 27-10, supra
note_, at para. 501 (providng that “commanders may be responsible for war crimes committed by subordinate[s]. . . when the acts 
in question have been committed in pursuance of an order. . . [or] if [the commander] has actual knowledge, or should have 
knowledge, through reports received by him . . . that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have 
committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and responsible steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to 
punish violators thereof.”); MCM, supra note_, at Art. 77 (providing that command responsibility requires proof a commander 
intended to and did in fact encourage subordinates to commit the unlawful act). Although in practice courts-martial, on the rare 
occasions they adjudicate an allegation of command responsibility, are prone to apply an even more restrictive standard that 
permits liability only where a commander is alleged to have issued an unlawful order, the de jure standard is identical to that at 
IHL—either a direct order, or gross and wanton negligence, is required to sustain a charge, and evidence necessary to prove such 
negligence is limited, essentially, to the failures to train troops in advance and investigate after the fact.  See Kenneth A. Howard, 
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 21 (1972) (stating that no principle of U.S. military law requires a 
commander to restrain acts of subordinates he has not ordered); Smidt, supra note_, at 193 (concluding that in practice courts-
martial employ the very restrictive standard requiring proof of a direct order or post hoc failure to investigate to sustain a charge). 
Still, the precise standard the ICC will employ to determine whether to impute knowledge of violations of IHL to a commander—
whether actual or constructive knowledge, ormere negligence—is unclear.  Shay and Michaeli, supra note_, at 852.  Similarly, 
where a commander is alleged responsible on a negligence theory, liability  ultimately requires an determination of whether the 
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Count One charged all defendants with crimes against humanity556 for “engaging in a conspiracy 
to commit, and committing, an armed attack on the Central Mosque in Namangan, Uzbekistan, a civilian 
house of worship, on or about January 5th and 6th, 2005, in a manner and by means, including chemical 
weapons and blinding lasers, intentionally calculated to systematically and directly expose civilians to 
great mental and physical suffering amounting to torture,557 serious injury, and death and which did in fact 
cause torture, injury, and death.”  Count Two charged all defendants with war crimes for “unenumerated 
violations of the laws or customs of war, as recognized by Articles of the Statute of the ICC and sources 
of conventional and customary law, including but not limited to UNGA Resolution 2444558 and 3675,559
act was so manifestly unlawful that a reasonably diligent commander would have learned of and prevented it or, at the very least, 
investigated and prosecuted its author; the discovery that subordinates committed acts not manifestly unlawful would not 
necessarily obligate investigation or punishment.  OSIEL, supra note_, at 161.  Because the Rome Statute does not specify which 
acts are manifestly unlawful, the precise boundaries of a commander’s legal responsibility remain unclear.  Finally, the Rome 
Statute is silent on whether a commander can discharge supervisory responsibilities, and thus offer an absolute defense, by 
proving his subordinates were trained in IHL and provided access to legal officers.  ROGERS, supra note_, at 141.
552
 The scenario presumes, contrary to facts, that 7/8 of the Assembly of States Parties agreed to a definition of “aggression,” that 
the preclusion on prosecution of the crime of aggression for 7 years after entry into force of the Rome Statute is inoperative, and 
that prosecution of an individual for the crime of aggression does not require a prior determination of the Security Council that 
his state of nationality, on behalf of which he is alleged to have undertaken acts constituting the elements of the crime, has 
engaged in aggression.  See supra note_ (discussing legal issues concerning the definition of and preconditions to the prosecution 
of the crime of aggression).  The following definition is employed for purposes of this scenario. “1.  For the purpose of this 
Statute, the crime of aggression is committed by a person who is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing 
political actions in his State, against another State, in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, by resorting to armed 
force, to threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of that State.  2.  Acts constituting 
aggression include the following: (a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any 
military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack . . . (b) bombardment by the armed forces of a 
State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State . . . or (g) the 
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State[.]”).  David, supra note_, at 389-90 (offering prospective definition of aggression).
553 See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 25(3)(b) (providing that a person shall be criminally responsible if he “[o]rders, solicits 
or induces the commission of . . . a crime which in fact occurs[.]”).
554 See id. at Art. 27(1) (providing for the applicability of the Rome Statute “without any distinction based on official capacity . . . 
as a Head of State or Government, a member of Government . . .or a government official[.]”).
555 See id. at Art. 28 (establishing command responsibility liability by providing that a “military commander . . . shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes . . . committed by forces under his or her effective command and control . . . where [t]hat . . . 
person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; and . . . that . . . person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measure within his or her power to 
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”).
556
 The concept of a “crime against humanity” entered into existence not by way of a multilateral treaty or by the ripening of 
custom into law but rather with Article 6(c) of the Charter of the IMT, which defined it as “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population . . . or persecution on political, racial, or religious 
grounds[.]”  Charter of the IMT, supra note_, at Art. 6.  Under customary IHL as it has developed, a crime against humanity is 
“one of a list of prohibited acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or 
organizational policy directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack.”  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT 
94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, paras. 639-43, Trial Chamber, ICTFY, May 7, 1997, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 939-41 (1997) 
(citing Article 5, ICTFY) (creating jurisdiction over crimes against humanity).  The existence of an armed conflict is not required 
as an element of a crime against humanity, but acts prohibited as crimes against humanity typically “involve, or at least occur in 
the context of, massive killings or mistreatment of civilians in . . . a time of armed conflict” under the direction of an official 
policy.  Fenrick, supra note_, at 779 (emphasis added). Because crimes against humanity are most often committed during armed 
conflict by soldiers as agents of their governments, and because the applicability of IHL has been extended through the Geneva 
Conventions to apply to most internal armed conflicts, there is thus some overlap between war crimes (when civilians are the 
victims) and crimes against humanity, and several commentator has called for the elimination of distinctions between the two 
categories of crimes and for their merger into a single analytical concept.  See L.C. Green, “Grave Breaches” or Crimes Against 
Humanity?, 8 U.S.A.F. ACAD. J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1997-98) (making this argument); Marler, supra note_, at 849 (noting that 
suspects have been charged in predecessor tribunals with war crimes and crimes against humanity for the same acts).
557
 The Torture Convention, cited by the Prosecution in the Indictment, supplied a definition of torture.  See Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 51, at 
197 (defining torture as an intentional act inflicted by or under the responsibility of public officials that causes severe pain).
558 See General Assembly Resolution 2444, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 18) at 164, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (1968) (declaring customary IHL principle of civilian immunity and complementary 
principle requiring belligerents to distinguish civilians from combatants at all times).
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Article 26 of the Hague Convention of 1907,560 Articles 3, 32, and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949,561 Article 4(4) of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property,562 Articles 35(2),563 51,564 52,565 53,566
56,567 and 57568 of the First Protocol Additional, and Articles 4(2),569 13,570 15,571 16,572 of the Second 
559 See General Assembly Resolution 3675, Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations In Armed Conflicts, GA 
Res. 3675, 25th Sess., Resolutions, (No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doc A/8028 (1971) (specifying that “every effort should be made to spare 
civilian populations from the ravages of war[.]”).
560 See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note_, at Art. 26 (providing that the “commander of an attacking force, before 
commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities.”).
561 See GCIV, supra note_, at Art. 3(1)(a) (prohibiting the application of “violence to life nad person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” to civilians and to combatants rendered hors de combat); id. at Art. 32 (prohibiting 
the taking of any measures “of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons,” 
including murder, torture, corporal punishment, [and] mutilation[.]”); id. at Art. 53 (prohibiting “[a]ny destruction . . . of real or 
personal property . . . except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”).
562 See Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S., at 
Art. 4(4) (obligating states-parties to “refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property.”).
563 See API, supra note_, at Art. 35(2) (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”).
564 See API, supra note_, at Art. 51 (“(1) The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations . . . (2) The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited. (3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities. (4) Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) Those which are not directed at a specific 
military objective; (b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective; or (c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this 
Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction. (5) Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: (a) An attack by 
bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct 
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; 
and (b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or 
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (6) Attacks 
against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.  (7) The presence or movements of the civilian 
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in 
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to 
the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population . . . in order to attempt to shield military objectives from 
attacks or to shield military operations. (8) Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from 
their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians[.]”
565 See API, supra note_, at Art. 52 (“(1) Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all 
objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2. (2) Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In 
so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military of advantage. (3) In case of doubt whether an object which is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an 
effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.).”).
566 See API, supra note_, at Art. 53 (“[I]t is prohibited: (a) To commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (b) To use such 
objects in support of the military effort; (c) To make such objects the object of reprisals.”).
567 See API, supra note_, at Art. 56 (“1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such 
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military 
objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may 
cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. 
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease: (a) For a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other 
than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible 
way to terminate such support; (b) For a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular, 
significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support; (c) For 
other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and 
direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support. 3. In all cases, the 
civilian population and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law, 
including the protection of the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57. If the protection ceases and any of the works, 
installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph I is attacked, all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid the 
release of the dangerous forces. 4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in 
paragraph 1 the object of reprisals. 5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the 
vicinity of the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, installations erected for the sole purpose of 
defending the protected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves be made the object of attack, 
provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected 
works or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected 
92
Protocol Additional, occasioned by the unlawful, wanton, and indiscriminate armed attack, not justified 
by necessity and out of proportion to any legitimate military purpose and without warning to civilian 
inhabitants, upon the Central Mosque, a historic facility dedicated to a religious purpose and known by 
defendants to be so, with lasers, asphyxiating gases, and other weapons of mass destruction573 in a manner 
calculated to cause widespread death, inhuman treatment, and unnecessary suffering to civilians, as well 
as the unnecessary and willful destruction of civilian property, and which did in fact cause such death and 
unnecessary suffering to many thousands of civilians and the extensive destruction of civilian property.”574
works or installations.  6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to conclude further agreements 
among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces. 7. In order to facilitate the 
identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a 
group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified in Article 16 of Annex I to this Protocol. The absence of 
such marking in no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under this Article.”).
568 See API, supra note_, at Art. 57 (“1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects.  (2) With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: (a) Those who 
plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor 
civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 
52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them; (ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects; (iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes 
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks 
which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. (3) When a choice is possible between several 
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be 
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the 
air, each Party to the conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects. 5. No provision of 
this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.”).
569 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, [“APII”] at Art. 4(2) (providing that noncombatants and civilians are to be protected against, inter 
alia, “violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being[.]”).
570 See id. at Art. 13 (“The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protections against the dangers arising 
from military operations . . . [and] shall not be the object of attack.”).
571 See id. at Art. 15 (providing unqualified immunity for specified civilian facilities).
572 See id. at Art. 16 (providing for the protection of cultural objects and houses of worship without waiver in cases of necessity).
573
 Due to unresolved disputes over the inclusion of the use of nuclear weapons as a war crime, as of 2003 the Rome Statute does 
not expressly prohibit the use of WMD or other weapons systems, requiring that “weapons, projectiles and material and methods 
of warfare . . . which are of such a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently 
indiscriminate in violation of [IHL]” must be “the subject of a comprehensive prohibition” and be “included in an annex to this 
Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provision set forth in articles 121 and 123.”  Rome Statute, supra 
note_, at Art. 8(2)(b)(xx).  However, the Prosecutor might be able charge the use of riot control agents and chlorine dioxide gas 
by the U.S. as illegal methods of war, and thus war crimes, through Article 8(2)(b)(xvii) and/or (xviii), which prohibit the 
employment of poison and poisoned weapons as well as asphyxiating and poisonous gases.  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 
8(2)(b)(xvii), (xviii); see also Bailey, supra note_, at 110 (arguing on behalf of this interpretation).  With respect to blinding 
lasers, potential criminal liability under Article 8, if not Article 7, is much less clear.  The ICRC has denounced blinding lasers as 
a cause of unnecessary suffering prohibited under existing IHL and advanced the adoption of a protocol to the CCW prohibiting 
“employment of laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause 
permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices.”  Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), 
CCW/CONF.1/7 (Oct. 12, 1995), at Arts. 1, 2. Moreover, the ICRC has rejected claims that blinding lasers can inflict merely 
temporary blindness, that the suffering such weapons inflict are justified by the military advantage gained through their use, and 
that blinding lasers, as nonlethal weapons, necessarily inflict less suffering than weapons that induce fatalities.  See ICRC, 
BLINDING WEAPONS 3, 4, 7 (1995) (stating that “anyone whose eyes are hit by the [laser] beam would be blinded, in most 
cases permanently[,] and that “it is impossible to develop a laser which can only flash blind[.]”).  Nonetheless, the Rome Statute 
has not been amended to include an annex prohibiting blinding lasers, and even if this weapons system were to be characterized 
as prohibited by customary IHL its use is not explicitly criminalized by the Rome Statute.
574
 With respect to war crimes alleging a violation of proportionality and distinction, it is unclear whether the Rome Statute 
requires the Prosecutor to prove actual knowledge or practical certainty that a military operation would cause loss of life or injury 
to civilians or damage to civilian property clearly excessive in relation to the military advantage gained or whether a negligence 
standard will suffice.  The actual or subjective knowledge standard imposes a heavier burden of proof than an objective, 
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Count Three charged the SOCOM CinC, CJCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the President with 
aggression, alleging that by “dispatching members of the Armed Forces of the United States to invade the 
sovereign state of Uzbekistan, occupy Uzbeki territory, and attack the Central Mosque with conventional 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction,” the defendants had, “without justification575 or 
authorization,576 employed armed force against the territorial integrity and political independence of 
Uzbekistan in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,”577 in derogation of the 
“independence and freedom of the Uzbeki people,” and in contravention of the “clear pronouncement 
[established at Nuremburg] that aggressive war is a crime.”578  The indictment stated further that “the U.S. 
was not the victim of an armed attack and OPERATION JEREMIAH was a prima facie act of 
aggression.”579 The Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for all defendants,580 and the Prosecutor 
forwarded copies to the Secretary of State581 requesting cooperation in their arrest and surrender582 “in 
accordance with Articles 87,583 89584 and 93.”585
The U.S. Ambassador presented this address the next morning in the UN Security Council:586
It is my solemn duty to report that after the U.S. acquired clear and compelling information 
concerning plans by Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization aided and abetted by the Government of 
Uzbekistan,587 to infiltrate the U.S. and attack our citizens with biological weapons, the President ordered 
United States Armed Forces to take preemptive measures to eliminate these weapons, which were stored in 
negligence-based standard which  imposes liability if commanders or soldiers were unaware of a substantial risk of harm but 
should have known that the attack would cause collateral loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property “clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
575 See Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua Nicaragua v. U.S., ICJ 1986 (holding 
that no customary IHL rule permits a state to self-defend absent an armed attack and that alarming military preparations 
undertaken by a second state justifies a report to the UN Security Council but not an act of anticipatory self-defense).
576 See David, supra note_, at 403-04 (stating that the risk to the U.S. of being subjected to charges of aggression before the ICC 
arises “only where the U.S. acts unilaterally, eschewing resort to the mechanisms of the United Nations for reasons of 
expediency, or fear of insufficient international support.”).  Precedent bears out this assertion: when NATO employed force 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [“FRY”] in 1999 absent UN Security Council authorization, FRY sued NATO 
members on ten separate counts in the ICJ alleging, inter alia, that the bombing was an illegal act of aggression.  See Legality of 
the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States) (http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyuk/iyukframe.htm) (dismissing case for 
lack of jurisdiction).  For a discussion of the cases, see Gerry Simpson, The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: 
The Power of Rules and the Rule of Power, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439 (2000).
577 See UN Charter, supra note_, at Art. 2(4) (“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state[.]”).
578
 Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremburg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1947).  Although the Nuremburg defendants 
contended that positive IHL did not prohibit aggressive war and that the principle nulla poena sin lege (“no punishment without 
law”) precluded trial on that charge, the IMT ruled against them.  See International Military Tribunal, Motion Adopted by All 
Defense Counsel, Nov. 19, 1945, 1 Trials of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal 168-70 (1945).  
Moreover, the chief prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson, maintained that “[w]hile the law is first applied against German 
aggressors, if it is to serve any useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations. “ TAYLOR, supra note_, at 12.  
579
 David, supra note_, at 395 (warning that the ICC may disagree with the U.S. as to the propriety of a particular use of force).
580 See Rome Statute, supra note 59.
581 Id. at Art. 58(1) (providing for issuance of arrest warrants by Pre-Trial Chamber upon application of Prosecutor).
582 See id. at Art. 91(1)(“A request for arrest and surrender shall be made in writing.”).
583 See id. at Art. 87(5) (“The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance . . on the basis of an ad hoc 
arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis[.]”)
584 See id. at Art. 89(1) (“The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the material 
supporting the request . . . to any State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of 
that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person.  States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the 
procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.”).
585 See id. at Art. 93 (creating obligations to assist the ICC in its investigation and prosecution, including with respect to 
production of persons and documents and access to victims and witnesses).
586
 No provision of the Rome Statute enables a requested State to set aside a request for the arrest and surrender of persons present 
within its jurisdiction, although Article 87(5) of the Report of the Preparatory Committee contained a provision to that effect.  See
United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Working Group On Procedural 
Matters (WGPM), NGO Coalition Report of 19 June 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, at 161-62.
587 See President Bush, Address to the United Nations Security Council, Oct. 7, 2001 (“If any government sponsors the outlaws 
and murderers and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves.”).
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the Central Mosque.  This defensive action, undertaken to prevent the deaths of millions of Americans, was 
clearly permissible under customary international law, as well as under the UN Charter 588  States and their 
588
 International law has long justified preemptive measures in defense of life and property.  See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, DE 
JURE BELLUM AD PACTUM 32, 75 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901); Caroline Case (note) (permitting self-defense where “the 
necessity . . . is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”).  However, the UN 
Charter narrowed the category of permissible acts of self-defense to those undertaken in response to an “armed attack” and 
excludes, or at least abridges, the natural right of self-defense subsequent to the moment the Security Council becomes seized of 
the matter.  See UN Charter, Art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”) (emphasis added); Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the 
Right to Self-Defence—Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT’L LAWYER 1081, 1809 
(2003) (contending that once the Security Council assumes “primary responsibility” for the restoration of international peace and 
security, the right to self-defense under Article 51 lapses and the threatened state must subordinate its response to this 
mechanism, regardless of its efficacy).  Some thus contend that preemptive measures are categorically prohibited and that a state 
must wait to be attacked prior to defending itself.  See, e.g., BERT V. A. ROLING, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION 
ON THE USE OF FORCE 5 (1986) (positing the restrictive theory of self-defense); Lacey, supra note_, at 307 (“Without the 
sine qua non of imminence, [preemptive] self-defense becomes nothing more than the slippery slope of naked aggression.”); IAN 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 112 (1963) (advocating a restrictive 
interpretation of Article 51).  Others argue that a state need not wait for its attacker to strike first but may, consistent with Article 
51, preempt such an attack, on the ground that states possess the natural legal right to take necessary and proportional measures 
in self-defense.  See Oscar Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1634 (1984); William V. 
O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 478 (1990) (supporting 
right of preemptive self-defense).  Moreover, as this permissive school asserts, the natural right to self-defend can be easily 
harmonized with the provisions of positive law by recognizing that, where the Security Council is unable or unwilling to take 
measures to that end, states are freed to pursue their own salvation.  Lysobey, supra note_, at 127.  Because “analysis of the 
legitimacy of an act of preemption requires replacing the objectively verifiable prerequisite of an ‘armed attack’ with the 
subjective perception of a “threat” of such an attack in the sole judgment of the state believing itself about to be a target,” 
preemptive self-defense has been a thorn in the side of IHL, and the UN, since the 1960s. See U.N. SCOR 188, Apr. 9, 1964 
(rejecting Portuguese claim of self-defense in the shelling of Senegal); U.N. SCOR 488, Jun. 19, 1981 (rejecting Israeli 
invocation of Article 51 as basis for destruction of Iraqi nuclear weapons facility at Tamuz despite Israeli evidence that the 
reactor was to be used to make bombs to target Israel); G.A. Res. 6/2, Jan. 14, 1981 (rejecting invocation of Article 51 by Soviet 
Union as justification for invasion of Afghanistan).  Similarly, the ICJ, in a much-criticized and –cited opinion, has held that the 
legitimacy of a claim to self-defense rests upon and is “subject to the State concerned having been the victim of armed attack[,]” 
thus seeming to rule out preemptive measures entirely.  See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note_, at 
193-95.   State practice is inconclusive: he U.S. is one of the few states that openly embraces the right to preemptive self-defense.  
W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW, Dec. 1989, at 7.  However, 
international tterrorism, along with the proliferation of advanced and lethal weapons systems, has invigorated the debate.  
Because the threat posed by the use of WMD against civilian population centers is many orders of magnitude greater than the 
threat of conventional weapons used against military targets, and because terrorist attacks can materialize almost without warning 
whereas traditional military operations are transparent to a much greater degree, several scholars consider that impending terrorist 
WMD attacks can reasonably treated as imminent in circumstances where an attack by conventional means would not be so 
regarded.  See Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm in 
Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 485 (1999) (arguing that 
when rogue states or terrorist groups possessed of WMD directly threaten the the survival of another state, the threatened state 
has the right to engage in “preemptive use of force to either deter acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition programs or destroy 
illicit WMD sites[.]”); John Shaw, Startling His Neighbors, Australian Leader Favors First Strikes, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, 
at A11 (quoting Australian Prime Minister JHoward as stating that a politician would be “failing the most basic test of office” if 
he did not order preemptive action); Lacey, supra note_, at 293-94 (arguing that “the threat [posed by terrorists with WMD] is 
simply too great for states not to act”); El-Ayouty, supra note_, at 492 (stating that “in the case of universal and catastrophic 
terrorism . . . striking at the terrorists does not wait until a definite nexus is established between the terrorists and their actions.”).  
Perhaps the most compelling version of this permissive interpretation of Article 51 is as follows:
[C]ommon sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a state 
passively to accept its fate before it can defend itself.  And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also 
seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right to self-defence . . . [T]his view accords better with State 
practice and with the realities of modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation of Article 51[.]
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 242 (1994), cited in Christopher Greenwood, 
International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 7, 15 (2003).
In sum, the permissive interpretation would permit a state to resort to preemptive self-defense provided it has “(1) 
reasonably determined that [WMD] are to be used as an aggressive force against it; (2) affirmatively pursued alternative 
modalities of resolution and remained engaged in the diplomatic process until the moment of action; (3) acted only after the 
aggressor’s conduct has coalesced into a coherent . . . threat; and (4) achieved minimal destruction, using only as much force as 
necessary to effectively eliminate the threat.”  Mark E. Newcomb, Non-Proliferation, Self-Defense, and the Korean Crisis, 27 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603 621 (1994) (building upon an earlier formulation in YORAM DINSTEIN, AGGRESSION 
AND SELF-DEFENSE 165-90 (1988)).  Arguably, where the UN takes no action in response to a request from a threatened state, 
or moves too slowly to neutralize the threat, the threatened state has the natural right, as well as a right under Article 51, to take 
military action unilaterally or in concert with others.  Moreover, with respect to terrorists in possession of WMD, it is arguable 
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citizens possess the inalienable right to life,589 and to defend life.590  When a terrorist organization couples 
hostile intent591 with the means to execute that intent, neither the U.S. nor any other peaceful state need wait 
to be devastated before responding.592  Although the U.S. delayed action for several months to pursue 
peaceful modalities of resolution in this august body, diplomacy failed.593  While the risk in waiting was 
patently obvious, wait we did, until terrorist attack was imminent and the slightest further delay would have 
jeopardized the lives of millions of innocent men, women, and children.  The last resort is always the stark 
reality of armed force, which the U.S. was morally obligated to employ to protect its people.594  To brand 
our response an unlawful act of aggression is an ill-considered measure that simply obliterates the 
distinction between terrorism and self-defense.595  Some may question the factual predicate that gave rise to 
the decision to employ measures of self-defense to preempt the terrorist threat.  When the United States 
determines it is possible to share some or all of the sensitive intelligence that prompted the military 
response without compromising its national security, it will do so.596  In the interim, the ICC ought never to 
that the Security Council, with Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognizing the inherent right ot self-defense and authorizing the 
exercise of this right against terrorists on the territory of states unable to prevent terrorist attacks, has accepted the permissive 
interpretation and pre-authorized preemption.  Arai-Takahashi, supra this note_, at 1087.  However, the law has been slow to 
respond, and the UN Charter, because of its susceptibility to interpretation as a categorical prohibition on self-defense except in 
the aftermath of an armed attack, presents a formidable legal obstacle to the application of customary doctrine.  Moreover, the 
lawfulness of specific acts of preemptive self-defense often does not become apparent until long after the fact when information, 
tightly held by states, surfaces.  See Reisman, supra note_, at 17- 18 (stating that, whereas most scholars condemnded the 1981 
Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, in light of the discovery that Iraq had an advanced WMD program in 1991 “now the general 
consensus is that it was a lawful and justified resort to unilateral, preemptive action.”).  Thus, in conjunction with the precedent 
of Nuremburg and the expansive powers of the ICC to define aggression, individuals who order or participate in preemptive self-
defense in the War on Terror may incur criminal liability.  See, e.g., FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE CRIMINALITY OF 
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (2002) (equating U.S. preemptive strike in Afghanistan with Nazi “self-defense” argument and 
contending that the Bush Doctrine is the primary reason for U.S. opposition to the ICC); Letter Dated 23 September 1999, supra 
note_, at annex, para. 7 (1999) (condemning U.S. bombing of suspected chemical weapons site in Sudan as an “unlawful act of 
aggression).  In sum, the legitimacy of preemption remains an open, political, question, and the prospect that an ICC Prosecutor 
might deem a particular exercise of preemption a crime within ICC jurisdiction is a real possibility.  David, supra note_, at 393.
589 See Lacey, supra note_, at 294 (arguing that the legal justification for preemptive self-defense should be the argument that 
states have an inherent juris ad vitae (“right to life”) that “prevents the random annihilation of their populations from WMD in 
the hands of unstable regimes or the murder of their citizens by rogue terrorist bands.”).
590
 As the ICJ, presented with the question whether a threatened state could lawfully use nuclear weapons where its survival was 
at issue, could not reach a definitive conclusion, the position that a state may use less destructive means to protect against its 
eradication is, at the very least, a good-faith legal argument.  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep. 66, 
80 (1996), 35 ILM 809 (“[T]he court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful 
or unlawful in an extreme circumstances of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.”).
591
 The Department of Defense defines “hostile intent” as “the threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit . . 
. against the [U.S.], U.S. forces, . . . U.S. citizens and their property, U.S. commercial assets, or other designated non-U.S. forces, 
foreign nations and their property.”  CJCS 3121.01, supra note_.
592
 State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (“Since 
when have terrorists . . . announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike.  If this threat is permitted to 
fully and suddenly emerge, all words and recriminations would come too late.”).
593
 A number of scholars center their post-hoc analysis of the legitimacy of preemptive self-defense on the question of whether the 
threatened state sought the assistance of the Security Council.  For this bloc, where a state seeks such assistance but is offered 
none, whether through the political paralyis of that body or some other unjustifiable delay, the threatened state is tacitly granted 
authorization to act unilaterally and preemptively.  See, e.g., W. Thomas & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 
1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense, 75 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 417, 427-28 (1982) (stating 
that legitimate claims to preemptive self-defense require as conditions precedent the unsuccessful referal of the matter to the 
Security Council and pursuit of “peaceful modalities of resolution,” including mediation and diplomacy); David, supra note_, at 
402 (suggesting that failure to resort to the Security Council for assistance in reducing a threat attenuates the strength of a 
subsequent claim of legal legitimacy for an act of preemptive self-defense).  However, not all commentators that support the right 
of states to undertake self-help following failed resort to the Security Council concur that such resort will “obviat[e] the need for 
force . . . and . . . eliminate the risk to civilians.”  David, supra note_, at 402.
594
 Liberal democratic social theory holds that the most important function of government is ensuring the physical safety of the 
governed, and international law will be interpreted by democratic governments to support this mission.  See Lacey, supra note_, 
at 308 (contending that states, as a creation of social contract, are obligated to protect their citizens from harm emanating from 
outside their boundaries and that “regardless of how international law describes the use of force against a . . . target, . .  [the] state 
will continue to fulfil its duties to its citizens.”); Reisman, supra note_, at 89 (“[A] government in a functioning democracy 
whose population faces such violence will not last long if . . . it tells its electorate that international law prevents it from taking . . 
. preemptive action.”).
595 See John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq’s Intelligence Headquarters, 17 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 241 (1994) (suggesting that the distinction between self-defense and reprisal is 
disappearing under a scholarly assault upon the principle of anticipatory self-defense).
596
 A state may refuse to cooperate with an order or measure of the ICC on the basis of “an existing fundamental legal principle of 
general application.”  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 93(3).  Articles 72 and 93(4)-(6) permit a state to refuse assistance if the 
request concerns the production of any document or disclosure of evidence that relates to its national security.  Id. at Arts. 72, 
93(4)-(6).  States are inclined to be reluctant to comply with requests for assistance with the prosecution of their own nationals, 
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permit military operations conducted in good-faith to be the germ of criminal prosecutions which would 
disclose to our enemies the process whereby sensitive sources and methods of U.S. intelligence operations 
lead to the development and implementation of military options.597
Moreover, OPERATION JEREMIAH was planned and conducted with great care to minimize 
casualties to innocent civilians and civilian property, as are all U.S. military operations.598  The U.S. deeply 
regrets the loss of innocent civilian lives, as well as the destruction of the Central Mosque.  It is 
unnecessary to reenter the divisive debate over the legal force or the wisdom of the Additional Protocols599
to conclude that in choosing a perfidious and dishonorable strategy, the terrorists and their state sponsors, 
and not the United States, made of the Central Mosque, a cultural treasure otherwise entitled to the broadest 
degree of immunity, a legitimate military target.600  In striking this target, which made direct and significant 
particularly if the requested assistance concerns divulging classified military matters or national intelligence product.  VON 
HEBEL ET AL., supra note_, at 119.  However, the ICTFY has ruled that state obligations to cooperate with international 
tribunals are extensive and that “to admit that a State holding [documents concerning military operations] could lead to the 
stultification of international criminal proceedings[,]” thereby undermining the “very raison d’etre of [international criminal 
tribunals].”).  Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case No: IT-95-14-AR108, 29 October 1997, para. 65.  Whether the ICC would follow this 
precedent is uncertain; however, if it concludes that an invocation of Article 93(4) as grounds to refuse a request is not in 
accordance with obligations under the Rome Statute, the ICC may refer the alleged breach to either the Assembly of States 
Parties or, in the case of non-parties, the Security Council.  Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 93(4).  In other words, U.S. 
unwillingness to share sources and methods with the ICC might lead to a Security Council vote on whether the U.S. has a duty to 
share national security information with potential adversaries.
597
 Some commentators suggest that the U.S., as a precondition to ICC membership, seek and receive the assurance that military 
operations based upon sensitive intelligence sources and methods are not criminalized in exchange for a solemn representation 
that its military operations will be predicated upon a good-faith belief in the legitimacy of the same.  See, e.g., FRYE ET AL, 
supra note_, at 66-68 (arguing further that “[g]ood faith differences in military doctrine should be argued in military journals and 
the public press, not in a criminal courtroom.”).
598 See Marc L. Warren, Operational Law—A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 3362 (1996) (“In combat the goal of the 
United States forces is always to minimize civilian casualties[.”]); see also UN Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2001 
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Councul, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001) (“In carrying out these [military] actions [against the Taliban regime and Al 
Qaida], the United States is committed to minimizing civilian casualties and damage to civilian property.”).
599
 Although a number of militarily significant states have not ratified either of the Protocols Additional, several scholars, as well 
as many human rights NGOs and at least one international tribunal, contend that API and APII in their totality have reached the 
status of customary IHL and are thus binding even upon non-parties.  See, e.g., Frits Kalshoven, Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Methods and Means of Warfare, in The Gulf War of 1980-1988: The Iran-Iraq War in International Legal Perspective 
97, 99 (Ige K. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 1992); Stefan Oerter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 111-13 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995); Prosecutor v. Dusan Tadic (Appeals 
Chamber), ICTFY, IT-94-1- AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, at 
para. 117 (“Many provisions [of the Protocols Additional] are now declaratory of existing rules or . . . have crystallized emerging 
rules of customary law or else . . . have been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles.”).  However, the 
drafters of the Rome Statute could not reach an agreement as to whether some or all of contents of the Protocols Additional have 
risen to level of CIL.  BASSIOUNI, supra note_, at_.  Several major military powers, including the U.S., have either refused to 
ratify the Protocols Additional or have entered extensive reservations, contradicting the claim to status as customary IHL.  
Parkerson, supra note_, at 51. The official position of the U.S., which has signed but not ratified either instrument, maintains that, 
while various provisions of the Protocols Additional, such as the principle of distinction in targeting set forth in Articles 48 and 
49 of API as well as the principle of proportionality codified at Article 57 of API, are expressive of customary IHL, many others 
are not, including, inter alia, restrictions in Article 56, API, and Article 16, APII, on attacks against civilian facilities converted to 
military use, the blurring of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, the presumption of the civilian character of 
facilities, the abdication of the responsibility for protecting civilians on the part of defending forces, and the relaxing of other 
obligations.  See George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1991) (noting statements of understanding offered by the U.S. Delegation during the 
negotiation of API; Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George P. Schultz, PROTOCOL II ADDITIONAL TO THE 1949 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICTS, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 2, 100th Cong., 11st Sess., at VII, IX (1987) (enumerating Department of Defense 
objections, including that the Protocols “grant[] guerrillas a legal status that often is superior to that accorded to regular forces[,] . 
. . unreasonably restrict[] attacks against . . . legitimate military targets[,] . . . and [are] too ambiguous and complicated to use as a 
practical guide for military operations.”).  Moreover, for the U.S. and several other advanced military powers, the Protocols 
Additional are less a serious attempt to regulate armed conflict than an incorporation of the “political and propagandistic goals of 
certain delegations, and a number of the Protocol’s provisions simply cannot be reconciled with the basic realities of military 
strategy and tactics.”  Roberts, supra note_, at 168.
600
 Terrorists, along with rogue states, have made a practice of siting weapons and forces in and in close proximity to sites legally 
protected under IHL, including hospitals, religious buildings, and archaelogical sites, “precisely to make public charges of 
indiscriminate use of force and of war crimes to the international community through the mass media.”  Phillip S. Mellinger, 
Winged Defense: Airwar, The Law, and Morality, 20 ARM. FORCES & SOC’Y 103, 111 (1993).  This strategy is intended to 
confer a degree of immunity upon defenders, for some attackers are loathe to attack churches, medical institutions, and cultural 
monuments, while some commentators dispute the notion that such facilities can ever be construed to make an “effective 
contribution to military action” despite their investiture with troops or war materiel.  See KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 89-90 
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contribution to the military operations of Al Qaida and Uzbekistan, it appears that some of the biological 
weapons stored within leaked from that site, causing civilian injury and death, despite the fact that the 
United States took great precautions, including the use of a ground-based assault rather than aerial 
bombardment, to avoid this.601  Some, including the ICC Prosecutor, intimate that the failure to warn the 
Government of Uzbekistan of our impending military action prevented the evacuation of civilians and thus 
constitutes a crime.  Had it been possible to provide warning without jeopardizing the mission, we would 
(positing a broad view of the protections due to categories of facilities).  However, defenders who elect this strategy present 
attackers with factual circumstances that support the legal argument that sites invested with military significance are thereby 
divested of their immunities as civilian facilities.  See API, supra note_, at Art. 52(2), (3) (limiting attacks to “military 
objectives[,]” defined as “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, . . . offers a definite military of advantage” and providing that 
doubts as to whether an object is a military objective are to be resolved in favor of a determination of civilian status); Hague 
Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art 27 (permitting attacks against civilian facilities stripped of civilian character by virtue of 
their use by the enemy in support of the military effort).
From the U.S. perspective the question of whether a facility is a legitimate military objective is ultimately a fact-
intensive inquiry, and where attackers discover that an otherwise-immunized facility has been converted by defenders to the 
“efficient conduct of hostilities and minimization of their casualties[,]” attackers are not likely to presume the contrary to their 
peril.  Roberts, supra note_, at 150 (warning of “dire consequences” for attackers who refuse to engage such targets).  During the 
negotiation of API, the U.S. Delegation made numerous statements regarding their understandings of the text, including, inter 
alia, 1) that Article 52 prohibts only those attacks directed against nonmilitary objectives and does not prohibit incidental 
collateral damage resulting from attacks on military objectives; (2) that if cultural objects and places of worship protected by 
Article 53 are used in support of the military effort they lose the special protection of that article; (3) that in relation to Articles 
51-58, commanders and others responsible for planning, ordering, or executing attacks necessarily must reach decisions on the 
basis of information available to them at the relevant moment of decision, rather than in hindsight.  Aldrich, supra note_, at 18.  
The U.S. made similar expressions of understanding with respect to APII that indicated that “[t]he United States understands that 
Article 16 [of APII] establishes a special protection for a limited class of objects that, because of their recognized importance, 
constitute a part of the cultural and spiritual heritage of people, and that such objects will lose their protection if they are used in 
support of the military effort.”  STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), at 7.  Thus, according to the U.S., where defenders, who share with attackers responsibility 
for reducing the risks faced by civilians, unilaterally strip otherwise protected sites of their immunity, these sites, whether they be 
schools, nuclear plants, hospitals, or mosques, are by their actions converted into legitimate military targets.  See Aldrich, supra
note_, at12 (stating that attacks against otherwise protected nuclear generating stations are permitted as militarily necessary 
where such stations are furnishing power to military facilities or used for weapons research or stockpiling); Meron, supra note_, 
at 277 (contending that targets with a generally civilian character may be lawfully attacked if they meet the definition of military 
objective under API, Art. 52(2)); United States Department of Defense, Report To Congress On The Conduct Of The Persian 
Gulf War—Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 612, 627 (1992) (stating unequivocally that, when civilian 
structures are invested with weapons or defending troops, these structures become legitimate military targets under the rule of 
military necessity).  Some, including a number of NGOs, contest the U.S. interpretation, suggesting that certain enumerated 
categories of facilities can never be divested of their civilian character.  See, e.g., 12 HUM. RTS. WATCH, Civilian Deaths in the 
NATO Air Campaign (2000) (available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm) (charging NATO targeting of 
bridges and communications facilities used by Yugoslavia in support of the war effort against NATO as war crimes in violation 
of the targeting restrictions imposed by Articles 51-58 of API).  These redefinititions of legitimate military targets, posited by 
what one commentator terms an “extreme” and “fringe” group, have begun to influence international legal jurisprudence.  See 
Meyer, supra note_, at 164-65.  However, if, as the U.S. and a number of other states contend, the Protocols Additional, 
particularly Articles 51-58, are not yet expressive of customary IHL, the U.S. position is a permissible interpretation of the sole 
applicable instrument of IHL governing restraints on combat targeting, the Hague Regulations of 1907, which are silent with 
respect to the targeting of particular categories of facilities.  See supra note_.  Whether the deliberate targeting of civilians to 
shatter enemy morale is permissible under the Hague Regulations is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article; it suffices to 
note in passing that the U.S. Air Force answers the question in the affirmative.  See Jeanne Meyer, Tearing Down the Façade: A 
Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. REV. 143 (2001) 
(stating that current Air Force doctrine “clearly recognizes and allows for . . . choosing targets that also affect the enemy's will 
and morale, both of their military forces and their civilian population.”).
601 Although the API proscribes attacks against targets likely to release “dangerous forces” for the sole purpose of killing 
civilians via such release and requires attacking parties to take “all practical precautions” to avoid the escape of “dangerous 
forces” from targets likely to release such forces, it does not categorically proscribe attacks on such targets, nor does it define 
what sort of measures are within the bounds of the practical.  API, supra note_, at Art. 56.  By selecting those tactics and 
weapons most likely to minimize the release of dangerous forces and providing warning where possible, attacking forces are 
most likely to substantiate the claim that they have taken “all practical precautions.”  Parkerson, supra note_, at 62; see also API, 
supra note_, at Art. 51(4)(c) (proscribing methods and means of attack that cannot be controlled sufficiently to protect civilians 
from injury).  In comparison to aerial bombardment, which requires significantly more ordnance and increases the potential for 
errant targeting and collateral damage, a ground assault, while more dangerous to exposed attacking forces, permits the more 
surgical application of force and enhances the opportunities to limit collateral damage.  See Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing Bin 
Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy,  26-SPG Fletcher F. World Aff. 17 (2002 ); U. 
MICHIGAN, Post-Cold War, supra note_, at 717 (reporting that the Department of Defense estimated during Desert Storm that 
the destruction of Iraqi biological weapons sites located in urban areas by aerial bombardment, as opposed to ground-based 
assault, could have the unintended effect of releasing toxic fallout and killing as many as 6 million Iraqi civilians).  Thus, the 
U.S., by employing Special Forces to eliminate the BWs in the Central Mosque, would arguably be judged by an independent 
reviewer to have taken “all practical precautions” in preventing collateral damage.
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have done so.602  Unfortunately, because Al Qaida intended to immediately transfer the weapons for use 
against the United States, it was not.  Nonetheless, and consistent with the felony murder doctrine in 
common-law,603 the ultimate authors of death and destruction associated with OPERATION JEREMIAH 
are Al Qaida and Uzbekistan, who chose to deliberately site prohibited weapons of mass destruction in a 
crowded urban area in a cowardly attempt to shield themselves and their weapons from attack.604
Not only does the U.S. lack responsibility for civilian casualties associated with OPERATION 
JEREMIAH, but the mere fact that a great number of civilians perished during and subsequent to the U.S. 
military attack does not support the conclusion that the U.S. is responsible for any crimes.  Although the 
U.S. accepts a customary obligation to adhere to the doctrines of proportionality and distinction in the 
conduct of its military operations and to use its best efforts to limit and prevent civilian casualties,605 it is or 
should be patently obvious that the United States neither targeted civilians nor intended that civilians 
become casualties of OPERATION JEREMIAH, which was directed solely against the weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of terrorists and their rogue state sponsor.  Civilian casualties are, tragically, an 
inevitable concomitant of armed conflicts conducted in urban areas.606  For this reason, proportionality is 
not an element in the charge of a crime against humanity, which imputes the intentional targeting and not 
the inadvertent killing of civilians,607 nor is there a magic formula that can be fairly applied post-hoc to 
answer the subjective question of whether civilian casualties are disproportionate to the military advantage 
602
 Assault confers upon attacking forces the tactical advantage of surprise, which is lost when a defender gains prior warning and 
is able to prepare defenses, and, in relevant circumstances, even relocate WMD.  Parkerson, supra note_, at 49.  IHL concedes 
that military necessity may require attacking forces to attack without warning.  Article 26 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 
(supra note_) obligates attacking forces, where circumstances permit, to grant advance warning of an intended assault in order to 
permit the evacuation of civilians from the target area, the development of state practice since 1907 indicates that derogation is 
permitted where “circumstances do not permit advanced warning.”  OPPENHEIM, supra note_, at 420.  Similarly, Article 
57(2)(c) of API provides that “effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, 
unless circumstances do not permit.” (emphasis added).  U.S. practice reinforces the conclusion that the obligation to grant 
warning is limited: paragraph 43(c) of FM 27-10 limits circumstances in which a warning is required to those “whe[re] the 
situation permits[,]”  and U.S. forces have withheld warnings in recent operations on the ground that to have issued warnings 
would have increased casualties to attacking and defending forces as well as to civilians.  See Parkerson, supra note_, at 48-50 
(discussing legal questions related to warnings to defending forces during OPERATION JUST CAUSE in Panama (1989)).
603
 The felony murder doctrine, developed at common-law and codified in several States, provides that any death which occurs 
during the commission of a felony is first degree murder, and all participants in that felony or attempted felony can be charged 
with and found guilty of murder.  See IND. CODE §35-42-1-1 (“A person who . . . kills another human being while committing 
or attempting to commit [a felony] commits murder[.]”).
604
 API obligates the defending party “to the maximum extent feasible” to remove civilians from the area of military objectives, to 
locate military objectives away from densely populated areas, and to take other necessary precautions to protect civilians.  API, 
supra note_, at Art. 58(a).  Even more pointedly, Article 51(7), along with Article 28 of GCIII, imposes a duty upon the defender 
to avoid using civilians to shield military objectives.  See API, supra note_, at Art. 51(7) ( ); see also GCIII, supra note_, at Art. 
28 (providing that civilians may not be used to render an area immune from attack,).  Thus, when defending forces fail to 
discharge their obligations to remove civilians from the area of military objectives, the resulting civilian casualties are arguably 
attributable to this breach of the defender.
605 In upholding obligations under proportionality and distinction to minimize incidental loss of civilian life, military planners 
consider a wide range of factors, including 1) the military importance of the target or objective, 2) the density of the civilian 
population in the target area, 3) the likely incidental effects of the attack, including the possible release of hazardous substances, 
4) the types of weapons available and their accuracy, 5) whether the defenders are deliberately exposing civilians or civilian 
objects to risk, and 6) the mode and the timing of the attack.  However, in so doing, military planners are hampered by imperfect 
information, the fog of war, the imperative of military necessity, and the need to make rapid decisions.  Commentators attempting 
to establish the legal standard under which to impose liability upon belligerents for violations of IHL committed in the process of 
target selection and mission tailoring offer what is essentially a gross negligence, rather than an absolute liability, standard, 
suggesting that the relevant question to be asked and answered after the fact is whether a “normally alert atacker who is 
reasonably well informed and who ma[de] reasonable use of the available information could have expected the excessive damage 
among the civilian population” in prosecuting an attack against a given target with the means and methods selected.  Kalshoven, 
supra note_, at 99-100.  Determination of liability under a negligence standard thus is a factual question which rests upon an 
assessment of the information actually or reasonably available to the attacker at the time the decision was made to target a given 
site with particular means and methods.  See David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-
Defense and State Responsibility, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 366-74 (1992) (discussing application of negligence standard to 
assess liability for deaths of civilians resulting from the mistaken targeting of a civilian airliner believed to be a military aircraft).  
606 See Department of Defense, Report To Congress On The Conduct Of The Persian Gulf War—Appendix on the Role of the 
Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 612, 624 (1992) (concluding that civilian casualties are inevitable in modern military operations); W.J. 
Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offence, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539 (1997) (same).
607
 Whereas crimes against humanity implies intentional targeting of civilians, the war crime of committing an unlawful attack 
envisages circumstances where unintended civilian deaths or injuries result in the course of an attack against a legitimate target.  
See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 6 (creating liability solely for the intentional commission of enumerated crimes against 
civilian victims in violation of the principle of distinction but maintaining silence with respect to the principle of proportionality); 
cf. id. at Art. 8 (note); Fenrick, supra note_, at 783 (arguing against expansion of conceptual definition of crimes against 
humanity to incorporate the crime of creating disproportionate civilian casualties during an attack on the ground that to do so 
could theoretically criminalize the conduct of all soldiers, depending upon how proportionality is determined, and thereby 
remove legal incentives for moderation during armed conflicts).
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gained by a legally permissible attack preceding those casualties,608 or otherwise great in comparison to 
resulting military casualties.609  To the extent that any parties were in a privileged position to prevent 
civilian casualties, that distinction is reserved to Al Qaida and Uzbekistan, which, rather than exploit 
ambiguities in the laws of war to support their propagandistic claims that the United States has engaged in 
an indiscriminate attack, might have evacuated their prohibited weapons and relocated innocent civilians 
but chose, for political purposes, another course of conduct.610  This is not the first time terrorists have 
cynically manipulated civilian populations, nor will it be the last.611  However, to “resort to counting bodies 
and placing monetary values on destruction and then applying a ‘but for U.S. intervention this would not 
have occurred’ kind of formula”612 to find a violation of the laws of war is as much a perversion of the law 
as it is of the facts and of the requirements of justice, and is beneath the dignity of this institution.
Furthermore, the most basic conceptions of morality and law rail at the notion that terrorists, a 
group beyond the pale of the law,613 can don civilian garb and hug the civilian population to make 
themselves invulnerable,614 but the Al Qaida terrorists, who know that the U.S. Armed Forces are populated 
608 See Parkerson, supra note_, at 59 (noting that although the general principles of distinction and proportionality elaborated in 
API are “unobjectionable as customary [IHL], . . . [a]ssessing what is the ‘concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,’ the 
‘incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects’ that may be expected, or the ratio between the 
two prior to attack is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task to perform with any degree of certainty.”).  Several states and 
commentators challenge Article 51(4)(c) of API as constituting a “radical revision” of the “inherited principle of distinction” in 
that it would not permit the continued immunization of attacks not intentionally directed against civilian targets where such 
attacks employed “methods and means of combat” that had the effect of causing disproportionate civilian casualties.  See
Roberts, supra note_, at_. (rejecting the substitution of a proportionality determination, assessed by an evaluation of the method 
and weapons employed in an attack, for the intent of the combatant as the relevant evidence in determining compliance with the 
principle of distinction).  Other commentators, favoring the modifications of API, have operationalized legal obligations under 
the principles of proportionality and distinction by suggesting that the two are so interrelated that, although adherence to the 
principle of distinction does not require that an attack produce no civilian casualties, an attacker must simply strike a balance 
between the value of the military advantage gained and the collateral damage produced—in other words, distinction drops away 
(save for those cases involving the intentional targeting of civilians) and what is left is simply that the attacker not violate the 
principle of proportionality by using excessive force or by using particular weapons systems where less lethal alternatives are 
available.  See, e.g., Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of 
Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 148 (2000); Kalshoven, supra note_, at 99 (stating that an attack 
on a military target satistifes the principle of distinction only if “the attack could be carried out without unduly severe losses 
among the civilian population.”); Parkerson, supra note_, at 61 (indicating that some adherents to this position consider that the 
U.S. doctrine of “highly sophisticated weaponry and tactics to present an overwhelming superiority of firepower that would make 
any resistance unthinkable” unnecessarily causes civilian casualties and therefore ipso facto violates the proportionality 
principle); Belt, supra note_, at 173 (reporting arguments that the U.S. practice of employing precision-guided munitions 
[“PGMs”] over the last 10 years has modified the meaning of proportionality to require the use of PGMs in urban areas).  In sum, 
determination of proportionality is an inherently political exercise, since the value of a military objective, as well as how many 
civilian casualties are necessary to constitute “unduly severe losses,” is a function of interests rather than law. 
609
 Americas Watch, a human rights NGO, has intimated that it is possible to draw inferences as to U.S. compliance with the 
principles of distinction and proportionality by comparing the number of civilian dead resulting from a U.S. military operation to 
the number of casualties suffered by attacking U.S. forces.  See Parkerson, supra note_, at 61 n. 155 (decrying the use of this 
compliance determination protocol by Americas Watch as a “macabre and distorted method of viewing proportionality[.]”).  The 
unstated assumption is that some proper proportion of military casualties to civilian casualties exists against which U.S. 
operations can be assessed for compliance with IHL and that insufficient military casualties permit the inference that an operation 
was not sufficiently protective of civilians.  Id.  Unsurprisingly, this view is diametrically opposed by the view that in evaluating 
compliance with the principle of proportionality by assessing whether the degree of force used was necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate military objective, “we are entitled to take into account not only the force needed to subdue the military force of the 
enemy, but also the danger posed to [U.S.] forces, when proceeding to subdue the enemy force, within the framework of the 
military action of defending against [the enemy.]”).  Temple, supra note_, at 237.
610 See Parkerson, supra note_, at 59 (“[P]rior to attack, the attacking commander knows much less than the defender about the 
location of civilians[,] . . . [and] [t]herefore the emphasis in Protocol I on placing the primary responsibility for minimization of 
incidental civilian casualties upon the atacker, rather than upon the more informed defender . . . encourag[es] defenders to charge 
‘indiscriminate attack’ and to call for analysis of attack results without consideration of the cause of those casualties, thereby 
exploiting civilians for tactical and propaganda purposes.”).
611 See O’BRIEN, supra note_, at 123 (stating that U.S. violations of proportionality and distinction in Vietnam was “in 
substantial measure the result of deliberate Communist policies of using the population as a shield[,] [as] [o]ften it was 
impossible to get at the enemy without risking disproportionate and indiscriminate actions.”).
612
 Parkerson, supra note_, at 139-40.
613
 Traditionally, terrorist groups did not come within the application of IHL, a regime framed in contemplation of wars between 
regular military forces; terrorists were classed as common criminals.  See generally KWAKWA.
614
 Quoting WALZER, supra note_, at 195.  Terrorists are heavily reliant upon secrecy and surprise, and largely immune from 
considerations of ethics and morality.  Baxter, supra note_, at 328.  To maximize secrecy and minimize the risk of drawing 
hostile fire, terrorists often site their operations within densely populated civilian centers in the expectation that their adversaries 
will be loathe to attack them for fear of creating incidental civilian casualties and arousing condemnation.  See WALZER, supra
note_, at 180 (“If you want to fight against us, the [terrorists] say, you are going to have to fight civilians . . . Therefore, you 
should not fight at all, and if you do, you are the barbarians, killing women and children.”).  Although the practice is contrary to 
law and hostile to the civilian populations wherein they take refuge, and although the U.S. does not succumb to the urge to 
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with decent individuals who recoil at the thought of pressing an attack likely to result in civilian casualties, 
capitalized upon the moral and ethical distinction between themselves and our soldiers by electing the 
criminal strategy of fighting in civilian clothing and taking women and children hostage in direct violation 
of the international law.615  That the ICC Prosecutor should undertake the selective prosecution of U.S. 
violate distinction in order to counter the strategy, terrorists ‘ refusal to distinguish themselves from civilian populations “invites 
enemies to attack civilians because the civilians might be [terrorists] in disguise.”  Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of 
Applying International Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y. U. L. REV. 916, 929 (1994).
615
 The taking of civilian hostages as human shields to protect against enemy fire is categorically prohibited by GCIV as a grave 
breach.  See GCIV, supra note_, at Art. 34 ().  A determination of the legal ramifications of the wearing of civilian clothing into 
battle requires deeper analysis, although the Geneva Conventions do not treat the wearing of civilian clothing into combat as a 
grave breach.  See GCIII, supra note_, at Art._ (enumerating grave breaches and providing that the perfidious wearing of enemy 
uniforms, but not the wearing of civilian clothing per se, constitutes a grave breach).  Still, to preserve the capacity for belligerent 
forces to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants and thereby uphold obligations under the principle of distinction, 
IHL has long required combatants, as a matter of custom, to dress so as to distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
and permit enemy forces to clearly identify permissible, and impermissible, targets.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DA 
PAMPHLET NO. 27-1-1, PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 138 (1979) (noting that 
customary IHL requires those claiming entitlement to belligerent status upon capture to be under the command of a responsible 
commander, to wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, to carry arms openly, and to conduct operations in 
accordance with IHL).  The positive rules of IHL reinforce this custom by stripping the benefits to which POWs are entitled upon 
capture from belligerents who do not conform to these requirements by, e.g., fighting out of uniform.  See GCIII, supra note_, at 
Art. 4(a)(2) (codifying customary IHL with respect to the elements of conduct required of belligerents to maintain their 
entitlement to status as POWs, immune from trial for acts of lawful belligerency, upon capture); GCIII, supra note_, at Art. 85 
(entitling POWs to protections of the GCs even if prosecuted for pre-capture offenses).   Under the Geneva Conventions, even as 
modified by the Protocols Additional, terrorists, who adhere to none of these obligations, are thus common criminals not entitled 
to POW status upon capture and may, in contrast to POWs, be tried as unlawful combatants under the domestic law of the 
detaining state.  Baxter, supra note_, at 338 (explaining that this legal status extends to spies, saboteurs, guerrillas, and all others 
who fail to meet the conditions established under international law for favored treatment upon capture by “engag[ing] in hostile 
conduct without meeting the qualifications established by Article 4 of the [GCs].”); see also id. at 327 (stating that such unlawful 
belligerents are “subject to the maximum penaltiy which the detaining belligerent desires to impose.”); API, supra note_, at Art. 
44 (providing that combatants who do not carry arms openly while preparing for or engaging in hostilities are acting perfidiously 
and thus disentitle themselves to POW status upon capture and may be tried under the domestic law of the capturing state).  The 
same is true of civilians who take up arms without donning a uniform: they lose their protected status under IHL and become 
combatants, albeit unlawfully, and thus legitimate targets as well as the legitimate subjects of post-capture judicial proceedings.  
See GCIV, supra note_, at Art. 4(a)(2) (defining noncombatancy and enumerating categories of noncombatants, including 
civilians, soldiers rendered hors de combat by wounds or capture, and medical personnel); id. at Art. 5(3) (stripping protections 
as noncombatants from civilians who take up arms); API, supra note_, at Art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”); RAMSEY, supra note_, at 435-36 
(explaining that “’combatant’ means anyone who is an actual bearer of the force one seeks to repress by resorting to arms.”); 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra this note, at 138 (“Civilians who take direct part in hostilities are ‘unlawful combatants’” who 
may be legally targeted . . . and may be tried . . . if captured by the adverse party.’).  This is true without regard to the age or sex 
of the civilian who becomes an unlawful combatant.  ILENE COHN & GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE 
ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 148 (1994) (noting that even women and children lose their protected status 
under IHL when they render military assistance to a belligerent).  The question of whether providing material support to a 
belligerent without actually taking up arms, whether by destroying enemy property, providing intelligence support, or in some 
other fashion, converts a civilian out of uniform into an unlawful combatant is a relevant issue beyond the scope of this Article.  
See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (2001) (arguing that the answer must be judged on a “case-by-
case basis.”); Faculty, supra note_, at 27 (arguing that civilians forfeit immunity from attack “whenever they take any action 
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of an armed force.”); but see ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE 
GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) 51 (Jean S. Pictet, ed. 1952) (“Every person in enemy hands must have some status under 
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by [GCIII], a civilian covered by [GCIV], or again, a 
member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by [GCI] . . . Nobody in enemy hands can be outside the 
law.”).  Similarly, disagreements over the provisions of API which create a presumption of civilian status is beyond the current 
scope, as is the current controversy over whether the designation by the Bush Administration of individual belligerents captured 
in the War on Terror as “unlawful combatants” creates a separate juridical status of persons not privileged either as civilians or as 
lawful belligerents to whom the protections of the GCs are not available.  See API, supra note_, at Art. 50 (defining as a civilian 
a person who “does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of [GCIII] and in 
Article 43 of this Protocol” and providing that “[i]n cases of doubt, . . . that person shall be considered a civilian.”).
Although the requirements that must be met to entitle an individual to treatment as a lawful belligerent upon capture 
were fairly well-settled under the Geneva Convention, API unsettled this body of law, and the requirements that would-be lawful 
combatants must uphold during a “military deployment preceding the launching of an attack” are now the subject of heated 
contestation. Article 44 of API provides that “combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while 
they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack[,]” but Article 43 eliminates part of the juridical 
distinction between soldiers and civilians by deleting the requirement that irregular forces wear a distinctive symbol and 
providing that irregular forces are lawful combatants if they meet the lesser obligations of organization under a responsible 
commander, adherence to IHL, and a relationship to “a Party to the conflict.”  API, supra note_, at Art. 43.  These two articles 
have been roundly condemned for blurring the principle of distinction between combatants and noncombatants and permitting 
interpretations of its text that would unilaterally allow “guerrillas” to disguise themselves as civilians, hide amongst civilian 
populations until just before the moment of an attack, produce insignia and weapons at the very moment of an assault launched 
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personnel, but not the terrorists and their state sponsors, for actions associated with OPERATION 
JEREMIAH is no more surprising than that U.S. forces, under heavy fire from these craven terrorists, 
should exercise their inherent right to self-defense.616  “U.S. forces never have to wait until they take 
casualties before they do what is needed to defend themselves[,]”617 and although our soldiers, forced to 
make split-second decisions, did everything possible to prevent civilian casualties, some hostages were 
killed as a result of gunfire.  While the U.S. regrets their deaths, again, responsibility for this tragedy lies 
heavy upon Al Qaida and the Government of Uzbekistan.
Moreover, the United States elected to employ various non-lethal weapons systems, including 
lasers and riot control agents, solely to enable U.S. forces to minimize civilian casualties while eliminating 
the illegal biological weapons stored in the Central Mosque.  Although the U.S. Government recognizes 
various restrictions upon its right to employ certain weapons systems under the Conventional Weapons 
Convention618 and the Chemical Weapons Convention,619 the United States has never accepted restrictions 
upon its sovereign right to employ those means of war best calculated to strike a balance between military 
necessity and humanitarian considerations.620  All instruments of war are cruel and inhuman in the sense 
that they cause destruction and suffering, but to brand the use of lasers and riot control agents—systems 
designed and employed to temporarily incapacitate, rather than to kill—as inflicting “unnecessary 
suffering”621 suggests, contrary to fact, that there is such a thing as necessary suffering, or that it would be 
preferable to kill by gunfire rather than to incapacitate by other means.622 It is not the amount of destruction 
from within the cover of the civilian population, draw fire from enemy forces that will have great difficulty discerning 
combatants from civilians (many of whom will be unintentionally killed as a result), and evade criminal liability for these actions, 
viewed widely as unlawful combatancy, upon capture.  See Aldrich, supra note_, at 764 (stating that the modifications to the 
Geneva Conventions proposed by API “virtually assur[e] that guerrillas . . . will disguise themselves as civilians and that the 
civilian population will suffer as a result.”); DEP’T OF ARMY, supra this note, at 138-39 (discussing official U.S. objections to 
Articles 43-44 of API); KWAKWA, supra note_, at 90 (parsing Article 43 of API and identifying erosion of obligations 
incumbent upon irregular forces; L. Green, The New Law of Armed Conflict, 15 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 14 (1977) (suggesting 
that if Article 44 is read to permit irregular forces to disguise their status for almost the entirety of their operations it will sully the 
principle of distinction and leave exposed the civilians it is designed to protect).  In light of the foregoing, the answer to the 
question of whether members of Al Qaida could be considered unlawful combatants during their counterattack on the Alpha 
teams during OPERATION JEREMIAH is a function of applicable law, which remains unsettled, contested, and ultimately a 
political issue.  Clearly, however, the taking of civilian hostages constitutes a grave breach of the GCIV, and thus a prosecutable 
war crime. For a thorough discussion of the concept of unlawful combatancy, see Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, “Unlawful 
Combatants” or “Prisoners of War”: The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 59 (2003).
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 Just as states possess the inherent right to self-defense, individuals possess the right, under IHL, to defend themselves against 
attack.  See XIII L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 149, 151 (1949) (holding, in acquitting Erich Weiss and Wilhelm Mundo, tried 
on 9-10 November 1945 by U.S. military commission for the alleged unlawful killing of a U.S. POW, that “self-defense which, 
according to principles of penal law is an exonerating circumstances in the field of common penal law offenses when properly 
established, is also relevant, on similar grounds, in the sphere of war crimes.”).  Actions taken in self-defense must be necessary 
and proportional to the threat.  See United States v. Carl Krauch, VIII TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1081, 1179 (1950) (restricting the 
defense of self-defense to those instances where actions taken in self-defense are necessary and proportional).
617
 Faculty, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations (UN) and 
Associated Personnel Enters into Force, 1999 ARMY LAW. 21, 30 (1999).
618
 Although the U.S. is a party to the Conventional Weapons Convention [“CWC”] it has entered extensive reservations and 
accepted only parts of that instrument as binding, including Protocol I (prohibiting use of weapons that create fragments not 
detectable by x-ray) and Protocol II (concerning use of mines and booby traps); it has not accepted Protocols III (banning 
incendiary weapons) or Protocol IV (prohibiting blinding weapons).  Commentators suggest that although the U.S. does not 
recognize Protocol IV it is adhering to it.  See David Atkinson, New Weapons Technologies Offer Complex Issues for Review, 
DEF. DAILY, Sept. 1, 1999, at 2 (quoting W. Hayes Parks, Special Sssistant to U.S. Army Judge Advocate General) (“We are 
not parties to [Protocol IV] but we are abiding by it.”).  For a list of CWC parties, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf.  
619
 Official U.S. policy has long approved the use of riot control agents [“RCAs”] (see supra note_) to aid in the rescue of downed 
aircrews and the dispersal of civilians being used as human shields.  See E.O. 11,850 (3 C.F.R. 980 (1971-1975)), reprinted in 
FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (note); CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3110.07, 
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE; RIOT CONTROL AGENTS; AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (3 
July 1995) (authorizing and instructing U.S. Armed Forces in the use of RCAs).  Although neither the Executive Order nor the 
Instruction have been superseded, the U.S. Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, and President Clinton 
took the position that the CWC prohibits RCAs as analogous to prohibited chemical weapons.  Warren, supra note_, at 55 n.91.  
The interpretation of the Clinton Administration is not binding upon successor administrations, which in future conflicts might 
well order the use of RCAs on the ground that such weapons are non-lethal alternatives effective in particular tactical situations 
and do so consistent with their belief that RCAs are not prohibited under existing IHL.
620
 The U.S. has developed and deployed portable ground-based low-energy lasers for target-marking and range-finding but has 
not officially sanctioned their use, although at least one commentator suggests that their use in force protection and reprisal is 
consistent with IHL.  See, e.g., Carnahan, supra note_; Noone, supra note_ at 27-35.  Other commentators maintain that blinding 
lasers are necessarily prohibited means of warfare in that they unavoidably cause unnecessary suffering.  See Carnahan, supra
note_, at 730-31 (summarizing but criticizing position that laser weapons are of no military value and categorically illegal).
621 See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_ (prohibiting methods and means that create “unnecessary suffering”).
622 See Carnahan, supra note_, at 712 (“’[U]nnecessary sumplies that there is such a thing as necessary suffering, because the 
“infliction of some suffering and injury [is] an inherent feature of armed conflict.”
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or suffering that is relevant in appraising the lawfulness of a particular weapon but rather the superfluity of 
harm involved in accomplishing a legitimate military objective with that weapon.623  In the best judgment of 
U.S. military commanders, based upon the tactical considerations and available intelligence, use of lasers 
and riot control agents constituted the most practical, and the most humane, means to afford our forces the 
security necessary to destroy the weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, the President, acting in his official capacity as Commander-in-Chief in defense of the 
United States, issued lawful orders through the lawful chain of command to members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces who executed OPERATION JEREMIAH.  Members of the U.S. Armed Forces who receive and 
follow lawful orders such as these are entitled to rely upon the legal judgments of their military and civilian 
superiors.624  The soldiers of Task Force Ryan did precisely what they were ordered to do in a professional 
623
 In determining whether a given weapon inflicts unnecessary suffering it is necessary to consider not merely the extent of that 
suffering but to balance it with the effectiveness of that weapon, and military effectiveness is calculated by measuring the success 
in destroying or neutralizing military material, in restricting the movement of enemy forces, in interdicting enemy lines of 
communication and command, in depressing enemy morale and elevating friendly morale, in eroding the stamina and cohesion of 
enemy forces, and in enhancing the security of friendly forces.  Carnahan, supra note_, at 713.  Soldiers can only carry so much 
equipment on any given mission and are never able to access the entire range of weapons in their national arsenals, and 
commanders must make decisions, based on information available, in equipping their forces.  DAVID HUGHES-MORGAN, 
LEGAL CRITERIA FOR THE PROHIBITION OR RESTRICTION OF USE OF CATEGORIES OF CONVENTIONAL 
WEAPONS (1974).  Moreover, where alternate weapons are unavailable, too costly, or ineffective, the use of the chosen 
weapons system is entitled to a presumption that it does not cause unnecessary suffering.  Carnahan, supra note_, at 713.
624
 Prior to the 1920s, unquestioning obedience was demanded of soldiers, and soldiers who followed superior orders enjoyed 
absolute immunity for violations of IHL, as did the high government officials who issued such orders.  ROGERS, supra note_, at 
137; WELLS, supra note_, at xiv (stating that prior to 1944 U.S. soldiers were expected to obey orders without questioning their 
legal legitimacy).  The domestic military regulations of leading states explicitly exempted soldiers acting on superior orders from 
criminal liability.  See, e.g., Rules of Land Warfare (1917), supra note_, at para. 366 (exempting from liability those whose 
violations of IHL were committed under orders from their “government” or “commanders”); R. v. Smith, 17 SCR 561 (1900) 
(acquitting a British soldier who obeyed an order to shoot a civilian who refused to assist the British military effort on the ground 
that the 1899 Manual of Military Law provided that obedience to superior orders was an absolute defense and soldiers were 
entitled to rely upon the lawfulness of the orders issuing from their superiors).  The Nuremburg Tribunals began to erode superior 
orders as a defense, confining it to mitigation of punishment and refusing to permit its applicability as a defense.  See Charter of 
the IMT, supra note_, at Art. 8.  Anticipating this transformation, as well as the impending prosecution of Axis defendants, the 
U.S., under the direction of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, modified its Rules of Land Warfare in November 
1944 to provide that superior orders did not automatically immunize the commission of manifestly unlawful acts.  See Rules of 
Land Warfare (1944), supra note_, at para. 345.1 (amending previous version of superior orders defense to permit prosecution of 
individuals for manifestly unlawful acts).  Although manifestly unlawful acts are generally described as those horrific and ghastly 
deeds which are objectively and gravely morally wrong and positively and clearly prohibited by law, specification of the exact set 
of such acts is difficult, as the law changes over time, and many of the acts soldiers can be lawfully ordered to undertake—
namely, the deliberate killing of strangers—evoke the sentiments of intense revulsion, remorse, disgust, and horror that follow 
directly upon the heels of the commission of a manifestly unlawful act, such as the deliberate killing of POWs, the execution of 
schoolchildren, and rape.  See OSIEL, supra note_, at 113-14 (discussing manifest illegality in depth).  The grave breaches 
provisions supply a ready enumeration of manifestly illegal acts, and most national codes of military regulation accept that a 
soldier may presume the lawfulness of superior orders and be excused from punishment for executing those orders if they prove 
unlawful provided the acts required of him by those orders neither run afoul of the grave breaches provisions nor “involve acts so 
transparently wicked as to foreclose any reasonable mistake concerning their legality.”  Id.  at 5 (“The law is now generally 
understood to require that soldiers resolve all doubts about the legality of a superior’s orders in favor of obedience.  It therefore 
excuses compliance with an illegal order unless [the order is manifestly unlawful.]”).  The corollary to this compromise is that a 
soldier who commits acts of manifest illegality may not defend himself by asserting reliance upon superior orders.
Contemporary U.S. military regulations track this formulation closely, providing that courts-martial are prohibited from 
issuing jury instructions as to the superior orders defense in cases alleging the commission of manifestly illegal acts but free to do 
so in cases where a defendant reasonably did not know that the act giving rise to the allegation of a war crime was unlawful.  
LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1976), supra note_, at para. 509 (“(a) The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an 
order of a superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its character of a war crime, nor 
does it constitute a defense in the trial of an accused individual, unless he did not know and could not reasonably have been 
expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful.  In all cases where the order is held not to constitute a defense to an 
allegation of war crime, the fact that the individual was acting pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment.  
(b) In considering the question whether a superior order constitutes a valid defense, the court shall take into consideration the fact 
that obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of every member of the armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected in 
conditions of war discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the orders received; that certain rules of warfare may be 
controversial; or that an act otherwise amounting to a war crime may be done in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of 
reprisal.  At the same time it must be borne in mind that members of the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders.”); 
U.S. v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 27 (1973-74) (“[T]he acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given him 
by his superior are excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the superior’s order is one which a man of ordinary 
sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in question is actually known to the 
accused to be unlawful.”); U.S. v. Medina, C.M.  427162 (1971) (case not reported) (same); U.S. v. Griffen, 39 CMR 586, 588 
(1968) (same); Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 8-12 (1982) (“It is an affirmative 
defense that the actor, engaging in conduct charged to constitute an offense, does no more than execute an order of his superior in 
the armed services that he does not know to be unlawful.”).
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manner, and each and every one of their acts and omissions were both permissible under the laws of war 
and well within the scope of their lawful orders.  As such they bear no legal responsibility whatsoever for 
OPERATION JEREMIAH.625  Nor can any legal liability be imputed, even under the most expansive 
interpretation of thecommand responsibility doctrine, to any senior military or civilian officials, whose 
lawful orders to subordinates were executed faithfully, professionally, and with all due attention to 
humanitarian considerations.626  There can be no question of superior negligence where each and every act 
and omission of subordinates is both lawful and in compliance with orders, and where, as here, the orders 
themselves are lawful, the issue never arises.627  Furthermore, the President, as head-of-state, along with the 
Secretary of Defense and other public officials, are entitled to immunity for their official acts,628 and 
The legal issue to be determined at a U.S. court-martial is thus whether the act giving rise to the specification with 
which the defendant was charged constitutes a manifestly illegal act for which the superior orders defense is unavailable.  The 
Rome Statute, however, is silent as to the availability of a superior orders defense, suggesting either that the entirely of its 
jurisdiction is concerned with manifestly unlawful acts or that the negotiating parties intended to eliminate the defense. 
625
 For arguments supporting and criticizing the proposition that military personnel who follow orders resulting in extensive 
civilian deaths and destruction can be held criminally responsible on the theory that reasonable military personnel would have 
recognized that the orders required the commission of manifestly unlawful acts, a position essentially identical to that staked out 
by the ICC Prosecutor in this fictonal scenario see Richard Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks 
upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 759 (1965) (discussing the conclusion by a Tokyo District Court that the 
U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki violated the principles of proportionality and distinction under IHL).
626 See supra at note_ (discussing the absolute liability standard of command responsibility proposed by several scholars).  The 
ICC might in theory interpret Article 28 of the Rome Statute to create de facto absolute liability of commanders for the acts of 
their subordinates by dispensing with the element that a commander either order an unlawful act or demonstrate gross and 
wanton negligence by failing to train and supervise his troops and failing to investigate and/or prosecute wrongdoing.  See infra
at note_.  However, such an interpretation, even if it were to attain the status of customary IHL, would not be directly enforceable 
in U.S. courts-martial or in civilian courts of the U.S..  Customary international law is inferior to statutory law and will not be 
enforced in U.S. courts where there is a statute contrary to the international rule.  United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086, 1091 
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Committee of Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F. 2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  The statute on 
point, Article 77 of the Manual for Courts-Martial providing the standard of command responsibility to be applied in a court-
martial thus will trump the emerging customary IHL standard the ICC would seek to apply against U.S. defendants.  See MCM, 
supra note_, at Art. 77.  Whether the ICC, after adopting the absolute liability standard, would concede, under the principle of 
complementarity, that the U.S., in applying the restrictive standard of liability resulting in the acquittal at court-martial of a 
defendant accused of command responsibility, had discharged its obligations in good-faith is a question without an answer.
627
 The argument that the U.S. President and other senior civilian decisionmakers are immune from criminal liability for the acts 
of subordinates in the absence of proof of a direct order requiring performance of unlawful acts or of criminal negligence is 
squarely within the contemporary jurisprudence of command responsibility:
The President of the United States is Commander-in-Chief of its military forces.  Criminal acts committed by those 
forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on the theory of subordination.  The same is true of other high 
commanders in the chain of command.  Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of command from 
that fact alone.  There must be a personal dereliction.  That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or 
where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part.  In the latter case it 
must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to 
acquiescence.
High Command Case, supra note_, at_ .
628
 Since the inception of the state-centric international political and legal order with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, heads-of-
state, along with other very senior civilian officials, enjoyed absolute immunity for their official acts.  See Gilbert Sison, Recent 
Development, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1583 (2000). Although ultimate responsibility for the composition, missions, and rules of engagement of a military force 
rest with the highest civilian decisionmakers, and although it is these senior political leaders who, by authorizing or tolerating 
violations of IHL, bear ultimate responsibility for the crimes of their subordinates, international law, for most of the past four 
centuries, shielded persons in the highest echelons of state power from individual criminal responsibility for violations of IHL.  
M. Cheriff Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 202 n.13 (1998).  However, the historical trend since 1945 has been to hold 
individual government officials, including heads-of-state, accountable for their official actions on the ground that the most 
heinous criminality is ultimately the work of these senior decisionmakers and that to continue to shield their conduct would 
effectively foreclose the imposition of criminal responsibility altogether or, alternatively, hold low-ranking personnel responsible 
for the orders of their superios.  FRYE, supra note_, at 2.  The jurisprudence of the ICTFY suggests that under limited 
circumstances senior civilian and military leaders may be held criminally liable for the acts of subordinates.  See, e.g., Prosecutor 
v. Zejnil Delalic, IT-96-21-T (16 Nov. 1998) (Celebici Case), paras. 356-63, 368-78 (available at 
http://www.un.org.icty/celecici/trialc2/judgment/celtj98116e.pdf) (citing ILC Draft Code Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 49th Sess., 6 May-26 July 1996, 
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10) (extending doctrine of command responsibility to civilian superiors to the 
extent that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates similar to that of military commanders and thus are de facto 
part of the chain of command); Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95- 14/1-T, Judgment, para. 75, Trial Chamber, 
ICTFY (1999) (extending command responsibility over subordinates to civilian leaders who have the “power to sanction” within 
the military hierarchy).  Some commentators warn that the erosion of immunity for the official acts of senior civilian and military 
officials may encourage a “victorious nation [to] convict and execute any or all leaders of a vanquished foe, depending upon the 
prevailing degree of vengeance and the absence of any objective judicial review.  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 38, 40 (J. Murphy, 
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nothing could be more within the scope of official acts of state than a dispatch of national armed forces to 
do battle in self-defense.
The United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify and improve [IHL] 
with the objective of giving the greatest possible protection to victims of [armed] conflicts, consistent with 
legitimate military requirements.629 Accordingly, the U.S. recognized and scrupulously upheld the laws of 
war during OPERATION JEREMIAH.630  However, war crimes and crimes against humanity have become 
dissenting) (suggesting further that, by virtue of the majority opinion upholding the conviction of a senior military commander 
for the unlawful actions of subordinates, all executive officials, including the President of the United States, were now potentially 
liable for the unlawful actions of the armed forces).  Critics of the detention of former Chilean head-of-state General August 
Pinochet on a warrant issued by a Spanish magistrate alleging responsibility in the disappearance of the nationals of several states 
during a 1973 coup reiterated the argument offered by Justice Murphy and claimed that the rejection by a British court of the 
defense of head-of-state immunity, a decision contrary to customary international law, threatened to unsettle a domestic 
compromise reached in Chile and create a political dispute between Chile and the United Kingdom that could threaten 
international peace and security.  See The Queen v. Bow Street Metro, Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1998], 3 
W.L. R. 1456 (H.L.) (citing Article 27, Rome Statute, which states that heads of state are not exempt from criminal prosecution, 
as the basis for rejecting the proferred defense of head of state immunity; Lippman, supra note_, at 58 (warning that extension of 
criminal liability to the policy level is “politically precarious” and potentially destabilizing).  Whether customary IHL still makes 
room for the immunity of heads-of-state and the most senior civilian and military decisionmakers is unclear.  The ICJ ruled that 
an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs enjoys immunity from criminal prosecutions conducted in foreign domestic courts 
during the pendency of his service in office.  See Arrest Warrant of 11 April (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14, 2002), at 
http://www.icj-cij.org, reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 536 (2002).  However, the Rome Statute expressly eliminates the immunity of these 
officials.  See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 25.  Whether the ICC would forge a course similar to that of the ICTFY and 
futher strip immunity from senior civilian and military decisionmakers, or else cotton to the opinion of the ICJ and protect that 
immunity, is uncertain.  For a discussion of the trends in the doctine of the immunity of heads of state and senior civilian 
decisionmakers, see Hazel Fox, The Resolution of the Institute of International Law on the Immunities of Heads of State and 
Government, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 119 (2002); Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from 
Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 595 
(2001); Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 237 (1999).
629
 Message from the President of the United States to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on 
June 10, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
630
 Prior to World War II states, protective of their sovereignty, did not accept the notion that IHL applied to armed conflicts not 
constituting “wars” in the international legal sense of the term—conflicts between sovereign states.  David Turns, Prosecuting 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position of the United Kingdom, 4 J. ARMED CONFL. 1, 24 (1998).  
State sovereignty continues to play a role in determining the applicability of IHL: at present, IHL is applicable in its entirety only 
to international armed conflicts of significant intensity or where war has been declared: noninternational armed conflicts, and 
interstate conflicts of limited dimensions, give rise to a more limited set of obligations incumbent upon states and members of 
their armed forces.  Geoffrey S. Corn & Michael L. Smidt, “To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question”: Contemporary Military 
Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel, ARMY LAW (June 1999), DA PAM. 27-50- 319; see also CHAIRMAN, 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR. 3121.01, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (1 Oct. 1994) 
(stating that only international armed conflicts trigger all the obligations under IHL, and “not all situations involving the use of 
force are armed conflicts under international law.”); KWAKWA, supra note_, at 47 (noting that although the Geneva 
Conventions, widely considered to be the primary source of conventional regulation under IHL, are applicable to interstate 
conflicts, a significant level of intensity is required before an internal armed conflict comes within the limited coverage of 
Common Article 3 of those instruments, and states contest even the applicability of this lesser standard of protection); UNESCO, 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 96-97 (conceding that it is “unclear whether the application of 
[IHL] . . . is called for under conditions of small-scale or low level violence between the armed forces of two or more states” 
unless war has been declared, in which case its applicability is ipso jure and without question); id. at 222 (indicating that the 
question of whether IHL applies to low-intensity conflicts and covert operations is susceptible of multiple pronouncements).  
Nonetheless, the Department of Defense has adopted the official policy that all members of every service component are 
obligated to “comply with the law of war during all conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles 
and spirit of the law of war during all other operations[,]” effectively vitiating the significance of the nature of the particular 
conflict at issue in terms of determining applicable sources of IHL.  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW 
OF WAR PROGRAM (DEC. 9, 1998), para. 5.3.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has ordered that “[t]he Armed Forces 
of the United States will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts however such conflicts are characterized and 
unless otherwise directed by competent authorities will comply with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other 
operations.”).  CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR. 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF 
WAR PROGRAM (12 Aug. 1996).  The official U.S. position, one adopted by many states, comports with the recommendations 
of various NGOs and other organizations which suggest that IHL be actively merged with human rights rights laws and principles 
the better to protect the participants and victims of armed conflicts.  See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, supra note_, at 
xiii (advocating the “[e]xtension to all persons actually participating in armed hostilities amounting to ‘war’ of all the rights and 
duties under the law of war that may be reasonably demanded, regardless of formal recognition of their legal status or their 
conformity to all of the ‘conditions’ traditionally required for belligerent status.”); OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., 
COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF 
WAR 36 (1958) (arguing for liberal extension of protections of Common Article 3 during internal armed conflicts); Parkerson, 
supra note_, at 44 (stating that an examination of state practice reveals that the Geneva Conventions in their entirety are applied 
to every armed conflict between states).
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elastic concepts stretched by propagandists631 to reach lawful acts of self-defense.  Even as the U.S. sets the 
standard for other nations to follow in their observance of humanitarian principles, we must not, and need 
not, give . . . protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.632
To reiterate, OPERATION JEREMIAH was a proportionate, discriminate response ordered by the 
President of the United States consistent with the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the UN 
Charter.  That it resulted in civilian casualties is regrettable, but the responsibility for the destruction of 
civilian lives and property is the sole responsibility of the terrorist group Al Qaida and the Uzbeki sponsors, 
whose decision to site weapons of mass destruction in a house of worship needlessly imperiled the civilian 
population in serial violation of applicable humanitarian law.  The object was limited to the destruction of 
those weapons, which the terrorists intended to use against U.S. citizens, and the choice of weapons and 
tactics—made in consultation with legal advisors in reference to applicable law—was calculated to reduce 
the suffering of the civilian population.  None of the U.S. civilian or military personnel that operationalized 
and executed the lawful orders of the President violated any laws.  Once again, although the U.S. regrets 
civilian casualties subsequent to OPERATION JEREMIAH, given the foregoing the U.S. had no legal 
obligation to investigate or prosecute any of its nationals for their acts or omissions in furtherance of this 
mission, which, by eliminating weapons of mass destruction the terrorists had imminent plans to use 
against U.S. citizens, clearly prevented significantly greater number of civilian deaths.  In sum, no acts or 
omissions of any U.S. nationals satisfy any elements of any crime within ICC jurisdiction, and the U.S. will 
not submit to any tribunal other than the moral judgments of history.633
The Ambassador submitted a draft resolution calling upon the Security Council to delay 
prosecution for one year as provided in Article 16 of the Rome Statute, but it was immediately voted 
down by China, Russia, France, Syria, Iran, Netherlands, and Iraq.  In response, he declared that the U.S., 
as a non-party to the Rome Statute, had no obligation to cooperate634 with an institution the “sole purpose 
of which is to put U.S. citizens and U.S. foreign policy, along with the citizens and policies of our 
adversaries in the War on Terror, up to the skewed judgment of the world.”635  The next day the U.S. 
President issued a terse letter to the ICC President refusing cooperation in the arrest and extradition of the 
named defendants, and in turn the ICC President reported U.S. non-cooperation to the Security Council636
and requested assistance.637  The Security Council voted that afternoon on a Sino-Soviet resolution, 
defeated by a U.S.-UK veto and a bloc of abstentions, which would have condemned the U.S. and 
imposed economic sanctions under Chapter VII for its “failure to surrender for trial the defendants 
631 See BEST, supra note_, at 350 (stating that the treatment of POWs, as well as the prosecution of soldiers who mistreat POWs, 
is part of the propaganda campaign at the heart of every modern conflict).
632
 Message, supra note_, at 7 (reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 910 (1987).
633 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The chief restraint upon those who command the 
physical forces of the country . . . must be their responsibility . . . to the moral judgments of history.”).
634
 Article 87(5) permits the ICC to “invite” states that are not parties to cooperate in its investigation and prosecution of their 
nationals but does not of its own legal force compel them to do so, and Article 89(1) simply provides that the ICC can “request” 
of non-parties the arrest and surrender of their nationals and that only “States Parties” are obligated to comply.  As such, non-
party states cannot be said to have legal duties to cooperate with the ICC unless such duties arise under customary international 
law, which position the U.S. has and would likely continue to reject although the ICTFY has ruled otherwise.  See Prosecutor v. 
Tihomir Blaskic (Judgment on the Request of the Government of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber of 18 
July 1997, IT-95- 14- AR 108, 29 October 1997, at para. 26 (holding that cooperation with the ICTFY was an obligation “erga 
omnes.”).  However, some of the most outspoken advocates of the ICC concede that it “makes little sense for State parties that 
have not accepted the jurisdiction of the [ICC] with respect to the particular crime under investigation or prosecution to be under 
any legal obligation to cooperate with the [ICC].” Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About An International Criminal Court, 6 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 103, 117 (1994).
635
 Mark Matthews, Court has to Get By Without U.S.; Tribunal: Denied the Right to Exempt its Nationals from the Jurisdiction of 
the Planned International Criminal Court, America Opts Out of the Treaty, BALT. SUN, Jul. 22, 1998, at A2 (quoting 
spokesman for Sen. Jesse Helms).
636 See Blaskic, supra note_, at para. 33 (“[The ICTFY] is endowed with the inherent power to make a judicial finding concerning 
a state’s failure to observe the provisions of the Statute or the Rules.  It has also the power to report this judicial finding to the 
Security Council[.]”).  Similar power might be conferred upon the ICC.
637 See Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber of 18 July 
1997) (IT-95- 14-AR108), 2 October 997, paras. 25-37 (holding that the president of an international criminal tribunal may 
request that the Security Council force compliance with arrest warrants).
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associated with OPERATION JEREMIAH, an act of state terrorism,” although the General Assembly 
called upon member states to contribute forces to enforce the ICC request for U.S. cooperation.638
In light of the failure of the Security Council to compel U.S. cooperation in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Task Force Ryan., the Prosecutor tried the defendants in absentia.639  After a bench trial 
lasting one month, all were convicted on all counts of the indictment.  In response, the U.S. Congress 
passed a joint resolution authorizing the President “to use all necessary force to prevent the forcible 
abduction or rendition of any U.S. national associated with OPERATION JEREMIAH.”640  The 
legislation also resolved that should any state assist the ICC in its efforts to obtain physical custody over 
these U.S. nationals, “a state of war will exist between the United States and that nation.”
C.  Lessons
The preceding analysis suggests that the substantive content of IHL secures compliance to the 
extent that it does so not because the rules and regulations are constitutive of a positive legal canon but 
because those aspects of the canon that soldiers obey are already internal to the martial profession in the 
form of the martial code.  The juxtaposition of the two paradigms suggests further that “to be broadly 
acceptable in practice, rules [of IHL] must respect the reasonable requirements of the armed forces for the 
efficient conduct of hostilities and minimization of their casualties, while equally being consistent with 
generally accepted humanitarian principles.”641  Accordingly, institutions called to adjudicate alleged 
violations of IHL ought to immunize, rather than criminalize, good-faith measures undertaken to defend 
law and civilization, even if and where such measures depart from the formal, positive legal prescriptions 
and proscriptions of IHL, particularly as that canon comes to be interpreted by outsiders to the martial 
profession.642  Where a modality of adjudication would criminalize acts promotive of the ends law is 
638 See Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377(A) (June 1950) (“Resolv[ing] that if the Security Council fails to exercise its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view toward making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures[.]”) (providing legal 
justification for collective enforcement measures against North Korea when the Security Council was paralyzed).
639
 Although the Rome Statute as codified prohibits trial in absentia, the Statute can be amended to provide for de novo trial of a 
defendant upon his capture and rendition to the custody of the ICC even if he has been previously tried and convicted before the 
ICC.  See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art._ (prohibiting trial in absentia); but see id. at Art. 121 (permitting amendment of the 
Rome Statute).  Some scholars urge the amendment of the Rome Statute to permit trial in absentia in order to enable the 
preservation of witness testimony and documentary evidence as well as to diminish the incentive for states to resist cooperation 
with the ICC.  See, e.g., Chase, supra note_, at 196.  The ICTFY has considered, but not attempted, the trial in absentia of 
defendants not in the custody of the tribunal, a proceeding permissible under Rule 61 of the Statute of the ICTFY, on the ground 
that to fail to do so would likely have the effect of permanently precluding the adjudication of their guilt or innocence and as such 
would frustrate the interests of justice and the purpose of the ICTFY.  See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 25, 1997, at 47 
(quoting Richard Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTFY).
640
 Under customary international law, the forcible rendition of acriminal suspect or convict in connection with a crime committed 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the rendering state is permissible under the principle of universal jurisdiction in regard to 
crimes including, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 
1991); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, Dist. Ct. Jerusalem (Isr. 1961), 36 INT’L L. REP. 5 (1961). Forcible rendition to 
hale the offender into the U.S. is permissible as well under U.S. law.  See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) 
(applying the Kerr-Frisbie rule to hold that the forcible rendition of a criminal suspect from a state with which the U.S. 
maintained a treaty of extradition was permissible under U.S. law); United States v. Rezaq, 908 F. Supp. 6 (D. D.C. 1995) (same).  
Moreover, the Rome Statute imposes general and specific obligations upon States Parties to cooperate with the ICC under 
Articles 86, 87, and 93, and 111, to include in the rendition of persons it has formally accused or convicted of crimes within its 
jurisdiction.  For the U.S. to object to the rendition of U.S. nationals, forcible or otherwise, by State Parties to the ICC, it would 
appear obligated to do so upon non-legal grounds, and to seek non-legal remedies in the event of such rendition.
641
 OSIEL, supra note_, at 31-32.
642
 The duty to defend Western civilization—the highest good imaginable—implies the duty to craft and wield those weapons that 
enable this defense. See Gross, supra note_, at 460 (charging the West with this duty).  Thus, the duty of the Western democratic 
state, engaged in a war against Islamic terror, to its own citizens may mitigate, or even obviate, any correlative duty to non-
citizens to strictly observe of all the politically malleable principles of IHL.
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tasked to serve, that modality is objectively dysfunctional.  Martial honor, reliant upon a regime of self-
regulation that secures compliance with a rigorous code of conduct upon pain of disgrace and death while 
nonetheless recognizing exigencies unique to the experience of the combat soldier and immunizing all but 
those acts that genuinely and universally smack of barbarism, is not only conducive to a more holistic and 
stricter standard of judgment of the martial caste but better suited than the ICC to accomplishing the 
critical functional task of suppressing inhumanity in war without disabling the defense against existential 
threats posed by manifestly evil adversaries dedicated to the destruction of civilization.643
Moreover, the contrast between martial honor and the ICC also demonstrate that the stakes 
associated with the choice of paradigms have been raised by the drift of the IHL canon over the past 
quarter-century.  The provisions of the Protocols Additional purporting to redefine proportionality and 
distinction drain the principle of necessity of nearly all meaning,644 and pronouncements upon the legality 
of particular weapons systems have  similarly inured to the benefit of terrorist groups and rogue states 
masquerading as lawful combatants.645  Further, the proliferation of dubious declarations as to what 
constitutes customary IHL, and perhaps even more importantly, how it is to be interpreted in adjudging 
individual criminal responsibility in connection with the use of certain methods and means of war, along 
with intemperate claims that preemption is synonymous with aggression, threaten to disrupt what remains 
of the equilibrium between operational necessities and IHL and fetter the self-defense measures 
undertaken by states in response to global terrorism.  In short, contemporary IHL absolutists, by eliding 
distinctions between lawful and unlawful combatants and adopting an interpretive approach absolute with 
respect to observance of self-declared rules concerning methods and means of war (the jus in bello)646 but 
agnostic with respect to the justice of the cause on behalf of which combatants take up arms (the jus ad 
bellum),647 privilege terrorists at the expense of their targets.
In other words, the credibility of IHL, cut adrift to terrorists’ advantage, is at a nadir at an 
extraordinarily unpropitious moment in world history to bull forward with an ill-conceived, absolutist 
catechism.  The contemporary push to simultaneously formalize and internationalize adjudication of 
(alleged) violations committed under such exigent circumstances, a misguided crusade that offers succor 
to terrorists, is the legitimate subject of critical examination.648  However, despite incipient awareness that 
IHL is waxing perilously anachronistic with respect to the scourge of terrorism,649 heretofore there has 
643
 For a discussion of functionalist theory, see infra at note_.
644 See Carnahan, supra note_, at 232 (describing the principle of military necessity from the perspective of IHL absolutists as 
“something that must be overcome or ignored if [IHL] is to develop[.]”).
645 See supra at note_.
646 See supra note_ (defining jus in bello).
647
 See supra note_ (defining jus ad bellum).
648
 Criticism is a “crucial part of the historical process through which [IHL] is made.”  WALZER, supra note_, at 43-44.  Just as 
its historical evolution toward greater protections was induced by post hoc casuistry and subjected to philosophical criticism, its 
venture into a new era of asymmetrical warfare ought to be accompanied at every step by the requisite degree of criticism 
necessary to ensure its continued functionality lest IHL become an unrealistic regime inapplicable to modern combat.  See
FLORY, supra note_, at (asserting that only the constant re-examination of IHL can forestall its “complete breakdown[.]”).
649
 IHL evolved in consideration of traditional force-on- force conflicts and has been viewed for more than a decade as unsuitable 
for application to conflicts with terrorists and other subnational actors. Personal Conversation with Guy Roberts, May 28, 2003 
(stating that the Protocols Additional were drafted in response to the perception that IHL as it existed in the late 1960s was not 
designed to govern the sort of Third World conflicts likely to predominate in the future).  However, few commentators, until 
recently, have brought this point to the fore.  In a development perhaps unimaginable only several years ago, a growing, yet still 
quiescent, chorus consisting not solely of American voices is calling for the general revisitation of IHL in light of its inutility 
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been no proposal for its substantial modification.650  In part this is attributable to the magnitude of the 
venture: the defense by rationalization of IHL necessitates more than the modification of tactics: it 
requires re-examination, and perhaps re-imagination, of the IHL canon, as well as the reclamation of 
responsibility for its creation and application651 by the predominant actor—the U.S.—that has consistently 
been able and willing to defend it, and the civilization from whence it sprung, against barbarism.  In some 
measure it is due to a lack of scholarly temerity: the very act of challenging the adequacy of IHL, save by 
advocating greater restrictions upon state military forces, is considered by many within the academy to be 
impolitic, if not heretical, and repudiating the prevailing claims of moral equivalence between democratic 
states and their terrorist enemies and suggesting a wide margin of appreciation for the former, may be 
grounds for excommunication.652 Nonetheless, because the defeat of terrorism is prefigured by the 
development of not merely an effective military strategy but also a common legal strategy with which 
those arrayed against terror can reverse the base exploitation of IHL that occupies so central a position in 
the terrorist campaign,653 the next Part reintroduces the concept of “barbarians” as the framework around 
which to craft a legal strategy intended to internalize the costs of terrorists’ violations of IHL while 
empowering, rather than hobbling, the robust application of military force to the defense of global order.
III. Contra Barbarum: A Proposal for a Rationalized Theory of the Laws of War
A.  Barbarians: A Conceptual Definition
The ancient Greeks and Romans, who believed in a natural moral order inherent in the universe 
which bound all peoples and upon which law rightly supervened,654 divided the world into two spheres, 
with respect to the War on Terror.   See, e.g., Address by Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, at the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Feb. 20, 2002 (“The war on terror is a new type of war not envisioned when the 
Geneva Conventions were negotiated and signed . . . We should look at all international documents to see whether they are 
compatible with this moment in history.”); see also Embassy of Switzerland, Washington, D.C., Communication to U.S. 
Department of State, Sept. 13, 2002 (stating that the Swiss Foreign Ministry “wishes to . . . provide a space for debate on the 
reaffirmation and development of [IHL] in light of the new and evolving realities of contemporary conflict situations.”).
650
 The ICC framers did contemplate the eventual  addition of terrorism to ICC jurisdiction.  See Rome Statute, Annex I, Res. E, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998).  However, neither the Rome Statute nor any other instrument or commentary has propounded 
the sort of major revision several commentators suggest is essential to the defeat of terrorism.  See Roberts, supra note_, at 43 
(expressing surprise that, despite the shock of September 11th, as of January 2003 “[t]here has neither been a serious suggestion 
that the existing legal framework [of IHL] should be abandoned, nor substantial proposals for an alternative set of rules.”).
651 See supra at note_ (discussing the detrimental shift in “ownership” over IHL).
652
 So powerful is its compliance pull that even official U.S. policymakers shy away from acknowledging its shortcomings. JEAN 
B. ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR 71 (2002) (“Somewhere along the line, the idea took hold that, to be an 
intellectual, you have to be against it, whatever it is.  The intellectual is a negator.”).  A few brave scholars admit that IHL is due 
for consideration..  See, e.g., George Wright, Combating Civilian Casualties: Rules and Balancing in the Developing Law of 
War, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 129 (2003) (stating that the law of war is “due for reassessment”); Bryan Hehir, Just War 
Theory in a Post-Cold World, 20 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 237, 238 (discussing danger in “understating how completely we need 
to rethink war, politics, and ethics today”).
653
 To suggest the centrality of a legal strategy to the defeat of terrorism is not to deny the importance of other policy instruments, 
such as diplomacy and the dissemination of democratic principles, to the long-term objective of civilizational coexistence with 
Islam.  See JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR (2003) (arguing that the War on Terror requires a 
short-term military solution and a long-term political solution achievable through promotion of democracy and human rights).  
654 See WOODROW W. BORAH, JUSTICE BY INSURANCE 6 (1983) (discussing Greco-Roman concept of divine ordination 
of universal moral-legal order); O.F. ROBINSON, THE SOURCES OF ROMAN LAW (same).  Ancient Confucian societies 
shared the Greco-Roman concept of a natural universal order to which barbarians did not conform.  See Alice Erh-Soon Tay, 
Legal Culture and Legal Pluralism in Common Law, Customary Law, and Chinese Law, 26 HONG KONG L. J. 194, 205 (1996) 
(“The barbarians are covetous for gain—human-faced but animal-hearted . . . As for clothing, food and language, the barbarians 
are entirely different from the people of the Middle Kingdom . . . Therefore, the sage rulers . . . neither established contact with 
them nor subjugated them. . . [T]hey are always to be considered as outsiders, never as citizens.  Our administration and 
teachings have never reached their people . . . Punish them when they come in and guard against them when they retreat . . . 
Restrain them continually[.]”) (quoting official Han Dynasty history).  However, Confucian societies closed themselves off from 
barbarians not because barbarians abjured responsibilities under public law in favor of private authority but because barbarians, 
unlike Confucians, required extensive regulation.  See ZIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE 
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with the first inhabited by “civilized” peoples whose affairs were governed by public laws and ethical 
principles derived from this order and the second the domain of savage, hedonistic, immoral “barbarians” 
who rejected public legal authority and invested political power in a head-man in whom they tolerated 
corrupt authoritarianism.655  Whereas civilized people committed themselves to cities, culture, learning, 
commerce, and diplomacy, barbarians were nomadic groups bereft of letters, culture, and alliances656
whose sole occupations were destruction, pillage, and war.657  To keep barbarism at bay, Roman law 
incorporated stark dichotomies as between barbarians,658 near-rightless persons who by virtue of their 
existence beyond the pale of law-governed civilization were not entitled to the sacred privileges of 
Roman citizenship659 including the protections of Roman civil law (jus civile),660 and citizens (cives), who 
enjoyed full legal personhood under jus civile.661  In other words, “barbarian” connoted rejection of a 
civilization constituted around public law and obligations descending therefrom in favor of parochial 
customs and rules and private sources of authority.  In contrast, a “citizen” was a member of civilization 
who accepted the rule of public law and attendant obligations, including taxation and military service,662
and citizenship, a precious concept, imposed the unremitting obligation to behave in keeping with duties 
to the natural legal order upon which civilization rested: a citizen convicted of a serious crime forfeited 
his citizenship and assumed the status of a de facto barbarian,663 as did cives captured in war664 and others 
TRADITION 20-21 (1997) (restating position that “law was for barbarians, not for Confucians, because an ideal society did not 
require extensive legislation . . . and law was an instrument of last resort.”).  The Confucian position—that the need for, rather 
than the source of, regulation is determinative of barbarian status—is at variance with the Greco-Roman position.  For purposes 
of parsimony, the latter position serves as the historical foundation for the conceptual definition of barbarians in this Article.
655
 S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW.  For a thorough discussion of the moral, cultural, and philosophical grounds upon which the 
ancients distinguished between civilized peoples and barbarians, see THEODESIAN CODE (C. Pharr transl.) at 3-7; C. 
GIBBON, DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (); M.P. Pearson, Beyond the Pale: Barbarian Social Dynamics 
in Western Europe, 198- 226, in J.C. Barrett, A.P. Fitzpatrick, & L. Macinnes, Barbarians and Romans in North-west Europe from 
the later Republic to Late Antiquity (1989); PETER S. WELLS, THE BARBARIANS SPEAK: HOW THE CONQUERED 
PEOPLES SHAPED ROMAN EUROPE (2001).
656 See John Stuart Mill, Civilization, in Essays on Politics and Culture (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed. 1962), at 49 (contending that 
“none but civilized nations . . . ever . .  form[ed] an alliance.”).
657
 According to the ancient Roman historian Herodotus in his Histories, “Barbarians can neither think nor act rationally [and] . . . 
are driven by evil spirits . . . who force them to commit the most terrible acts . . . [They] are incapable of living according to 
written laws and only reluctantly tolerating kings . . . Barbarians are without restraint[.]”  Cited in HERWIG WOLFRAM, THE 
HISTORY OF THE GOTHS 6-7 (1990). Tacitus’ Germania, written in the first century A.D., elaborates a similar disgust with 
barbarian venality in contrast with Roman virtue.  See CORNELIUS TACITUS, GERMANIA 6-10 (J.B. Rives transl. 1999) 
(describing barbarians as a violent, slothful, hedonistic people largely without laws).  Contemporary accounts of the disparities 
between ancient barbarians and civilized contemporaries track closely with this formulation.  See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra
note_, at 321 (contrasting the “rich accomplishments in religion, art, literature, philosophy, science, morality, and compassion” of 
the “world’s great civilizations” with their absence in barbarian “cultures”).  Some scholars contest the Greco-Roman view of 
barbarians as destructive, warmongering philistines bereft of morals and ethics and insist that barbarians possessed rich cultures 
and effective, if private, legal systems that strove to uphold certain virtues.  See generally MARC SALTER, BARBARIANS IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2002).  However, it is not necessary to prove or disprove either thesis to borrow the concept 
of a distinction between civilization and barbarism and transfer that concept to analysis of the role of law in the conflict between 
a Western civilization committed to law, order, and a set of ethical principles that categorically proscribe terrorism on the one 
hand and a group of anti-civilizational terrorists committed to destruction of these values and principles on the other.
658
 Roman jus civile originally divided free peoples into two classes—cives (citizens) and peregrini, a category that included 
aliens, barbarians, and others who could claim no rights either private or public. SCOTT, supra note_.  A third class, latini, was 
added later.  Id.  Slaves could be made of persons from any of the preceding categories.  
659
 WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 201 (1989).
660 See id. at 202 (describing barbarians as outlaws subject to jus gentium (law of peoples) and not the more favorable jus civile)
661 Id. at 200 (noting that Roman jurisprudence was exclusively applicable to only those enjoying Roman citizenship, the cives).
662
 SCOTT, supra note_, at_.
663 Id.  at_ (indicating that loss of citizenship imposed a condition akin to outlawry).
664
 BURDICK, supra note_, at 204-05.
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who suffered impairment of their civic honor.665  The distinction was crucial: armed operations against 
barbarians could be initiated without invoking the blessings and protection of the Roman gods that 
preceded wars against non-barbarians because the former did not possess the legal personality necessary 
to be legitimate subjects of warmaking,666 and Roman military commanders were granted near-unlimited 
authority to destroy barbarians to whom the Roman laws of war did not reach.667  When fighting 
barbarians, the bellum hostile, a regime characterized by restraint, was supplanted by the unlimited bellum 
romanum.
668
 Similarly, the Greeks accepted no restraints in conflicts with barbarians.669
The citizen-barbarian distinction, drawn to sharply limn the separation between societies 
organized around public law on the one hand and the rule of man on the other, coupled with the 
application of different sets of rules and norms to govern armed conflicts against citizen as distinct from 
barbarian enemies, survived the fall of Rome, and from 400-900 A.D. much of Europe evolved pluralistic 
legal systems that applied one law, the lex romanum, to Romans and another, known as the lex 
barbarorum, to tribes and political communities beyond the reach of the Roman legal order.670  However, 
by the second millennium, the diffusion of Roman law671 and the rise of strong nation-states with 
institutions of organized coercion effective in securing compliance with codified systems of public law 
drew vast areas outside the former boundaries of Roman rule within the realm of civilization, a process 
that largely subsumed the lex barbarorum.672  Nonetheless, certain individuals and groups continued to 
resist the tide of history and remain outside the reach of public laws and institutions, and the citizen-
barbarian distinction thus became important less to specifying imperial boundaries than to the 
development of new legal regimes to counter the emerging phenomenon of transnational criminality.
In medieval England, those who defied legal obligations by refusing to appear in court when 
summoned673 or committing particularly egregious felonies were held to be beyond the protection of the 
law under the doctrine of “outlawry.”674  Outlaws, as persons with no enforceable legal rights,675 could be 
665
 Civic honor, an essential element of Roman citizenship, obligated cives to conduct themselves so as not to bring disgrace upon 
Rome and so as to remain fit to render service to civilization.  Id. at 208.  Cives who failed in this duty suffered immediate 
impairment of civic honor and were stripped of citizenship.  Id. at 209 (explaining Roman doctrine of infamia immediata).
666
 JULIUS CAESAR, GALLIC WARS 5.55 (note).
667
 ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 6-7, 9 (1988) (noting that whereas non-barbarian enemies might be taken 
prisoner or otherwise granted the benefit of the protections of Roman laws of war, barbarians were generally denied quarter 
unless they agreed to accept the laws and political authority of Rome).  Against barbarians, in the words of the Roman Senator 
and jurist Marcus Tullius Cicero utted in 50 B.C., silent leges inter arma (“In time of war the law is silent.”).
668 See HOWARD ET AL., supra note_, at 34 (elaborating distinctions between bellum hostile , a war between civilized peoples 
in which nascent restraints of the era were operative, and bellum romanum, a “war of fire and sword” without any legal restraints 
whatsoever which could be fought only against barbarians).
669 See PLATO, MENEXENUS (recommending moderation in relations between Greeks but none in relation to barbarians).
670
 Tay, supra note_, at 198.
671 See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (1999) (discussing diffusion of Roman law).
672
 Not all the known world became “civilized,” and medieval Christians were cnouraged by secular and clerical elites to take up 
arms against the barbarian Muslims.  See AUGUST C. KREY, THE FIRST CRUSADE: THE ACCOUNTS OF 
EYEWITNESSES AND PARTICIPANTS (1921) (describing exhortatio ad bellum contra barbaros--the call to Christian 
Crusaders to take up arms against the barbarians holding Jerusalem).
673 See 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 604-07 (5th ed. 1942) (stating that failure to answer 
a minor charge when summoned to court resulted in forfeiture of property and chattels, whereas failure to answer a felony charge, 
particularly of treason, was considered a tacit admission of the charge that resulted in conviction of the offense and outlawry).
674 See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 449 (2d ed. 1899) 
(describing “outlawry” as the condition of being an object, rather than a subject, of law, and of being beyond the protection of the 
civilized legal order).
675 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 319 (describing legal status of outlaw as “put out of the protection of 
the law; so that he is incapable of taking the benefit of it in any respect[.]”).
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killed by all upon sight, and their property was forfeit, by operation of law, to the crown.676  Likewise, 
associates of outlaws were outlawed and subjected to summary punishment, as were the issue of traitors 
in punishment for treason.677  A decree of outlawry could not be evaded by flight: comity provided that 
those outlawed by one court were accorded the same status in other jurisdictions.678 With the rise of 
piracy in the 16th century, international law drew from the ancient barbarian distinction, along with the 
doctrine of outlawry, to provide that pirates and other private bands of organized criminals679 were in 
perpetual war with all mankind680 and thus, as hostis humani generis subject to attack by any and all 
persons at any time681 without legal niceties, such as a declaration of war682 or the protection of the laws.683
Regardless of nationality, all persons were entitled, under universal jurisdiction684 and principles of natural 
law harkening to the ancients,685 to capture and summarily kill pirates.686
676 See id. (noting that an outlaw under early English law was described as caput lupinum (“having a wolf’s head”), by virtue of 
the fact that he might be “knocked on the head like a wolf by anyone that should meet him.”).  Outlaws were effectively dead to 
the law, or civiliter mortuus (“dead citizens”).
677 See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note_, at 69 (reporting that in a defendant who suffered a "judgment of outlawry upon an 
indictment for felony" or who was convicted of a felony was subjected to "corruption of blood" whereby he lost his ability to 
own, inherit, or devise property.
678 See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note_, at 584 (stating that the legal effect of outlawry extended across jurisdictions by 
the principle of comity and that a “man outlawed in one shire was outlaw everywhere.”).  The adoption of extradition treaties has 
rendered outlawry all but obsolete.
679 See GROTIUS, supra note_, at _ (defining as international outlaws all those banded together for criminal wrongdoing, 
including pirates, but excluding states that engaged in illegal acts on the ground that their wrongdoing was nevertheless 
authorized by legitimate public authority and thus not anti-civilizational).
680 See GENTILI, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF WAR (1598) (classifiying pirates as outlaws and “common enemies of 
all mankind”).
681 See RUBIN, supra note_, at 87 (“[A]ll Pirates and Sea-rovers, . . . are in the Eye of the Law Hostes Humani generis, Enemies 
not of one Nation . . . only, but of all Mankind.  They are outlawed . . . by the Laws of all Nations; that is, out of the Protection of 
all Princes and of all Laws whatsoever.  Every Body is commissioned, and is to be armed against them . . . to subdue and to root 
them out.”) (citing 17th century scholar Leoline Jenkins).
682
 PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARY ET BELLO TRACTATUS (1564).
683 See GENTILI, supra note_ (stating that the laws of war are not applicable to pirates on the ground that the protections of 
international law are applicable only to those acting under the command of a legitimate sovereign and that pirates are merely 
private miscreants unauthorized to engage in violence by a legitimate public sovereign); RUBIN, supra note_, at 70 (stating that 
pirates, by rendering themselves enemies of all mankind “ha[ve] thereby lost [their] right in the law of nations.”) (quoting 17th
century statement of the King’s Advocate of the Admiralty, Dr. William Oldys); 30 Fed. Cas. 1049, No. 18,277 (16 Oct. 1861), at 
1049-50 (“[Pirates] carry on war, but it is not natural war; and they are not entitled to the benefit of the usages of modern 
civilized international war.  There being no government with which a treaty can be made, or which can be recognized as 
responsible for the acts of individuals, the individuals themselves are [liable to punishment].”).  The treatment of pirates as 
outlaws by virtue of their lack of connection to any legitimate public authority is consistent with the contemporary development 
of the category of unlawful combatants by the Bush Administration.  See supra at note_.
684
 The modern principle of universal jurisdiction under international law holds that some crimes are so universally abhorrent that 
their perpetrators are hostis humani generis—enemies of all manking—and that jurisdiction may be based solely on obtaining 
physical custody over the perpetrators.  See REST. (3rd) FOR. REL. L. U.S., §494 (“A state has jurisdiction to define and 
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave 
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even when none of the bases 
of jurisdiction indicated in §402 [such as territoriality or nationality of the accused or victim] are present.”).  A state exercising 
universal jurisdiction prosecutes a criminal under its own law, rather than that of the state where the crime was committed, or 
under international law on the theory that the prosecuting state is acting on behalf of all mankind.  The earliest origins of 
universal jurisdiction trace to the struggle against piracy.  For a thorough discussion of universal jurisdiction, see generally
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988).
685
 Renaissance commentators indicated that the basis for the assertion of universal jurisdiction over piracy had roots in the theory 
that pirates were morally akin to barbarians in that by existing beyond the scope of public law they committed the unpardonable 
sin of threatening the natural legal order constituting and defending civilization.  See, e.g., CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE 
MARITIMO 38 (1677) (stating that “the old natural liberty remains in places where are no judgments” and that instead of 
resorting to judicial process “Justice may be done upon [pirates] by the Law of Nature[.]”) (RUBIN, supra note_, at 86.).
686 See id. at 40 (citing Royal Proclamation declaring “all pyrates and rovers” to be “out of [royal] protection, and lawfully to be 
by any person taken, punished, and suppressed with extremity.”).  Prior to the 19th century, pirates were typically condemned 
after a brief hearing and executed.  See MOLLOY, supra note_, at 38 (“If Pirats . . . happen to be overcome, the Captors are not 
obliged to bring them to any Port, but may expose them immediately to punishment by hanging them up at the main Yard end 
before a departure . . . So likewise, if the Captors bring [the pirates] to the next Power, and the Judge openly rejects the Tryal, or 
the Captors cannot wait for the Judge without certain peril and loss, . . . the [pirates] may be there executed by the Captors.”).  
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Historically, barbarians disentitled themselves from the protections of the jus in bello, a body of 
regulation contracted as between legitimate public sovereigns, and in contemplation of the threat posed by 
the predations of pirates and others of their ilk, states claimed the sovereign prerogative to modify the 
scope of application of IHL to better enable the punishment of offenses against the “law of nations” and 
the defense of civilization against such attacks.687  In the words of 17th century scholar Emmerich Vatel, 
“as for those monsters who . . . act as a scourge and plague of the human race, they are nothing more than 
wild beasts, of whom every man of courage may justly purge the earth.”688  Modern IHL, erected in 
service to the moral conviction that the most egregious war criminals are violators of norms of jus cogens
and deserving of the most serious legal sanction available,689 is at the very least permissive of the 
declaration of the authors of unlawful private acts of violence hostile to the natural legal order buttressing 
civilization as barbarians subject to death upon capture.690  The precedents stretch to the Lieber Code:
Although pirates were afforded due process protections in the 19th century, states retained legislation permitting their summary 
trial and execution.  See, e.g., 30 Fed. Cas. 1049, No. 18,277 (16 Oct. 1861), at 1049-50 (“All civilized nations . . . are under a 
moral obligation, to . . . suppress [pirates], . . . [who] are liable to be put to death for the suppression of their hostilities.”). A 
series of treaties commit states to the suppression and punishment of piracy, and the pirate continues to be “treated as an outlaw . 
. . whom any nation may in the interest of all capture and punish[.]” The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. Series A., No. 10, at 70 
(dissent); see also Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (10 Dec. 1982), at Articles 
100-110 (defining piracy as a crime of universal jurisdiction and requiring states to cooperate in its suppression and punishment).
687 See Wedgwood, supra note_, at 564 (stating that Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution granting power to Congress to 
define and punish piracy as well as offenses against the “law of nations” was framed to permit derogation from IHL in the case of 
pirates, a category of unlawful belligerents to whom the Framers did not intend to extend the protections of IHL).  The extension 
of Congressional jurisdiction to punish violations of the “law of nations” extends to the punishment of war criminals and 
provides the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over enemies accused of pre-capture crimes.  See U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, cl. 
10 (providing Congress with broad authority for trial of those who commit criminal offenses “against the Law of Nations” and 
thus creating the constitutional basis for creating tribunals to try enemy belligerents).   With the Geneva Conventions of 1949 the 
U.S. accepted the obligation to extend to enemy belligerents charged with pre-capture offenses, regardless of their legal status, 
the benefits of the identical courts and procedures applicable to the prosecution of members of the U.S. Armed Forces for 
violations of IHL.  See GCIII, supra note_, at Art. 85.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, prior to U.S. ratification of the 
Geneva Conventions, that an enemy belligerent is not entitled to this benefit for violations committed pre-capture, and has not 
revisited the question since 1945.  See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 22 (denying habeas corpus relief to enemy POW convicted by 
a military commission on ground that the “same courts-same procedures” rule from the Geneva Convention of 1929 did not apply 
to pre-capture offenses).  Whether an unlawful combatant accused of pre-capture violations of the “law of nations,” specifically 
violations of IHL, is entitled to the benefits of court-martial, as opposed to military tribunal, is hotly debated.  For a critical 
discussion of the scope and source of legislative and executive powers to create tribunals to prosecute violations of the “law of 
nations,” a contentious topic beyond the scope of this Article, see, e.g., Mark S. Martins, National Forums for Punishing Offenses 
Against International Law: Might U.S. Soldiers Have Their Day in the Same Court, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 659 (1996). 
688
 EMMERICH VATTEL, II THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 4, at 132.
689
 A norm of “jus cogens,” or a peremptory norm, is recognized by the entire international community as one from which no 
derogation is permitted and which cannot be modified save by a subsequent norm of general character.  Norms of jus cogens limit 
state sovereignty and immunity in that the general will of the international community takes precedence over the individual will 
of states to order their international relations.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
92-1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entry into force Jan. 27, 1990) (defining norms of jus cogens); see also REST. (THIRD) OF FOR. 
REL. L. U.S. §102 cmt. K, Reporter’s Note 6 (1987) (defining jus cogens as a narrow subset of customary international law 
norms, including prohibitions against genocide, slavery, torture, and terrorism, that sit atop the international legal hierarchy and 
preempt conflicting treaties and norms).  Many commentators insist that prohibitions against war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, acts which threaten to “subvert the very foundations of the enlightened international community as a whole,” have 
ascended to the apex of the normative pyramid of international law, and that “those who commit war crimes are the 
contemporary hostis humani generis. S.Z. Peller, Jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 32-33 (M. Cherif. Bassiouni and Ved Nanda eds., 1973).  The work of the post-World 
War II tribunals in identifying, prosecuting, and disposing of the principle architects of aggression, genocide, and war crimes 
consistent with the joint legal-moral theory that these acts constituted crimes against the entire international community supports 
the argument that war criminals are an anti-civilizational force.  See Joyner, supra note_, at 167-68 (arguing that Nuremburg and 
subsequent jurisprudence reinforces the claim that war crimes “violent and predatory actions that descend to the level of gross 
bestiality[,] . . . offend the law of civilized states and have therefore been declared . . . crimes against universal law.”).
690
 Concerted post World War II efforts to immunize the conduct of broad categories of belligerents who do not meet the 
traditional requirements of combatancy (including open carry of arms, acceptance of obligations under IHL, responsible 
command structure, and a fixed insignia visible at a distance), including spies, saboteurs, and guerrillas, led, in part, to the 
development of the provisions in the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols Additional that confer additional protections upon 
these actors.  See supra at note_.  A number of states, and the European Court of Human Rights, have accepted the view that 
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Men . . . who commit hostilities . . . without being part . . .of the organized army, and without sharing 
continuously in the war, but who do so with intermittent return to their homes and avocations, or with the 
occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or 
appearance of soldiers . . . are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the 
privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.691
Furthermore, the historical practice of states with regard to reprisals against and trials of war 
criminals evinces that violations committed by soldiers in battle have long been considered serious 
assaults upon the integrity of the system of public law that justify death as the only condign punishment.692
Although the Geneva Conventions and Protocols Additional reject the outlawry of and summary reprisal 
against guerrillas and others who abjure obligations under IHL693 as archaisms in favor of an approach 
originating in the broadly protective law of human rights, terrorism calls into question whether recent 
expansions of the panoply of rights and privileges to which terrorists are judged entitled presumes, 
contrary to fact, that they are susceptible to deterrence by legal sanctions,694 or that they have a stake in the 
these instruments preclude the trial of otherwise unprivileged belligerents for unlawful combatancy in domestic military courts.  
See David B. Rivkin & Lee Casey, The Crime of Unlawful Combatancy, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at 9 (reporting the 
British belief that the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Britain is a party, prohibits the use of military 
commissions to try “unprivileged” or “unlawful” combatants).  Not all states, however, accept that these instruments have 
modified the international common law of war.  See supra at note_ (discussing U.S. objections to various provisions of the 
Protocols Additional purporting to alter the law of unprivileged belligerency).  Many states and commentators consider unlawful 
belligerents disentitled to treatment as POWs, and liable to prosecution, and execution, upon capture.  See Nurick and Barrett, 
Legality of Guerrilla Forces under the Laws of War, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (1946) (restating traditional position with respect to 
unprivileged belligerents); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 312 (2d. ed. 1912): “Since international 
law is a law between States only and exclusively, no rules of International Law can exist which prohibit private individuals from 
taking up arms and committing hostilities against the enemy.  But private individuals committing such acts do not enjoy the 
privileges of members of the armed forces, and the enemy has according to a customary rule of International Law the right to 
consider and punish such individuals as war criminals.”); Baxter, supra note_, at 327 (stating that under customary IHL “it has 
generally been understood that [guerrilas, partisans, so called ‘war traitors,’ francs-tireurs, and other persons who, in the face of 
the enemy or behind the lines, have committed hostile acts without meeting the qualifications prescribed for lawful belligerents] 
are subject to the death penalty.”); GUSTAVE MOYNIER, CONSIDERATIONS DUR LA SANCTION PENALE A DONNER 
A LA CONVICTION DE GENEVE (1893) (indicating that the capturing belligerent may put the unprivileged belligerent to 
death under its municipal law); U.S. v. List, 11 TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1245, 8 WAR CRIM. REP. 492 (1949) (holding that 
enemy combatants who fail to meet qualifications for privileged status may be prosecuted by their captors).  The doctrine, as well 
as the legal consequences, of unlawful combatancy remain firmly ensconced in the domestic law of leading military powers, and 
“by universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful population of 
belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.”  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) 
(holding, in denying writs of habeas corpus, sabotage activities carried out by non-uniformed enemy personnel to be unlawful 
combatancy, that unlawful combatancy was violative of IHL and a war crime, and that unlawful combatants are “subject to trial 
and punishment by military tribunals[.]”).  To the category of unlawful combatants whom an armed force may prosecute and 
punish for hostile acts against can be added terrorists, who meet none of the criteria for lawful belligerency; this is the position 
taken by the Bush Administration in its classification of Al Qaida terrorists captured in the War on Terror as “unlawful 
combatants.”  For a discussion of unlawful combatancy generally and as applied to the War on Terror, see (note).
691 See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 82.
692 See supra at notes_.
693 See supra at notes_.
694
 The notion that criminals are amenable to deterrence by the prospect of punishment for their illegal acts is an argument hotly 
debated in domestic criminal law scholarship, and allthough some commentators suggest that “ordinary” would-be war criminals, 
as generally “’respectable’ persons . . . highly esteemed by their superiors” and “not social outcasts or marginal people[,]” can be 
deterred by legal sanctions, the extension of this hypothesis to terrorists—persons who “unlike ordinary criminals . . . belong to 
the category persons in need of being [sic] ‘resocialized’” can be similarly deterred—has little support.  DELISSEN & TANJA, 
supra note_, at 205.  Successful deterrence requires rational actors to reject those choices that will result in costs that exceed 
benefits and to elect those choices that produce benefits in excess of costs, and nonrational actors are exceedingly difficult to 
deter from criminality.  See generally STEVEN MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (1994); Chase, supra note_, at 191 (maintaining that only rational actors can be deterred through the imposition of costs 
associated with the enforcement of law).  Some, and perhaps most, terrorists, for whom the act of terrorism is itself an “ultimate 
satisfaction” and not always a rationally-determined means to a clearly-defined and reachable goal but instead the cause of their 
own destruction, are classically irrational . Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 513, 518 (2003) (contrasting terrorists, “whose avoiwed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents” and who 
actively seek martyrdom, with previous adversaries of the West, who were “status quo” and “risk-averse” in comparison.); 
SLANN & SCHECHTERMAN, supra note_, at 20 (presenting arguments in support of the general irrationality of terrorists); 
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civilizational order that can be used to impel them to comply with IHL,695 rather than a burning desire to 
destroy civilization and law itself.696  Moreover, these instruments, along with the contemporary disfavor 
into which reprisal has fallen,697 call into question whether the general legal principle of reciprocity, which 
maintains that to be a subject of law entitled to its privileges and protection one must in turn respect the 
legal privileges and rights of others,698 or the principles of contract which postulate parties of equal legal 
capacity with co-dependent legal obligations699 are any longer to be elemental to the theory underpinning 
IHL.  If IHL is to be created and interpreted through an institutional framework so as to provide one set 
of rules, less restrictive and more protective of terrorists, and another, more restrictive of and more likely 
to impose criminal liability upon soldiers, IHL, and international law more generally, cannot inhabit an 
anarchic world where law is respected only in the breach700 and power is again the sole convertible 
currency.701
No military force will ever conduct its operations in perfect concord with IHL—quite simply, 
there are “limits to the amount of humanitarian observance that desperately fighting flesh and blood can 
stand[,]”702 and no soldier or state in extremis is ever likely to privilege compliance with IHL over 
survival.703  Nonetheless, the general observance of IHL by honorable soldiers fighting in defense of 
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, ED., INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 181 (1987) 
(suggesting that deterrence based upon the threat of apprehension and punishment is inapplicable to self-sacrificial terrorists); 
von CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR bk. I, ch. 1, at 2, 3, 75, 76 (Howard and Paret eds. 1976) (contrasting civilization and barbarism 
and describing the use of force by barbarians as not directed toward a political objective but the “crude expression of instinct.”).
695 See Ralph Peters, The New Warrior Class, 24 PARAMETERS 16, 16 (1994) (analogizing terrorists to “erratic primitives of 
shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order”).
696 See Robert McFarlane, Deterring Terrorism, J. DEF. & DIPL., June 1985, at 63 (“Terrorism is a revolting . . . form of warfare 
directed against the very heart of civilization[.]”).
697 See supra at notes (discussing reprisal under IHL and evaluating contemporary arguments as to its applicability).
698
 For a discussion of the general legal principle of reciprocity, see LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed.) 19-27 
(1969).  For a discussion of reciprocity in the structure and process of international law and international relations, see Robert O. 
Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," in Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in 
International Relations Theory  132- 57 (1989). 
699
 The conception of IHL as a contract between warring parties carries with it the obligation to honor the contract and implies 
that failure of either party to do so constitutes a breach with entitles the other to declare the contract to no longer be in force.  See
Costas Douzinas, Postmodern Just Wars: Kosovo, Afghanistan and the New World Order, 24-41, in John Strawson, ed. (2002).
700
 The endemic shortcoming of international law is that in its positive rules and regulations it is too frequently divorced from the 
practical necessities and moral requirements of the actors that are the subjects of its concern, resulting in ineffectual law and a 
weakening of the principles and norms that underlie the rules and regulations it declares.  For a discussion of this phenomenon, 
see generally DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE (1995). To the extent that the IHL has been unjustly 
bifurcated into distinct spheres of regulation, with one functionally supportive of terrorists and the other punitive with respect to 
the armed forces of states, it is not difficult to imagine that members of the latter group might come to view IHL as something 
artificial to be manipulated or, worse, ignored.  See DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL 158 (2002) (“The gap 
between ‘justice’ and what is ‘legal’ has led to the degradation of international law rather than to its development.”).  If law 
depends for its respect and observance upon the general perception that it is rational, functional, and just, IHL may be 
endangered.  See OSIEL, supra note_, at 134 (discussing dangerd posed to IHL by its inconsistency with the practical realities of 
modern warfare and by perceptions that it has departed from a position of fundamental fairness).
701
 The quest to transform international relations from a power-governed to a law-governed system is age-old and has contributed 
to the development of international legal institutions and conventions, including the Charter of the United Nations, the 
International Court of Justice, and the proposed ICC.  See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, LEGALIZATION AND WORLD 
POLITICS (2003).  However, although all forms of law rely upon at least some measure of voluntary compliance to lower the 
costs of policing the regime, international law, which cannot turn to a sovereign for enforcement, is, even more than domestic 
sources of law, a conciliatory law reliant upon voluntarism. For a general discussion of compliance, see EDITH BROWN 
WEISS, ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L. J. 2632 (1997); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA 
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); 
HAZEL FOX, EFFECTING COMPLIANCE (1993).
702
 BEST, supra note_, at 349-50 (stating a truism that is untenable to the untutored but common sense to veterans). 
703
 The “practical necessities, irrationalities, and uncertainties” of combat invariably impel some soldiers to elect self-preservation 
over compliance with IHL.  Of the many horrors of war the frequency with which soldiers, who by all accounts are otherwise 
morally upstanding citizens, may be forced to contemplate and commit violations of IHL in combat in order to survive, is among 
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civilization is the behavioral variable which most clearly distinguishes civilized peoples from modern-day 
barbarians,704 a venal and intractable assemblage hors de loi (“outside the law”)705 that inhabits an utterly 
incompatible moral universe and that, by deliberately targeting innocent civilians permanently dislocates 
itself, along with its barbarian, piratical, and outlawed progenitors,706 from the ranks of the civilized.  One 
need not embrace the ancient ordination of territory into civilized and barbarian spheres to defend the 
assertions that morality, even during war, should march in step with law,707 that the premeditated murder 
of innocents is ethically and juridically distinct from their unintentional killing, and that rather than 
accord terrorists enhanced status under the law defenders of civilization should withdraw the protections 
of the law they shun.708  Nor need one lump all enemies together under the barbarian rubric: simply stated, 
barbarians are those who deliberately attack civilians to advance the destruction of a civilization based 
upon liberty, law, and respect for individual human rights and dignity. 
B. Islamic Terrorists and Rogue-State Sponsors: Latter-Day Barbarians
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western liberal scholars reposed much faith in the prospect that a 
modern and universal civilization,709 based upon Western norms and values such as liberty, individual 
the most unsettling to humanitarians. See TAYLOR, supra note_, at 33 (“Otherwise law-abiding individuals will commit crimes 
in order to save their own lives; national governments will likewise break treaties and international rules if necessary for their 
own preservation.  Intrinsically a desperate and violent business, war is not readily limitable in terms of the means to be used in 
its prosecution.”). As unpleasant as this may seem to the uninitiated drafters of conventions and declarations, this has always 
been, and will always be, the practice of soldiers, and while it may not comport with the expectations of civilians it is entirely 
consistent with, and remediable to the extent remediation is necessary by, the martial code.  See supra at note_ (presenting 
principles upon which the martial code operates).  Nonetheless, the phenomenon whereby soldiers engaged in combat with other 
soldiers occasionally transgress against a formal legal regime to which they generally adhere ought not be accorded the same 
degree of moral reprobation as the actions of terrorists, who deliberately target civilians and categorically reject IHL obligations.
704 See Gross, supra note_, at 446 (identifying respect for law as the cardinal distinguishing feature between Western democratic 
states and “terrorists who trample the law in their fight[.]”).  Although soldiers of Western democracies do not hold IHL 
sacrosanct, their violations of IHL are nonetheless exceptional, and their adherence the norm.  The converse is true for terrorists, 
whose premeditated legal transgressions are standard operating procedure and whose end—the deliberate destruction of civilians 
and the legal regimes instituted to protect their rights—can never justify reciprocal derogation from obligations under IHL.  See
DAVID C. RAPOPORT & YONAH ALEXANDER, EDS., THE MORALITY OF TERRORISM: RELIGIOUS AND 
SECULAR JUSTIFICATIONS 290 (1982) (contrasting soldiers, whose violations of IHL are incidental to their mission, with the 
terrorist, who “not only violates the rights of others by violence, but . . . does so with the purpose of making everyone’s rights 
insecure . . . and destroy[ing] the community of understanding and mutual self-restraint upon which the existence of rights 
depends.”).   In short, the difference between soldiers and terrorists rests ultimately upon the morality of both means and ends.
705 See George Aldrich, The Hague Peace Conference: The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 47 (2000) (stressing 
the absolute irrelevance of law to the terrorists’ ends and means); Baxter, supra note_, at 333-34 (same).
706 See Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 181 (1945) (tracing the terrorist genealogy 
through barbarians to “bandits,” “pirates,” and “guerrillas”).
707
 The philosophical position that, although the worlds of morality and law are perhaps impossible to conflate, particularly in 
war, the two, which reinforce each other and are essential to the preservation of civilization, should map together as closely as 
possible even in battle, dates to antiquity.  See, e.g., SUN TZU, ART OF WAR (Y. Shibing, transl. 1994); V. S. SOLOVIEV, 
POLITICS, LAW AND MORALITY (W. Wozniuk ed. 2000).  This position is at odds with the practice of contemporary IHL 
absolutism on a number of counts.  See infra at pp_.
708
 Perhaps the most compelling argument for the divestiture or limitation of legal rights from terrorists rests upon the moral sense 
that to accord terrorists rights superior to those of their victims is fundamentally unjust:
The terrorist makes himself vulnerable . . . in that he loses the moral title to complain of [mal]treatment.  Having a right 
consists precisely in having the title to command respect for our demands that others act or refrain from acting in 
particular ways towards us, and for our complaints when they fail to do so.  The assertion of this title is inconsistent 
with the position into which the terrorist has put himself to the extent of his wrong-doing.  For him to claim that his 
rights remain intact in spite of the harm he has done to others is for him to claim that he deserves to be left in a better 
position than his victims, and the unfairness of such a claim seems clear [.]
RAPOPORT & ALEXANDER, supra note_, at 292.
709
 “Civilization” refers to a human community that, although it may consist of a multiplicity of ethnicities, languages, and states, 
is united by common historical experiences, traditions, values, and beliefs that influence and determine a shared normative vision 
of domestic and international order, the goals that the community should collectively pursue, the values and objectives to be 
promoted and defended, and the means to these ends.  See Jacinta O’Hagan, Conflict, Convergence or Co-Existence? The 
Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 537, 539 (1999); see also Ali 
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rights, free markets, limited government and separation of church and state, and a legal culture710 built 
upon the doctrine of the formal equality of all persons,711 would emerge from decades of bipolar 
confrontation.712  More pessimistic observers, anticipating that the collapse of Communism would yield a 
global order in which religion would become the primary constituent of civilizational identity and 
increased contacts would heighten tensions between largely incommensurable civilizations,713 postulated a 
“clash of civilizations” in which burgeoning antagonisms, rather than Westernization, would fill the 
vacuum left by receding East-West tensions.714  According to this civilizational conflict thesis, the 
principal fault line along which systemic upheaval can be expected lies between the West and Islam by 
virtue of stark dissimilarities between belief systems and legal cultures.715  For Muslims, law is of divine 
origin and therefore incompatible with and supreme compared to a Western legal order that recognizes 
human reason and the will of the majority as sources of legitimate rule-making authority,716 and perpetual 
conflict with the unbelievers of the dar-al harb is therefore divinely ordained.717  Although it may shock 
Ahmad, The Myth of the “Islamic Threat to the West”: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, 15 J.L. & REL. 605, 605 (2000 -
2001) (defining “civilizational identity” as the “highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity[.]”).
710 See generally LARENCE M. FRIEDMAN ET AL., LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1996) (defining 
“legal culture” as the prevailing “legal consciousness, attitudes, values, beliefs, and expectations about the law and the legal 
system” within a political community).
711 See id. at 197-98 (championing Western universalist approach to post-Cold War global order as morally superior to non-
universalist conceptions,  insisting upon the necessity for moral judgment, and rejecting “cultural relativism”).
712 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (elaborating thesis that the end of the
Cold War and the introduction of the integrative forces of globalization heralded the dawn of a universal civilization); Sohail H. 
Hashmi, International Society and Its Islamic Malcontents, 20 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 13, 13-14 (1996) (describing 
diffusion of norms, values, and principles of Western liberalism as necessary to the replacement of international anarchy with an 
“international society”); O’Hagan, supra note_, at 540 (tracing Western universalism to 19th century evolutionary theories).
713 See Ahmad, supra note_, at 605 (listing the major civilizations as Western, Islamic, Chinese, Eastern Orthodox, Japanese, 
Latin American, Hindu, and African).
714 See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 67-68 
(elaborating his “clash of civilizations” thesis).  This “clash of civilizations” thesis builds upon a skein of long-standing auto-
critiques of Western universalism.  See OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST’S PERSPECTIVES OF 
WORLD HISTORY, 2 vols. (Charles Francis Atkinson trans., Alfred A. Knopf, 1928) (1922) (suggesting that the world consists 
of separate and self-contained civilizations pursuing independent histories rather than a universal history); see also Tay, supra
note_, at 195 (suggesting that the “multiculturalist” rejection of Western universalism is rooted in the “mystical belief . . . that 
every people has a specific and special ‘genius’ and way of life and that all . . . foreign legal influence is a violation of its soul.”).
715
 Whereas Western legal systems aspire to the incorporation of universal and rational principles, Islamic law is a “status group 
law” that rejects reason in favor of faith and uiniversalism in favor of limitation to a community of believers.  MAX WEBER, 
LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCIETY 241-43 (1954). Although the civilizational conflict thesis concedes ground to 
universalism by declaring that the central distinction to be drawn is between the West as the dominant civilization and the “non-
Western many,” it nevertheless maintains that the primary zone of conflict lies at the conjunction of Western and Islamic 
civilizations.  See HUNTINGTON, supra note_, at 36, 40-41 (describing Islamic and Western legal cultures as “particularly at 
odds” due to marked conflicts over the relative importance of individual rights and the relationship between church and state).
716
 SHIREEN T. HUNTER, THE FUTURE OF ISLAM AND THE WEST: CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS OR PEACEFUL 
COEXISTENCE? ix (1998) (identifying source of irreconcilable conflicts between the Muslim and Western theories of political 
and legal legitimacy); see also Khan, supra note_, at 317 (describing incompatibilities between the Islamic conception of law as 
divinely-ordained and public international law—essentially a Western creation—as fashioned by treaties, customs, and the 
teachings of jurists); J.I. COFFEY & CHARLES T. MATHEWES, RELIGION, LAW AND THE ROLE OF FORCE 56 (2003) 
(noting widely-shared Muslim sentiment that international law is incompatible with Islamic law and therefore “alien”).
717
 Islam conceives of the world as divided into two spheres: the dar al-islam (abode of peace), in which dwell the Muslims, and 
the dar al-harb (abode of war), the realm of the unbelievers.  FAROOQ HASSAN, THE CONCEPT OF STATE AND LAW IN 
ISLAM (1981).  Faithful Muslims are commanded to take up jihad and wage perpetual war with  dar al-harb to defend and 
spread the faith.  See ENCYLOPEDIA ISLAMICUS (elaborating the dar al-islam/dar al-harb distinction); id. at (defining 
“jihad” as the duty of a Muslim to struggle in defense of the faith); Khan, supra note_, at 308 (explaining that Islam justifies war 
against the dar al-harb because non-Muslim societies establish men and laws, rather than God, as sovereign).  The Qur’an clearly 
delineates one set of duties owed to fellow Muslims and another to unbelievers.  See, e.g., Surah 8:57 (commanding Muslims to 
discriminate between fellow Muslims and non-Muslims with respect to the taking of prisoners); Surah 47:1 (requiring Muslims to 
kill non-Muslim combatants as punishment for infidelity to God).   For an extensive discussion of the militance inherent in Islam, 
as well as of the call to jihad that animates Islamic terrorism against Western civilization, see Barry Feinstein, Operation 
Enduring Freedom: Legal Dimensions of an Infinitely Just Operation, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 201 (2002).
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untutored Westerners,718 the history of Muslim efforts to conquer the “infidel” West, which commenced in 
7th century Spain and continued through the medieval crusades to the present,719 is very much with us, and, 
if the West is to survive, the civilizational conflict thesis holds that Westerners are duty-bound to awaken 
to the defense of their civilization against the growing Islamic military challenge.720
Still others treat the suggestion that differences between civilizations necessarily translate into 
violent conflict as a gross oversimplification.721  They stress that Islam is akin to Judaism and Christianity 
in ascribing to the divinity all legitimate authority to order the affairs of mankind722 while utterly 
proscribing acts of murder;723 they insist further that the contemporary resurgence of Islam is simply an 
assertion of religiosity that can be harmonized with, or at least exist in harmless parallel to, Western 
civilization.724  Moreover, they clearly distinguish a liberal strain of Islamic thought725 from the schismatic 
teachings of an untutored, if charismatic, minority,726 and reject the idea of a monolithic ummah dedicated 
718 See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 384 (explaining that, after a long respite 
from religious warfare, the conception of religion as a violent variable in world history has become alien to the Western mind).
719
 HUNTINGTON, supra note_, at 256.  The historical and cultural context is important: modern Islamic terrorists do indeed 
view themselves as heirs to the legacy of the Muslims who defeated medieval Christian crusaders.  Cole, supra note_, at 95.
720
 The social contract theory of the creation of Western liberal democracies posits that states are instituted primarily  to protect 
the lives and property of their citizens.  See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689).  A logical corollary 
of the duty of the state to protect its citizens is the duty of the state to work in concert with other liberal democracies in their 
collective defense, and it is this duty to which scholars refer in challenging the West to unify against the Islamic civilizational 
threat.  See HUNTINGTON, supra note_, at 311 (charging Westerners with the “duty” to achieve greater political, economic, and 
military integration the better to restrain the development of Islamic military power); see also Regis Debray, Nous Sommes Tous 
Americains, NEW LEFT REV., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 2 (suggesting that Western civilization must draw closer to defend against an 
assault by the combined forces of Islamic as well as Sinic civilizations—“Confucius plus Allah”).
721 See, e.g., Jacinta O’Hagan, x, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 1, 19 (1995) (criticizing inevitable intercivilizational conflict thesis as a 
simplistic reduction of the complexity of international relations and an attempt to “look for enemies” ).
722
 The most fundamentalist Muslims purport to be the bearers of the absolute revealed truth of the Creator. RAPOPORT & 
ALEXANDER, EDS., supra note_, at 68.  However, in this regard they are no different from the orthodox among their spiritual 
forebears, Jews and Christians.  HUNTER, supra note_, at ix.
723
 According to perhaps the foremost Western expert on Islamic law and history,
At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder.  At no point . . . do they even consider the random 
slaughter of uninvolved bystanders . . . [The 9/11 terrorism] has no justification in Islamic doctrine or law and no 
precedent in Islamic history . . . These are not just crimes against humanity and against civilization; they are also acts—
from a Muslim point of view—of blasphemy, when those who perpetrate such crimes claim to be doing so in the name 
of God.
BERNARD LEWIS: CRISIS OF ISLAM 47 (2003).
Furthermore, although Christianity, with its just-war doctrine, is more closely associated with the development of IHL than is 
Islam, defenders of the latter can point to the sacred text of Judaism and Christianity to argue that it is these religions, rather than 
Islam, that embrace terrorism and mass murder.  See, e.g., Deuteronomy 7:1-6 “When the Lord your God brings you into the land 
which you are entering to take possession o fit, and clears away many nations before you . . . and when the Lord your God gives 
them over to you, and you defeat them; then you must utterly destroy them; you shall make no covenant with them, and show no 
mercy to them . . . [Y]ou shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces of their pillars, and . . . burn their graven images with 
fire[.]”). But compare Exodus 12:48-49 (“And when a stranger shall sojourn with you and would keep the passover to the Lord, . 
. . he shall be as a native of the land . . . There shall be one law for the native and for the stranger who sojourns among you.”).
724 See Hamid Khan, Nothing is Written, Fundamentalism, Revivalism, Reformism and the Fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 273, 299, 307 (2002) (describing modern Islamic revivalism as a benign cultural awakening); ROBERT D. KAPLAN, 
THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: FROM TOGO TO TURKMENISTAN, FROM IRAN TO CAMBODIA—A JOURNEY TO THE 
FRONTIERS OF ANARCHY 107 (1996) (presenting Islam as a compassionate source of social cohesion and moral instruction).
725
 Hashmi, supra note_, at 23 (describing attempts of intellectuals to accommodate Islamic ethics with a modern social world).
726
 Most religious “scholars” who condone terrorism—a small minority within the Islamic faith—are adherents to Wahhabism, a 
“narrow, intolerant, rigid, literalistic, and puritanical” sect of Islam that is extremely hostile to intellectualism, modernity, and 
above all Western culture, which they blame for the numerous difficulties that plague Islamic societies.  Khan, supra note_, at 
307; see also HUNTER, supra note_, at viii (lamenting terrorism as one of the “tragic uses to which Islam has been put” to foster 
intercivilizational enmity).  These new Islamic fundamentalists, a group that includes Usama bin Laden of al Qaeda and Mullah 
Muhammad Omar of the Taliban, are concerned less with the well-being of their societies than with their cults of personality. 
RASHID, supra note_,  at 3.  Courageous mainstream clergy, adamant that Islam is a religion of social justice categorically 
opposed to terrorism, charge this radical sect with rejecting Islamic tradition, custom, and the Qur’an itself in propounding 
apostasy.  See id. (differentiating political terrorism of radical Islamists from the religious piety of traditional Islamic scholars).
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to destroying the West.727  Even if Muslim states miraculously unified,728 any transhistorical conflict has 
withered along with the potential for any such coalition to muster sufficient military power to pose a 
credible threat.729  In short, the explanation of Islam as a cultural orientation730 maintains that there is 
simply no Islamic civilizational approach to law or politics and nothing to fear from Islam ascendant, and 
U.S. Middle Eastern policy is more squarely within the chain of causation of September 11th than the 
twisted version of the religion professed by those who piloted the final instruments of that tragedy.731
Whether Islam is a call to jihad or merely a call to prayer is an open question.732  Islamic terrorism 
may eventually be revealed as a treatable, although severe, symptom of regional societal dysfunction,733
yet it may also be the logical outgrowth of an agenda of conquest laid down by Muhammad in medieval 
Mecca.734 Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to prove the civilizational conflict thesis or probe the motives of 
727
 Scholars of Islam stress that the ummah—the billion members of the world Islamic community—is no more unified than are 
the adherents of any other religion.  See HUNTER, supra note_, at 7-8, 14- 18 (rejecting the notion that the ummah acts as a 
single political bloc); Kishore Mahbubani, The Dangers of Decadence, 72 FOR. AFF. 12, 12-14 (1993) (dismissing the 
adhesiveness of pan-Islamic sentiment as applied to geopolitics); Fouad Ajami, The Summoning: “But They Said, We Will Not 
Hearken”, 72 FOR. AFF. 1, 8-9 (1993) (explaining that “the world of Islam divides and subdivides”).  Moreover, “there are 
growing numbers of Muslims . . . who desire nothing better than a closer more friendly relationship with the West[.]”  LEWIS, 
supra note_, at 47; JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD (2002) (same).  Even if Islam imposes a dar al-
islam/dar al-harb distinction, the Qur’an explicitly establishes that the  duty of jihad is purely defensive; aggression is 
categorically proscribed.  See Abulaziz A. Sachedina, From Defensive to Offensive Warfare: The Use and Abuse of Jihad in the 
Muslim World (positing the defensive interpretation of jihad).
728
 Although the Organization of the Islamic Conference was formed in 1969 to further cooperation between Islamic states, no 
unified program has yet been crafted or proposed by that or any other entity.  See Hashmi, supra note_, at 18 (discussing disunity 
that characterizes relations within the community of Islamic states since the fall of the Caliphate in the 11th century). 
729
 HALLIDAY, supra note_, at 112.
730
 The image of Islam as a military program calling for the defense of Islamic civilization by subjugation of non-Muslims is 
starkly contrasted with that of Islam as a set of customs and values around which to order a just society, and the vast majority of 
Muslims express their faith in the latter tradition. See JOHN CLARK MEAD, THE NEW WORLD WAR 47-95 (2002) 
(elaborating distinctions between majoritarian “cultural Islam” and the “militant Islam” of a small minority).
731 See John Quigley, International Law Violations by the United States in the Middle East as a Factor Behind Anti-American 
Thought, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2002) (arguing that, because it has supported Israel and allegedly suppressed Arab self-
determination, the U.S. is partly responsible for September 11th and other acts of violence against U.S. targets in recent years); see 
also PAUL BERMAN, TERROR AND LIBERALISM (2002) (presenting and criticizing arguments that U.S. capitalist foreign 
policy is responsible for creating the hatred that produced September 11th). Critics of the impulse to find the origins of September 
11th in the consequences of U.S. foreign policy counter with the contention that the perpetrators of the unspeakable horrors of that 
day simply “loathe [the West] because of who we are and what our society represents[,]” namely respect for individual liberties, 
religious tolerance, and a political system governed by secular law. ELSHTAIN, supra note_, at 3.
732
 A clear distinction can be drawn, and is so drawn, for purposes of this Article between Muslims and terrorists.  In the 
immediate aftermath of September 11th, the U.S. took the official position that it is terrorists who profess to be Muslims, and not 
the Islamic faithful, who threaten not only the West but the Muslim faith itself:
We respect your faith.  It’s practiced freely by millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America 
counts as friends.  Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the 
name of Islam.  The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself.
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001.
This view is shared by religious scholars as well:
To suppose that the Islamic faith . . . somehow lead[s] men . . . to be capable of flying an airliner full of passengers into 
a building crowded with unsuspecting civilians, is deeply denigrating to Muslims . . . It requires us to suppose that 
Muslims . . . lie almost beyond the borders of a shared humanity . . . simply because they are Muslims.
David S. Yeager, Just War: Reflections from the Lutheran Tradition in a Time of Crisis, 10 PRO ECCLESIA 401 (2001).
Still, not all scholars believe the War on Terror can be neatly cabined to shield the broader Islamic civilization from 
violent clash with the West.  See, e.g, Francis Fukuyama, Their Target: The Modern World, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at _ 
(arguing Islam is fundamentally hostile to secular civilization and that the conflict in which the U.S. is embroiled is “not simply a 
‘war’ against terrorists” but is in fact a “much broader” conflict between modern ity and anti-modernity).
733 See Craig Hall, The Wake-Up Call of Terrorism, 36 INT’L LAWYER 125 (2002) (suggesting that non-religious factors such 
as economic deprivation and a lack of education are the root causes of terrorism and must be resolved to prevent future attacks).
734
 For arguments in support of the latter position, see BENJAMIN NATANYAHU, HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 8-9 (1986) 
(asserting a causative relationship between “Islamic radicalism” and much of the terrorism of the 20th century); Laurie Goodstein, 
Seeing Islam as “Evil” Faith, Evangelicals Seek Converts, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at A1 (reporting the popularization of 
the impression of Islam as a “very evil and wicked religion” and a global threat based upon its textual support for terrorism).
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individual terrorists735 to establish that the entire Society of Peoples736 is under assault by atavistic foes 
who abjure all political, moral, and legal restraints and brandish a radical religious vision as both weapon 
and justification for the deliberate mass murder of innocents.737  September 11th demonstrated something 
far more profound than the futility of employing laws to deter wicked miscreants who value their own 
lives no more than those of their hapless victims and for whom no depredation is beyond contemplation:738
that tragic morning during which over 3000 innocent men, women, and children were deliberately 
immolated by 19 suicidal Islamic terrorists heralded a paradigmatic shift toward an era of asymmetrical 
warfare739 in which enemies of the U.S. and its allies, absolutely incapable of gathering armed forces to 
meet and defeat regular armies on the field of battle, will instead employ unconventional methods in an 
attempt to overcome their political will.740  Terrorism and WMD are merely the more obvious and tangible 
weapons.  It is somewhat paradoxical,741 although consistent with the historical development of the 
analytical concept of “barbarians” as those beyond the shadow of law, that it should be IHL itself—or, 
more properly, the asymmetry in compliance as between the terrorists, who proclaim their divorce from 
any legal obligations and flout the rules of IHL to their advantage,742 and the Western populations they 
target, for whom law is a central ordering principle—that bristles as the most potent weapon in the 
735
 Still, a fatwa (religious command) issued by Usama bin Laden  and leaders of other Islamic terrorist groups declaring that to 
“kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for any Muslim who can do it in any country in 
which it is possible to do it” supports the thesis that these terrorist groups, at the very least, are in  civilizational conflict with the 
West.  Usama bin-Muhammad bin-Laden et al., Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans, AL-QUDS AL-ARABI, Feb. 
23, 1998.  The reaction of bin-Laden to the events of September 11th further underscores this point.  See Usama bin-Laden, 
Statement of Oct. 7, 2001, AL-JAZEERA (“Here is America struck by God Almighty . . .  [T]hanks be to God . . . God has 
blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America.”).
736 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 3-37  (1999) (defining the “Society of Peoples” as those states that observe 
treaties, observe the duty of nonintervention, refrain from war except in self-defense, honor human rights, and assist others).
737
 The terrorist group Al Qaeda, relying on its interpretation of Islamic law, explicitly rejects political solutions to disputes with 
the West and advocates unrestricted murder of citizens of the U.S. and other Western governments.  See Al Qaeda Training 
Manual 8 (available at http:://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.) (“The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless 
and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy.  But it knows the dialogue of 
bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.”).  For such 
organizations, Islam offers “carte blanche justification for going to war . . . without concern for limitations upon its means[,]” and 
terrorism is “divinely sanctioned[.]”  J.I. COFFEY & CHARLES T. MATHEWES, RELIGION, LAW AND THE ROLE OF 
FORCE 30 (2003) (discussing 1998 Usama Bin Laden fatwa calling for terrorist acts against U.S. citizens and property).
738
 The architects of September 11th and their ideological progeny are vicious murderers who “have acquired a taste for killing, . . . 
[and] are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive power of language.”  Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Virtuous Warrior in a 
Savage World, 8 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 71 (1998).  The deliberate targeting of innocent women and children, and the 
conscription of children as warriors in the cause, are but two of the more heinous means and methods in the arsenal of these 
unscrupulous terrorists.  See Justus Reid Weinder, The Use of Palestinian Children in the Al-Aqsa Intifada: A Legal and Political 
Analysis, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 43 (2002) (describing employment of propaganda and educational incitement to 
induce Palestinian children to engage in acts of terrorism, including suicide bombing of civilian targets); see also ILENE COHN 
& GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT (1994) (same).
739 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010 (1996) (defining “asymmetrical warfare” as 
“atrtempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strength while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that differ 
significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations.”).
740
 The notion that non-state actors might possess the capacity to initiate an armed attack against a state of sufficient magnitude as 
to vest themselves with a form of international legal personality under IHL and the UN Charter had been discussed very little 
prior to September 11th.  See Yutaka Arai Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defense—Appraising the Impact of 
the September 11 Attacks on the Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT’L LAWYER 1081 (2003) (noting that international law has required that 
aggression stem from a state) (citing G.A. Res. 3314, GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974)). 
741
 That IHL should be perverted from humanizing regime to weapon of war by terrorists is perhaps not so much paradoxical as 
ironic if one considers that agreements as to limitations on warfare presume shared interests and the capacity to reach rational 
understandings with enemies who, if such shared interests and understandings were possible, would not likely be enemies.  
742 See supra at note_ (enumerating recent violations of IHL by irregular unlawful combatants during the Liberation of Iraq); see 
also Anderson, supra note_ (listing violations of categorical rules of war committed by terrorists and other unlawful combatants, 
including systematic rape, use of human shields, and summary execution of POWs).
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Islamic terrorist arsenal.743  Nonetheless, because a concatenation of “reforms” over the last several 
decades, coupled with the ascendance of IHL absolutism, have delivered IHL into the hands of terrorists 
who now wield it as a sword against civilization,744 the moral essence of the law must be reclaimed and 
decocted from accumulated ideological accretions if it is to once again shield civilization against 
barbarism.  Accordingly, the next section crafts a legal strategy to empower the robust application of 
military force in defense of global order and liberty.
C. Reforming IHL to Meet the Barbarian Threat: A Functionalist Argument
IHL, just as any other regime of legal regulation, is an ongoing functional response745 to existing 
and anticipated factual circumstances that is designed and interpreted in light of the capacities, interests, 
objectives, and “felt necessities” of politically relevant actors746 to the benefit of whom it 
disproportionally redounds.747  However, the matrix of costs and benefits under all legal regimes tend to 
be kinetic, rather than static: under the metamorphic pressures exerted by human rights NGOs and other 
absolutists over the last generation it is not surprising that IHL has been warped in ways that have 
redistributed the costs and benefits attendant to particular tactics, strategies, and weapons systems.748
Nevertheless, the process whereby IHL is subject to reconstruction is omnidirectional, and when states, 
743
 Observance of IHL would deny terrorists the very methods and means of war essential to engaging their enemies on something 
approximating an equal plane, and consequently they reject its application.  See W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise 
the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 81, 86 (2003) (contrasting practical disparity between the legal restraints occasioned by 
IHL upon territorial states, who are subject to the “dynamic of reciprocity and retaliation” that underlies international relations 
and who publicly accept legal limitations upon their capacity to respond to terrorist depredations, with terrorist groups and other 
nonstate actors who are difficult for states to locate and target in retaliation and who deny any legal restraints upon their actions); 
see also QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE (1999) (“When a nation state . . . (which adheres 
to certain rules and will only use limited force to obtain a limited goal), faces off with [terrorist] organizations . . . (which never 
observe any rules and which are not afraid to fight an unlimited war using unlimited means), it will often prove very difficult for 
the nation state . . . to gain the upper hand.”).  By selectively violating and then exploiting lacunae and ambiguity in IHL to their 
military and especially political advantage, terrorists convert IHL from a shield to a sword.  See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth 
Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 
89-90 (1989) (arguing that IHL ultimately serves terrorists’ interests); Anderson, supra note_, at (stating that IHL has the effect 
of “rewarding” state sponsors of terrorists who recognize that the commission of war crimes against their own civilians, and the 
subsequent attribution of those crimes to retaliating states, is a very effective strategy against more powerful foes); Aldrich, supra
note_, at 3 (expressing qualified support for the argument that, in light of the Additional Protocl I, the West is prejudiced not 
merely by disparities in compliance as between terrorists and liberal democracies but by the structural and normative foundations 
of IHL which are evolving in favor of the protection of terrorists).
744
 The contention that law is an instrument of coercion just as much as is military force dates at least to the Renaissance.  See, 
e.g., MACHIAVELLI, supra note_, at 99 (“There are two ways of fighting: by law and by force.”).
745
 The social theory of functionalism maintains that society is essentially a set of interrelated institutions and norms each of 
which has a particular essential purpose to the existence and operation of the social whole; society is analogous to a living 
organism.  See EMILE DURKEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893) (positing a general functionalist theory).  
Functionalist theory postulates that law is the mechanism that structures expectations and secures compliance with a particular set 
of socially desirable norms, principles, rules, and procedures at the lowest possible cost, and that the need to resort to coercive 
enforcement to enforce compliance with this set of values marks the weakness, and even failure, of the law.  See MICHAEL 
BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS 87-88, 157 (1968) (describing law as the authoritative and normative statement of 
the “paths over which the affairs of [a] community are carried on” and stating that the overriding function of law is “the 
preservation of order” and the “ordering [of] social relationships[.]”).  IHL functions as the mechanism whereby  application of 
force to the resolution of otherwise intractable disputes is, via a set of positive and normative rules, prevented from destroying the 
objects, norms, and principles constitutive of civilization without rendering that application of force in the defense of 
civilizational values impracticable.  See Douglas Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 1 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 121, 126-30 (2001) (stating that international law functions to deny moral relativism, establish normative preferences 
shared by the international community, and defend those preferences against violators).  IHL thus simultaneously enables, yet 
limits, the destruction attendant to war the better to secure civilizational security.  For a thorough discussion of (neo)functionalist 
theory, see JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984); for a defense of functionalist 
theory against critics, see MICHAEL FAIA, DYNAMIC FUNCTIONALISM (1986).
746
 Reisman, supra note_, at 81.
747 Id.  (“[E]very legal regime perforce benefits some actors more than others[.]”).
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the principal authors of international law for centuries, can “no longer assure their defense within the 
ambit of inherited law, those charged with national defense [will] inevitably demand changes in [IHL].”749
Thus, if even the remotest possibility exists that IHL, unwisely reformed to suit the felt needs of the 
human rights community and subject to interpretation and application in the hostile politico-legal milieu 
of the ICC, could be slaved to the sheltering of terrorists and rogue-states bent on the annihilation of 
millions of innocents and the criminalization of the reasonable acts of honorable soldiers protecting 
civilization itself against holocaust, IHL is, as the U.S. has effectively declared in renouncing the ICC, a 
compromised and dysfunctional legal regime.750  That IHL should ever be marshaled to gainsay the 
assertion that the Private Ryans and Captain Ryans of the world are at critical moments the sole bulwark 
standing between civilization and unremitting evil, and that law should ever be permitted to punish 
virtuous soldiers who brave danger in a long twilight struggle against terrorist adversaries who flout the 
law as but a bothersome trapping of the civilization they aim to eradicate would be farcical if it were not 
so disconcerting.  In short, civilization is bracketed between the danger inherent in the order that the ICC 
might well impose and the disorder engineered by terrorists,751 for whom IHL is but the substrate for evil. 
It is thus logical that those states predominantly responsible for civilizational defense would 
assume the van in a demanding the revision, and even the broader rethinking, of IHL and the institutions 
responsible for its enforcement.752  The salvation of Western civilization depends upon victory in the War 
on Terror; in turn, this calls into question whether the (primarily U.S.) soldiers defending civilization, 
although they must as a moral imperative cleave as closely as practicable to the humanitarian purpose of 
the IHL regime,753 may employ allegedly prohibited methods and means or otherwise derogate from a 
body of law never tailored for this sort of conflict754 in order to guarantee victory.  To be sure: the U.S. 
remains unwaveringly committed to the observance of IHL during the conduct of post-September 11th
operations in the asymmetrical War on Terror.755  However, September 11th revealed that the defense of 
748 See supra at note_ (discussing effects of purported post-1977 modifications to conventional and customary sources of IHL and 
the legal debates as to whether such modifications create enforceable obligations); see also supra at Part III (same); Reisman, 
supra note_, at 81 (describing “tensions between formally prescribed [IHL] from a previous period and contemporary [IHL].”).
749
 Reisman, supra note_, at 81.
750 See JOHN STRAWSON, ED., LAW AFTER GROUND ZERO xi (2002) (conceding, from the perspective of an IHL 
absolutist, that IHL has been revealed post-September 11th as “feeble” and “fragile as our world order”); id. (describing the Bush 
Administration view as the position that “we [are] at a now foundational moment at which existing legal norms and institutions 
are either irrelevant or questionable” and that IHL is dysfunctional or even harmful to the task of defeating terrorism).
751 See Paul Valery, French Poet (1871-1945) (“Two dangers constantly threaten the world: order and disorder.”).
752
 Although states enjoy formal equality under international law, the notion that declarations of custom offered by states that do 
not engage in armed conflict and have no direct responsibility for the defense of civilization is inconsistent with the practical 
reality of the context presented by the War on Terror.  See supra at note_.
753
 Deontological scholars, even if they accept the assumption that the defeat of terrorism is an end very much preferable to the 
alternative, challenge this utilitarian assertion that it is possible to derogate from the IHL regime where absolutely necessary in 
order to prevail without abdicating the moral high ground and denaturing the moral force of the rule of law.  See Gross, supra
note_, at 465 (contrasting the deontological and utilitarian perspectives on IHL). However, although it is preferable that the 
defeat of terrorism complement, rather than erode, IHL, if ultimate victory requires derogation under limited and precisely 
defined circumstances, it would seem a small price to pay.
754 See id. at 469 (arguing that because IHL was never designed to apply against terrorists, one must look outside IHL to 
determine whether a state can ever incur a moral duty to overlook IHL in order to protect its own citizens against terrorists); see 
also id. at p. 484-85 (answering in the affirmative by stating that “[t]errorism . . . thereby forces upon us a ‘regime of necessity’ 
whereby we are compelled to put aside guiding moral principles in favor of a moral duty to protect the lives of the citizens of the 
free world.”).  For examples of the unsuitability of IHL in its current incarnation to the War on Terrorism, see infra at Part_.
755 See CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 5810.01, supra note_ (insisting that the “Armed Forces of the 
United States will comply with the law of war during the conduct of all military operations and related activities in armed 
conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.”).  The U.S. commitment to the observance of IHL, however, does not imply 
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vital national and civilizational interests are in tension with a cascading series of constraints on U.S. 
freedom of military action756 that, although they spring from noble impulse, have neutralized the 
comparative military advantage of the U.S. and handicapped its policy options against terrorism beyond 
the danger point.757  At first blush it seems we are enmeshed in a moral dilemma from which escape 
requires a Hobson’s choice:758 either jettison IHL, suspend all normative restraint, and sacrifice the higher 
moral terrain to a counter-jihad against terrorism, or scrupulously observe a regime whose demise will be 
but a mere incident to the ritual suicide of the civilization from whence it emerged.  The first choice 
conflates the distinction between combatants, debases the civilization for which the war is fought, and 
confers a victory upon the terrorists, whose re-creation of us in their own image would assuage their 
defeat on the battlefield.  The second abdicates moral responsibility to the abjectly immoral and orders the 
sworn defenders of civilization to orchestrate its passage into the gloom of a darker and more fearful age.  
In short, a fissure has expanded into a chasm dividing what is generally deemed lawful under IHL 
from what might be charged as unlawful, although it can legitimately be described as the morally just 
conduct of soldiers.759  This disjunct threatens, in synergy with the ICC, to swallow up respect for, and 
observance of, law more generally.  However, although this is unquestionably a moment of fragility and 
perhaps even decision for international order, there is a narrow course that will maximize national and 
global welfare that can be navigated between these twin moral shoals: rather than deify IHL, as the 
absolutist framers of the ICC in their subsumption of its authorship from states760 would have us do, we 
U.S. recognition of the full panoply of legal obligations, particularly of the customary variety, that IHL absolutists would impose 
through the operation of the ICC.  See supra at note_ (discussing disagreements over the parameters of IHL).
756 See Adda B. Bozeman, U.S. Conceptions of Democracy and Security in a World Environment of Culturally Alien Political 
Thought: Linkages and Contradictions, in SAM C. SARKESIAN & JOHN MEAD FLANAGAN, EDS., U.S. DOMESTIC AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDAS INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 55 (1994) (tracing progressive U.S. auto-
imposition of constraints on the use of force as evidenced by treaties, practice, and the declarations of public officials).
757 See BARNETT, supra note_, at 80 (contending that U.S. membership in IHL conventions has the effect of “removing options 
from the board” and offering potential adversaries who do not adhere to these conventions opportunities to their asymmetrical 
advantage); see also Bozeman, supra note_, at 55 (warning that the Western understanding of IHL is dangerously “out of date”).
758
 A Hobson’s choice is the obligation to choose in a situation in which there is no available choice that is free of attendant guilt 
and responsibility for resultant evils.  See Thomas Nagel, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143 (1972).
759
 That objectively just conduct could ever be characterized as unlawful is an indictment either of the moral character of the 
community that created the law or of the institutions wherein the conduct adjudged unlawful.  For a discussion of evil legal 
systems, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUDICIAL OBLIGATION AND THE RULE OF LAW (1976).
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 NGOs and activists at the helm of this venture have capitalized upon the diminished role of the state in the post-Cold War era 
and seized control over the prescription and enforcement of IHL from states—the entities that actually engage in armed conflict.  
In so doing, they have extended it beyond its functional and democratic limitations:
For the past 20 years, the center of gravity in establishing, interpreting and shaping the law of war has gradually shifted 
away from the military establishments of leading states and their “state practice.”  It has even shifted away from the 
International Red Cross . . . and toward more activist and publicly aggressive N.G.O.’s . . . [T]he pendulum shift 
toward them has gone further than is useful, and the ownership of the laws of war needs to give much greater weight to 
state practices of leading countries[.]
Anderson, supra note_, at_.
“Ownership” of IHL is indeed crucial.  Inarguably, the substantive quality of scholarship in IHL is augmented by 
knowledge of military history and especially by combat experience: those unenriched by either of these capacities are left subject 
to criticism particularly where they advocate prescriptions or proscriptions that history and experience have proven untenable in 
actual combat operations.  See H. Wayne Elliot, MICHAEL HOWARD, GEORGE J. ANREOPOULOS, & MARK R. 
SHULMAN, HISTORY, WAR, AND LAW (1994), 30 TEX. INT’L L. J. 631, 637 (1995) (book review) (“Only when one has a 
firm foundation in military history can one truly begin to understand the utility and limits of the law of war.”).  Many critics of 
the U.S. position with respect to the ICC are civilians lacking in the experience necessary to an understanding of the stochastic, 
nonrational processes that govern combat operations and exert pressures upon combatants to derogate from absolutist, positivist 
legal proscriptions and prescriptions.  See FUSSELL, WARTIME 283 (“The relative few who actually fought know that the war 
was not a matter of rational calculation.  They know madness when they see it.”)  As a consequence, these critics are unable to 
appreciate the environment in which individual soldiers make decisions, and thus when they recapitulate the events in question to 
determine what they would do under similar circumstances and to adjudicate the criminal responsibility of individual soldiers, 
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should accord it our respect and criminalize its violation only to the extent that it comports with the 
practical necessities of honorable soldiers locked in total war761 against barbarians who brook no legal 
restraints whatsoever.  In other words, by rationalizing IHL the West can interdict evil and shepherd law, 
along with the civilization law defends and reflects, through the vale of terrorism.762  The next section 
operationalizes this thesis by proposing reinvention of IHL as a regime that genuinely supports the 
humanization of conflicts between soldiers who observe the martial code while banishing barbarians to a 
legal wasteland beyond its application.763
D. Operationalizing the Barbarian Distinction
States, as well as individuals, have the moral and legal right, independent of any institutional 
arrangements, conventional understandings, or subjective beliefs, to defend themselves against terrorism.  
Principles of fundamental fairness and justice militate in favor not only of restoring the pre-1977 legal 
consequences of terrorists’ unlawful combatancy but of internalizing, rather than transferring to their 
opponents, the legal consequences of their depredations against civilized peoples.  If IHL is to continue to 
defend civilization and merit compliance by state-defenders of the international community, then, in the 
existential battle against terrorists who declare civilization itself as the stakes for which the war is to be 
contested, the margin of appreciation to which the U.S. and allied states764 are generally entitled in 
interpreting the boundaries of IHL should be stretched to its zenith, rather than contracted to its nadir.  
Ultimate victory over terrorism will, on occasion, require the U.S. and other states to undertake missions 
that will give rise to claims that members of their armed forces have violated provisions of IHL that do 
not universally meet the definition of binding law; in other cases, otherwise valorous warriors pressed to 
their physical and emotional limits may deny quarter or inflict reprisals that, while inarguably violative of 
the positive law, are excusable or at least mitigated in their seriousness in light of all the circumstances, 
especially the fact that it is terrorists who are the “victims.”   The ratio of the evil that soldiers may 
occasion in the defeat of terrorism to the evil that they avert by hastening its demise is sufficiently 
they are bereft of the most essential information.  IHL conceived in ignorance thus carries within it the seeds of its own 
compliance failures and ultimately its unenforceability. 
761
 Although there has not been a formal declaration of war, “only a most technical and arid legalism could deny [that the U.S. is 
at war with terrorist organizations].”  Reisman, supra note_, at 88 n.14.
762
 The term “rationalize” has traditionally been employed with respect to the scholarly review of IHL for the purpose of 
suggesting those modifications that harmonize the “rules on the books” with the prescriptions and proscriptions likely to be 
observed by soldiers in practice.  See, e.g., FOOKS, supra note_, at 3 (calling for the modification of IHL such that “the rights of 
belligerents [are] secured by such agreements as are likely to be followed in time of war.”); HINGORANI, supra note_, at 194-
95 (concurring with the argument that the acceptance and observance of IHL depends upon its compatibility with the realities of 
warfare and stating that “[n]o belligerent will accept rules [of IHL] which run counter to its basic principles and interests.”).
763
 Although this distinction intersects at the level of theory with the lawful-unlawful combatants distinction by asserting that the 
allocation of legal rights should reflect the degree to which belligerents assent to and comport themselves in accordance with the 
rule of law, the two are of different provenance, and the former is intended as a guide less in regard to the resolution of legal 
issues surrounding detention and prosecution of enemy belligerents for pre-capture crimes than to the choice of legal standards 
and institutions connected with the adjudication of alleged violations of IHL by soldiers.
764
 Unilateralism, generally a more politically costly approach to international relations than a more multilateral foreign policy, 
“sits uncomfortably” with those who fear that a “single state has taken on the role of judge, jury and policeman.”  Wedgwood, 
supra note_, at 726.  Ideally, the U.S. will gain the support of a coalition of like-minded states who together will demand and 
obtain a wider margin of legal tolerance for their concerted actions in response to terrorism.  However, if a multilateral approach 
fails, or if multilateral policy agreement does not translate into assistance in military operations or in providing legal support to 
U.S.-led operations, the U.S. may be forced to take the path to a rationalized IHL alone.  See id. (conceding that the “availability 
of unilateral action may be essential to forging a result that strengthens security.”).  For a discussion of the difficulty in securing 
and maintaining alliances in international relations, see generally James A. Caporaso, International Relations Theory and 
Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations, 46 INT’L. ORG. 599 (1992).
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favorable that any rational theory of IHL will ensure that institutions called upon to adjudicate their 
criminal responsibility consider the net benefit with which their labors have endowed mankind in 
balancing the scales of justice.  In short, the transposition of IHL in light of the contemporary threat 
directly implicates the ideological interests and perspectives of the actors and institutions that interpret 
and adjudge the conduct of soldiers, and rather than permit the ICC, a politicized body disinterested in the 
moral universe of soldiers and committed to an absolutist philosophy that rejects considerations of 
exigency, necessity, and justice from its calculus to pass judgment in regard to alleged violations of IHL 
in the War on Terror, U.S. and allied soldiers should be held to the ethical and moral strictures of the 
martial code and, where appropriate, prosecuted and punished in courts-martial.  
However, courts-martial will justifiably rely upon the judgment and experience of members of the 
martial profession in applying nonlegal norms, interpreting ROEs, and ultimately determining whether 
the conduct of the accused can fairly be said to have been contrary to that expected of the honorable 
soldier, a standard radically different from legal absolutism.  A rationalized approach to IHL takes a much 
more conscientious approach to upholding civilizational obligations and demands that parallel institutions 
respect the determinations of courts-martial.  Certainly, not all transgressions across the burgeoning 
boundaries of what the human rights NGOs championing the ICC declare to be IHL can legitimately be 
characterized as war crimes or crimes against humanity.  Viewed through the analytical prism of a 
rationalized IHL, as courts-martial have been wont to do across their developmental history, it is 
impossible to describe the acts of Private Ryan et al. or the personnel associated with Task Force Ryan as 
barbaric, and it is utterly beyond comprehension that the conduct of those prosecuting the agendae of 
Nazism and Islamic terrorism—irrefutably barbaric programs765—could ever be perceived as more 
deserving of legal shelter than the soldiers who interpose between them and civilization.  It is worse than 
foolish to pretend that the militaries of Western democracies defending against Nazism and Islamic 
terrorism spawn war criminals at the rate or on the order of their wicked foes.  To forfeit moral judgment 
guts IHL of its normative component and mocks justice.
This is not to suggest that courts-martial need validate the greatest fears of legal absolutists, who 
distrust the professional self-regulation of the armed forces and envision courts-martial as a forum suited 
principally to whitewashing military misdeeds.  Although the temptation to abandon all normative and 
legal restraint may be great,766 rationalization need neither imply nor countenance the general suspension 
765 See AIME CESAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (Joan Pinkham transl. 1972) (1955) (offering an early academic 
treatment of Nazism as “the crowning barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarians[.]”).
766
 Terrorists are the sort of “implacable enemy whose avowed objectives”—the destruction of our way of life—motivate 
maximalist responses and the abandonment of “[h]itherto accepted norms of human conduct” as the price of their defeat.  
Doolittle Committee, Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, Sept. 30, 1954.  A reknowned U.S. 
constitutional scholar has advocated the judicially-sanctioned torture of terrorists to force the disclosure of information that 
would prevent an imminent and massive terrorist attack.  See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 166-213 (2002).  Another scholar suggests that 
the U.S. go so far as to consider the destruction of Islamic holy sites in order to simultaneously constitute the conditions for 
future deterrence and to disprove the mistaken notion held by some terrorists that Western decadence renders Western restraint 
inevitable.  See Daniel Pipes, Discarding War’s Rules, N.Y. POST (Online Edition), Jul. 22, 2003, available at 
http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/1200.htm (previewing a forthcoming work by Lee Harris that claims it is 
Western restraint, the product of an “arch-civilization,” that has “insulated its enemies from the deserved consequences of their 
actions.”).  Although the present argument is in some senses a call for a break with past restraints, it does not accept that the 
intentional targeting of civilian structures is permissible within the ethical boundaries established by the martial code.
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of IHL in the fight contra barbarum.  Even while engaged in this just cause, moral and legal 
responsibility attach to all individuals—civilian or military—charged with the prosecution of the War on 
Terror.  In armed conflicts, however characterized, the U.S., one of the few states that has systematically 
prosecuted violations of IHL, must continue its official policy of scrupulous adherence to those aspects of 
the IHL canon that can be harmonized with the ethos and principles of the martial code and the practical 
necessities of the War on Terror, and it should strive always to conduct its operations so as to afford the 
greatest humanitarian protections to all privileged persons.  Moreover, the martial code does not 
necessarily disfavor the grant of humanitarian treatment, where feasible, to terrorists, in part because law 
is so deeply impressed into the fabric of our civilization that it is difficult to forswear it even in response 
to terrorism,767 and in part out of homage to chivalric ideals.
Nonetheless, a rationalized IHL is inimical to the absolutist argument that the legal standard to 
which soldiers combating barbarism should be held is exempt from recalibration to reflect the nature of, 
and threat posed, by these anti-civilizational adversaries.  It is worse than foolish to pretend that the 
militaries of Western states defending against Nazism and Islamic terrorism spawn war criminals or 
criminals against humanity at the rate of their foes; rather, it is a dangerous, often politically-motivated 
position which finds expression in the exposition of legal absolutist arguments that, actualized through the 
jurisprudence of the ICC, may threaten the edifice of law and the civilization which depends upon it.  In 
stark contrast, the martial code, with its broad consideration of not merely legal but also non-legal 
variables768 in ascertaining whether an accused has abided by the precepts that direct the conduct of 
honorable member of the military profession, embraces the positions that legal and moral obligations 
under IHL are, to some extent, conditional, and that the degree to which an enemy force observes IHL, 
the means and methods employed by an enemy, and the justice of the cause for which an enemy fights are 
relevant variables in the decisional matrix employed by those called upon to judge martial conduct.  In 
other words, a sliding legal-moral scale is at work within the legal machinery of a rationalized IHL 
regime that weighs the experience of the combat soldier and the moral virtues and vices of combatants 
without abandoning its humanizing mission.  This scale would permit a far more nuanced and holistic 
examination of alleged violations of IHL: although it would unhesitatingly adjudge the deliberate murder 
of an innocent civilian or otherwise blameless POW serving an enemy force that accords treatment 
consistent with the martial code to be ipso facto an act of barbarism, it would declare reprisal against a 
parole violator or terrorist as either a justifiable offense or a much less serious crime punishable with 
disciplinary sanctions, and not simply declare the act a war crime justifying imprisonment.  Moreover, it 
would reflexively reject any assertion of criminality with respect to the unintentional killing of civilians 
located near terrorist targets.  In effect, a rationalized IHL is an admixture of jus in bello and jus ad 
767
 This is not to suggest that soldiers in circumstances such as those faced by T/5 Upham will never undertake reprisals in 
response to terrorists’ violations of IHL.  However, for soldiers in the armed forces of the West, impressed as they are at all turns 
with the requirements of the martial code as well as with the obligations, as members of a civilization governed and symbolized 
by the rule of law, there are significant professional and cultural restraints upon the abandonment of rule-governed behavior.  See
BARNETT, supra note_, at 16 (examining cultural differences with regard to willingness to violate law in pursuit of personal and 
social objectives and to undertake reprisals for others’ violations of the law).
768 The application of non-legal norms to the humanization of war fits into a generalized discussion of the salience of non-legal 
norms in regulating the conduct of epistemic communities.  See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
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bellum that treats not merely the conduct of soldiers but also the cause for which they fight as practically 
significant in establishing differential legal standards, canons of interpretation, and guidelines for 
adjudication.  Thus, the following measures are proposed to effect the formal operationalization of the 
civilized peoples/barbarians distinction in a rationalized IHL regime:
1. The U.S., acting under the protective principle of jurisdiction,769 should exercise its sovereign right to 
prescribe legislation designating particular states, groups, (including but not limited to those listed as 
foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department),770 and individuals, regardless of nationality, as 
barbarians and declaring them, by virtue of their deliberate predations against civilians, criminals against 
civilization who disentitle themselves from the panoply of legal rights and privileges under international 
and domestic law.771  The Actus Contra Barbarum (“Act Against Barbarians”) [“ACB”] will relegate such 
actors to an inferior status under IHL—in effectively, it will redefine them as unprivileged, rightless 
outlaws—as IHL is incorporated in U.S. law.772 This declaration need not be interpreted as a denunciation 
of the general applicability of IHL provisions with which the U.S.disagrees; rather, it would stand as a 
public proclamation that the U.S. will withhold the protections of IHL from rogue states and terrorists and 
exercise restraint in its operations against them only indirectly through observation of humanitarian 
obligations concerning civilians and other noncombatants.773  Terrorists and rogue states would then be 
subject to attack by all means and methods at all places and times, denied quarter, and subjected to 
summary execution.  In short, ACB would declare bellum romanum against terrorists.
To secure domestic political support, and in light of strategic considerations, the ACB might 
contain a provision suspending its legal effect for a period of months to induce affected states and 
groups against whom the full military force of the U.S. would otherwise be immediately employed to 
desist from terrorism and comply with IHL; failure to do so would result in immediate abandonment of 
769
 The protective principle of jurisdiction permits domestic exercise of jurisdiction where an extraterritorial act threatens interests 
vital to thesecurity,  territorial integrity, or political independence of the prosecting state and allows the state to prosecute foreign 
nationals.  See REST. (3rd) FOR. REL. L. U. S § .  This jurisdictional basis has been used to prosecute terrorists under U.S. law 
for conspiracy to engage in attacks that affected or would affect U.S. nationals.  See U.S. v. Yousef et al, 2nd Cir. 2003 (affirming 
application of CIL principle of protective jurisdiction to uphold convictions of terrorist defendants for conspiring, outside the 
U.S.,  to destroy civilian airliners upon which U.S. nationals were to have been on board, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §32)
770 See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator on Counterterrorism, Appendix B: Background Information on 
Foreign Terrorist Groups, at I.  Foreign Terrorist Organizations (listing 29 officially designated terrorist groups), available at 
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2450.htm>
771
 Although domestic definitions of war crimes generally overlap with the definitions established under IHL, the principle of 
sovereignty permits states to adopt their own domestic standards provided the resulting legislation does not run counter to norms 
of jus cogens.  See Joyner, supra note_, at 165 (discussing sources of conflict between domestic and international law with regard 
to war crimes definitions); see also supra note_ (discussing norms of jus cogens).  In an attempt to restore a measure of 
symmetry to the battlefield, states might elect to redefine war crimes to prohibit the tactics, weapons, or other practices of their 
adversaries, and to threaten enemy combatants with punishment for the employment of these tactics, weapons, or practices upon 
capture.  Taken to further extreme, a state might elect to immunize the use, by its own soldiers, of all tactics, weapons, and 
practices, even those otherwise prohibited by law, against the enemy.  The declaration proposed herein would effectively stand as 
a declaration of war against terrorists that would not only transform legal relations between the U.S. and terrorist groups but 
would open up, for use against identified terrorists, a set of military options, tactics, and weapons otherwise prohibited by 
domestic and international law.  Constitutional amendment may be necessary to pass such legislation, as the doctrine of outlawry 
has long lapsed into obsolescence under the domestic law of States and was never available at federal law, and the Due Process 
Clause of the 5th Amendment has been interpreted in dissent by the Supreme Court as an impediment ot the resurrection of 
outlawry.  See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 (1956) (Douglas and Black, dissenting) (“The prohibition of Bills of 
Attainder place[s] beyond the pale the imposition of infamy or outlawry by either the Executive or the Congress.”).
772
 Although the unlawful combatant distinction effectively imposes this legal status by executive order upon terrorists captured in 
battle, Congressional silence leaves the door open to arguments that the civil rights of unlawful combatant detainees, particularly 
those who possess U.S. citizenship, have been violated by their continued detention without the benefit of the Geneva 
Conventions and without trial, as well as to arguments that such practice violates the substantive provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and the Protocols Additional.  See Padilla ex rel Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(challenging detention of U.S. citizen, suspected of membership in the terrorist group Al Qaeda, held by the military on a 
material witness warrant as an unlawful combatant without access to counsel); see also supra at notes_ (discussing the effects of 
the Protocols Additional on the customary doctrine of unprivileged belligerency).  Moreover, the proposed declaration 
encompasses all members of the designated terrorist groups within its ambit even in advance of armed conflict with those groups, 
rather than applying simply to those members caught while not in compliance with the conditions necessary to establish lawful 
combatancy.  Id.  As such, ACB is an act of legal preemption designed to affirmatively resolve not only the constitutional 
authority to detain unlawful combatants indefinitely but to discriminate, even if in contravention of IHL, as between different 
categories of combatants on the basis of the objectives and methods of their armed operations.
773
 One commentator proposes the far narrower solution of eliminating the principle of proportionality with respect to anti-
terrorist operations.  See Michael C. Bonafede, Note, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and 
U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11th Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 189-97 (2002).  This 
Article proposes a much broader suspension of IHL in regard to the War on Terror.
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all restraint.774  The legislation might also incorporate a provision granting affected parties standing to 
appeal their inclusion on the list of designated terrorist groups, and permitting special appearances,775
along with safe passage,776 for this purpose.  In the alternative, or in conjunction, the legislation might 
authorize the President to negotiate bilateral agreements, akin to treaties, with states and terrorist 
groups in which the U.S. would pledge to refrain from implementing ACB in respect to those actors 
that pledge to follow IHL, refrain from military operations against the U.S. and its nationals and divest 
themselves of all but those weapons systems required for self-defense.777
2. To translate this strategic declaration into rules of decision for courts-martial, Congress could, as s 
provision in ACB, amend the UCMJ to expressly establish the doctrine contra barbarum (“against 
terrorists”) as an absolute defense that would excuse soldiers accused of committing crimes in violation of 
the UCMJ of criminal responsibility.778  Alternatively, the Manual for Courts-Martial could be amended to 
provide that the fact that a soldier is alleged to have committed the specified crime in question contra 
barbarum is a factor in mitigation of the severity of the offense as well as of applicable sanctions upon 
conviction.779
3. The President not submit future IHL treaties for ratification without first negotiating a contra barbarum
clause waiving the legal effect of these instruments with respect to terrorists.  The Senate might append an 
understanding or declaration to such texts indicating that the U.S. position is that terrorists are not within 
the protections afforded by such treaties.
4. If the ICC amends Article 120,780 the President might revisit the question of accession to the Rome Statute.  
Conditions precedent should, however, at a minimum include the following: (a) a contra barbarum clause 
in the instrument of ratification reflecting the understanding of the Senate that the Rome Statute is 
inapplicable in cases of armed conflict with terrorists;781 (b) a statement to the effect that the U.S. does not 
recognize any conventional instruments to which it is not a party, or any statements of custom to which it 
774
 Social science research suggests that the most efficient strategy for inducing cooperation is one that initiates relations on a 
cooperative basis but immediately retaliates in response to “defections” with punitive actions.  See ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 174-76 (1984) (describing “TIT FOR TAT” as the most effective strategy in securing 
cooperation, suppressing defection, and teaching opponents to understand that noncooperation is unprofitable).  The proposed 
strategy, however, requires that subjects make rational calculations, an assumption potentially false in the case of terrorists. Id. at 
174.  Moreover, observation of the martial code and terrorism are, logically speaking, mutually exclusive: honorable soldiers 
simply do not target civilians, and jihadis are programmed to the destruction, not accommodation, of unbelievers.  For arguments 
that Islamic warriors are incapable of assimilating the martial code, see Bassam Tibi, War and Peace in Islam, in Terry Nardin, 
ed., The Ethics of War and Peace (1997): 128-45; Ignatieff, supra note_, at 147.  For an argument that the regime elites that 
sponsor terror, as well as leaders of terrorists groups, can be deterred, see Robert F. Turner, State Responsibility and the War on 
Terror:  The Legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L.  121, 139-40 (2003).
775 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
776
 Terrorists might be given temporary status as protected diplomatic persons to enable their safe passage to and from the U.S. to 
plead their legal cases.  See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, at Art. 29 (providing 
that the “person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable[,]”  that he shall be immune “any form of arrest or detention[,]” and that 
the “receiving State shall . . . take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”).
777
 The U.S. has a lengthy history of negotiating treaties with states with which it continues thereafter in a state of war, including 
those that would currently be characterized as “rogue states” and sponsors of terrorism.  See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Amity 
between the United States and Tripoli, concluded June 4, 1805, Article XVI (cited in MALLOY, TREATIES AND 
CONVENTIONS ETC. 1776-1909 v. 2) (agreeing on principles restricting conduct of war between U.S. and the Barbary States 
and providing in particular that POWs would not be enslaved but would be exchanged within 1 year of capture).  On April 15, 
2003, the U.S. concluded its first ever accord with a terrorist organization, permitting the Mujahideen al Khalq, a 1000 member 
anti-Iranian group operating out of bases in Iraq that was placed on the State Department list of terrorist organizations in 1997 for 
attacks against Iranian government targets, to keep most of its weaponry and to be immune from U.S. military operations in 
exchange for agreeing not to undertake hostile acts against the U.S. and to provide intelligence on Iran.  See Douglas Jehl & 
Michael R. Gordon, American Forces Reach Cease-Fire with Terror Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A1.  Whether 
similar such agreements are possible with organizations such as Al Qaeda is very much in doubt.  See Howard Witt, Iranian 
Group on Terrorist List Has Pull in D.C., CHI. TRIB., Jul 13, 2003, at A4 (suggesting that the agreement with the Mujahideen al 
Khalq was possible only because Congress considers it a “pro-Western” organization); ELSHTAIN, supra note_, at 154 (valuing 
a treaty negotiated with a terrorist group as “not . . . worth the paper it was written on.”).
778 See supra at note_ (enumerating applicable defenses in U.S. courts-martial)
779 See supra at note_ (considering mitigating and extenuating circumstances in trial and sentencing ib courts-martial).
780
 Presently, the ICC does not permit reservations.  See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 120 (“No reservations may be made to 
this Statute.”).  Nor may amendments be made prior to 7 years after entry into force of the Rome Statute, and even then a 
supermajority of 7/8 of States Parties is required.  See id. at Art. 121(1) (“After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force 
of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto.”); id. at Art. 121(4) (requiring a 7/8 supermajority to amend).
781
 This precondition would possibly require amendment to the Rome Statute, which, under Article 21, rejects “application and 
interpretation of law . . . wit[h] adverse distinction founded on grounds such as [inter alia] religion or belief, [or] political or other 
opinion.”  Because the doctrine of contra barbarum would alter the interpretation or application of law with respect to terrorist 
on account of the acts they undertake in furtherance of their religiously-motivated political program, the Rome Statute would, as 
currently conceived, be perceived as a bar to such a reservation or understanding offered by the U.S. upon its accession.
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has persistently objected,782 as creating any legal obligations; and (c) a statement to the effect that U.S. 
understands that the ICC Prosecutor will in all cases recognize that a U.S decision not to investigate or 
prosecute a U.S. national, or to sentence a U.S. national upon conviction at court-martial to a particular 
penalty, will have been made in good-faith and consistent with the interests of justice, and that the 
Prosecutor, in deference to complementarity, will not invoke ICC jurisdiction.  The U.S. might pursue the 
conclusion of a treaty to this effect, thereby securing a grant of functional immunity.783
5. If the ICC will not amend Article 120, the U.S. should suspend all financial aid to and terminate trade 
relationships with states that refuse to sign bilateral treaties pledging not to extradite U.S. nationals to the 
ICC.784  The U.S. should withdraw all forces from the territory of states-parties and notify the UN that it 
will refuse to provide troops to peacekeeping operations upon their territory.  An amendment to ASPA 
bolstering the Hague Invasion Clause785 might grant explicit notice that the transfer of a U.S. national to the 
ICC would create a state of war between the transferring state and the U.S.786
6. The U.S. should encourage all states to adopt similar classificatory mechanisms reflective of the 
civilizedpeoples/barbarian distinction to facilitate a coordinated bellum romanum against terror.787
Chart I presents three variant images of the relationship between law and war: the first depicts the 
legal absolutist view, in which war wholly subsumed by and regulated by law; the second illustrates the 
nihilist or barbarian position, in which law is irrelevant to war; and the third represents a rationalized IHL 
in which military operations against honorable foes occur in the zone of intersection and are governed by
the martial code, but operations against terrorists are conducted in the peripheral space contra barbarum
where law does not reach war.788  In this third image, invocation of ACB directs soldiers to set aside the 
martial code and march across the line delineating the zone of intersection from the zone contra 
barbarum into total war against their barbarian adversaries; by the same token, in the third image the 
border is permeable bidirectionally: the barbarians are invited to embrace the martial code, cease 
attacking civilians, and engage soldiers in the zone of intersection.  
(Insert Chart I about here)
In sum, a rationalized IHL, given effect through the system of courts-martial but with the door 
open to parallel association with a reformed and delimited ICC, is the image best suited to humanizing 
782
 The “persistent objector” rule of customary international law provides that a state is not bound by the maturation of a 
customary international legal principle if it has consistently indicated its dissent from a practice while the law was “still in a state 
of development.”  REST. (3rd), FOR. REL. L. U.S. §102, cmmt. d.  The U.S. has at the very least an arguable claim that it has 
persistently objected to many declarations of customary IHL, although its failure to specify precisely what it does recognize as its 
legal obligations, coupled with its adherence to many of the principles contained in the Protocols Additional and other IHL 
declarations out of humanitarian concerns if not a sense of opinio juris, complicates this claim.  See supra at notes_ (noting U.S. 
refusal to specify which provisions of the Protocols Additional it recognizes as creating legal obligations and describing U.S. 
practice as consistent with the provisions of much of the Protocols Additional).  For a discussion of the “persistent dissenter” rule 
in customary international law, see T. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in 
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 457, 459-60 (1985).
783 See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 103 (2003) (arguing that the 
price of enforcement of ICC decisions should be the grant of “functional immunity” to the U.S.).
784 See supra at note_ (discussing the recent proliferation of such treaties between the U.S. and over 35 states).
785 See supra at note_.
786 See supra at note_ (offering proposed language to effect such a declaration of war under these circumstances).
787
 Currently, there is disagreement within the Western Alliance as to precisely which organizations merit classification as 
“terrorists.”  See Marc Perleman, EU Won’t Ban Hamas, Jul. 17, 2003, at www.frontpagemag.com (reporting that the EU 
executive organ, the European Commission, despite significant U.S. pressure, has declined to classify the “political wing” of 
Hamas a Middle East terrorist organization, although the EU considers its “military wing” to be so).  Disagreements over 
precisely “who is a terrorist?” threaten to impede collective action in the War on Terror.  However, Israel, by declaring “all- out 
war” against Hamas, appears to have adopted the very bellum romanum approach proposed.  See Matthew Chance, CNN, Israel 
Vows “All-Out War” on Hamas, Sept. 2, 2003, at http://www.cnn/com/2003/WORLD/meast/09/01/mideast/index.html.
788
 The depiction of these images builds upon a recent critical analysis of the theories of legal absolutism, also known as classic 
legalism, and legal peripheralism, a perspective into which a rationalized IHL fits neatly, in which non-legal norms and rules are 
often more important in the regulation of human behavior than is positive law.  See Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of 
American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y. U. L. REV. 239, 254-259 (2003).
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war without neglecting civilizational obligations because it attaches practical legal consequences to the 
gross moral distinction between honorable soldiers and barbarians.  
IV. Conclusions
Legal absolutists, in their cupidity for a law-ruled world, may read into the call for a rationalized 
IHL an entreaty to the destruction of their avatar,789 as well as to the general weakening of international 
law.790  Some may attack as illiberal, imperialist,791 Islamophobic, or even racist792 the argument that only a 
rationalized IHL that differentiates between combatants based upon the justice of the causes for which 
they fight and the degree to which they themselves observe IHL can defend human civilization.  Others, 
disinclined to inject moral considerations into law, unwilling to agree upon an epistemology that enables 
us to discern what is right and what is wrong and uncomfortable with revivification of the language of 
good and evil,793 or unalterably distrustful of the moral fibre of soldiers, may cavil at the re-introduction of 
jus ad bellum considerations, particularly if members of the martial profession sit in judgment not only of 
their peers but of the causes for which their enemies take up arms.   Further, the argument that any class 
of persons, no matter how reprehensible, can ever be stricken from the set of rights-bearing entities may 
789 See Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on Terror (unpublished manuscript on file with author, forthcoming in INT’L 
L. STUD. (2003) (anticipating that suggestions for the modification of IHL will be perceived by legal absolutists to be programs 
for the destruction of IHL).  Some observers, willing to concede in theory the propriety of modification to IHL, nonetheless insist 
that any modifications be “reasonable,” “taken . . . as much as possible . . . on a collective basis,” and consistent with the 
“generally accepted principles in [the] international community.”  Antonio Cassesse, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial 
Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 1001 (2001).  Whether this is a genuine call for a multilateral 
approach to transforming IHL or merely a sophisticated restatement of IHL absolutism remains to be determined.  Other scholars 
suggest that the former position is gaining adherents.  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Op-Ed., N.Y. TIMES, (describing U.S. conduct 
in the War on Terror as “illegal but legitimate” in light of moral considerations (referencing language from the Independent 
Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 4 (2000)).
790 See STRAWSON, supra note_, at xix (stating as of 2002 that “[i]n challenging so much in the international legal order [to 
conduct the War on Terror], President Bush may have broken the spell of modern law” inasmuch as “[w]hat had appeared so 
fixed has now been consciously transformed into a contested arena.”).  The claim that international law is a fragile body of 
regulation that relies heavily for its existence upon its near-mythic status as a kind of received truth in the minds of state 
decisionmakers, that it is never acceptable to violate international law even in defense of a moral imperative, and that the fate of 
international law generally hinges on the preservation and expansion of IHL are central features of legal absolutist dogma.
791 See generally ANDREW BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE (2002) (claiming that the U.S. is becoming an imperial power 
through the globalizing influence of U.S. law and power and that the sole question is what form the empire will assume).  The 
civilization/barbarian distinction, once a predominant organizing principle in fin de siecle international relations theory, has been 
challenged by realists displeased that Western states should be interested in pursuing a civilizing mission rather than the 
maximization of power, as well as by dependency theorists and critical scholars as part of an imperalist justification for the use of 
power to dominate “backward peoples” and thereby secure an advantage in global trade.  See WILLIAM OLSON & A.J.R. 
GROOM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEN AND NOW 146 (1991) For the most plangent critique of the contemporary 
resurrection of the civilization/barbarian distinction, see SALTER, supra note_ (noting that classifications of peoples as morally, 
culturally, and racially inferior justified abandonment of legal restraint to aid in their domination and extermination).
792
 Admittedly, 19th and 20th century Western powers have warped the civilization-barbarian distinction to the explanation and 
justification of racist policies of colonialism and even genocide in the name of “progress.”  See, e.g., HEINRICH VON 
TREITSCHKE, ZEHN JAHRE DEUTSCHE KAMPFE (1896) (justifying extermination of “barbaric” colonial populations on 
the ground that such peoples were alleged to be biologically inferior); JOHN FISKE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NEW ENGLAND 
(1889) (justifying slaughter of American Indians on the ground that “civilized peoples” were entitled to use any means and 
methods to defend their existence against “savages”); HENRY GRAFF, ED., AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 95 (1996) (“When a 
war is conducted by a superior race against those whom they consider inferior . . . the superior race will almost involuntarily 
practice inhuman conduct[.]) (citing 1902 Congressional testimony in response to reported U.S. atrocities committed against 
Philippino forces).  Some contemporary scholars fear that the trope of the terrorist as “frightening, foreign, barbaric beast” is 
nothing more than a racialized illusion to differentiate between “us” and “them” to support the claim that “ordinary law is . . . 
deficient or insufficient to deal with them” and “extra-ordinary law,” which will remain on the books long after the threat has 
passed, is required. Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 121-22 .
793
 For some, the use of terms such as “good” and “evil” is not only strategically unwise but also itself an act of immorality.  See
Gavin McCormack, North Korea in the Vice, 18 NEW LEFT REV. 25 (2002) (describing the reference to an “Axis of Evil” in 
the 2002 State of the Union Address to describe the linkage between North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as “historically immoral” in its 
use of this judgmental language); Text of Address by Alexander Solzhenitsyn at Harvard University, Thursday, June 8, 1978 A 
World Split Apart by Alexander Solzhenitsyn (lamenting a world in which evil ideas and individuals prey upon those who 
internalize the “humanistic and benevolent concept according to which there is no evil inherent to human nature”).
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offend those for whom natural law dictates that all individuals possess, by the fact of their existence, an 
inviolable body of rights: for these critics, the proposed rationalization may seem a nihilistic Conradian 
plea to “Exterminate the brutes!”794 that tramples upon the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur795 and leaves 
undesirable normative footprints in the sands of legal and moral history.  The proposal may strike others 
as the emotional sacrifice of law on the altar of expedience796and the open-ended bellicization of political 
life to fill a vacuum left by the end of the Cold War, and thus a capitulation to terrorism.797  Worst of all, 
some may fear that the rationalization of IHL by Western democracies, particularly if promiscuously 
applied to regimes not objectively barbarous, will be prologue to a vicious spiral of subsequent, and 
genuinely barbaric, counter-“rationalizations” by rogue-states and terrorists.
However, best-laid plans of legal absolutists cannot bring to heel the world’s most execrable and 
rapacious individuals and groups, although, ironically, it is for them as law breakers, rather than for law 
followers, that all law is originally conceived.798  Reclassifying terrorists as barbarians is a pleonasm 
inasmuch as both terms are descriptive of counter-civilizational entities, but it bears repetition that 
terrorists are functional equivalents of the 5th-century Vandals who sacked Rome and cast the West into a 
thousand years of darkness: they will not cease attempting to topple our civilization until they succeed or 
are destroyed.799  If terrorists are not objectively evil, nothing and no one can ever be.800  The law-creating, 
law-abiding, peoples of the earth—a designation inclusive of the vast majority of Muslims801—must 
794
 At the conclusion of The Heart of Darkness, the body of Kurz, who failed to civilize the “savages” in the quest to extract ivory 
from the jungle, is discovered along with a report, written to advise the “International Society for the Suppression of Savage 
Customs,” on the last page of which Kurz had concluded that if savages would not accept the gift of civilizaiton it was necessary 
to “Exterminate the Brutes!” to preserve the West.  See JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1899).
795
 Tranlated loosely from the Laton, “Right cannot originate from injustice.” 
796 See Mofidi & Eckert, supra note_, at 92 (suggesting the U.S. response to September 11th has been the product of  “inflamed 
passions and emotions” rather than a “commitment to the calm and rational, albeit slow, path of law.”).
797 See Yehezkel Dror, Terrorism as a Challenge to the Democratic Capacity To Govern, in Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power 
73-74 (Martha Crenshaw ed., 1983) (contending that counterterrorist measures sacrifice law to the defeat of terrorists and 
threaten to “barbarize” the international system).  One commentator, thoroughly wedded to a judicial model that treats terrorism 
as a crime “no different from any other offense,” likens the “differentiation between classes of offenders” as the broadcast of the 
“moral weakness” of the society that distinguishes terrorists from other malefactors.  See Emanual Gross, supra note_, at 2, 95.
798
 The assumption that law is created to control, by threat of punishment, the actions of those who would otherwise be tempted to 
commit the acts made illegal by positive rules, rather than to govern the conduct of those who would already obey the legal 
sanction even in its absence, is of old vintage.  See I Timothy 1:8-14 (“We also know that law is made not for the righteous but 
for lawbreakers and rebels, the ungodly and sinful, the unholy and irreligious; for those who kill their fathers or mothers, for 
murderers, for adulterers and perverts, for slave traders and liars and perjurers[.]”); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (“If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary.”); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2nd ed. 1979) (“In 
international society . . . law is not effective against the Hitlers.”).
799
 Elshtain urges us to recall the “brutal indiscriminate slaughter of thousands of people in an instant, along with the sight of 
bodies dropping like debris from dizzying heights” and warns that it is “important to take the measure of people who not only are 
capable of planning and executing [September 11th] but are gleeful about the lives lost and exult in the terrible devastation to so 
many families.”  ELSHTAIN, supra note_, at 153.  It is well that we heed her lest we suffer the “corrosive effects of 
misdescription” and fail to treat terrorists for who and what they are.  Id. at 12.
800
 Many relativistmoral philosophers contest the argument that there are absolute and self-evident moral principles or “verdictive 
beliefs” that are independent of attitudes and contexts and that some things, persons, and ideas are objectively good, whereas 
others are objectively evil.  See Russ Shafer-Landau, Knowing Right from Wrong, 79 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 62 (2002) 
(examining such arguments and contrasting them with a “moral realist” perspective). Not all persons may agree with the moral 
realist assertion that terrorists are the exemplars of pure evil.  Some may reject the very concept of evil; others may simply be 
unwilling to definitively state that terrorists are objectively so; still others may consider absolute evil to be the slaughter of 
dolphins (as opposed to humans), or the eating of meat, or some other avalue-system or practice.  We may simply have to agree 
to disagree. 
801
 The official U.S. position with regard to the Islamic faith is one of respect and tolerance; it is the terrorists who claim their 
particular version of the Islamic faith directs them to murder innocent civilians, and not the Islamic faith against whom they 
blaspheme in claiming the sanction of Islam in these murders, against whom the War on Terror is directed.  See George W. Bush, 
“Islam is Peace,” Says President, Office of the Press Secretary, Sept. 17, 2001  (“These acts of violence against innocents violate 
the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith.  That’s not what Islam is about.  Islam is peace.”).
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choose between civilization and barbarism, and the creation and implementation of policy instruments 
entail decisions that feed into that choice.  If regulators simply cobble together additional sources of law 
and foist them upon soldiers rather than identify and support rules and institutions that promote the 
primary end law is intended to serve—the creation, sustenance, and manifestations of the values that 
preserve humanity against chaos—then regulators are handmaidens of evildoers.  Combat soldiers 
fighting a desperate struggle on behalf of a civilization yet to fully awaken to the magnitude of the threat 
deserve no less than that their acts and omissions, unless they can legitimately be fit into the categories of 
war crimes or crimes against humanity be immunized by the official machinery of politics and law.  The 
Private Ryans and Captain Ryans of this world are simply not enemies of all mankind; the Usama bin 
Ladens and their minions are this, and more.  Truly anti-civilizational criminals—those who deliberately 
set out to kill innocents en masse—do not deserve the entitlements of the laws they seek to ravage, but 
evanescence of considerations of the justice of the cause for which combatants battle has utterly blurred 
moral distinctions and made possible the legal morass in which the events in the fictional scenario may 
well transpire.  A slavish devotion to positive IHL, to which absolutists would commit us, “would be to 
lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly 
sacrificing the end to the means.”802  The re-incorporation of traditional principles of martial custom, re-
consideration of the justice of the causes for which combatants fight, and re-acquisition of an empathetic 
understanding of the moral universe in which the subjects of regulation experience the cauldron of 
combat are intended not to banish law from war but to rescue IHL before it withers into an elegy for the 
civilization it owed a duty inter vivos.803
Law cannot cure every ill by the mere fact of its existence.  Ultimately, all legal regimes are 
aspirational in that they are enforceable only if there is power and will behind them.  Moreover, the 
formal legal equality of states does not translate into support for international order.804  The empire of law 
requires an imperial power, and until it is disproven that the sole source of support for the enforcement of 
IHL is U.S. military power, or the threat thereof, it is counterproductive to alienate the U.S. and forfeit its 
prodigious energies in the humanization of war by clinging to a talismanic insistence upon the ICC.805  It 
is further irrational, and even morally irresponsible,806 to condemn U.S. opposition to the ICC as 
sovereigntist arrogance rather than hail a principled stand against the existential threat posed by Islamic 
terrorism armed with WMD.  Simply put, leadership is essential, and not every pooling of sovereignty 
802 See BARNETT, supra note_, at 139 (quoting Thomas Jefferson from an 1810 letter to J.B. Colvin).
803
 Very simply, the “letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on society[,]” and the failure to take 
seriously  non-legal sources of norms by which we might govern our social life constitutes acceptance of “moral mediocrity” and 
the “paraly[sis] of man’s noblest impulses.” Solzhenitsyn, supra note_.  Moreover, in moments of great crisis, civilization has the 
greatest need of the support of non-legal sources of norms: “[I]t will be simply impossible to stand through the trials of this 
threatening century with only the support of a legalistic structure.”  It is thus of no small moral concern that IHL should eschew 
the martial code and its stock of non-legal norms, which in practice exert a tremendous compliance pull, in the War on Terror.
804 See SCHACTER, supra note_, at 5-6 (“Since we cannot deny the crucial role of power in the relations of States, we should 
seek to understand its specific impact on the international system [.]”).
805
 The ultimate answer to the question of whether the ICC is merely a flawed but improvable institution or is in fact, as this 
Article asserts, an inescapably dangerous tool ripe for exploitation by terrorists and their state-sponsors, remains to be determined 
by future events.  See BEST, supra note_, at 400 (cautioning against the premature judgment of international criminal tribunals).
806
 “Absolute adherence to pacifism makes the pacifist morally responsible for the evils that an intelligent use of force may 
sometimes prevent.”  SIDNEY HOOK, PACIFISM AND POLITICS _ (1947).  The same might be said for an absolute 
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benefits the international community.807  The proposal to do so here is one the U.S. has rejected largely 
upon moral considerations that do not register with the cult of legal absolutists peddling the ICC, an 
institution that threatens to become the next “smelly little orthodoxy contending for our soul.”808
It is confounding that a mere two years after September 11th, rather than express common 
resolve,809 the ardent consortium of activists championing the ICC810 will not concede that, in the absence 
of a central executive, U.S. military operations, even where unauthorized by the UN, enhance the security 
of the entire international community,811 that cultural and historic agnosticism of real-world military 
operations should temper their absolutism, and that the U.S. deserves a margin of appreciation in its 
titanic struggle.812  However, our civilization is in the crucible, and we must soberly face the fact that we 
no longer have the post-modernist luxury of pretending that morality and law are estranged cousins, or 
that all wars are equally unjust, or that it is beyond our ken to sift through the moral confusion 
engendered by sophists and autists who have enshrined their professed ignorance about the ultimate 
metaphysical foundations of justice in the provisions of modern IHL,813 to determine which of the causes 
for which combatants fight are virtuous and which are vile.  We need not become servants to law; rather, 
law must be made to serve us,814 and IHL is not, any more than domestic law, a suicide pact.815  Evaluating 
the rectitude of the cause for which combatants fight is far more essential to an ethically legitimate theory 
adherence to the ICC in the face of strong evidence that it is prone to unleashing greater evils than would be suppressed by the 
application of instruments of policy and law to the defeat of terrorism which the ICC would be likely to criminalize.
807 See Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291, 297 (recognizing that 
on narrow grounds of interests, “a plausible case can certainly be made” for U.S. abstention from participation in the ICC).
808
 GEORGE ORWELL, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA _ (1938) (referring to socialism and fascism).
809 See James B. Motley, Coping with the Terrorist Threat: The U.S. Intelligence Dilemma, in STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, ED., 
INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 165 (opining that one might expect that 
“[c]ompassion [would be] stirred when Americans, or citizens of other nations, become hostages to or victims of fanatical 
terrorists[.]”).  At first blush it appears that the attacks of September 11th are being treated by U.S. allies as an attack not so much 
upon the West as upon the U.S. as the primary power.  If true, the admonition that to understand terrorism, and responses thereto, 
it is first necessary to understand “what is happening to whom, where, when, how, why and with what outcomes and effects[,]” 
takes on additional significance in analyzing the post-September 11th political equation.  SLANN & SCHECHTERMAN, supra 
note_, at 3.  While collective security has always been bedeviled by the free-rider problem, that the U.S. should be forced to go it 
alone at a time when the necessity of collective action ought arguably to be more apparent than at any time since World War II 
does not augur well for the future.  See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Peace by Other Means: Using Rewards in UN Efforts to End 
Conflicts, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 235, 242-43 (critiquing the free-rider problem in the UN collective security system).
810 See infra at note_ (identifying and describing this coalition of states, most of which have little military capacity and no 
responsibility for international peace and security, and activist NGOs).  Many of the staunchest supporters of the ICC are 
members of the European Union, militarily weak states that have “moved beyond power” and adopted a post-realist normative 
framework for their harmonized foreign policies in which the use of force is inconceivable except where authorized by the UN 
and conducted multilaterally.  See James Dao, Solitaire; One Nation Plays the Great Game Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 2002, at 
D1 (illuminating European preference for multilateral institutionalist approaches to security).
811 See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note_, at 39 (stating that international law is merely a form of “authorized coercion” that 
requires, in the absence of central authority with a monopoly over the use of force, individual states to enforce it).
812
 The term “margin of appreciation” refers to the observation that there is a legal disjunction between the “black letter of the 
[UN] Charter and the bloody reality of world politics[,]” and that states, particularly those responsible for the maintenance of 
systemic order, are to be granted some latitude to self-interpret their obligations under IHL in the discharge of their duties, 
particularly with regard to the use of force. Id. at 38 (distinguishing between “text myth system” of the UN Charter, in which the 
provision of law proscribing unauthorized use of force is reflexively applied, and the “operational code” system, in which uses of 
military force in certain contingencies, such as collective defense, are legitimized notwithstanding the black letter of the law).
813 See NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 2001, at 12 (denying that there is any nonarbitrary method of differentiating between 
descriptions of what is just or good) (citing interview with Stanley Fish); but see STEPHEN L. CARTER, CONFESSIONS OF 
AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 145 (1991) (stating that to excuse acts of evil and immorality along the lines of the 
argument that “Hitler wasn’t evil, just insane” is a “pile of garbage”).  To escape the slough of relativist despond, one must 
“never lose the capacity . . . to judge ourselves and other people.” Id. at 144.  
814 It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since[.]”Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Path of the Law, 
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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of IHL than an assessment of the methods and means they employ or a tabulation of the casualties they 
create.  We need not navigate a moral maze or parse legal texts to assert that the cause to which the U.S. 
and its allies816 are committed—preserving the last best hope for human freedom and dignity—is infinitely 
more noble than that of their terrorist foes.817  Application of a differential legal standard in the War on 
Terror is an act of moral indignation in the face of a great evil threatening all with a stake in humanity.  
All may seek and enjoy the protection of the laws, but those who would must themselves respect the 
reciprocal rights of others.  Legal absolutism invites catastrophe.  A rationalized IHL that unabashedly 
lets slip the dogs of the bellum romanum818 is no parochial approach to the “laws of war;” rather, it is an 
affirmation of a universal vision of law with ubroken ties to moral reason and judgment.819
If we screw our civic and moral courage to the sticking point820 and rise to the “new height of 
vision” to which we were summoned, presciently, by the Russian Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
a quarter-century ago, will we see the world not merely as we would wish it to be but as it is.  The 
barbarians are at the gates of civilization, they are evil, and they mean us grievous harm.  It falls to us to 
decide whether IHL is to be crafted into the battering ram that forces a breach or the sword that sweeps 
away the hordes, and whether the inheritance of future generations is to be a civilization wisely governed 
by law or a darkling plain821 haunted by the drifting ghosts of its humanizing promise. 
815
 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is danger that, if the court does not temper 
its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”).
816 See supra at note_ (discussing advantagees to a multilateral approach to international relations).  Ideally, the U.S. will secure 
the assistance of other states in implementing a rationalized IHL, but the defense of civilization is such a vital imperative that it 
must be prepared to proceed unilaterally.  See Joseph S. Nye, Seven Tests Between Concert and Unilateralism, NAT’L 
INTEREST, Winter 2001/02, at 10-12 (advocating U.S. unilateral action where vital survival interests are at stake, where it helps 
advance multilateral interests, and where multilateralism would be “recipes for inaction” or contrary to U.S. values).  
817
 “It is essential to condemn what must be condemned, but swiftly and firmly.” ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, 
REBELLION, AND DEATH (1960)
818 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act III, sc. 1 (“Cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war!”).
819
 In arguing that the War on Terror may require an “Extra-Legal Measures” model of constitutional law which permits 
decisionmakers to transcend the established domestic legal order to “protect the nation and the public in the face of calamity,” 
Gross contends that it is possible to simultaneously defeat terrorism while “preserv[ing] the long-term relevance of, and 
obedience to, legal principles, rules, and norms.”  Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional, YALE L. J. 1011, 1023-24, 1047 (2003).  “While going outside the legal order may be a ‘little wrong,’ it . . . 
facilitate[s] the attainment of a ‘great right,’ namely the preservation not only of the constitutional order, but also of its most 
fundamental principles and tenets.”  Id.  The argument that preservation of domestic law may require violating it in extreme 
circumstances fits neatly into international context, for “[w]hen government acts in a certain way that is deemed necessary to . . . 
safeguard the nation,  . . . its actions are imbued with affirmative moral value, i.e., they are morally legitimate. If acting 
extralegally is the right thing to do (pragmatically), . . . it is the right thing to do whichever way you look at it.”  Id. at 1097.
820 See Solzhenitsyn, supra note_ (“The Western world has lost its civil courage . . . Should one point out that from ancient times 
decline in courage has been considered the beginning of the end?).
821
 “And we are here as on a darkling plain, swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, where ignorant armies clash by 
night.”  Matthew Arnold, “Dover Beach”  (1867).
